WesWorld

While cleaning up my grandmother’s attic some time ago, I stumbled across a large wooden box with documents from my grandfather and the time he worked at the Admiralty as staff officer. There were journals, reports, personal notes etc., most of which I could not read as I am not able to fully decipher my grandfather’s handwriting. xo) Others, however, were done with type writers and provided an interesting view on things back then. One of those papers I have translated to share it with you (see below). It provides a keen insight, reveals the status quo of the Royal South African Navy early in 1940.

Feedback is most welcome.

[SIZE=3]An Analysis Of The Royal South African Navy[/SIZE]
By Admiral Evert van Thom, Chief Inspector of the Navy
Pretoria, 4th of April 1940

Introduction
Some say, it was a naval battle that finally sparked the fire in South America and led to war with Argentina. This thesis might be limited in that it does not explain the complex situation in South America, but to some degree it can be supported.

On the 13th of December 1934 the small patrol craft RSAN UJ11 under command of Lieutenant E.H. Larive was drawn into a fight against a much larger Argentine warship. The UJ11 finally sank, her surviving crew taken prisoner and Captain Larive court marshaled by the Argentineans. Whether this incident really was the turning point that finally doomed all efforts to solve the problems of territorial water limits and weapon supply to Paraguay diplomatically, or if it was the fighting between RSAN Alerter, then in service for the Coast Guard, and Argentine vessels on the 27th of December, one thing is for sure: naval interests and naval vessels played a decisive role in those days.

Almost five years have passed since hostilities in South America ended and it is time for a review, how lessons learned from this ultimate test have been incorporated into ship design, naval doctrine and training.

This report is meant to be a brief summary of the success and effectiveness of the Royal South African Navy and her individual ship classes during the war of 1934/35 and thereafter. During the conflict each design was undergoing an ultimate test as did the strategic orientation and doctrine of the RSAN high command. A detailed analysis of surprising successes as well as of unexpected failures in design and tactical handling is necessary to reveal strong points and weaknesses in the defence of the Empire. With these lessons learned the Royal South African Navy will be prepared and ready to adamantly defend South African interests against whomever with ease, should we be called for duty again.

Battle Fleet
The South African battle fleet featured 16 units when hostilities broke out but four of them, the Victory and Imperator classes, had just entered service or were about to do so. These units had to fight several teething problems; especially the Victories new armament gave problems. Despite all efforts of the engineering corpse and builders yards, it took several month to solve all issues; a long time paid bitterly for as the RSAN had not taken measures early enough to answer the threat caused by the latest and most modern units in the fleets of Argentina and Brazil. So in fact, the RSAN battle fleet fought most of the war relying on equipment designed and build prior to or through the Great War period, the sole exception being the Ophions.

However, despite such drawbacks the battle fleet was strong enough to dominate her Argentine and Brazilian counterparts in general. Even together, the two opponents could field only half as many units. But as it turned out, strength on paper is of little value when a navy is forced to disperse her units, which is what happened to us when an early blockade of our enemy’s ports could not be successfully installed. The success of the Argentine and Brazilian battlecruiser operations in the early stages of the war is testimony to this effect. These operations also proofed the need for modern, fast designs that combine the capabilities of a full scale battleship with the high speed of a cruiser. It is some kind of irony, that the oldest units among the ranks of our capital ships, the Hertog class of 1911, were the only units then fast and capable enough to catch and tackle the modern Brazilian battlecruisers, and it was a close match still, which could have easily turned against us.

Later in the war, the most modern units then in continuous service, the Ophions, had a chance to proof their value, fighting and sinking several enemy cruisers and the battlecruiser Pampas during the Argentine Operation Black Tiger. But again reality proofed theory wrong, and what looked like an easy match for the much stronger South African ships turned into a prolonged fight with much damage to our units by shell and torpedo.

Finally, in the Battle of Porto Alegre, the RSAN could bring their superior numbers to bear and fought the Brazilian Sao Paulo and assorted cruisers with success, the old battlewagons of the Mauritius class with support by several coastal defense ships and light forces clearly dominating their opponents. Afterwards, no more battle was fought between capital ships and our battle fleet focused on escort and fire support duties until end of the war.

Today, five years later, the South African battle fleet is down to 14 units (not rating the super cruisers of the Radiance and Vengeance classes as capital ships) but overall has gained in strength. The beaten up Hertogs are no more and the Konings, used for training only in the early 30s, have been sold. All capital ships, except the Victories, have main guns of 38cm caliber and are fully modernized or barely six years old. But even the most modern units, the Monarchs, are children of the treaty era, designed and build when the Cleito Treaty was in place and well before lessons learnt from the conflict in South America could be incorporated. Only with the entry into service of the Thunderer and Leviathan classes in 1942 things will be put right and the RSAN be equipped with the latest fashion designs, matching the best in the world. Until then, the existing designs have to and will suffice to allow dominance in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean area, projecting power against whoever threatens grows and wealth of the Empire.

Naval Aviation
Experiments prior to and during the Great War period showed the potentiality to launch and to land aircrafts on ships or to use small flying boats or planes with floats that operate directly from the water but were maintained on the ship in question. The potential of seaborne aviation was seen in the capability of the aircraft to scout beyond the visual range of the warship equipped with such aircraft and, later, to deliver bombs or torpedoes. Although the capabilities of naval aviation where yet not fully understood, there was some kind of euphoria and several navies began to convert or to design ships meant to operate aircraft at sea. To control these developments, the aircraft carrier was added to the Cleito Treaty as an individual category, another proof of the importance given to the new technology. For some reason, this did not include floatplane tenders or carriers below a certain size, leading to a completely different development of such vessels.

The Royal South African Navy also tested seaborne aviation, beginning with some non-permanent installations in 1915. Finally a liner was converted, then known as CVX Wim Kraash and tests were promising. However, different to other navies, the Admiralty was quite reluctant to immediately free budgets for a purpose build design and waited for results of the Cleito Treaty conference and what other navies would make of it. So it took until 1922 when a first series of design studies was appointed. For two more years no decision was taken, while more and more became known about foreign developments. Finally, a dedicated carrier was added to the building plan when funds for the financial year 1925 were under revision. The ship became the RSAN Hammer, a large design not only meant to operate as carrier but also as a cruiser, thus featuring a cruisers armament and armor. A second unit soon followed in 1926, the Forge, build to a slightly modified design. A building pause afterwards allowed intensive testing and development of doctrine for three years until decision was taken to build a new class of carriers. Tonnage constraints because of the Cleito Treaty did not permit to build large hulls again, so following international tendencies, two smaller units the size of a heavy cruiser were laid down, the Anvils. These two units commissioned in 1931 and 1932 respectively. Later, in 1934, two more full-size fleet carriers were laid down but these did not commission until 1936/37 so it was the formerly mentioned group of four carriers, which represented the RSANs carrier force during the conflict with Argentina and Brazil.

