WesWorld

The following comes from Christian, AKA Pengolodh. The Argentine fleet he describes, with the addition of the Italian-designed CAs and BCs recently posted by Red Admiral, should be considered "gospel", and ought to help out Ithekro at the least. I have made minor edits to Peng's note to remove reference to the USA entering the Great War, which he thought was the case. Although he does not speak to 1921 war losses, one can read between the lines and infer a fair bit.

Further information from Peng is in my mailbox and I will post it over the next few days as opportunity allows.


In 1913, a political decision was made to expand the domestic
shipbuilding capacity of Argentina, and also expand the capabilities of
the Argentine navy. Central in this new programme were two new
battleships, which were to be built domestically to a US design.
Important components would be manufactured abroad, but the ships would
be constructed in Argentina.

The first ships so constructed were eight destroyers, basically built
to a British design for the Turkish navy, but with American-made
turbine-sets, and laid down in 1914. Four more were laid down in 1915.
These were to supplement and partially replace the existing force of
destroyers/torpedoboats. Those in service range from the 340-ton
CORRIENTES-class of 1896-98 (being relegated to secondary coastal
roles) to the 950ton CORDOBA-class of 1910-12, built in various
nations.

At the same time as the four 1915 destroyers were ordered, two new
battleships were ordered, also for laying down in 1915. Heavy armour,
guns, and turbines would manufactured in the USA, but shipped to, and
assembled in, Argentina. The medium and light armour, and quickfiring
guns of 4inch and smaller calibre would be manufactured in Argentina.
These ships were intended to take the names of the two coast-defence
armourclads, but following the South-Georgian War the surviving
coast-defence ship was retained, and the battleship that was to have
had its name was renamed Capitan Gascón.

The ships would design-wise be in many respects similar to the
Nevada-class of the US Navy - of around 30,000 tons displacement, they
would have fewer but heavier guns: ten 14inch guns, in two
triple-turrets and two twin-turrets disposed symmetrically fore and
aft, twins superfiring. Like the Rivadavia-class, the new ships would
also mimick USA in their choice of cage-masts.

As far as protection was concerned, however, they would be more
conventional - where the Nevadas had a socalled "all or nothing"
armour-scheme, which either did not armour an area or else armoured it
with the heaviest armour, Argentina preferred for its ships a more
conventional incremental scheme. In the secondary armament there was
also a difference - where USA used a uniform battery of 5inch/51 in
casemates, Argentina chose a combination of 6inch and 4inch guns, as on
the Rivadavia-class battleships.

Unfortunately, it turned out that there were far greater difficulties
involved in setting up domestic shipbuilding-industry than had at first
been anticipated - this was painfully obvious with the destroyers, the
first being completed only in 1918, and approaching obsolesence. By
1916 this was so clear that the planned 1917 laying down of four scout
cruisers domestically was postponed.

The battleships fared little better. While the US-produced goods were
delivered on time, there were severe difficulties with construction of
the hull, and the domestic armour-mills intended to deliver medium
armour to the ships consistently failed to produce satisfactory armour
of thickness greater than 2.5 inches. Eventually, by 1917, it was
realised one had to order the medium armour from USA - unfortunately the order was not executed until after the Great War. The great
delays involved also caused problems for the shipyard, and in early
1918 the government had to intervene and essentially take over the
shipyard.

Combined with the other difficulties, this led to the battleships still
not being ready by the end of 1921 - although one was launched, and
beginning the fitting out process. One might ask why, in this case,
Argentina pushed ahead with the attack on South Georgia when it did,
rather than wait for the fleet expansion to complete. The answer is
mainly political - Argentina felt it could not wait. Once Great
Britain sold the islands, it essentially abandoned any claim to those
islands - if Argentina waited, that would allow Nordmark to gain a
claim on the islands, and make Argentina less able to gain
itnernational sympathy for its claim.

As a long-term consequence, Argentine has scaled down its ambitions for
building a domestic ability to manufacture warships. With the
armourmills having repeated quality-problems with armour thicker than 3
inches, and the shipyards having problems with complicated ships, it
was determined that in the future major warships would probably have to
be procured with far greater international assistance. Financial
setbacks following from the war with Nordmark, and the greater than
planned for expenses with the battleships and destroyers, caused delays
in naval programmes, and plans for classes of cruisers and destroyers
laid down domestically in the 1918-1923 period were shelved or delayed.


The important project following the South Georgian War was the
completion of the two battleships - the one was commissioned January
1923, and the second March following year - and reapirs of surviving
tonnage. Most notably, the large and relatively new armoured cruiser
SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD had been badly damaged in the South Georgian War,
and repairs were very extensive - so extensive, in fact, that under
normal conditions she would have been scrapped. Conditions were not
normal, however, and it was important to return her to service.

