[Ladies and Gentlemen, the show is about to begin. Dreaming and welcome to the best.....
Well, actually the story is not yet ready to be posted in full but the SIM is proceeding and the below happened in March with an aftermath in April so I´m starting to post before it´s too late.]
[SIZE=3]The Battle of St. Helena[/SIZE]
Taken from "Running The Gauntlet - South African Cruisers In Action" by Peter Kogge (Naval Institute Press, Durban, 1983)
"[...] So in early 1935 the conflict in South America was still unfolding and spreading despite attempts by several parties to put out the fire before thousands get burned. And the more blood was shed the louder shouts for revenge became.
Early Moves
In February 1935 the Brazilians had used their battlecruisers of the Rio de Janeiro class to some success against South African shipping. On February 1st the Brazilian Navy's pride, the Rio de Janeiro, departed her namesake city with her sister Recife. According to Brazilian sources their mission was to disrupt South Africa's lines of communications and trade to Cameroon and South Africa. The South Africans were somehow caught by surprise and their counter actions to hunt down the Brazilian ship brought no success (see chapter 3 Early Operations). So the triumphantly return of the two warships to Brazil on the 22nd was an early defeat of the Royal South African Navy and felt badly. Of course the Brazilian propaganda used that successful operation to their advantage albeit their claim of "at least a dozen" vessels sunk stretched reality a bit [Note 1].
So when the South African naval intelligence reported a follow-on operation by the Brazilian battlecruisers on March 6th the RSAN would not allow being mortified again. All assets at hand including most ships cruiser-size and up as well as land-based reconnaissance aircrafts were ordered to take position and search the South Atlantic for the Rio de Janeiro and the Recife. Part of the forces involved were Montevideo´s 4th Battle Squadron, 1st and 5th Scout Squadron plus RSAN Cape Delgado of the 7th Cruiser Squadron. Additionally the 2nd Coast-Guard Flotilla would form a local screen closer to the shore east of Porto Alegre. Their back-up would be the 3rd Battle Squadron whose units of the Mauritius class were too slow to catch the Brazilians in open water. Operating out of Mar del Plata 9th Scouting would also help to cover South African shipping but was partially bound by their duty to keep an eye on the Argentinean navy. Sailing from their bases in Cameroon or South Africa 1st Battle Squadron, 4th, 6th and 8th Scout Squadron, 8th and 10th Cruiser Squadron, the latter from Durban via Cape Town, as well as 1st Coast-Guard with floatplane carrier RSAN Egdir added to the fleet of hunters showing just how serious the South Africans were to prevent a second success for the Brazilians. Despite all these units the meshes of the net woven were still quite large in the face of thousands of square kilometres of water to cover. So the Brazilian pair could not be found until they hunted down their first prey.
The Chase
The 11th of March brought a distress call from a freighter on the Cameroon - Uruguay track. The ship - identifying herself as Trevanion sailing from Douala to Montevideo [Note 2] - send "RRR attacked by raider and forced to stop" and her position before suddenly falling silent. Later investigations revealed the Rio de Janeiro opened fire with light guns on the radio room to stop the African vessel from sending. Sadly for the Africans the most important information, Trevanions position, was garbled. However, what could be read indicated a position about 500km south of the island of Ascension and so the Royal South African Navy shifted forces towards that position to decrease the meshes of their net that was about to catch the Brazilians.
Closest to the reported position was 8th Scouting with aircraft carrier RSAN Gripper which had left Douala late on March 7 and the 8th Cruiser Squadron with four light cruisers. Both units were about 600km northeast and 900km south-southeast of Ascension respectively and immediately turned toward the origin of the distress call. Further to the West 1st Scouting under command of Vice-Admiral Martijn van Spierenburg also turned towards Ascension ordering line abreast with cruiser Port Elizabeth taking the position in the North followed by battlecruisers Hertog Alexander and Hertog Rijnhard further down the line and finally Porto Alegre, also a cruiser of the Town-class of 1913, marking the lowest edge.
No contact could be made during the next 48 hours and weather conditions were decreasing. Obviously the Brazilians had escaped the South Africans. The Brazilian admiral had left the position where the Trevanion was sunk on a northerly course and closely passed Ascension to the West unnoticed. Knowing the RSAN would be on his heels he took the risk to choose the most unexpected course which would bring him very close to many eyes that could report his position and course but offered best chances to open the range to the South Africans otherwise. He retired his two ships to a position well northwest of Ascension and away from crowded tracks to refuel from an oiler. Meanwhile the South Africans too were forced to refuel and relocate their unit. The 1st Scout Squadron returned to a position between Ascension and the Brazilian coast while RSAN Gripper remained further in the South.
This was the situation when the Brazilian admiral made his next step. He gave orders for a course towards the Venezuela track hoping to catch some of the valuable oilers bringing their important freight to Uruguay. To avoid the dangers of the Brazilian coast these ships had to choose a course bringing them much deeper into the South Atlantic and pretty close to the searching battlecruisers. On March 17 they found a first victim.
For the Africans first sign of the Brazilians return to the shipping lanes was a distress call from the Maracaibo Shell, an oiler leased from the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company for the duration of the war. The ship was capable to radio "Attacked by unknown warship" and this time her position could be read by the South Africans. The Maracaibo Shell was only about 60km north-west of RSAN Port Elizabeth, being again the most northerly ship of the 1st Scout Squadron which was in line abreast to the South. Captain Muhabi immediately ordered an intercepting course and radioed his intentions to his superior onboard Hertog Alexander. Against a battlecruiser his 4,500ts cruiser would have little chance but the call had not clearly identified an enemy capital unit. Not all Brazilian cruisers were accounted for by the last intelligence report so there was a chance the attacker could also be a Bahia-class light cruiser or armed merchant cruiser that could be easily overwhelmed by the African cruiser.