According to the then effective doctrine, our carriers were mainly used to scout for the battle fleet or to operate with the cruisers in blockading Argentine and Brazilian ports. Their enlarged scouting range was used to good results in several occasions but it also became clear, that naval aviation was heavily weather dependent and when weather prohibited the extended use of aircraft, the carriers became little more than large light cruisers. It was this inability to operate planes in bad weather that doomed the Hammer on July 13th. Under great risk her air crews had tried to keep up scouting over the course of the day but finally had to return to the ship when the weather worsened. The last crews to return reported almost no visual range and it must be rated great fortune they even found their way back again. They cannot be blamed for not reporting the approach of an Argentine battlecruiser force and when it was too late for the Hammer to escape, her light armor and armament was no match for a capital ship. The result was inevitable

As a result of this loss, our doctrine had to be changed. Until aircraft technology has reached a point, where operations can be maintained under all weather conditions, carriers have to be permanently escorted by a force allowing successful defense against large warships. Future carrier design also was influenced in that the capability to operate like a cruiser was given up. The weight and space dedicated to medium size guns, magazines, fire control equipment and gun crews was freed and could be used to improve the carrier’s capabilities to operate aircraft.

Late in the war the first long range duel between aircraft carriers again revealed the problems of finding and fighting enemy ships over a distance of several hundred miles. Aircraft development still sets a natural limit to the usefulness of carriers but with advanced technologies reaching frontline units, i.e. more powerful engines, larger airframes, better radio and navigation devices, aiming sights, better results can be expected in the future. It is our designers, manufacturers and yards responsibility and goal to provide these means to the air crews, so our carriers can be used as a reliable platform to project power beyond visual range. And we are making good progress five years after hostilities ended. While the Thomas von Deen class is a design of the pre-war era, the ships large size will allow operating the latest fashion aircrafts and permits the installation of the most modern electronic equipment. The RSAN also commissioned a purpose-built training carrier, increasing quality and quantity of our training program. Finally, a new large fleet carrier was laid down in 1937 to compensate the loss of the Hammer. With 27000 tons standard the Asgard represents a large, modern state-of-the-art design, incorporating all the lessons learnt during the war of 1934/35. She is about to enter service in summer 1940, then raising the total number of active carriers to 7. With so many hulls, the RSAN is well prepared to support operations with four units, while one unit is dedicated to training, one in reserve and one undergoing maintenance.

To keep pace with the development of new technologies and with the increased number of aircraft carrying vessels in service with the navies of the world, another large fleet carrier has been added to the building program in 1940.

As explained, the development of aircraft carriers was quite linear and the way forward is well prepared now that this kind of warship is about to grow out of childhood. Things are a little bit different for our floatplane carrier force. The main purpose of a floatplane carrier is quite similar to an aircraft carrier: to transport, maintain and operate planes. However, the use of floatplanes does not require the ship in question to have a large landing deck and in general installations are less complex, the ship much smaller. In the RSAN a clear borderline was never drawn between a floatplane tender and a floatplane carrier. In service floatplane tenders often were freighters equipped to raise and lower floatplanes from the water and provide some maintenance like a small floatplane base. This definition fits to almost all floatplane operating vessels in service with the RSAN when the Cleito Treaty was put in place and early shipborne catapults became operational, allowing the start of an aircraft while the so equipped vessel is underway. Articles G Ib and Ic of the Cleito Treaty allowed an unlimited number of floatplane operating vessels within their respective limits. Together with the new technical developments this lead to the introduction of two new ship categories: a small patrol/scout vessel of less than 2000 tons and a large ship operating with the main fleet and providing means to maintain and operate numerous aircrafts of different kind for the purpose of scouting and attacking enemy vessels or bases. In autumn 1934 the RSAN had six small and two large floatplane carriers in service.

The Mimir class of 1922 represented the first purpose build design and they served in the Indian Ocean throughout the war, forming the 3rd Scout Squadron in Victoria. Over ten years old and known to be the result of naval designers too eager to put too much on a small hull, they were never detached to South America. However, close to the wars end one of Mimirs finally had to face an enemy surface raider, the AMC Guadeloupe. Again the short comings of the cramped design were revealed. None of her aircraft had been in the air to inspect the suspicious freighter from a distance, because none of her small complement of four floatplanes was operational that day. The limited space and weight dedicated to the aircraft facilities had not allowed storing more aircraft or more spare parts aboard, so at the end of a long patrol loop the Gymir had to face her enemy like any other patrol craft. However, the aircrafts and fuel aboard still meant a potential hazard to the ship as they would easily burn once hit. And this is exactly what happened when one of the initial salvos from the Guadeloupe hit her amidship. In consequence, the erupting flames made it impossible for Gymir´s crew to make full use of her relatively heavy armament and she was sunk by an auxiliary warship she should have been able to dominate. Although the damage she dealt to the Argentine AMC finally sealed that ships fate too, the Mimir class had been proven a bad compromise of being a floatplane carrier and dedicated warship.

Likewise small but of completely different design, the Bölthorn class proofed to be more balanced. Her aircraft complement was increased by 50% compared to the Mimir while her armament was cut down to what was deemed a minimum for successful self defense. Her designers also took care she features an enclosed hangar where planes could be more easily prepared for their next mission, while on the Mimirs aircrafts could only be stored below deck but had to be readied for action on deck without weather protection. Further more, the Bölthorns were not used for independent patrol duties but served in Coast-Guard flotillas where they provided scouting and spotting for Coastal Defense Ships. In that role both units of the class proofed successful and the loss of the Bölthorn to bombs while on such a mission cannot be tracked back to a design failure.

The two large floatplane carriers in service at the beginning of the war were the Thjazi and the Ymir. Thjazi served with the 9th Scouting Squadron based in Mar del Plata and was mainly used for blockade duties. Her aircraft were of good use to extend the area covered by the 9th Scouting or to provide anti-submarine protection in confined waters closer to the shore. In a completely different role, her sistership Ymir was used with 4th Coast-Guard Flotilla to provide support during convoy and bombardment missions. She also participated in the naval sea battle of Porto Alegre where she was badly damaged by a torpedo hit forward.

The different use of the large floatplane carriers allowed a detailed post-war analysis of their capabilities. Both were built to operate with the fleet and to fulfill the role of an aircraft carrier where no such carrier is available. This doctrine also included independent operations with cruiser-like profile for which the units got a light cruiser armament. The Thjazi was used according to this doctrine. Despite several short comings like a deck hangar too small or a lack of automatic short range anti-aircraft guns she succeeded in her role. The Ymir on the other hand was less often used for blue water operations. Instead she stayed closer to the shore, supporting bombardment missions, putting her in much more danger than the Thajzi. Providing a relatively large and widely unarmored target, she was always in danger to be hit by coastal batteries or attacking aircrafts. And also she was intentionally built to be able to stand her own against enemy AMCs or similar vessels while on patrol mission; she was never designed to be part of a battle line fighting enemy capital ships or cruisers. The heavy damage she took from a forward torpedo hit clearly showed how vulnerable she was without having an armored torpedo bulkhead.

