WesWorld

This post is in this forum as it is not "news". Your in-player identities have no knowledge of what happens here. This thread will be made up of 2 parts; a government report; and a discussion on its proposals.

I'd appreciate it if we didn't get too far off track.

A few things to consider;

The government wants to cut naval spending.
Ignore the Cleito Treaty for the moment.
Re-read that Jones' interview for the prevailing view of Supermarina.

Credit for the report must go to Jacques Sapir/Fantasque, which has been substantially altered by myself.

[size=1]By Jacques Sapir and Conte di Rosso[/size]


Cruiser construction is pro-eminent in thinking leading to Fleet rebuilding post-war. Initially cruisers were supposed to play four distinct war roles entailing different specifications:

Strategic scouting (long range, good communication)
Tactical scouting (good armament and protection to fight for information)
Fleet screening (high speed to be combined with DD, good torpedo armament)
SLOC off/def (long range, good armament to dispose off any AMC or trade cruiser).

Peace employment includes training and enforcing political presence.

These different missions traditionally are split into three different cruiser types, the Fast ACR (Pisa, San Marco), armed with 10" guns and with good protection for tactical scouting, the large trade cruiser for SLOC off/def and strategic scouting (which plays little part in Italian thinking), and the small fleet cruiser (Quarto Esploratori types) for fleet screening. Such thinking was explicit during first talks held in winter 1924/25 and have lead to the June 1928 conference about fleet rebuilding. Even if no new major ship construction is seen possible before 1933 for economic reasons, a long-range plan has to be drafted. Capitalizing on the brief clash between Denmark and India, both the fast ACR and the fleet cruisers are seen as vindicated. The trade cruiser is something of a novelty, but plays more on Italian minds as we become closer to Iberia and her overseas territories. However, other naval powers are building large cruisers armed with 8" or 210mm guns (the so-called Cleito-type) and it made sense to assume that any new large cruiser had to be able to fight "treaty" cruisers.

In 1928 thinking has evolved fast. First studies done at the Naval War College demonstrated that iterations of the "treaty" type are weak on armour. The fast ACR could be then a very potent cruiser-killer. At this point carrier-based aviation was becoming a relevant factor both for tactical scouting (hence relieving the need for an ACR or scout cruiser) and for strike, with the development of torpedo-carrying planes. It has to be noted that the Italian Air Attaché in Germany had sent by spring 1927 a complete report about dive-bombing trials done in Germany and Soviet Union. The potential of Dive-Bombers has begun to be appreciated in the Navy by 1928 when a study demonstrated that a 250kg bomb launched at 1500m would be equivalent to a 10" shell. The newly tested two-seat scout aircraft designed by the Fiat company could be turned into a provisional dive-bomber. Quick progresses in aircraft engine design are promising powers between 800hp to 1000hp for mid-30's. Already, there exist existed 2 1000hp engines of Fiat and Isotta-Fraschini design, but development is proving troublesome. Planes able to carry a 500kg AP bomb (equivalent to a 12" shell) or even a 750kg one (equivalent to a 14" shell) could well be at hand by the mid -30s. Combined to torpedo-delivering planes, which are the our much favoured type, it appears that Carrier-based air groups could deliver a considerable punch, or at least a useful hinderance, when ships of the "New Navy" would be completed.

Now it is important to recall what is the main strategic assumption of Italian military authorities. We assume that the country would not face the full strength of a possible enemy (seen by 1928/27 as either the USA, Atlantis, SAE or SATSUMA) because such enemy would have to husband a large part of his naval forces against another major naval powers. Hence a limited fleet could be quite enough to have a deterrence effect, the more so because countries supposed to be possible enemies did not have major naval bases close to Italy apart from France. Hits on capital ships, even if not lethal would imply retreat to well equipped base and would let the enemy at a diminished strength to face his possible other competitors.
Actually, the Minister for Defence and Military Affairs Paulo Yue stated at a Defense Council meeting in March 1927:
"If you can cut your enemy's arm and let him face his other adversaries with just one hand you will make him think twice before attacking a country he can't see as a major military threat for him. Building up our forces to achieve a complete kill against any major world power would then be a waste of resources badly needed in other places. What our country needs is a combination of forces making the prospect of any intervention against us as a protracted and risky business implying such losses, both military and political at home, that the interventionist would be considerably weakened when confronting his opponents in the struggle for world supremacy. In the context of the current world's correlation of forces between major powers this would give a weaker military power like us an effective lever against stronger powers."

