Eduwart Land : Herr Krook, can we get a quarterly report on the status of the military?
Jan Krook, War Minister : Certainly. The primary variables are of course the possibility of further integration with Belgium, wether full integration or partial under the auspices of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, or as an extension of the Benelux treaty . . .
Eduwart Land : Confidentially, a number of their politicians from several parties, as well as the National Congress, have made some contact. There is no political will to merge the nations, but union under the UKN is most likely. Luxembourg, which of course has a monetary union with Belgium and considered full union after the war, has been quite concerned that they are not forgotten. We will likely form some informal committees with leaders from both countries to lay the groundwork for after the Belgian elections this October. Until then, we are going to proceed as normal.
Jan Krook: Thank you for the update Herr Land. For the reports, I will defer to my subsecretaries, gentlemen, keep it short, Army?
Herman Loeder, Staatssecretaris of the Army : Construction and improvement of the fortified belts is going well, the Belgian depression has provided a cheap labor pool, and we anticipate completion in 1936 per your original schedule.
We still anticipate moving two divisions from frontline to strategic reserve. The 15th Division has been designated for redeployment of NEI and work on the basing there is proceeding. Should we enter into a closer military relationship with Belgium, that would add 16 active divisions and 6 reserve divisions, and both of our countries could probably entertain a mild force reduction and joint mobile reserve as a result.
Kongo has requested joint large scale maneuvers. They are proposing separate plain, jungle and hill maneuvers. The brigades in Ubangi-Shari and the 18th division in eastern Kongo can provide two of those, and the 15th should be shipping past in July and August, we may want to land a regiment to coordinate some exercises near Matadi.
Development of the heavy tanks is proceeding at FN and Skoda, though FN is having issues with the suspension. The Skoda design is looking far more promising, though they were using dual bogies to support a wider track, but over the winter they found frozen mud would not just jam the bogies, but also wedge them apart. We will likely be looking at potential production this fall or early next year.
We have completed deliveries of the PA-IV armored cars and the second batch of Vickers tanks. We are considering turning away from the Vickers and back to the Carden-Lloyd tankettes for reconnaissance, as the amphibious capability gives them so many more options in most of our theaters. The primary tank would be the Skoda LT-33, which has been serving well, and we are planning further orders to allow full replacement of the FT-17s. We have a plan to select the best FT-17s for storage and scrap the remainder. While the Kongo expressed interest in the FT-17s it now looks like they will pursue purchasing LT-33s from Skoda-Davao.
The 45mm/L48 ATG program you initiated is going well. We have substituted a Skoda breech design from their 47mm gun, allowing us to use a larger cartridge. The new version propels a 1.4kg shell at over 850m/s, which is quite satisfactory. While final versions are being prepared, we believe the production version will be below 600kg. Once we are satisfied, we will make the order for the remaining Lt-33s armed with this weapon.
The only other armored vehicles of note are the Italian 75/L18s assault guns and 10cm mobile artillery in development. We have been pleased with the state of development. We expect by late next year we can look to integrate those into mobile counterstrike forces.
Development of the new 155mm artillery carriage is looking quite favorable. The firing platform concept appears to be a winner, though we are still investigating the best means of obtaining clearance. We are currently testing the smaller version for the 10cm gun in combination with the Sonic spigot mortar array. This is now in combination with the FN artillery tractor and looks promising for certain applications.
Krook : Excellent Loeder. So, what does the Air Force want?
Hendrik Visscher, Staatssecretaris of the Air force : More funds.
The Air Force continues to desire the long range heavy bombers as a means of shattering enemy homeland infrastructure, but a report released today detailed the costs of such a program. Detailed cost estimates reveal that a limited order of 36 D119 bombers would require substantial fixed costs in infrastructure. Comparatively a full squadron and spares of 144 D119 bombers would spread these fixed costs, as well as benefit from some mass production, for a 31% cost savings. However, in place of a squadron of 36 D119 heavy bombers, an estimated 378 D.XIXc fighters or nearly 150 G.s can be acquired, and in place of a wing of 144 D119 bombers, an estimated 1,152 D.XIXc fighters or 460 G.1s could be bought. Support and personal costs would of course considerably diminish this ratio, but as the bombers require more personal, not as much as one may think.