Today the lessons learnt from the war have been addressed. The small floatplane carriers have been proven too cramped and limited in capability to be further supported. Two Mimir class vessels have been sold while the remaining third was transformed into a landing ship. Only the Egdir of the Bölthorn class remains in active service, deployed to support our Costal Forces. No future projects are planned. On the other hand, the large floatplane carriers were successful when deployed and used properly. They offer a cheap and capable alternative to standard aircraft carriers when a full scale air group is not required. Accordingly the RSAN commissioned three units of the Unicorn class and laid down two more of the improved Wyvern class in 1939. The new floatplane carriers are larger and address several short comings of the earlier Thjazi design. Their larger hull makes it easier for them to operate a higher number of modern floatplanes, which have become heavier and larger, and also allowed light armor to be applied. The vessels main armament is now composed of a heavy dual purpose battery and an increased number of light guns. Further more, provisions have been taken to allow the conversion of the floatplane carriers to light escort carriers, increasing the Navy´s strategic options. Doctrines have also been modified to correspond to the vessels full capabilities. Hence the new ships are deployed in similar fashion to light fleet carriers today, with a focus on the Indian Ocean.

Cruiser Fleet
When war erupted the Empire featured one of the largest and most modern cruiser forces in the world. Numbers and quality of design had been in focus of naval designers for the past decades, clearly favouring the RSAN over the joint navies of Brazil and Argentina. About forty units stood ready for numerous tasks such as blockade, escort, scouting, power projection and bombardment. Yet the large area to cover and the vast number of duties forced a dispersion of the cruiser fleet that stretched our capabilities to extremes when losses became inevitable and had to be compensated. But the challenge was mastered and in general the cruisers proofed up to their tasks and the rebuilds of old units worthwhile. However, the stunning success of the Arion class light cruisers, which became known as “Pony Express” [1], came completely unexpected. The offensive use of fast surface units for short and dangerous hit and run tactics had not been part of the RSAN pre-war doctrines where the Arions were planned to operate as destroyer flagships. The pressure that could be built up forced our enemies to respond and spend resources that would have been available otherwise. The relatively high losses during those daring high risk missions were overcompensated by achieved results. Efforts to build a similar unit of the 1st Cruiser Squadron and 10th Destroyer Flotilla to fight the Brazilians proofed successful too, albeit less effective in binding enemy forces owing to the more desolate situation of the Brazilian Navy in general.

In all cases where cruisers were lost they succumbed to superior enemy firepower, either in number or quality. Despite all improvements in cruiser design, the old rule was proven right again that cruisers cannot tackle capital ships when gallant Ladon fought her fight to save the carrier Hammer or when the Port Elizabeth lured the Brazilian battlecruisers under the guns of 1st Scouting.

A new development in cruiser design, the use of heavy dual purpose guns as main armament to increase the cruisers capabilities to fight aircraft, came too late to be tested. The first such design, the Dione class, was still under construction and reached active status only post war. However, some first experience from cruiser operations during the war could be used and the follow-on design, the Danae class, was increased in size and firepower, also featuring a new generation of fire control systems. All tests and results from life firing and fleet exercise over the past month are proof of the capabilities of the new designs.

To compensate our losses of six light cruisers total, four units have been built aside the new anti-aircraft cruisers. The two units of the 37er Nampula II class are built as fast and powerful, albeit lightly armoured vessels and will replace the lost Arions. The Charybdis class of 1938 on the other hand is an improved Douala II design, featuring twelve 15cm guns of the latest model on a standard cruiser hull [2].

For future designs further evolution of the multi-role standard type is strongly recommended. These ships represent the work horses of the fleet and cannot be ignored in future building plans.

The situation regarding former Type A cruisers, generally referred to as heavy cruisers, is not that easy. Due to international tendencies to introduce super-cruisers, ships smaller than what is usually considered a capital ship but larger than 13000 tons and armed with guns of more than 21cm calibre, the value of the heavy cruiser has to be carefully examined. The low number of super-cruisers yet present among the navies of our most likely opponents might make a fight between Type A cruisers and a super-cruiser unlikely. However, the question needs to be answered if it is worthwhile to build ships larger and more expensive than the standard type cruiser but not capable to battle super-cruisers or light battlecruisers on even terms.

Our own experience with the new category of super-cruisers or light battlecruisers based on the Radiance and Vengeance classes allows a differentiated point of view. The Radiance is internationally accepted as one of the best designs in this category; her heavy main armament not only capable to defeat the armour of all other designs of her kind but also powerful enough to endanger true capital ships while her armour is thick enough to protect her against the weapons usually installed on foreign super-cruisers. However, as a result the Radiance has grown to a size where the individual unit has become quite large, expensive and indispensable. Building numerous vessels of her kind is impossible due to budget constrains and so her value as a multi-role ship is limited. The Vengeance class on the other hand grew only 2000 tons beyond the former limit of the Type A cruiser but this increase in size was suffice to allow the installation of a 25cm main gun battery quite similar to what foreign designs field. However, neither her speed nor her protection is outstanding or could be enhanced much compared to the original heavy cruiser. So while her main gun calibre allows superiority over most cruisers afloat today, it is not powerful enough to guarantee success at all times or promote operations against foreign super-cruisers or capital ships. To accept an increase in costs and maintenance over the former Type A cruiser remains questionable as a result.

Instead it might be wise to increase - within the constraint of budget and the number of hulls required - the size and power of the standard type cruiser, to merge the former Type A and B categories. However, this might leave us with no adversary to foreign designs. Doubtless foreign developments have to be carefully tracked and evaluated, so our navy will always be prepared and superiorly equipped. If this requires building more super-cruisers or light battlecruisers cannot be answered today. Therefore I recommend installation of a committee to evaluate the future of the former Type A cruiser.

Destroyer Leaders
A sub-class to the light cruisers under the Cleito Treaty but intended to serve a different role, destroyer leaders are worth a separate chapter. By end of 1934 four out of seven units were deployed to South America, three of them serving in their intended role as leader for destroyer or torpedoboat flotillas. By end of 1935 one of these vessels had been lost but overall six out of seven destroyer leaders were available in the war zone (one new Diana class vessel had replaced the lost Wulf class RSAN Freki). Obviously, the combat value of these small and fast but capable warships was rated quite high. They provided firepower clearly superior to any destroyer but were comparably fast and their low silhouette made them ideal for surprise attacks on enemy shipping or coastal facilities. To use this potential, Fasold, Freischütz and brand-new Diana formed 1st Cruiser Squadron and were used similar to 9th Cruiser Squadron, the famous “Pony Express”, where Cerberus and Kweldulf had replaced the sunken Arion class cruisers Sleipnir and Areion. Only RSAN Garm was used in a standard cruiser role, deployed to the second division of 6th Battle Squadron. Because of their good design, well trained and highly motivated crews, perfectly prepared operations and last but not least some luck all of these units survived the war, Cerberus being the only one to be remarkably but not seriously damaged.

