WesWorld

One of the topics that has cropped up in Wesworld from time to time has been the question of the size of a nation’s army. There are many facets to this question but I discovered an interesting source on line that sheds some clues on how one can approach this question. The source document can be found here:

Overall strength of the peace-time German Army: 615,390 (1)
Officers Corps: 25,718 (3.67%)
Non-Commissioned Officer Corps: 85,226 (13.85%)
Voluntary Recruits: 69,146 (9.87%)
Short Service Conscripts: 435,300 (70.74%)

This represents less than 1% of the total German population, which that year’s census placed at approximately 64,900,000.

The annual contingent of conscripts – assuming a two year period of service for all arms – amounted to approximately 217,650, which equates to 3.35 men per 1,000 population. On a number of occasions I recall Brockpaine citing 3 as a reasonable number upon which to base strength estimates.

This of course represents a peace-time strength; in time of war mobilization would recall to the colors many classes of reservists. Generally speaking, the peace strength of the Army was approximately 20% of its war establishment.

What would this mean if applied to another nation?

Presuming that nation was as wealthy (in proportion) to Germany and could afford to equip and train an army of proportionate size, and felt the need to do so, the results for France of 1910 would look like this:

Overall strength of the peace-time French Army: 374,545
Officers Corps: 15,653
Non-Commissioned Officer Corps: 51,871
Voluntary Recruits: 42,084
Short Service Conscripts: 264,937

The population of Metropolitan France was only 39,500,000 in 1910, and the strength of the peace strength of the French Army is calculated on that basis. France maintained substantial colonial forces in Africa and elsewhere that are not accounted for here. The annual contingent of conscripts would be approximately 132,468.


This situation leaves France with several possible courses of action:

• Draw more conscripts from the population – if the number of conscripts per thousand population was increased to 5 from 3.35, the annual contingent would increase to 197,000. Would eventually increase the peacetime strength to approximately 560,000 – at great cost to the national economy.

• Increase the term of service, keeping recruits with the colors for three years instead of two. This would accomplish much the same result in terms of peacetime strength, again with cost to the national economy, but not, perhaps, as great.

• Rely more upon reservists in all categories.

• Rely more upon the colonial forces to offset the lower strength of the Metropolitan Army
  

Overall, I believe that between 3 and 4 conscripts per thousand population, with officers and permanent cadre in proportion, would be a realistic limit for peacetime armies.

(1) The total strength cited in the source and the individual categories do not quite add up – the variance is only slightly more than 1%, which for my purposes is minor

From my own research, finding the troops per thousand citizens, anywhere between two to five servicemen per thousand citizens tends to be approximately the right figure for a modern, Western nation. For instance, the US, as of the last time I checked, has about five per thousand, which was about the higher end of the median. Once reserves and paramilitary forces are taken into account, it rises towards ten per thousand. The outliers are countries like the South Korea (13 per 1000), North Korea (45 per 1000), Syria (15 per 1000) and Israel (22 per thousand).

Keep in mind these are figures for modern (21st Century) militaries.

One factor to keep in mind is that in the early 20th Century there was a need for a far higher proportion of the population in agriculture to keep the rest of the economic engine going. The mechanization of farming in the mid and late 20th Century freed many agricultural workers for employment elsewhere. Likewise, improvement of farming methods would permit the same level of output with smaller labor inputs.

David G. Hermann’s work, “The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War”, discusses in depth the structural changes that the armies of the major European powers underwent in the years before the First World War. It also contains much useful information regarding the comparative size and costs of the military establishments of the powers.



I have abstracted some of this information into the table above to put into perspective the burden of the military establishment of the powers on their population, and the cost borne by the taxpayer.

The first thing that should be noted is the relatively high cost of the ordinary British Tommy; however, it must be remembered that he was a volunteer and not a conscript – the high cost per soldier represents the better pay and conditions of service that a volunteer soldier requires to offer his service. The high cost per soldier also reflects the cost of maintaining the soldier overseas, the costs of transport to and from overseas garrisons and many other factors.

Despite the highest overall budget, the Russian soldier saw less expenditure per soldier – which translates into a relatively poorly-equipped force; a picture that fits with the situation prevailing in the First World War. In contrast, the German soldier saw the highest expenditure per soldier, which also fits with the common perception of Germany as the leading military power in Europe.

