A "summary". Thanks to Kirk, Gavin, and RLBH for Asir-related feedback/comment/plot advancement. Apologies to Ithekro and Swampy for omission of certain items - these deserve more detail than a paragraph, and I'll attempt to write them up shortly.
*Clears throat...*
Indian News Wrap-up for Q3, 1932
Asir:
On 3 July, Saudi Arabia announces that sickness in the Indian refugee camp has been contained, and that the camp will now be opened to Red Crescent observers. They warn, however, that Indian provocateurs are working within the camp to slander about Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian efforts. “All statements coming from the camp should be viewed from the perspective that their government is waging a war of conquest against our nation”, notes Prince Yusuf Ali Ibn Saud.
Representatives from the humanitarian agency, along with several neutral radio and newspaper reporters, fly in from Cairo (via Jiddah) shortly afterward and report that current conditions are adequate, with an imam from Dhaka having assumed an informal leadership position. However, they also report that the refugees claim they lived in squalor, with a serious cholera outbreak that claimed approximately six hundred lives. It was only at the beginning of May, the pilgrims tell the Red Cresecent, that the Saudis suddenly made an effort to improve the state of the camp.
Red Crescent officials begin negotiating the release of the pilgrims and their passage out of Saudi Arabia on neutral vessels - Dutch passenger liners laid idle by El Derretir are available, for example, to transport the pilgrims up to Turkey or over to Aden. Saudi officials discuss the notion on and off over the course of a few weeks, but abruptly refuse to allow it as of 7 August. They also order that future Red Crescent trips into or out of the country use Medina and not Mecca or Jiddah.
The camp, incidently, is indeed the one India had spotted east of Al Muwayh, about one hundred twenty miles east-northeast of Mecca. Saudi Arabia’s sudden reversal on camp access puzzles the military and government alike, but both recognize that with the camp now under international scrutiny, there is less pressure to launch an immediate military operation to liberate it. A planned landing just south of Jiddah, scheduled for mid-July, is accordingly postponed and the assets tasked elsewhere.
On 8 July, the Indian submarine I-21 conducts a night time transit of the Bab el-Mandab and enters the Red Sea. After a brief stop at As Salif, she heads north and passes through the Straits of Tiran, using the wider of the two Egyptian channels, on the night of 19 July. Though detected by RAF fly-overs the following day, the submarine arrives off Hqal unseen by Saudi eyes. Two Bhulans (“Indus Dolphins” - ~human torpedoes) are unloaded from the boat’s locker on the night of 20 July and four AOWWT (Atypical Operations, Weapons & Warfare Team) men steer them in toward the town. One breaks down two miles from the shore; the two crewmen eventually swim back to the submarine, though it takes them some time to find her.
Amiir al-Bihar is surrounded by a log boom and an improvised torpedo net constructed of fishing nets. As the outer boom is just a few dozen feet from the warship, the Bhulan crew slide off their vehicle and use a short line to tether it to the boom. They detach the Bhulan’s warhead, which is weighted to have approximately neutral buoyancy, and swim under the boom. When they reach the net, they cut through it at the waterline with knives. Soon the Indian dolphinmen have attached the warhead to the old warship’s hull, using magnets to hold it three feet below the waterline, approximately amidships.
A sentry on the Amiir al-Bihar spots the Bhulan as it attempts to escape; the heads and shoulders of the two operators have appeared as darker blotches on the sea. Gunfire kills one of the AOWWT men; the other spends the next hour evading a pair of troop-carrying fishing boats. He ultimately misses his rendezvous with I-21, abandons his Bhulan as far from the Saudi coast as possible (opening a stop-cock to sink the vehicle), and is rescued on the morning of the 23rd by a British tramp freighter bound for Aqaba.
As for Amiir al-Bihar, the limpet mine detonates twelve minutes after the alarm is sounded, blowing a three foot hole in the side of the ship. Although the Saudis have closed up much of the ship as a result of the alarm, the explosion has breached the coal bunkerage and the engine room, flooding both before the crew can react. The ship sinks on an even keel, her main deck two feet below the water.
Fighting on land between Saudi Arabia and India begins to change in scope. While India’s Sixteenth Field Force is up to two divisions and a regiment (Chakravaat, Sind Krait, plus the Filipino 2nd Independent Infantry), logistics and the wide front preclude any serious attempt at an offensive. Indian aircraft harass and strafe any large group of horsemen they see, and the Camel Corps tangle with others. Casualties continue to add up on both sides, but if there is one nation in the world that can afford a limited game of attrition, it is India.