The repairs involved in fact opening up the armoured deck, as the
machinery was badly damaged - so badly damaged that there was in fact
little extra complication from replacing it rather than repairing it.
The opportunity was therefore taken to replace the coalfired boilers
and machinery (vertical triple expansion engines) with new, more
efficient oilfired boilers and machinery (turbines, perhaps supplied
from Italy?) since one had the ship open down to the engine-spaces
anyway. Sustainable top-speed was thus brought up to 29 knots. She
was returned to service by 1923. Her sister PRESIDENTE SARMIENTO,
while damaged in the war, was much less damaged, and therefore retains
her VTEx engines and 24knot top speed.

By 1926, the Argentine fleet would contain the following ships:
2 - LIBERTAD-class battleships:
LIBERTAD and CAPITAN GASCÓN (completed late 1923 and 24)
1 - 15200ton armoured cruiser, new machinery:
SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD
1 - 15200ton armoured cruiser:
PRESIDENTE SARMIENTO
1 - 6800ton armoured cruiser:
PUEYRREDON
1 - ???ton protected cruiser:
NUEVE DE JULIO
1 - 2300ton coast-defence armourclad:
INDEPENDENCIA
3 - light scout cruisers:
COMODORE PY, HIPOLITO BOUCHARD, ESPORA
6 - 1914-programme destroyers (cazatorpederos)
CERVANTES, YUCUMAN, JUAN DE GARRAY, SAN JUAN, SAN LUIS, SANTA CRUZ
309x28.6x9.5ft, 1098 tons
Turbines, 25,000 shp = 32 knots
5 - 4inch, 4 - 21inch TT
4 - 1916-programme destroyers
SALTO, SAN JUAN, BATHURST, KING
Particulars as 1914-programme
2 - French-built 950ton destroyers
MENDOZA, RIOJA
289.5x25.25x10.25ft, 950 tons
Rateau turbines, 18,000 shp = 32 knots,
4 - 4inch, 4 - 21inch TT
3 - German-built 950ton destroyers with ram bow
CORDOBA, LA PLATA, MURATURE
295x29.5x7.75ft, 950 tons,
Curtis (A.E.G.) turbines, 20,000 shp = 32 knots
range 2700nm/15 knots, 715nm/full speed
4 - 4inch, 4 - 21inch TT
4 - German-built 950ton destroyers with straight bow
CATAMARCA, JUJUY, JORGE, THORNE
288.67x27x8.5ft, 950 tons
Curtis (A.E.G.) turbines, 18,000 shp = 32 knots
range 3000nm/15 knots, 800nm/full speed
4 - 4inch, 4 - 21inch TT
3 - British-built 350ton torpedoboats
CORRIENTES, ENTRE RIOS, MISIONES
190x19.5x8.25ft, 340 tons
VTEx machinery, 4000 hp = 26 knots
range 900nm/15 knots
1 - 14pdr, 3 - 6pdr, 2 - 1pdr, 3 - 18inch TT
9 - large coastal torpedoboats:
~200-250 tons, ~25 knots (VTEx machinery),
four 18inch TT, two 3inch QF
10 - large coastal torpedoboats:
~100-130 tons, ~23-25 knots (VTEx machinery),
typically two 18inch TT, two 3pdr QF, 1 MG

Names vacant formerly used by battleships:
RIVADAVIA, MORENO
Names vacant formerly used by armoured cruisers:
GENERAL BELGRANO, GARIBALDI, GENERAL SAN MARTIN
Names vacant formerly used by protected cruisers:
BUENOS AIRES, ALMIRANTE BROWN
Name vacant formerly used by light cruisers:
SEQUI

One new name I have intended to make available as a new name for
destroyers or other ships to be named for dead heroes would be CAPITAN
JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN.

On the board for the ten-year period 1926-35 would be new cruisers, new
destroyers of ~1400-1500 tons, and a decision on what to do with the
two most powerful armoured cruisers. New cruisers would have the
highest priority.

There are several proposals regarding the future of this tonnage. The
four proposals that are shortlisted for decision are as follows:

1. Retain the ships in service as they are today
until worn out (but remove submerged torpedo-
tubes), then decommission without
replacement.

2. Re-engine PRESIDENTE SARMIENTO to the standard
of SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD, re-condition subsystems
of both ships as needed, remove submerged
torpedotubes.

3. Re-engine PRESIDENTE SARMIENTO to the standard
of SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD, replace existing 25.4cm
twin turrets with specially commissioned 20.3cm
triple turrets with guns similar to existing
20.3cm guns onboard the ships, re-condition
subsystems of both ships as needed, remove
submerged torpedotubes, reshape bows of both
ships for better seakeeping.