Another growing influence on our thinking has been the need to operate in 3 distinct areas; the Meditterenean first and foremost; the Red Sea and Indian Ocean; and the Atlantic and Carribean in support of our erstwhile ally. Even so, the firming up of relations between Italy and the Netherlands has raised yet another possibility, that of operations in the East Indies.
Operations in the Meditterenean are seen to be berefit of BBs. They are seen as too valuable to risk in an environment rich in small craft. However the aircraft carrier-cruiser group gives visibility yet limited expendability, which is seen as essential. The situation in the Indian Ocean is different. With vast ocean to search, encounters are expected to be rare, again lending support to the Carrier-cruiser group to bring an enemy to battle. Warfare in the Carribean and Atlantic is seen to be an extension of the Meditterenean, with sporadic clashes and confused battles. The shorter ranges and larger draughts of our battleships ensure that they will be impossible to use in the Carribean and most probably restricted to operations in the Bay of Biscay and around the Azores. The fast ACR has a perfect environment here in which it can sucessfully both interdict traffic and hunt on the high seas.

A new mission is appearing for the cruiser force, which is Carrier-escort at night and in bad weather against cruisers and destroyers during the opening phases of operations. In bad weather or at night, CVs could encounter enemy cruisers; hence a potent cruiser was needed. Experience in naval exercises with KDM Jutland have shown this vulnerability. But carriers are also to expect air attack and be able to destroy enemy scouting aircraft, hence a good AA platform is a requirement for any CV-escort. The demise of tactical scouting does not translate into the demise of the large cruiser, which can become a specialised CV escort coupled with a trade protector/raider whilst the CV takes on the role of scouting.
With the newly-elected government in 1928, finances have become a important factor too. Some doubts were raised on the cost estimates of a full program with 5 BBs, backed by Zara-type cruisers and 2 aircraft carriers. The cost of this program is roughly £120m. When coupled with the need to improve infrastructure in the EAS, this is unaffordable.
The BB project is already clearly in trouble, despite 1 ship being laid down, as aviators are proclaiming their ability to deliver heavy bombs and torpedoes quite accurately. Politically too the BB project is becoming highly sensitive as there is much muttering in foreign countries over our interests. Internally, there are some factions who would like to make far-reaching liberal reforms than construct vessels of limited purpose. The lack of activity of the Italian battleships in the war has questioned the rational behind their existance. Their only real affect was in shore bombardment; the projection of sea power onto land. This is something naval aircraft are able to do for less cost.
A heavy cruiser force is seen as politically less damaging as a true cruiser race has already developed between Cleito-treaty powers. But, if political angles were to be accepted, then the fast and well armoured battlecruiser was problematical too. Now, in 1928 this project has evolved into a large ship which could grow still. A conference held in June 1928 at the Naval War College reached the following conclusions:

:-BB construction has to be abandoned altogether, as BBs are too expensive and too limited a design.

:-A large CV force (4 new, purpose-built carriers) is desirable and has to be escorted by large cruisers, and fleet cruiser began to mean now a CV-escort type.

:-The Zara type cruiser should be a excellent vessel but is too limited with regard to the 5 roles imposed on it. A reduced version of the A2 design which at the moment is a small battlecruiser with VIII x 10" (4xII), VIII x 130mm, and XII x 100/47 AA, could be scaled down and used for an 8in cruiser.

I propose the curtailing of future battleship construction until such a time when economic conditions allow for a large naval construction program to be instigated. The current fleet of battleships should be sold by 1933 with the exception of the Caracciolo-Class and Lepanto. The older ships are too limited, too small and too slow. The 2 aircraft carriers currently under construction will be completed along with 2 of new construction. A detailed study into the A2 design should be produced for the production of at least 12 vessels by 1933. Initial estimates for this program are of around £50-60m, a significant saving over the battleship program.

Very interesting work. It's good to see you work foreign developments into the study.

I assume the dive-bombing info is historical?