The figures highlight the dilemma faced by France in this period. To try and match the strength of the German Army France was forced to place a heavy military burden on its smaller population – conscripting personnel at a rate more than 50% greater than Germany and expending more than 40% per soldier to do so. The data also shows that both Austria-Hungary and Italy were slipping from the front-rank of the powers though maintaining a parity with each other.

It should be kept in mind that the budget figures cited reflect the rapid pace of re-equipment that the armies of Europe underwent in the period before the First World War – adoption of quick-firing artillery, acquisition of machineguns, airplanes and radio signal equipment.

I have a reprint copy of the 1913 edition of Brassey’s Naval Annual – a treasure trove of information. One of its sections includes budget and expenditure information for the principal navies of the world. To give comparison with the data for military expenditures and strengths, I have abstracted data for the same powers as discussed above.



Total expenditure represents the total naval budget for the 1913 financial year for each nation; Shipbuilding and Repair represents the sum to be expended on new construction or repair of existing vessels – either in the national dockyards or in private shipyards; Naval Armament represents the sum to be expended in the acquisition of the armament of naval vessels – again, either in national arsenals or under private contract – weaponry that would be installed as “Government Furnished Equipment” on vessels being constructed in private shipyards.

I must caveat the data for Austria-Hungary, which at this time adopted rather “creative accounting” techniques in developing its budget. There is a line item entitled “Extraordinary Credit for the Development of the Fleet” - £2,850,000 – which probably represents new construction of warships, but as it is unspecified, I have excluded it. The percentages of the total budget for Austrian shipbuilding and naval armaments is thus understated.

As one would expect, Britain’s naval budget is the largest, and represents the highest per capita expenditure as well. The very large expenditure of Russia is surprising – it is the second highest of the powers – and represents the hasty expansion of the Russian Navy in the years before the First World War. Few of the warships projected under the budget would be completed, and the ships, shipbuilding materials and weapons ordered abroad would end up in German, French or British inventories.

It is interesting that for its strong army and growing fleet that German military expenditures amounted to less than £1 per capita; whereas France needed to expend £1.35 per capita to maintain its army and navy, and Britain £1.59 to do likewise.

Very interesting statistics.

Britain seemed to be paying a very heavy price for her armed forces, the Army expenditure is very high, more so than I would have thought even with transport costs etc. factored in.
Russia's expenditure on naval armaments seems very high, I know she was in the midst of an expansion programme but and relied on foreign guns for her capital ships (I think the guns for the Svetlana light cruisers were of foreign design too), but this seems an extraordinarily high figure if you compare the number of new ships Britain and Germany were building and arming to Russia's ambitious, but much smaller, plans. I wonder if there is there an element of profiteering from foreign suppliers pushing up the costs?

Have you got any stats for Japan in this period? It would be interesting to compare them to these European powers given their rapid industrialisation in this period.

I have little doubt that foreign firms included a substantial profit margin in the vessels they built for Russian account, but it was far easier for those firms supplying armament, engines, and armor to Russia for the far more numerous vessels that were to be built in Russian yards. The Tsarist naval plans projected most of the new vessels to be built at home – with foreign assistance – in yards newly expanded for the purpose. Given what I know of prewar Russian business practices, not only did foreign firms enjoy the benefits of fat contracts but any senior Russians involved in the process found ways to rake off a piece as well.

I have some information for Japan, but, like Austria-Hungary, Japanese accounting was creative.

The overall naval budget for 1913 was £9,860,912, of which shipbuilding and armaments comprised only £1,243,556; however, a separate line item “Armaments Replenishing Fund” had an appropriation of £5,386,768 – and I have to assume that some of that was intended for new naval construction. The Japanese budget also includes some other interesting line items, such as “Salaries of Foreigners” for which £2,086 was appropriated.

The data for the United States is not directly comparable either. The budget requested was £31,123,740, but Congress only appropriated £28,932,630; the exact breakdown of the cuts is not specified in the source. The USN’s bureau structure also make it difficult to match budget expenditure with European navies but “Increase of the Navy” had the sum of £8,459,194 in its original request. I believe that most of the difference between the request and the sums appropriated may be found in this category.

Also, as an aside, the British data breaks down the contributions of “India and the Colonies” to the RN’s overall budget – the total is a surprisingly small £415,300 – 0.92% of the total expenditure.

The home page of the late Angus Maddison Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen has some excellent statistics on population and GDP. I have abstracted some of them in the table below to illustrate the relative economic strengths of some of Wesworld’s major nations in the period before the Great War.