Action in the Persian Gulf is limited. The Saudis attempt to time their operations with the absence of the Japanese carrier unit, but is not always successful. Eight small craft are lost, against two tankers damaged and one Persian minesweeper, the elderly M1, sunk. On 14 September, however, a Persian fishing trawler is lost after striking a mine, leading to delays in Indo-Persian operations while minesweeping forces work to sanitize Persian ports. This leads to the cancellation of a planned intercept of a British-flagged Shell freighter thought to be smuggling ex-Dutch military equipment into eastern Saudi Arabia. Indian officials instead send a note to the British consulate in Aden asking the UK to investigate the matter.
Just as it is controlling action to the north, logistics also determines the course of fighting between India and Yemen. Despite modest improvements to facilities at As Salif in the past decade, the ports there and in Jizan are strained to their limits supplying the needs of the five Indian divisions facing Yemen. India’s ability to launch offensives is limited, particularly further inland where dust, heat, poor roads, and occasional bands of Yemeni irregulars impede supply efforts. India thus initiates a plan that is logistically feasible while also promising to improve the situation if successful.
The operation begins on 13 August with demonstrations by Indian warships and Filipino assault transports off the southern Yemeni port of Mocha; two days later, Indian naval infantry stage a night raid against Al Khawkhah, on the mainland east of the Hanish Islands. The raid is of limited military value, but results in the destruction of four armed speedboats before the Indians withdraw. A further demonstration off Al Hodeida on the 17th results in a skirmish between light naval forces that costs India an MTB.
Action then moves inland from west to east at a slower pace; first, the Green Dervish division pushes south along the coast to the village of Marzi’ah, fifteen kilometres north of Al Hodeida; then the South Assam Rifles seize ground further inland. The intention is to appear as if the offensive will culminate with a large attack against Sa’dah, in eastern Asir, but while the Indians do make some limited attacks in that area, the main blow ends up falling on 28 August at the port city of Al Hodeida.
Before sunrise, the Indian destroyer Srinigar and the torpedo-boat T-19 run into Al Hodeida’s harbour and pull up alongside piers where they disgorge three companies of naval infantrymen and a small advance party from the 2nd Chittagong Regular Division. Within a few minutes, the ships have cast off and are creeping offshore, using their main guns to fire starshell and shoot back at a handful of light artillery emplacements along the harbour front, while the lighter guns seek out troop positions. The naval infantry make good progress and secure two pier complexes and several adjacent structures before their advance pauses in the face of increasing Yemeni resistence.
As the naval infantrymen are securing their initial objectives, the raid escalates into a landing as the Japanese attack transport Go Ni 1-V runs alongside the Indian-held pier. A line company and heavy weapons platoon from the 2nd Chittagong Regulars scurry ashore, directed to their positions by the divisional advanced party. Go Ni 1-III arrives six minutes later and disgorges a second line company and part of a regimental command team. By 0730, the Division’s 3rd Regiment (less its field artillery battalion) is ashore, along with a company of armored cars. With As Salif barely fifty nautical miles away, the transport group (twelve Japanese and Filipino Go Ni types plus India’s Field Marshal Dhoni and three landing craft [vehicle]) and escorts run north, embark the waiting 1st Regiment, and have them ashore by evening. The battleship Akbar, aircraft carrier Urumi, and escorts remain on station, sinking three Yemeni speedboats and harassing Yemeni troops ashore while suffering damage to a destroyer and the loss of two aircraft.
The fight for the city lasts eight days, during which the Green Dervish divisions muscles down from the north and links up with the Regulars. Yemeni troops are gradually pushed east, out of the city, before a push by the South Assam Rifles at the feet of the highlands threatens to trap the defenders. The Yemenis make a steady but measured withdrawal in two directions - to the town Bajil, at the base of the highlands and along the road to Sana’a - and Zabid, a town along the main road leading to the more southerly ports.
Al Hodieda’s harbour is not fully restored to working order until mid-September, but with the city’s population not actively resisting the Indian garrison, supplies for three divisions begin entering the city on 22 September, greatly alleviating Indian logistical concerns.
It is at this time that Indian troops start encountering groups of soldiers dressed in very new and sometimes not-quite-correct Yemeni uniforms, equipped with weapons of Italian manufacture. The few prisoners captured from skirmishes with these groups claim to be from southern Yemen, but a linguist flown in from India expresses his belief that they are in fact from eastern Africa. The government chooses not to press the matter yet, but the military is tasked with planning operations in the coming months that will prevent further infiltration of EAS troops and equipment into Yemen.