Building a dozen A2 cruisers with 10" guns would be problematic, given the currnet text of the Cleito Treaty - they'd count as capital ships, and Italy's only got nine hulls alloted to it in that regard. So it'll be interesting to see how this document ties in with your position at the treaty conference.

Aside from 'Soviet Union' = 'Russia' the dive-bombing probably occurs in the WesWorld, too.

We really, really need an active German player... :-/

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Building a dozen A2 cruisers with 10" guns would be problematic, given the currnet text of the Cleito Treaty - they'd count as capital ships, and Italy's only got nine hulls alloted to it in that regard.

That's why the report proposes scaling them down to 8"-armed ships.

I could see both types being built, actually - one or two of the 10" version, perhaps, and the rest the smaller 8" (A3?) ships.

Does the '4 new carriers' include the two "Europa" type or are we talking about 4 more?

Excellent work, BTW. :thumbs-up:

I smell Italy angling to transfer numbers limited BB allocation to unlimited large cruisers tonnage. I see Italy has the trouble of specifications for ships for short range Med operations and long range Indian Ocean deployment. Something that can only be satisfied with larger ships and inevitably, larger guns.

So it looks like the RM is pursuing a force structure of 4 carrier battle groups with a carrier and 3 large cruisers for operations in No.1 the Med and No. 2 Indian Ocean/Atlantic.

Cheers,

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I assume the dive-bombing info is historical?

Yes. There is quite a bit of info from Fantasque's paper that I used.

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Building a dozen A2 cruisers with 10" guns would be problematic, given the currnet text of the Cleito Treaty - they'd count as capital ships, and Italy's only got nine hulls alloted to it in that regard. So it'll be interesting to see how this document ties in with your position at the treaty conference

A2 is the denotation for the hull form. A smaller 8" armed vessel is proposed. Which is just legal under the Treaty.

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I could see both types being built, actually - one or two of the 10" version, perhaps, and the rest the smaller 8" (A3?) ships.

Does the '4 new carriers' include the two "Europa" type or are we talking about 4 more?

We'll have to see. The 8" armed version will definitely come first. The 4 new carriers includes the Europa type, 1 replacement for FM and 1 additional.

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I smell Italy angling to transfer numbers limited BB allocation to unlimited large cruisers tonnage. I see Italy has the trouble of specifications for ships for short range Med operations and long range Indian Ocean deployment. Something that can only be satisfied with larger ships and inevitably, larger guns.

Really? I wonder where you get that idea from? Larger guns aren't a necessity, neither are larger guns. The study mentions the need for expendability thus too large ships are precluded. So Italy will definitely not build Oyama-types.

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So it looks like the RM is pursuing a force structure of 4 carrier battle groups with a carrier and 3 large cruisers for operations in No.1 the Med and No. 2 Indian Ocean/Atlantic.

I hadn't considered that option actually. I'd prefer some cruisers for individual operations rather than tying them up to carriers.

Any thoughts or input as to what Italy should do?

Will the new Zara-type be classified as large cruisers/fast armored cruisers, or will Italy invest in a new type for that particular mission? As the Oyama-type does not appeal to you, what smaller, option did you have in mind?

The Zara-Type are heavy cruisers and don't fit into this particulary well. They are more for independant cruiser operations. They are too small for ACRs.

The Oyama-Type is too big. A well armoured type with 8"guns is proposed, but apart from the firepower she doesn't lose out to Oyama too much.

Swampy has already seen a possible version elsewhere.

"...but apart from the firepower she doesn't lose out to Oyama too much."

I have no doubt about that. Oyama is a "bigger is better" excersice because is can be done.

I was told over the weekend that treaty cruisers were armored like they were to take fire from 60 degrees off the broadside. Meaning they could stand hits from shots fired from 60 degrees off the broadside in either a chase or retreat. That generally is not taken into account in most games. It makes some sense when you figure that a ship of 8,000 - 10,000 tons can't take on enough armor to stand up to its own shells and maintian speed and firepower. I would guess, this would also give rise to the three turrets forward approach that could fire 30 degrees off the bow. This would also mean that broadsides would be considered risky to the owners cruiser as it would expose a weakness of the design to enemy fire.

What would Italy do with the battleship hulls under construction now? And how are they planning on selling the older battleships if the treaty is not amended?