The Nordmark competition has caused a considerable angst to have a heavy bomber fleet with at least a 2,500nm range, if not 3,500nm. The former would allow operations anywhere in SE Asia, and the latter would considerably ease transport ranges. Unfortunately, the cost of such a large bomber places it out of range in large numbers. A fast long range bomber for deep strikes may be worth acquiring in limited numbers, but only if bombing accuracy improves. Therefore we recommend funds be expended on improving bombsights at this time.
Otherwise we are seriously looking at switching from the T.Va to the T.VII that Fokker presented to Nordmark, performance is excellent and the cost only marginally greater.
For the heavy fighter role we are looking towards the FW-187 for some roles, and the G.1 for others. Depending on the capability of the G.1 we may or may not field a separate light bomber. Atlantic aircraft has presented a design that may be worth consideration also.
On fighters, the D.XIXa is performing well in service, and engine reliability is now quite good. As they enter service they are displacing D.XVIIs, while the D.XVIIbis are rugged and overbuilt and should be serviceable for some time. Hispano-Suiza is still improving the engine and our late 1934 fighter production will likely switch to a D.XIXb with an improved 12Y engine, and possibly an improved supercharge, to make the D.XIXc. We will be converting at least the carrier D.XVIIbis to a v2 with the 12Y-21 for just a little better performance. After that, there are a number of prototypes available now and we will pick one or two to move towards a production 1935 or 36 fighter.
On the armaments front, we are leaning towards including a cannon in our fighter weapon arrays for anti-bomber use. We are considering the 23mm Madsen versus the 20mm for this role. We would like to develop a midsized 17mm weapon for testing to establish if there is merit to having a mid ranged weapon. The German 15mm looks best for scaling up for this purpose. but we plan on doing more live fire exercises against scrapped planes to evaluate effects, but we want the hulks to be fully fueled and armed.
Lastly, on the bomb front, we believe we have a reasonable facsimile of the rubbergas weapon that we are testing in Guiana now. Though we may have an equivalent using an aluminum salt gelling agent. The multi-bomb dispensers are a failure to date, though we understand the Italians may have made progress in this area. Again, as a generic recommendation, we suggest further funds for improved bombsights. For that matter, gunsights and canopies.
As a general concern, the insistence on a large pool of reserve fighters has at this stage resulted in hundreds of D.XVII biplanes being flown once or twice a month for training. At this point, they lack the speed to be adequate in first line combat. They might be adequate in a lower threat level area, such as the Kongo or Guiana, but not Europe or the Indies where we have them. Likewise the old CVD and F.VII-v3m bombers are old and inadequate. Having these planes as reserves simple saps funds from other allocations. A far smaller number of dedicated trainers would serve to keep the reserve aircrews ready to serve as replacements, at far lower cost.
Krook : Interesting Visscher, though I am not to sure my party would stand for dropping half of the on-paper strength of the air force, regardless of its worth in combat. So, is the Navy proposing to scrap half the fleet, Herr Van Deventer?
Theodoor Van Deventer, Staatssecretaris of the Navy:
Terribly sorry to disappoint you Herr Krook, but we plan to continue the refit programs. Construction is preceding on schedule. We have routed more resources to the defense programs in the Indies and temporarily idled work on the Boerentange class to ensure work on the Zeven Provincien and Heemskerk will be completed on schedule. We are expecting that Zeven Provincien will be passing De Hollandia around Cape Horn this August, and De Hollandia will commence her refit in September. This fall we are slated to commence the rebuild of De Hollandia, and will restart the Boerentange. Lead ships of the new minesweepers, minelayers, and submarines have been laid down. We have also obtained plans for Iberian assault boats and landing craft and plan to construct a handful for practice. Once the sonic detector tests on Zx-13 are finished, we will lay down the lead for the new sloop class. Scrapping of the Ijelsijk and Palembang classes is expected to commence this fall as well.