Other International Events
Given the focus on Asir and El Derretir, India is somewhat absent on the international stage. Her forces are too busy with Asir and El Derretir to lend assistance to China’s hunt for the pirate Ning Hai. India declines invitations to events such as Talons Over Cordoba and the Olympics. The presence at other events such as the Spithead Naval Review are limited and pale in comparison to the rather large contingents sent by nations such as Australia. India pays little to no attention to conflicts in South America, other than watching for any indication that South Africa may be drawn into the expanding chaos there.
The Cowes Naval Conference takes place and the subsequent view from Hyderabad is that while things did not go particularly well, they could certainly have gone worse. The treaty is intact, if shaken. India’s own allies have not really helped matters in this regard, but when those same allies are lending valuable naval resources to the campaign in Asir, it is hardly prudent to say so publically. Canada’s inventive justification for not being part of the Cleito Treaty is viewed as a convenient way of circumventing the issue of a nation withdrawing from the treaty, hence Indian acceptance of the explanation for both Canada and Australia. Although Canada is perceived to be over-reacting to world events, their fundamental issue of national security is considered valid; Australia’s determination to sacrifice international diplomacy in favor of lining the pockets of a few businessmen is viewed less favorably.
Third-party proposals that might have helped address the Bharatiya Nau Sena’s unease over recent Italian cruiser developments have been quashed. India had seen the Australian CDS and the Chilean mid-size tonnage categories as a combined means of adding heavy cruiser or light battlecruisers to the allowable roster, but some other Contracting Powers have evidently felt this was not a desirable outcome and voted the motions down.
India does not respond to Australia’s offer to hold naval arms limitations talks in 1934; privately, Samraja Brashkar views it as a matter that can wait until later, while his wife Urmila is opposed to entering into further treaties with nations she views as “untrustworthy”.
Samraja Brashkar attends to other matters - diplomatic discussions with France, and economic discussions with Germany - as time permits. No public announcements are made on these matters.
Domestic News
It becomes evident that India is coming to grips with El Derretir. The number of outbreaks - and the average number of cases resulting from outbreaks - are in decline as the medical sector becomes more proficient at recognizing and treating patients. The civilian population is also more alert and health-conscious; unpleasant rumors about a town called Baldia begin circulating in September, motivating those who were not previously concerned with their neighbour’s well-being. There are no reports of cross-border infection, prompting Samraji Urmila to praise the efforts of the British, Siamese, Danish, and Dutch governments for their effective actions against the plague. She is quoted as saying, “Wherever the seat of power may be, a government which takes seriously its responsibilities to its people shall earn my respect far sooner than one which does not.”
Nonetheless, two serious outbreaks do afflict eastern India. The disease finally manages to reach Sittwe, bring that city to a stand-still for much of July. Dhaka is hit in an area that had previously escaped the disease: the University of Dhaka’s engineering and sciences departments are ravaged and several dozen promising young minds are lost.
The annual typhoon season is mercifully quiet in comparison to previous years. Two storms do inflict damage and deaths along the Mouths of the Ganges, but the loss of life is the lowest in several years.
Admiral of the Navy Kashiram Paswan meets with Samraja Brashkar in early August to discuss his position as commander-in-chief of the Bharatiya Nau Sena. Admiral Paswan had intended to retire at the end of the year, but is loath to do so during the current crises facing India. The two men discuss the situation and agree that Admiral Paswan will remain in his position for the duration of the conflict, but that there will be a shuffle to ensure that his successor is in place for a quick and seamless transition afterward. The successor - Vice-Admiral Fadil Epp - is appointed to the Capital Projects Command, to give him some additional experience in the procurement and asset-management side of the navy’s operations before his anticipated promotion.
The Bharatiya Nau Sena’s own emergency military efforts include the requisitioning of additional passenger ships for conversion to infantry landing ships, which the military expects are going to be needed again to deal with Saudi Arabia at some point. High-speed escorts are laid down for use in defending convoys against lightly-armed small craft. Several other trawlers and a freighter are requisitioned for refits into various harbour defence roles, but work does not begin until October.
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Quoted
Canada’s inventive justification for not being part of the Cleito Treaty is viewed as a convenient way of circumventing the issue of a nation withdrawing from the treaty, hence Indian acceptance of the explanation for both Canada and Australia. Although Canada is perceived to be over-reacting to world events, their fundamental issue of national security is considered valid; Australia’s determination to sacrifice international diplomacy in favor of lining the pockets of a few businessmen is viewed less favorably.
Friday, May 31st 2024, 10:14am
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