5 years later the value of the destroyer leaders is still quite high, although the elderly Wulf and Hunter classes have not yet been modernized. RSAN Fenris and her surviving sisters now form the 11th Cruiser Squadron in Africa while 1st Cruiser Squadron in South America is made of the two Hunters and the two new Dianas (Goddess of Hunting). Currently plans are made how the 1930er design of the Wulf class can be best modified to prepare the vessels for the next decade and make them best suited for tasks to come. Especially their mixed armament of 13,3cm, 8,8cm, 4cm and 2cm guns plus torpedoes has to be updated, reducing the number of different calibers and increasing the ships capability to attack or defend against aircrafts. Their long and slender hulls of less than 3000 tons are a disadvantage but chances are good they will receive 11,5cm dual purpose guns and the new 75mm automatic guns currently under development. For the Hunters - their larger, more cruiser-like hulls offering even more potential - plans are not yet fixed too. Arguments have been raised that the 11,5cm gun is too small for these 4000 tonners, but with no heavier dual purpose gun in deck mounts available, chances are there the RSAN will decide volume of fire will compensate the heavier punch of the heavier gun.

To the building plans of 1943 and 1944 new destroyer leaders of a yet unknown design have been added.

Torpedoboats and Destroyers
By end of 1934, the RSAN had in service 32 ocean going torpedoboats in three classes, 62 destroyers in five classes and 16 heavy destroyers. These vessels were organized in 14 flotillas of which only five were available in South America. They soon were extensively used and bore the brunt of the fighting. Three torpedoboats, four destroyers and one heavy destroyer were sunk within 6 month while 17 units were damaged to different extend. Reinforcements were soon sent to compensate losses and to answer the need for more hulls given the increased requests for operations. So by end of 1935 seven floatillas were permanently detached to the war zone while others operated from bases in South Africa, Cameroon and St. Helena. During the second half of the war, when the Empires supremacy at sea was more and more felt, losses still included one torpedoboat and five destroyers sunk plus about 20 incidents where units where damaged, some of them several times. An evaluation of all operations including torpedoboats or destroyers lead to the following results, some of them not surprising.

The age of ocean going torpedoboats as part of fleet operations is over. RSAN doctrines still included the option to have torpedoboat flotillas operate with the battle line where they could be used for fast attacks, launching numerous torpedoes to either damage or sink opponent numbers or to force the enemy line into disorder. However, as there was no classical match-up between battle lines, the Hound class torpedoboats available in South America were used differently. The missions they were sent on included raiding of coastal ports and facilities, offensive mine laying, escort duties and of course attacks against Argentine or Brazilian shipping. With their designs emphasis on torpedoes instead of guns and their limited deckspace, it soon became obvious they were not well suited for either of these tasks. Despite individual bravery and skill and although their low profile helped to sneak up on enemy vessels, the relative low number of guns and their lively hulls did not permit greater success. And the longer the war lasted, the more their machinery and equipment was worn out or at least in need of extensive maintenance and repair. So it is not surprising, the RSAN soon decided to get rid of those vessels that had suffered the most and offered little for future planning. By 1937 the Hound I class had been completely sold or scrapped while the Hound II class remained in service until today but is now also awaiting final fate.

In Africa, the elderly boats of the Cat class were used for patrol and convoy duties, as well as training of new crews. These units saw no action against the enemy and so were in better condition than the much smaller Hounds. However, despite their modernization in the mid-20s, they were also taken out of service and sold in 1937. Compared to modern destroyers of similar size they could no longer compete in terms of fighting power, speed, range and the capability to take on modern electronic equipment.

Finally, an evaluation of the torpedoboat force in service with the RSAN will not be completed without dealing with the Reptile class. Designed and laid down in 1935 as a stop gab measure to compensate losses and to increase the number of hulls available, these units compare better to their large cousins, the destroyers, than to the old torpedoboats as they almost pack the same combination of fire power and endurance. However, they also show what happens when designers put too much on a small hull. They are cramped, top heavy and their seaworthiness is below standards, the water coming over their bows a constant threat to the forward armament and equipment. Despite these short-comings, all eight units have been completed, the second batch to a slightly modified design with intends to decrease top heaviness and increase defense against airplanes or fast attack crafts. Serving with the 7th Torpedoboat Flotilla, the Reptiles were deployed to the Indian Ocean post war where their reduced seakeeping is less of a problem.

Currently the navy has no plans to build any torpedoboats and there is no war plan requiring their existence. The remaining units will be used along the lines of either small destroyers for escort duties or as fast attack crafts where opposite forces allow such operations.

The destroyer force in South America was hampered by the fact that most units were of the Nymph I and II classes, the oldest destroyers in service. Only the 10th Destroyer Flotilla was equipped with a design of latest fashion, the 1932er Weapon class heavy destroyers of which some had just reached full combat status. This force of old and new designs was intensively used right from the beginning, either for escort duties of heavy fleet units, merchants and minor combatants or as fast attack crafts or auxiliary mine layers. Losses were inevitable, especially during the battles for Mar del Plata (May 1935), but in general, the individual units lived up to expectation. Later in the war, when losses had to be compensated, elements of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla featuring Nymph IV class destroyers were also deployed to South America but at this time the most severe fighting was over and only Egeria was badly damaged by an Argentine coastal battery.

Other flotillas, including the 9th with the most modern destroyers of the Snake class, operated from bases in Cameroon, South Africa and the Atlantic islands, especially St. Helena. Their main task was to provide long range escorts and anti-submarine patrols for troop ships and convoys. As it turned out, Argentine and Brazilian attacks against the Atlantic shipping lines were limited in number and focused on single ships rather than entire convoys. As a result, the effectiveness of destroyers as escorts rather than units operating with the battle fleet was not tested but it can be expected, both crews and ships would have prevailed.

No unit of the Nymph III, Nymph IV or Snake classes was lost, although Monatheris was damaged by hitting an underwater rock while maneuvering to leave harbor with a convoy.

Five years after hostilities in South America ended, the destroyer force is as strong as prior to the war again, with 64 units currently in service. Of these, 16 units belong to the surviving Nymph I and II classes, all of which are refitted or rebuild to apply lessons learnt from the fighting. These rebuilds usually include the replacement of armament and machinery, as well as the installation of modern electronic equipment. The navy has also built 8 units of the Fish class to compensate losses. The units of this class feature the latest version of dual purpose armament and fire control, increasing their offensive capabilities despite a cost driven reduction in overall size compared to earlier designs. For the years to come, financial plans already include budget for the modernization of the Nymph III class while a decision on the follow-up on the Fish class has not yet been taken.