4. Retain the ships in service as they are today,
but commission replacement tonnage of roughly
similar tonnage using as main armament twin
12inch mounts salvaged from the wreck of the
MORENO (six mounts salvaged), re-use armament
from PRESIDENTE SARMIENTO and SANTÍSIMA
TRINIDAD as coastal artillery. Due to drydock
restrictions, any replacement-tonnage is
limited to 600 ft length, 100ft beam, and
30ft draft when being docked.

I see that the Italian designed battlecruisers exceed the dimensions of the drydocks Peng alludes to. I think it would be reasonable to assume that Argentina will be able to expand a drydock to Class Three to accommodate the ships by the time they're in service.

Mucho thanks!

I regret that it has been collecting dust for a bit, but life has just been too crazy of late to do anything about it. Things seems to be slowing down now...thank the gods. So as I said, I should be able to excavate some more info from Chris to post in the next few days.

Interesting, now all that is missing is how involved Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia were durring the South Georgian War. That would greatly effect politics with those nations.

So That is what my Neighbor has...as of 2-3 years ago.

With the few additions I can remember that bring the Argentine Fleet to the following: (roughly)

2 BB
2 BC (planning)
2 HAC (Heavy Armored Cruisers)
2 CA
1 AC
6 CL/PC
22 DD
19 TB

Compared to Chile's Fleet: (also roughly)

2 BB
1 CDS (the two CDS will not be in service together)
2 PD
1 HAC
1 AC
1 CA (building)
1 CVL (building)
8 CL/PC (1 of which are building)
1 CLV
14 DD
12 SC

Comments.

Looks like you needsome more DD's/TB's.

I thought you had 2 CA's building, 1 in Atlantis?

T'wouldn't surprise me if the Argies go for an Italian-built CV, next...

I haven't started building the one CA in Chile yet.

Quoted

Originally posted by Swamphen
T'wouldn't surprise me if the Argies go for an Italian-built CV, next...

Well you know the ABC nations tend to seek to one up each other so who knows. Will the Argies be able to afford it following the Italian BC builds? Will Brazil beat em to the punch?

Knowing that Brazil started the dreadnought push in that region of the world, I'd say yes.

Rocky - thanks for posting.

It is my understanding that Argentina has stretched it financial resources to the edge (if not beyond) to order two small BCs from Italy. They even had to re-use old guns to save money. So I really can´t see how they could order a fleet carrier during the next few years. Some experiments with a converted hull should be possible, thought.

Perhaps Presidente Sarmiento could be a conversion canidate?

Tho you're right, Brazil would probably do it first.

Armoured cruisers cannot be converted into carriers. The Argies will probably build one eventually, but having just massively invested in 2xBC and 2xCA they will be held up for some time. THey will have superiority anyway.

She is only 22 feet shorter then the Chilean Light Cruiser that is being converted, and 11 feet wider. She'd be slower then the Chilean carrier, but might have a suitable aircraft compliment for the region.

But that isn't my navy. Besides I have to go on the assumtion that Chile needs to maintain counters for the HAC as well as the expected Battlecruisers and Heavy Cruisers. Right now the Predreadnoughts are the HAC's counters, and Tylor, Capitan Prat (and soon to be Almirante Gideon) and O'Higgins are the AC and CA's counters. Prat will be scrapped in 1929 as soon as the Gideon enters full service around June.

As I expected....Chile as a little catch up work to do....hense the Capitan Oyama-class to counter the HACs. But the BC's may need something else to counter them.

I meant for a practicle aircraft carrier.

Colossus is about the smallest you can go for a fully-working carrier and even so, aircraft and munitions are limited. For comparison, Urumi has armour, 150mm guns, more speed, less hangar space, more aircraft, but is the same basic size. Small carriers don't work well.

Depends on how you use em. As fleet carriers, no, but used like the Independance Carriers as support for their larger sisters they work reasonably well.

Of course we won't find that out till a war breaks out and carrier doctrine rapidly developes.

Yes that is true...in 1928...who will know that small carriers are bad? Ranger wasn't even finished by this point. And the idea at the time was for more smaller carriers rather than fewer big carriers. (they changed there minds of course after experiance with the Lexingtons and Ranger increased).

Well, American experience with the Sackets Harbor light carriers has been mixed. They certainly seem less capable of operations in rough seas than their larger sisters, though they provide more decks for launching scouting missions, etc... Future US CV's will be primarily large fleet carriers. Smaller ships will be limited to the conversions envisioned under War Plan Orange and actually built during WW2.

This is a lesson that will no doubt be learned with the Alioth class CV in reguards to Atlantis, but again with tonnage limits in the CT, nations will have to decide on larger or smaller carriers.