Unfortunately, the lack of data over the period leaves gaps for some nations – Italy, Spain, Japan – and Russia’s data is quite incomplete. As Austria and Hungary are cited separately, along with other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire – it cannot be cited. The data is what it is.

The dollar figures cited are constant, which facilitates analysis over the long term. I chose the United Kingdom’s 1870 GDP as the base for the index showing the relative growth for each nation. The growth rates cited are calculated for each successive five year period.

The data cited for the UK excludes the Empire – that information is also fragmentary and while a composite GDP for the British Empire might be calculable for some years, the entire series is beyond my small ability to reconstruct.

The most surprising fact emerging from this analysis is the US had exceeded the UK’s GDP so early – from 1875 forward both the absolute GDP and GDP growth rate is far above Britain’s. It has been claimed by some that the US’s industrial potential has been slighted in Wesworld; these figures give some credence to such claims.

The second interesting fact is the relative weakness of France compared to the United Kingdom or to Germany – its GDP is consistently far less than Britain’s and while it started nearly equal to that of Germany in 1870, by 1880 it had fallen significantly behind, and by 1890 decisively so.

Germany’s economic growth in the period, while somewhat uneven, is impressive. By 1910 German GDP had exceeded that of the United Kingdom.

In discussing relative industrial strengths, this data may help frame the discussion. Of course, Wesworld history since the Great War is far different that the Original Time Line – but I suspect that the basics would remain true.

I recently rediscovered a source for information on the M1917 Enfield Rifle – the US version of the British Rifle No.3 or P14 – which was manufactured for the US Army in the First World War.

To illustrate what I consider an example of the possible, I have abstracted the monthly production figures for M1917 rifles manufactured by the Winchester Repeating Arms Company for US orders; as noted in the source article, they are best approximations, as sources disagree on finite numbers. Yet this data gives a limit of what one might expect in terms of output from an established, experienced, mass-manufacturer of firearms under war conditions. It should be mentioned that Winchester was not the only source for the M1917, and total production was far larger than the values cited here.



The production curve is quite steep – Winchester had built P14 rifles for British orders, and they had long experience in producing rifles for military and civilian customers. From a standing start they reached 40,000 rifles per month inside of seven months – a most impressive performance. The average monthly production was slightly more than 27,000 – also a very reasonable quantity; still, given the mass army raised by the United States prior to the Armistice, and the number of troops actually envisaged for 1919, it was a good thing that Winchester was not the only source for rifles.

What does this information infer? That when adopting a new shoulder arm getting production into stride will take time even under the best of conditions – experienced manufacturer, access to raw materials, labor, industrial equipment, etc. – and that there are limits on what can be achieved for a single source.

On the other end of the scale I have some incomplete information on Chinese armaments production in the 1920s, the historical Warlord period. It is drawn from “Warlord Politics in China 1916-1928”, by Hsi-Sheng Ch’i, and “Arming the Chinese – The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928” by Anthony B. Chan. Neither work has industrial production as their major focus; the latter, as its name indicates, is far more interested in imported weaponry than indigenous capability. The information is presented in passing.

Hsi-Sheng Ch’i cites the China Year Book of 1923 and 1928 in quoting data for armaments production in China proper. In 1923, he indicates, the monthly output of armaments was 7,000 rifles, 5,500,000 cartridges, 750 pistols, 33 machineguns, 6 pieces of artillery (type unspecified) and 1,200 artillery shells. By 1928, the situation had improved somewhat – to 8,500 rifles per month, with 9,500,000 cartridges, 1,250 pistols, 72 machineguns, 300 pieces of artillery (type unspecified) and 96,000 artillery shells.

He quotes other sources for production in Manchuria – in 1928 he indicates a monthly production there of 7,500 rifles, 9,000,000 cartridges 70-80 machineguns, a “large quantity” of artillery pieces and 120,000 artillery shells of unspecified type.

These may seem like large quantities – but set beside the total number of troops estimated as being mobilized by the various warlords of the time – 1,100,000 – the domestic output was small indeed.

Chan cites the same output for the Shenyang Arsenal, the industrial base of Zhang Zuolin – 7,500 rifles per month; and provides some additional snippets of information – the acquisition of machine tools from Denmark to increase its output, the 17,000 Chinese workers in the cartridge factory, and the 1,500 foreign technical experts (principally Germans and White Russians) employed there.