During a bright day the reported position was close enough to allow visual contact within an hour but the weather had worsened and the South Atlantic had become an unfriendly place with sea state 5 to 6 and winds up to Beaufort 8. Spray and rain as wells as low clouds limited visibility changing from nil to 10km.
While the Port Elizabeth sailed to investigate Vice-Admiral van Spierenburg ordered his forces to turn west too, bringing him into a position he could intervene should his scout make contact and run into trouble. He ordered turns for 23kn knowing the Porto Alegre could hardly better that speed due to the heavy seas. In fact even that speed was too high as the weather was worse several miles to the South. The cruiser was thus starting to fall behind. Because of the squadrons original formation Hertog Alexander was ahead of her sister by about 12 miles while Porto Alegre was away about 25 miles to the south-southeast.
The Battle - Phase One
Despite being a relatively good sea boat Port Elizabeth hardly reached her top speed when heading for the reported enemy´s position. Large waves coming over her bow reduced her speed over ground to 25 knots while water running down her weather deck forced her crew into cover. All men with there stations outside were wet to the bone within seconds. Some even had to lash themselves to their equipment avoiding to be washed overboard.
At 01:48pm, which was about an hour and half after turning west, look-outs reported an unknown contact bearing 040 relatively to her bow. The shadow was about 6000m away and partially hidden in a rain squall. That first visual contact was immediately reported to Vice-Admiral van Spierenburg and the rest of 1st Scouting. About three minutes later a radio message from Port Elizabeth identified a slow running battlecruiser close to an oiler. According to studies of the Brazilians log files years after the war the Port Elizabeth opened fire at about this time with her 15cm guns and turned away to the South and later South-East. If she also launched her torpedoes at maximum range during those minutes remains unclear but is most likely.
The cruisers turn to the South reflects her skipper´s intention to avoid battle with the Brazilians as his command was badly outgunned. Instead his new course would lure the battlecruisers towards 1st Scoutings position.
If it was a smart move to open fire or if remaining silent and fade into the spray would have been a better choice remains a permanent what-if. Brazilian battle reports are not very specific if the South African cruiser was already reported before she opened fire. Fact is the battlecruisers secondaries were quick to respond but it took about 90 seconds before Rio de Janeiros main guns send out a first salvo. Initially they were trained fore and aft.
The retreating cruiser landed a first hit at about 01:53pm. The 15cm shell hit well amidship below some light guns and entered about 4 meters into the BCs superstructure where it partially exploded [Note 3]. Damage remained superficial in general but fragments of the shells base travelled further into the hull and through two bulkheads. Four Brazilian sailors of a damage control team were wounded.
Behind Port Elizabeth the Rio de Janeiro accelerated and turned to follow but range was increasing and the cruiser stood a decent chance to escape out of sight. However, before cover in form of another rain squall could be reached visual contact was made with a second large warship coming out the spray and rain further north. The newcomer was the Recife. She had been circling her sister and the Maracaibo Shell to allow a boarding party to reach the valuable prize by generating a relatively calm area inside her circling radius. With guns ablaze she now followed the Port Elizabeth south and achieved a first hit in the cruisers aft superstructure at 01:56pm with her secondaries. The 12cm projectile exploded against a 4cm twin on port. Range for this hit is given as 6400 meters in Brazilian charts.
Slowed by her turn the Port Elizabeth was working hard to increase speed and disengage but Recife´s log reports a speed of 20kn for those minutes so chances for the light cruiser to escape were small. During her first salvos the Brazilian battlecruiser was overshooting her prey but at 02:02pm a first straddle with a four gun salvo was achieved, soon followed by a second. She had not yet hit the cruiser and her sister Rio de Janeiro had come out of sight to the North so there was a chance the Port Elizabeth could survive long enough to find help.
Unknown to the Brazilians every turn of Port Elizabeth´ screws brought her closer to 1st Scouting which was sailing towards the fleeing cruisers position at best speed. Admiral van Spierenburg ordered guns loaded with AP shells at 02:12pm but no enemy battlecruiser was in line of sight yet. Steering an intercepting course according to incoming radio messages contact was expected every minute.
Notes:
[Note 1]
The ships sunk during that operation were:
Feb 2 - Domingo de Larrinaga (5.358ts)
Feb 7 - Morviken (5.008ts)
Feb 8 - Nimbin (1.052ts)
Feb 14 - Empire Light (6.828ts)
Feb 17 - Tela (3.777ts)
Feb 19 - Blairlogie (4.425ts)
[Note 2]
The historical Trevanion was a british freighter of 5.299ts caught by Graf Spee and sunk on the 22nd of October 1939. Her captain J. M. Edwards ordered his radio operator N. C. Martinson to send RRR and their position in face of the German warship which immediately opened fire with heavy MGs. Edwards protected Martinson with his own body to allow the signal to be send. Both men were wounded during that action by ricochets. Sadly (for the British) Martinson made a mistake while sending the ships position not allowing any British station to get a clear signal.
Story taken from "Die Schlacht im Atlantik" by Léonce Peillard (pp. 61-62)
[Note 3]
I use this example to explain how I calculate damage (if not freestyle). The gun used is a 15L42 with a base-fuzed 47kg shell. At 6400m BigGun gives a flight time of 10,2secs and an impact angle of -5,4deg at a speed of 1640 feet/sec. For such shell (#6 on the German shell list) Facehard gives complete penetration against a 25mm plate which I assume to be used for the outer superstructure. The shell enters without nose and lower body damaged. It no longer is effective which is why I chosed "partially exploded" above.