Regarding future of the destroyer it must be noted, that the war in South America has revealed the aircraft to be a general and more deadly threat to naval units than experts had expected prior to the conflict. As a result, modern destroyers have to be able to fight aircrafts with success should they succeed in their escort role. Emphasis for design thus has to be on high elevation guns and fire control to allow early detection and fight of incoming aircrafts. On the other hand, building holidays for submarines that were imposed by the Cleito Treaty are over now and the world’s submarine fleets begin to show what modern submarines will be capable of. It is therefore necessary to provide our destroyer fleet with the latest means to fight these new submarines. As a result of these two requirements, to enhance anti-aircraft and anti-submarine capabilities, something has to be given up when growth of the individual unit should be kept small. Thus the number of torpedoes and reloads will be restricted, probably given up entirely, as there are no indicators the torpedo will remain as decisive for surface battle as it might have been in the past.

Finally, the deployment of our assets during the war in South America has to be criticized. As I already stated, the majority of our destroyers in the war zone was of elderly design. This speaks volumes about the priorities of the Admiralty, despite the fact that South America always was the place where the likelihood for a break out of hostilities was the highest. Things have changed a little bit since then. Today only modern or completely rebuild units serve in that area and the Admiralty is best advised to keep it like that.

Escorts and Patrol Crafts
Prior to the war in South America the RSAN featured various designs build for escort and patrol duties. Sloops generally featured relatively large, stoutly build and partially armored hulls to provide enough space, habitability and survivability in the icy regions of the most Southern Atlantic. These vessels were mainly used for individual patrols and rarely operated together with the fleet. Both the older Circe and Arctic classes saw little action as very few operations against South African fishery were launched by the Argentine or Brazilian navies. All eight units survived the war and still serve the navy today, their true combat value still untested.

The River class frigates in service with our Navy were purposely build to act as blue water escorts and to protect shipping against submarines and small surface raiders. Pressure was high on their crews and time to rest was very limited as only 16 units were available which turned out to be not enough when a convoy system was installed. Generally a group of four frigates acted together, formed from the Flotillas divisions to make use of the experience of the crews who knew their companions best. However, this way only four groups were available and with increasing damaged and the loss of four units total over the course of the war, availability of these escorts became more and more limited. As a counter measure an emergency program was started in 1935 and eight units of the larger, more capable Lake class ordered. Due to limited yard capacity and budget cuts post war, only seven were laid down of which only four were completed. As a result the total number of frigates in service never exceeded 16 until today.

The third component adding to the strength of RSAN escorts were the light destroyers of which two classes of eight units each were available in 1934. The designs of the Pleiades and Planet classes were true children of the Cleito Treaty. With the category of B class destroyers limited, RSAN designers tried to put a destroyer’s speed and torpedo battery on a hull of only 600 tons displacement. As a result these units featured very lightly build and highly stressed hulls, making it critical for them to remain operational in bad weather. In several incidents ships of these classes almost capsized or suffered damage while their crews suffered bruises and broken bones. Luckily no unit was ever overwhelmed by the sea and so losses count up to only two, one succumbed to a bomb and one snapped in two after a ramming by battlecruiser Mocambique. To compensate losses and to generally increase the number of vessels available, the RSAN ordered a new class to be laid down in 1935. Known as the Bird class these light destroyers were larger and performed much better than their predecessors. All eight units of the program were completed until 1937, unlike the frigates of the River class.

Finally the six units of the PC22 design, also known as Guard class, remain to be mentioned. At a size of almost 2000 tons, heavily armed and armored they are some kind of oddity, probably best described as super light escort cruisers. Because of their unusual design they were used for many tasks – gunboat on the River Plate, escort for coastal defense ships or floatplane carriers, auxiliary bombardment vessel and high sea escort for troop transports or convoys. Despite extensive use, damage mainly remained superficial thanks to the heavy armor carried. Only one unit was lost when an air raid against Buenos Aires caught the Keeper at the piers.

Five years after the war the number of escorts is still much too low as little has actually happened to increase the number and strength of the escort flotillas. The sloops in service today are still the same as in 1934 and no units are planned to be build prior to probably 1943, more likely 1944. Almost the same is true for the frigates where no new units have been built too. However, an advanced modernization program for the aging River class units is planned for the financial year 1941 while a new class of frigates will be laid down already this year. By 1943 the total number of frigates available will raise to 24 units, none of which could be rated outdated any longer. Regarding light destroyers a decision is pending whether this kind of vessel should be further supported in the future. Currently the Planet and Bird classes (16 units total) are in service while the remaining six vessels of the Pleiades class have been sold in 1938. Finally, the sole Fishery Protection Ship Lorelei has to be mentioned which compensates the loss of the Keeper in number but is of completely different design. Currently no plans are known to further build units to either the specifications of the older Guard class or the Lorelei.

In summary, the total number of available escorts will only increase by eight hulls from 1934 to 1943 – a meager result given the lessons learnt during the war where escorts and patrol vessels were never enough. Should the Empire be forced to fight in the near future, the lack of adequate vessels will cause a severe problem.

Mine Warfare
Mine warfare during the conflict showed two aspects that have to be dealt with separately: offensive mine laying operations against an enemy’s shipping and protective measures to allow free movement of friendly units in SAE waters and harbours.

Successful operations of the single Argentine fast minelayer San Martin clearly revealed the potential of such vessels and doctrine if carried out with discipline, well trained crews and good planning. Many of our resources were bound until the threat could finally be neutralized. In return the RSAN completely lacked comparable equipment and strategy. The auxiliary use of light cruisers or destroyers as fast minelayers proofed much less successful and contained great risks to both crews and ships. After the war it was thus highly recommended by the CinC South America, Admiral Paul Duran, to build purpose-build minelayers capable of fast offensive operations following the example of the Argentine San Martin. The recommendation was supported by the Design Board and so the Admiralty soon gave permission to build two units to different specifications in 1936 and 1937 respectively. One became the RSAN Lightning, a design based on our experience with large destroyer leaders, and the second one is RSAN Hedgehog, a larger design with much higher mine capacity. After commission both units have been detached to form the 1st Minelayer Squadron and were used mainly to work with the Naval Academies to develop and train doctrine and tactics for the use of such vessels. The program showed good results and today both units can be rated as fully operational while plans are made to increase the number of purpose-build minelayers available to the Navy.

To protect our coastal shipping, widespread defensive mine fields had to be laid and continuously patrolled while open waterways needed to be regularly controlled for enemy-laid or drifting mines. For this huge task, the minesweeping flotillas were used as planned pre-war, supported by other units of the fleet where available.