The scheduling of the De Hollandia and Zeven Provincien, along with CVx Hund appearance at Talons, means we will have three units in the South Atlantic this summer, which sounds like when the 15th division will be transiting the area. I realize we didnt budget for the matter, but I recommend combining any exercises involving the 15th division in the Kongo with naval maneuvers. We can also explore a possible exercise with the South Africans.
Our other concern is the treaty. The design bureau has completed our post-treaty OPFOR update, presuming the treaty does fail, and is not replaced, then De Vries believes we are looking at the following:
Battleships we expect to grow to roughly 270mx 33m x 9.75m. The later two dimensions are dictated by Panama and Suez, but even without those restrictions these are not unreasonable numbers. This gives a vessel of around 51,000 tons normal. Speed is expected to climb to 32-33 knots, allowing most treaty battleships to be caught. With a 5 deck, and 15 belt, they will likely mount around 9 x 16 guns.
Aircraft carriers will likely become more popular, simply as the removal of tonnage limits will allow more carriers of a viable size. The current vessels seem adequate for the role, and more platforms are desirable, so we are unlikely to see massive changes in size or speed. Considering the vulnerability, what we may see is more of the armored carriers, which field similar air groups, but are somewhat more resilient to light damage. The drawback is the airgroup size to cost ratio, and they are much harder to modify or repair if damaged as armor steel is difficult to work.
The treaty Cruiser A category will likely be replaced by battlecruisers with 10-12 guns, and about 32-34 knots of speed, and displace 20-30,000 tons. There may be an interim armored cruiser design like the Italian vessels, or our next proposed CA, but we expect that those will be overtaken by battlecruisers. As such, any expenditure of A tonnage should be with the expectation that 34kts is the minimum and in the future they will be working in conjunction with the light cruisers.
Treaty Cruiser B will likely remain, as there is to great a need for sheer numbers of capable vessels which they fulfill, though the speed will be pushed towards 34-35 knots, which will probably require more in the 8-10,000 range, but we believe the majority will be 6-8,000 and 34 knots. In order to remain in this range they will retain the 6 gun and armor.
Destroyers will likely remain in the 1600-2000 ton range, with a 34-35 knot speed.
How does this impact our fleet? Well this assessment points to the fact our lighter forces are already within acceptable range of the future OPFOR. It is our larger units which become less useful.
The De Rutyers, Utrechts and Heemskerck have adequate armor and reasonable main batteries, they will at least be able to contest the issue. The Ijilsiks are obsolete and will be scrapped. There had been discussion of a major reconstruction of the Zeven Provinciens, but studies show that even rebuilt they would not have the requisite guns or speed to oppose the new battleships, but with the current rebuild will still be effective against the new BCs, so we will proceed on De Hollandia.
Based on the forecast, it would appear that the Friesland CAs will be obsolescent, and the reconstruction to augment the deck armor likely not worth doing, but they will still be useful units and the major refit to refurbish the vessels and improve the secondary suite would still be worthwhile. The Breda CL are probably worth rebuilding with better, or some, deck armor.
For light anti-aircraft artillery, we are moving from the 1927 20mm mount to a new mount with a 23mm Madsen and the 23x152 cartridge. The field reports from the 40mm Hazemaijer mounts indicate they are a bit more of a maintenance concern than desired, but otherwise performing quite well. The reflector sight system coupled with the lead calculator is reliable, but requires good crew integration.
Development of the stabilized dual-purpose mounts is not going so well. The stabilized mounting systems are adequate in two dimensions but we are encountering repeated jams and mechanical failures, which is exacerbated in the tri-axle versions. A redesign has been ordered, but some very small pins in center of the apparatus are shearing completely and need to be replaced with a stronger material prior to some of the other issues being worked out. We havent fitted the quadaxial mounting prototypes, but the system requires 11 gyros to operate in a very complex arrangement, and we expect the same problems, so we are redesigning for a more robustly engineered version.