According to Chan, at this period the Taiyuan Arsenal of warlord Yan Xishan employed some 8,000 workers who were capable of turning out 1,500 rifles, 50 pistols, 30 machine guns, ammunition and shells per month, and the Hanyang Arsenal 6,000 rifles, 3,000 pistols, and 50 machineguns, plus ammunition, per month. The figures between the two authors are not in complete accord, but are close enough to paint a picture of domestic production incapable of keeping up with needs, particularly when active operations were underway.

This information is perhaps of passing interest; the China of Wesworld is a far different place – with fewer internal conflicts and opportunity for greater investment, many of the shortcomings of the Original Time Line are absent.

The original link seems to be dead now, but this page shows the production of the Swiss military arsenals during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. I used those as something of a basis for estimating how much production a smaller but well-equipped arsenal can reasonably produce.

Building off that, I estimated approximate numbers for Bulgaria's Kazanlak Arsenal, which I've expanded several times in order to take advantage of export sales. Originally, Bulgaria produced between ten and twelve thousand rifles per year for their own needs, but once export orders for the Radichkov STPR36 / SK36 rifles started pouring in, Kazanlak expanded their business. Over the years...
- 1935: 6,000 [1]
- 1940: ~30,000 rifles [2]
- 1941: ~48,000 rifles [3] [4]
- 1942: ~59,000 rifles
- 1944 (est): 100,000+

Note 1: Production was low - Bulgaria started production in mid-year of the K31 rifle, and spent a considerable period tooling up the factory.
Note 2: Included a quantity of rifles to Argentina.
Note 3: Included at least 18,000 rifles for Bulgaria (from VMZ Sopot) and 15,000 rifles for Siam.
Note 4: In 1941, Kazanlak began a major expansion with the objective of manufacturing 100,000 rifles a year by 1944. This is almost exclusively on the basis of their export business - Bulgaria's still taking about 10-12,000 rifles a year.

The power of export... :)

The much-maligned Brewster Buffalo has its fans, and the Warbirds Forum has a number of articles devoted to the aircraft. They shed light on the matter of aircraft production, and the vagaries to which it is subject.

One article cites production statistics for the Buffalo, and they are abstracted below.



As you can see, the production rate was discontinuous – Brewster was not the greatest of manufacturing plants – but one of the principal causes was the bottleneck of aircraft engines. In this period the customer was responsible for providing the engine to the airframe manufacturer – and many of the customers for the Buffalo had difficulties in procuring engines from American suppliers – the Dutch particularly so. When engines could be procured, production soared; when they were scarce, production tapered off.

Also worthy of note is the spares equivalent production – which of course represents airframes only. It is a factor often overlooked.

The historian Ales Skrivan has published several articles on the subject of the Czechoslovak arms trade during the Interwar period; given the prominence of Czech armaments or Czech designs in the context of Wesworld, I thought it might be interesting to look more closely at the subject.

In his article “Export of Czechoslovak Arms to China during the Arms Boom of the 1930s” Skrivan provides statistical data which places the Czech trade in armaments within the context of Czech total trade. I have abstracted this in the table provided below.



During the period the total export/import trade of Czechoslovakia underwent a severe contraction yet the trade in armaments remained a growing factor in the Czech economy. The article itself does not touch on the question of overall trade and the cause of its contraction, but it is clear that Czech authorities maintaining the level of exports in armaments was very important – at the end of the period arms and armaments represented more than six percent of all Czech exports.

Given the prominence of Skoda in artillery, Ceskoslovenska zbrojovka Brno in small arms, and Ceskomoravska Kolben Danek in armored vehicles this should come to no surprise. The dependence of Romania and Yugoslavia on Czech armaments is well documented, as is Britain’s adoption of both light and heavy machineguns of Czech origin.

The cited figures most likely exclude such “dual-use” exports as motor trucks – a favorite acquisition from Czechoslovakia in Wesworld and one based on historical fact. It certainly omits the armor plate exports of the Vitkovicke steel works, whose output protected many a British warship built in the late 1930s.

It is therefore quite reasonable for us as players to turn to the Czech source when all else fails. Of course, the difficulty is in moving purchases from the heart of Central Europe to wherever they might be wanted; that is a subject for a different post.

Great finds.
Most interesting statistics. I must try and dig out some stuff from my end at some point over Easter.

Quoted from "Hood"

Great finds.
Most interesting statistics. I must try and dig out some stuff from my end at some point over Easter.