Despite a steady build-up of our forces prior to the war, it turned out the minesweeping flotillas in South America where hard pressed to answer all the requests to patrol, guard and extend mine fields while they also had to sweep areas that had become the target of Argentine mine operations either by plane or ship. Especially magnetic mines laid by Argentine planes or coastal forces proofed a serious hazard as they were often detected only after first victims were to be bemoaned. The deployment of flotillas from South Africa and the Indian Ocean helped to prevent a collapse when the situation was about to become critical because of high losses. But these counter measures were not started early enough and revealed some distinct reluctance to expose other areas such as the Indian Ocean although the danger of mine warfare could have been rated very low. The 5th Minesweeper Flotilla - which remained in Daressalam for the duration of the war - should have been send to South America. The Admiralty’s argument that the naval infrastructure in South America was already stretched even without another flotilla to support, cannot be followed. The task to keep open the most vital shipping lanes always had to have the highest priority, as only these waterways allowed the transfer of supply of men and material to the front, saving Grand Uruguay in the end. If the infrastructure in South American ports really would not have been able to serve all assets, it might have been possible to detach some of the larger long-legged units such as cruisers or carriers to other bases. An emergency building plan was likewise seriously delayed because of priority being placed on other projects and yard capacity being occupied by repair jobs in general, while a shortage of steel and shipbuilding material added to the problem. It is my opinion that priorities for new builds should have been different and short comings in setting the right strategic priorities almost endangered our victory in South America.

Beside the matter of strategic deployment, the designs of our minesweepers proofed successful in general, although some units lack enough quarters for enlarged wartime crews and deck space to handle equipment always is scarce. The installation of additional light guns added to that problem. It was therefore requested that future designs should put more emphasis on crew facilities to negate negative effects on effectiveness during operations. For trans-oceanic deployment, good seakeeping also became a requirement for the specifications of post-war designs. However, the relatively small size of most minesweepers sets a natural limit to that and so the Flower class of 1935, designed and started as a stop gab measure to compensate losses, could not meet this requirement. Only with the later Seychelles class it was possible to build a design that incorporated all lessons learnt, and with completion of all eight units the total number of standard minesweeper will exceed the number of units available prior to the war. Additionally, the introduction of a class of small coastal minesweeper in 1937 helped to prepare our forces for future conflicts and a further increase of numbers is already planned.

In the end I dare putting a personal comment: Despite all technical short comings, bad planning of the Admiralty and at great daily risk of their lives, the crews of the minesweepers kept all vital routes open, facing threats below and one the surface as well as from the air. Their high morale and devotion to duty should be placed in high regard and taken as example for all other units of our armed forces. I therefore recommend the introduction of a special monument, probably in Montevideo, to honour the men of the minesweeping service for the important role they played in saving Grand Uruguay.

Submarines Fleet
The RSAN submarine forces started into the conflict in South America with a huge handicap. Because of the Cleito Treaty development of new designs was largely impossible during the 1920s and early 1930s. As a result our submarine fleet was completely overage, except for the costal units of the K class operating from Buenos Aires for most of the war and the two ocean going L class vessels used for training purpose with the Navy Academy. Ongoing troubles with equipment and machinery breakdowns lead to a much reduced effectiveness at the front. As a result there was much less pressure on Argentine and Brazilian shipping compared to pre-war scenarios. Only few of the larger oceans going submarines were of good use for blue water operations, some of them build also for mine laying. Coverage of the most distant ports in Brazil or Argentina remained difficult throughout the war. However, despite these technical disadvantages our crews showed great devotion to duty in the face of improved ASW equipment on Argentine side and scored some important hits, playing their part in the blockade of enemy harbours.

What-if scenarios that have been run post-war indicate a much better result would have been possible had there been better equipment for our highly motivated crews. So the most important lesson to be learnt was the urgent need for modernization of the RSAN submarine fleet. Plans were made to design and build new classes of large ocean going fleet submarines in the 1200 tons range as addition to the M class started 1935 and to modernize all remaining units of the elderly J class. It was also recommended to build new coastal submarines of no less than 450 tons to make good for the losses among the K class. All remaining units of the overage E/F and I/H classes were to be sold or scrapped to save resources.

Five years later this modernization is far from being complete and our Navy´s submarine fleet is still not the powerful force it ought to be. In fact, the total number of vessels available is lower than prior to the war as most old units have been either sold or scrapped to reduce maintenance costs and stay within the minimum budget allowed to the submarine forces. As part of the problem, only few experienced crews could be transferred to new units while the rest was detached to other commands. The result of such policy will be felt bitterly now that a new building program could finally be launched in 1939, starting with the P, O and Q classes.

Due to constant budget constraints, the build up of our flotillas with modern designs was delayed almost five years and today, now that the budgets have finally been raised; the reduction of crews available to the submarine force will be the limiting factor. Depending on budget limitations and our capability to intensify and increase training for new crews, it will take another five years to completely build up our submarine forces.

Coastal Forces
Our coastal forces were tasked to protect coastal shipping, to defend our coastline and to project power against enemy coastal fortifications, ports and troops. To do so various designs had been built over the past decades and they all faced the ultimate test in South America.

The most powerful and valuable assets were the large coastal defense ships of almost 8,000 tons each. Bound by the Cleito Treaty, the Admiralty had decided early on to build them along the lines of multi-role vessels instead of heavily armed and armored monitors or ironclads. And they were proven right despite differences in individual design of the Nagelring, Tyrfing and Gungnir classes. Over the course of the conflict all CDS served in various missions with the cruisers force to blockade enemy ports, with the escort forces to secure the transit of troop convoys, with the battleline to fight Brazilian capital ships and in cooperation with the Army during bombard missions off the Argentine or Brazilian coast. Only RSAN Nagelring was severely damaged by enemy attack late in the war; and the Navy was right to order and push forward the building of a forth unit, the Excalibur, in 1935.

Next to the large CDS in size and firepower were the light coastal defense ships (LCDS) of the Alswinn and Ringhorn classes, all four units displacing about 2,000 tons. They too saw extensive service, including raids on the rivers to Paraguay. During one of these operations the Negelfar was heavily bombed and shelled while the Arwakr already succumbed to a torpedo hit in June 35 while defending a convoy. Post war it was difficult to judge the designs performance, too different are their characteristics because of their very different main armament. Obviously the newer Ringhorn could build up a real barrage of fire with her twelve 127mm guns but the triple mounts were prone for jamming and the actual rate of fire was quite low. Nevertheless, a salvo of her main armament could not be ignored and for the bombardment of coastal, non-moving targets the rate of fire was not critical. The 15cm twin mounts on the Alswinn, however, proofed to be the better weapon against targets at sea. Accuracy and rate of fire of the individual mount together with the heavier punch of the larger shell made for a more deadly combination.