Simple scaling up of the Hazemeijer system did not account well for the additional mass and leverage effects of the larger mounts. Further we are having more issues with shorts. Experiments indicate they encounter adverse interaction with the ships motions- namely the compensators become overworked and break in moderate seas- and the seals are not sufficient to keep the units clean in the North Sea. This leads to maintenance issues, which are stressing the mounts further. Add in the aimed for compactness and lightness, and they are underbuilt and difficult to maintain. The early model, utilizing the heavy inertial mass attached to the lower portion of the subassembly is performing better, but the additional weight of the mass is undesirable.
On the bright side, the program to chrome plate the bores on liner changes looks to be a very successful choice, and we are seeing barrel life expectancies climb substantially.
As you know we will shortly be fitting the first operational directional telemobilescope navigation device on the ZP. Of the ones being tested on CLx Den Helder this shows the most promise. At this point it still lacks resolution and range to be effective as a night fighting tool, but may aid nighttime squadron navigation and station keeping. We expect doing it now in conjunction with the other electrical refits is best, as are having enough issues with shoehorning the Mk1 tachymetric fire control system into the ZP, as the damn ship was built to a different electrical standard.
The Phillips active directional underwater sonic detection and location system is performing within expectations, though we are experiencing reliability issues and need better system of integration to control rooms. The primary problem is shielding the mount at speeds of over 18 knots, we have tried a combination of both exterior clamshells and a retractable mount, and these are in testing on Zx13. At this juncture it looks like the best plan is to expect to field it in the sloops first, and then consider retrofitting destroyers.
On the nautical air front, we are fairly satisfied with the current group of aircraft. We are trying the D.XIXb on Hund, and it may replace the D.XVIIbis on the Brederode and Eendracht this year. The C.XIW floatplane is entering the fleet, and we are looking at the next generation of reconnaissance, both ship and maritime patrol.
Lastly, facility enhancement is going well. We expect Balikpapan to be fully operational later this year. The improvements at Tjilatjap are scheduled to commence this year, with the additional dredging being the greatest importance if we want the option to berth capital ships there regardless of tides.
Krook : Very good Van Deventer. So, de Rave, what do the Marines want, and no you cant have it. Joke.
Willem de Rave, Staatssecretaris of the Marines : Terribly funny Krook.
The primary project the Marines have is the semi-automatic rifle trials. If Loeder does schedule some exercises with the Kongo this summer, that may be a good opportunity. The Marines have taken delivery of the second batch of the Carden-Lloyd amphibious tankettes, and are considering a third.
The Marines would also like to consider augmentation of the current transports to allow a dedicated regimental landing and support, and adding some capacity for Kommando companies. Preferably in dedicated landing craft. The Iberian craft and assault boat designs will at least allow us to evolve a employment doctrine, and make advances in regards to amphibious defense doctrine.
Other than that, the only real news is the adoption of the 23mm anti-aircraft gun and incorporating it in the fire support battalions.
Krook : Draw up the design requests for the regimental lift capacity. I think after the diversion of shipping for the Queens Bolivian adventure, and this summer for the 15th Division, dedicated lift capacity may look more attractive.
Eduwart Land : De Rave, do not get the Marines hopes up. We have many, many demands on our finances, and redeploying the 15th instead of turning it into a reserve formation it has not had a good effect on them. I do not see how we will be able to fund such items until the second half of 1935 at the earliest. Lets get the exercises arranged, and fund that bombsight. I will expect proposals for restructuring the airforce reserves into a usable force supplement, and phasing out the FT-17s.
Thank you Gentlemen. Now, treasury?
This post has been edited 2 times, last edit by "Kaiser Kirk" (Apr 22nd 2007, 6:55pm)