Naval Operating Base Cavite, Tuesday, 5 April 1949
Kapitein-luitenant ter Zee Buis sat at his desk in the naval liaison’s office and read the week’s intelligence summary with a nagging sense of concern. There had been a noticeable uptick in the number of encounters between Philippine patrol vessels and Chinese fishing craft in the vicinity of the Kalayaan Islands. The incidents logged happened on the high seas, and there was nothing to indicate that the Chinese had entered Philippine waters, but fishing rights had been the cause of the last war; and both sides had continued to arm to the teeth.
The Philippine Government had adhered to the letter of the Treaty of Saigon – most of its installations in the archipelago were manned by the Philippine Constabulary rather than its army or navy, and ‘civilian’ contractors manned some of the smaller outposts. But in addition to the principal station at Itu Aba, observation and navigation posts were established on Likas, Storm, Parola, Pugad, Lawak, Bailan, and Kota Islands – giving the Philippines the ability to closely monitor ship and air traffic. This was, of course, a great boon to navigation – maritime strandings were down more than twenty percent in the last year alone – but Buis knew how valuable these installations would be in time of war.
The economic value of the islands had grown since the war as well – being a protected fishing area the Philippine fishing fleet drew much of its catch from those waters. Moreover, the guano deposits on Lawak and Storm Islands were now exploited, to the benefit of agriculture on Palawan and other islands in what his hosts considered the “Southern Seas”. Palawan had grown tremendously in value to the Philippine economy, and conflict would not only hamper but perhaps destroy the progress made to date.
He made an entry in his notebook for inclusion in his next report to Batavia.