The largest numbers of vessels used by the Coastal Command were of the R and UJ classes, supported by some S-boats later in the war. The RSAN had built the U-boat Jagers as general workhorses for the Empire’s coastal seas, despite their name which implies a single-role design. At a maximum of 200 tons they could be build in large series but were not too expensive and the RSAN had in service 84 units total (Type 26 and Type 30) when hostilities broke out. They fought a gallant war against submarines, destroyers, torpedoboats and airplanes. They were shelled, torpedoed, mined, bombed and strafed and when the war had ended, 19 units were lost while many more were heavily damaged.

Of those losses 14 were of the Type 26 class, a result of extensive use and of a higher number of available hulls, but also testimony of an inferior design. Compared to the slightly enlarged Type 30 the older design lacked in firepower, seaboat quality, machinery layout, subdivision and the amount and quantity of equipment carried. Battledamage had a more severe influence on the ships handling and survivability in general. Although a better design than her older cousin, the Type 30 was not perfectly suited for their task either. The design was still very cramped, especially with a wartime crew and a full load of ammunition and stocks. Especially deck space for handling equipment was limited and the overall hull design leads to constant strain in open seas.

Only with the Type 35 class U-boat Jagers a more suitable design could be built, influenced by wartime lessons and a general boost in shipbuilding technologies. The hull was now of a completely different design, reducing strains by open seas to a normal level. Furthermore, the armament could be improved in weight of broadside and fire arcs. The internal layout allowed higher bunker capacity and the installation of a more sophisticated machinery, also increasing the vessels ability to withstand damage. However, production started not earlier than September 1935 and when the first units entered service the war was almost over.

As a small multi-role vessel the RSAN introduced the 100 ton R-class in 1928. Of course many small vessels and motor launches had been used before already but all of these were small and had little combat value. With the Rs the decision was taken to build a wooden standard hull that would be large and powerful enough to provide a versatile combatant for coastal waters, capable to act as coastal mine layer/sweeper, pilot boat, coastal tug and patrol boat. Over the course of three years orders for 48 of these vessels were placed at yards familiar with the production of fast wooden boats, e.g. the Fast Boat Company at Lüderitz or Alvarez & Sons in Rio Grande. Then, in 1931, the design was subject of a revision and 24 more units of the improved Type 31 were built until 1933.

In 1934 the 72 R-boats of both types were organizes in 6 flotillas but only one of these was deployed to South America, the motor launches used extensively on the rivers as auxiliary gun boats. Three boats were lost in those months, two by Paraguayan rebel forces and one in what has become known as the Rio Salado incident. In consequence, only 9 units were in service when we were drawn into war with the Argentine and Brazilian navies. Of course this number was much too low so other flotillas had to deploy to the combat zone. By end of 1935 the number of R-boats in South America had increased to 26 in three flotillas despite the loss of no less than seven more vessels total. On top of that, three were lost in 1936 before hostilities finally calmed down on the continent.

In general the design of the Type 28 and Type 31 class R-boats can be rated a success. The boats were large enough, stoutly built and their performance at seas up to the level that could be expected from such a small craft. However, their armament proofed too weak in many incidents, especially on the Type 28. A single 2cm gun is a decent weapon against pirates or fishery vessels poaching restricted areas but against enemy fast attack boats or fortified positions on a river bank neither volume nor weight of fire is heavy enough. During the conflict, many crews provisionally installed army MG or other guns they could lay their hand on, but this could not be deemed sufficient. It was the 40mm canon that made the Type 31 a more fearsome opponent and enemy forces showed much more respect to this kind of firepower. However, the guns installation on top of the aft deck made the mount an easy target and battle reports agree with that. Against attacking planes the vessels good maneuverability proofed their best defense as their small hulls could not be expected to be good AA platforms while at sea.

The third group of small combatants used by our Coastal Forces was the Snellboten or S-boats. Quote late the South African Navy began to consider fast attack crafts equipped with torpedoes although other navies were building this type of vessel for years and in large quantity already. Several prototypes were ordered at civil yards and their performance tested until the Navy finally issued an official request for tender which was won by the Fast Boat Company in Lüderitz which had the advantage of knowing the business and the Navy due to earlier contracts for small combatants. A series of twelve boats were built and delivered in 1934 and another eighteen in 1935. Only the first batch was ready for combat early enough to face the enemy in South America. Transported to Mar del Plata as deck load on some freighters, they formed the 1st S-boat Flotilla in the second half of 1935 and participated in actions against Argentine shipping. The crews lacked the experience shown by their adversaries but they added a new tactical component to the overall Navy strategy. A total of four boats were lost to enemy actions but this high loss rate also cumulated in a steep learning curve and by end of the war the S-boats could be rated as effective as their counterparts on the other side of the fence. The S-boat design, however, also needed improvement and so a new series was laid down in early 1936. These so-called Type 36 boats grew to 80 tons (instead 60 tons before) but also gained in speed and armament. Twelve were built but they all came too late for the war.

The current situation of our Costal Forces is still similar to 1934. Neither the tasks nor the tools have changed much. Of all CDS and LCDS classes only the Nagelring went through a modernization program that came with the repair work necessary and prepared her for challenges to come by increasing her anti-aircraft battery and electronically equipment. As both the Tyrfing and the Alswinn almost 15 years in constant service now, budget has to be provided for a major maintenance and modernization program but yet the financial plans hold no position for that. It must thus be considered what secondary role these ships can fulfill and how their loss as first line units can be compensated. However, such considerations have not yet led to any feasible result and so the future of these units remains unclear.

For the UJ, R and S classes constant development has not taken place over the past five years for each individual category of ship but there was no phase of inactivity also and the Coastal Forces seem well prepared here. The Type 35 class of U-boat Jagers was completed and 24 units entered service. Further evolution of wartime lessons and the need to replace the aging Type 26 boats led to a series of design studies and the decision to add budget to the plans for financial years 1942/1943 for 16 new vessels. This is only half the number of hulls that will be taken out of service but by using the latest technologies for machinery, weaponry and equipment the combat value will be at least equal. The R-boat flotillas have already been boosted by a class of 8 units laid down 1937/38. This so-called Type 37 incorporates many lessons from the war. The bridge has been enlarged for installation of more modern equipment and the hull form reworked for better performance in bad weather. However, the most important and probably most remarkable modification happen in the weapons department where the firepower was doubled compared to the older Type 31. With two 40mm and 20mm guns each the Type 37 is sometimes also referred to as Motor Gun Boat, a multi-role combatant with the capability to individually deal with all other coastal designs of the navies in South America or Africa. To further exploit this design philosophy another class of at least 16 units will be ordered in 1942/43. By increasing the displacement by 20% the new design will feature an even heavier armament and more powerful engines for a higher top speed. Finally more S-boats are about to be built, starting in late 1940. The new class will again grow in size compared to the previous Type 36, reflecting a general tendency in small craft design. A low silhouette and high speed are the premium design features and for the first time there may be reloads for the torpedo tubes, further increasing the vessels striking capability.