Thanks. The history and economies of Wesworld are rather different from the historical but it is useful to have a framework in which to make estimations of the possible and the probable.

Mr. Skrivan has also authored a more focused examination of Czech small arms exports to China, “Export of Zbrojovka Brno (Czechoslovak Arms Factory of Brno) to China in the Interwar Period”.

Therein he provides details of the numerous direct and indirect transactions between the Czech firm and various Chinese governmental entities – the various warlord factions of the 1920s and the Kuomintang Government of the 1930s, and provides an overall estimate of the level of Czech small arms flowing to China. I have abstracted this information below. It should be noted that the data for 1937-38 is a subset of the overall total.



In view of China’s overall needs for small arms during its fights between the warlords, the “anti-bandit” campaigns against the Chinese communists and the long war against Japan the less than 200,000 rifles provided seems paltry, though the supplies of machineguns were probably of greater value. Plans to construct Czech small arms in China were pursued but to no end. It is however clear that in the years leading up to the war with Japan that Czech arms were sought in large quantities, and at considerable cost.

China was not the principal purchaser of Czech small arms in the interwar period – Romania has that distinction; other significant purchasers include Persia, Yugoslavia and Bolivia, together with Republican Spain.

What this suggests is that even the most interested supplier may not be able to furnish the mass quantities of weaponry required by a nation in a short period of time, and that the financial cost is not insubstantial.

The words of poet Robert Burns are quite appropriate to the situation in which Romania found itself in the years before the outbreak of the Second World War, particularly in regard to the procurement of motor vehicles.

In “Third Axis, Fourth Ally” Mark Axworthy summarizes the rearmament efforts of Romania in the latter 1930s. With adequate oil revenues that nation pursued a rather rational effort to address its needs for modern military equipment, turning to its traditional suppliers, France and Czechoslovakia, for many of its requirements. Its plans were good, its choices of equipment wise; unfortunately outside influences disrupted Romania’s plans and brought them to nought.

In motor vehicles Romania placed orders in Czechoslovakia for more than 1,000 heavy tactical (6x4 and 6x6) trucks, principally of the Skoda 6STSL type and some 1,200 light tactical trucks of the Praga RV, Skota 6L and Tatra 93 type, plus 200 command cars on the Tatra 93 chassis and 500 special trailers for its heavy trucks. The good news is that these were all delivered, and went far to motorize the corps artillery units of the Romanian Army – and gave good service during the war years. However, the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany cut off further supplies from that source.

Romania had also turned to the Austro-Daimler firm, acquiring 361 examples of that firm’s ADG 6x4 medium truck. These too were delivered – eventually – the quantities were:

1936 – 4 examples
1937 – 49 examples
1938 – 31 examples
1939 – 212 examples
1940 – 65 examples

That equates to an average of less than eight units per month. It is far less than any West European or American supplier could manage, and once the initial contract was complete, Romania could not procure further units from a source that had also come under German control.

Lest we place too much blame in any one quarter, Romania had also placed orders with Ford of Britain for the supply of 1,850 Ford 01 30cwt non-tactical trucks – principally ambulances, the order being booked in October 1939. The entire order was requisitioned and Romania obtained none of them.

This salutary lesson leaves us with several points to ponder:

* Reliance upon a neutral source for military equipment may serve for a time, but that source may become unavailable

* Deliveries from even the best sources could be stretched out beyond all reasonableness by outside forces

* Even the friendliest sources of supply will turn upon you when they see their needs as greater than your own

Some interesting bits of data, especially on the raw materials required to operate factories, the costs of building factories and some interesting production stats and the comparison of the costs of a battleship to aircraft.

David Edgerton 'Britain's War Machine', 2012

The yearly input of raw materials (1939) into Metropolitan-Vicker's Trafford Park Works making electrical equipment such as generators and transformers and turbines etc.
20,000 tons of coal for heating and process work
16,000 tons of sheet steel
2,000 tons of steel forgings
4,500 tons of steel castings
10,000 tons of pig iron
4,000 tons of copper
5,500 tons of timber
1,000 tons of slate and marble
400 tons of insulating boards
40,000sq yards of silk
15,000 workers in 1939, double the number in the early 1930s and 50% more than before the depression.
Of these 600 in maintenance, 900 apprentices and 400 college apprentices (majority university graduates)

British Rifle Production
Under 200,000 between 1939-41.
BSA Small Heath Works, Birmingham producing 8-10,000 per month May-September 1940, after air raids this dropped by more than half.

Output of Principal Weapons, last 4 months of 1939 - from M.M. Postan ' British War Production', 1952;
UK: 18,700 rifles, 6,900 machine guns, 0 field and medium artillery, 224 medium AA, 314 tanks (all types)
Germany: 279,000 rifles, 12,700 machine guns, 773 field and medium artillery, 192 medium AA, 247 tanks (all types)

First 4 months of 1940;
UK: 26,800 rifles, 7,400 machine guns, 51 field and medium artillery, 234 medium AA, 287 tanks (all types)
Germany: 310,400 rifles, 14,700 machine guns, 675 field and medium artillery, 317medium AA, 283 tanks (all types)

May 1940;
UK: 11,100 rifles, 2,900 machine guns, 63 field and medium artillery, 94 medium AA, 138 tanks (all types)
Germany: 101,600 rifles, 5,200 machine guns, 217 field and medium artillery, 86 medium AA, 116 tanks (all types)

Imports of oil products to UK (all users, including US forces), millions of tons (Payton-Smith, 'Oil')
1938
Motor Spirit & Aviation Spirit: 4.699
Admiralty Oil: 0.403
Gas oil/ diesel: n/a
Total: 11.618

1944
Motor Spirit: 4.773
Aviation Spirit: 4.751
Admiralty Oil: 3.912
Gas oil/ diesel: 2.211
Total: 20.344

From same source, Anglo-American 100-octane production, millions of tons
1942
US, all companies: 3.075
Aruba, Esso: n/a
UK: ICI, Trimpell, Shell: 0.184
Curacao, Shell: 0.057
Trinidad, Trinidad Leaseholds: 0.088
Abadan, Anglo-Iranian: 0.258

1944
US, all companies: 15.125
Aruba, Esso: 0.505
UK: ICI, Trimpell, Shell: 0.549
Curacao, Shell: 0.230
Trinidad, Trinidad Leaseholds: 0.165
Abadan, Anglo-Iranian: 0.858

The Trimpell plant at Heysham in 1944 produced: 344,000 tonnes of hydropetrol, 55,000 tonnes of iso-octane and 22,000 tons of ammonia
This required the following raw materials: 466,000 tons of imported gas-oil, 100,000 tons of coal, 204,000 tons of coke and large amounts of electricity and water

Construction of Royal Ordnance Factory, Chorley, Lancashire. Construction began 1937, limited production end of 1938 and official opening by the King spring 1939.
30 million bricks, 1 million cubic yards of concrete, 15,000 steel window frames, 50 miles of road, 25 miles of railway track, 1,500 buildings, required the building of the world's largest cement mixer which mixed 5,000 tons a day moved by 30 lorries, 12,000 workers needed to build the plant. Cost £11 million.

1942 - 1 week's output = 500 tons of TNT, 250 tons of ammonium nitrate, 150 tons of cordite, 210 truckloads of 25pdr shells and 70 trucks of 5.5in howitzer shells.

Factory building and equipping costs during the war:
Chemical Warfare factories: £20 million
20 aero-engine factories at £1.5 million each building costs plus £4 million for tooling, some came to £10 million (e.g. Ford Merlin plant at Manchester cost £7 million) and total spent was over £100 million.

Armament Costs
Cost of battleship King George V was £7.5 million.
Edgerton claims a battleship was the same price as 200 Avro Lancasters (enough for two Wings)

Those who have read my regular news posts know that I ascribe to the dictum, “A picture is worth a thousand words”. A map, I think, is worth far more.



I came across the above image on a French-language site, but I think most readers will understand. It is a spatial representation of French heavy industry and armaments factories in 1940. What it illustrates is one reason – out of many – why France had few options but to accept an armistice in 1940.

The initial German advance through the Ardennes had cut off and occupied the vital Nord industrial zone; the subsequent thrusts to the south and southeast – seizing Paris and cutting off the forts of the Maginot Line – had the byproduct of cutting off and/or occupying the Centre and Est industrial regions.

Shorn of the industrial and arms-manufacturing facilities in these regions a France that chose to fight on would have had a distinct disadvantage and would have been dependent upon whatever Britain might have been able to spare from her own post-Dunkirk stocks and on supplies from a perhaps reluctant and certainly uncommitted United States. The more I look at this map the more complex the situation facing France’s leaders in July 1940 becomes.

Neat map!