Riverine Warfare
The RSAN forces in South America were caught completely unprepared for riverine warfare. Pre-war doctrines and war plans build on the use of standard fleet units and vessels of the coastal forces to deny an enemy entrance to rivers and to aid the Army with transport capacity and fire support. This doctrine was soon proofed flawed. The seizure of the Paraguayan river gun boats by the Argentine provided those with purpose build units strong enough to clearly dominate the Rio Parana. The R or UJ class boats used by the RSAN coastal forces on the rivers at the beginning of the war were valid patrol vessels but stood no chance against the much larger and more powerful Humaita, Paraguay or Parana. So with the commission of the former Paraguayan units into Argentine hands, superiority on the rivers was permanently lost. Larger patrol vessels of the RSAN such as the Guard class or the light coastal defence ships of the Alswinn or Ringhorn classes, that would have been able to dominate the Argentine squadron, were not capable to fully operate the rivers upstream because of their draught. As a stop-gab measure Dutch gun boats of the Putten and Gruno classes were brought to service. Thanks to our ally the RSAN was then able to somehow balance out the Argentine advantage numerically even though the individual designs remained inferior to the larger and better armed ex-Paraguayan vessels. With the late appearance of the Victor Garcia class river gun boats the situation further improved but the much larger Argentine units remained a constant threat.

Today the General class river gun boats are in service, a design capable to match all riverine warships in active service with the Brazilian or Argentine navy. However, currently there are only two such units commissioned which will not be enough in case of a new conflict. More units of likewise designs have to be built.

Another problem the RSAN faced during their operations on the River Plate and River Parana was insufficient reconnaissance, a general lack of information about the strength and position of enemy forces and a doctrine not suited for the tasks put on the shoulders of individual units. As a result RSAN vessels were used as spearhead for offensive or transport operations and send into hostile waters several times when there was no support on the river banks. Enemy artillery and infantry with fortified positions caught these units in crossfire leading to high losses and forced retreat with negative effects on our forces moral and general military efforts.

Little has happened to deal with this problem during the past five years, so it is highly recommended to develop doctrines and war plan scenarios to train riverine warfare in general, including an advance of our military forces upstream with combined assets (Navy, Army, Airforce).

Special Forces
A massive failure in pre-war strategy was to overlook the requirement to quickly deploy troops behind enemy lines. The capability to launch special operations or to open a second frontline in the back of an enemy force would have helped a lot to support our Army’s efforts along the coasts of Brazil and Argentina. The old fashioned way of landing Marines or Army forces by using standard troop ships and cutters is no longer an option in modern warfare if the enemy still controls the coast line. Therefore plans were made post war to improve the current situation and develop operational strategies how to use modern landing ships.

After a detailed analysis of foreign technical developments and strategies, and with the help of our Indian friends, Navy yards began conversion of a former floatplane carrier and two tenders in 1938. Additionally, a series of small infantry and tank landing crafts were build for deployment on board of these landing ships; while two newly build assault vessels, capable of deploying a company of tanks and assorted infantry each, are now available too. Of course this force is just a first step, barely enough to train people and to develop strategies. More and larger vessels are required to provide our Navy a new asset capable to be decisive.

Current status of the fleet
The Royal South African Navy ranked high among the world’s largest navies prior to the war with Argentina and Brazil, and she still does today, which is the most important result of this analysis. But there is a shady side to this statement. Some ship classes, especially those that provide the workhorses for the RSAN, are in neglect, need replacement and build-up in numbers and with more modern designs. Especially the submarine fleet suffered a lot from the Cleito Treaty but little has happened since the limits where shaken off, and only few submarines in service with the RSAN can be rated modern and capable today. Finally, the lack of capability to land troops at enemy beaches in numbers clearly limits the fleets strategically options.

Furthermore, the RSAN participated in no large scale international exercise since the end of war. Only local annual NavEx operations were conducted but these hardly qualify our current generation of young officers and enlisted men for cooperation with allied fleet units in case of international conflict. New doctrines and ways of communication have to be trained; the handling of foreign equipment in use with our allies has to be something our crews are familiar with.

The evaluation of modern techniques like radar, capable aircraft or automatic weapon systems and their influence on strategy, tactic, doctrine and training has to be pushed. The distribution of resources is a critical factor for that and budget restrictions set a limit to what can be done at a time. Hence it is very important, to balance out prestige projects that are important to show the flag and leave a mark of our fleets strength in the world versus small units and workhorses that are required in numbers and quality for daily business.

Currently, the RSAN lives from her hard-won reputation but is in danger of falling behind. Many new technologies and design features have been introduced to warship design by the navies of the world and both Brazil and Argentina are progressively building up their navies again. So the Empire has to be on the watch, carefully evaluating all options, and make sure the Royal South African Navy remains the corner stone of our foreign policy and standing among the world’s powers, ensuring growth and wealth of our great nation.

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[1] All ships of the class are named after mythical horses.
[2] I cannot but provide a personal comment on the names of the new classes. It strikes me odd that the replacements of the Arions, named after mythical horses, got traditional names from cities, while the replacements for the lost Town class cruisers are named after mythical monsters (Charybdis and Hydra). The data in the responsible department seems to have been mixed up.

Impressive !!! Phantastic !!! Awesome !!!! There is no expression, which fits only approximate.

YAQW. I worked on the text for quite a while.

My intention was to provide some insight into SAE internal thinking and planning. The analysis should give an idea why I re-build the RSAN the way I do. Hopefully it also animates people to respond and provide some feedback so I get an idea if my interpretation of things is realistic.

Have been too busy to read it in its entirety, but once I am able to give it the full reading it deserves, I'll try to comment.

I read the whole thing and is a very interesting read. it gives the drivers for the future construction of the SAE for what it seems the first part of the decade.

I wonder if my conclusions regarding (super) cruisers, naval aviation, mine warfare etc. meet general acceptance or are seen as not reasonable.

This is a truely outstanding piece of work.
An awesome combination of detail and personal views.
I think those conclusions are valid, certainly the SA War stuff is spot on. Looking back certainly the Argentine Navy came off slightly better than expected in terms of losses. I guess a section on morale and leadership might give more insight into the tactical future of the RSAN. Strategy is easy to plan and ships are easy to build but on the day its the commander on the spot and how he plans and reacts that decides the battle despite any theoretical superority on paper.

Again great stuff Hoo. I hope the Argentine Navy has learnt as much as the RSAN has!

A section on morale and leadership would surely have rounded off the article and in fact, I had planned for that. However, I found it really difficult to judge these things and to put it in words. So I abandoned the idea, leaving only some small remarks in the original text that hints where morale got a boost by surprising successes and where hard work and daily losses had a negative effect.

Now, I´d also be happy to have a similar text on army or airforce, so I could say I have a plan. For the RSAF my datasheets give an idea what was learned and is planned. But for the Royal South African Army it will never happen......