Well the DA is already in Turkeys hands so if the treaty is ammended that deals clinched. I could see Turkey being interested in aquiring some of the Dulio or Cavour class as well given the fact they alsomount 12" guns allowing for a standard gun caliber for the BB's of the fleet.

It all depends on how the treaty pans out, what Italy does with its older BB's and how much Turkey is willing to spend for its own fleet.

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I was told over the weekend that treaty cruisers were armored like they were to take fire from 60 degrees off the broadside. Meaning they could stand hits from shots fired from 60 degrees off the broadside in either a chase or retreat. That generally is not taken into account in most games. It makes some sense when you figure that a ship of 8,000 - 10,000 tons can't take on enough armor to stand up to its own shells and maintian speed and firepower. I would guess, this would also give rise to the three turrets forward approach that could fire 30 degrees off the bow. This would also mean that broadsides would be considered risky to the owners cruiser as it would expose a weakness of the design to enemy fire.

Targets angles of 20-30 degrees are more likely when not running towards or away. Italian calculations went for TA of 25 degrees. Treaty cruisers here are still poorly armoured. They may have thicker plates, but those plates cover far less of the hull. They lack armoured volume.

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What would Italy do with the battleship hulls under construction now? And how are they planning on selling the older battleships if the treaty is not amended?

The older battleships can be scrapped by 1933. PEdS under construction now will be scrapped where she lies.

A 13,000-ton ship is just large enough for a "conventional" Armoured Cruiser armoured belt; the latest version of Basilan, for instance, is 682.41' and 13,500-actual standard (will be 13,000 claimed, of course); the armoured belt is 426.51' of 150mm plate.

(Which, BTW, squares nicely with the picture for once - calculating from that, the minimum belt length to cover engines+magazines is 415'.)


As for the Italian BBs - if the Treaty is changed to allow them to be sold, they will be in need of a refit immediately by their new owner (they haven't been refit any later than 1920...); but I could see, perhaps, the Argentines being interested in one or two... ;-)

If the new treaty was revised to allow the sale of Italian BB to Turkey then Greece would withdraw... but I digress.

I imagine Italy would only sell if Turkey could afford the battleships.

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I imagine Italy would only sell if Turkey could afford the battleships.

They would only need pay better than scrap prices and the ex-BB market would be saturated with ships for sale.

If the ships that Turkey has leased from Italy while other ships are being refitted were to stay in Turkish hands then Greece would withdraw from the treaty.

Cheers,

How does Italy see its carrier operations?

If I read this report correctly, then Italy will start using carriers like a capital ship with at least some screening forces by say 1933. I'd assume that one carrier would be in each operations area with one in reserve to bolster any trouble spots.
The report suggests the development of a dedicated escort cruiser for the carriers (or actually it suggests a Fast Armored Cruiser as an escort). That would translate to at least 4 - 8 such cruisers.
But what destroyer types would be assigned to such a force? Gun heavy? Anti-sub types? Anti-air types? Or a torpedo heavy type for the odd capital ship as a raider type?

(And somewhere it was suggested that a treaty nation, can't back out of the treaty until the treaty's expiration date, and that nation would have to give a year to twos notice. Of course, I don't know how they would enforce that if you wanted to back out.)

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Originally posted by alt_naval
If the new treaty was revised to allow the sale of Italian BB to Turkey then Greece would withdraw... but I digress.

...which is presicely why Turkey has no inclination of joining the CT. However I'd rather not cloud this thread up with counter threats, but I do stress that Turkey at this point is merely "interested" in Italy's elderly battleships .

BTW Gavin nice work.

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BTW Gavin nice work.

Yes, I agree, well done.

However, it would be handy to know more of Italy's Risk Areas assesment; the diplomatic strategy to deal with the risks, the national defence strategy and then the naval strategy to properly comment on Italy's building strategy and force structure. eg. Italy's Indian Ocean aspirations are hostage to the UK and a lesser extent, the SAE. How do these countries react to the RM in the Indian Ocean or is a massive investment in Italian East Africa on the cards to counter perceived threats? 'Alliance value' or 'Risk Theory' are not that substantive.

Cheers,

One also has to wonder about Italy's Atlantic aspirations, there are three major nations who would challenge Italy's presence there, not including allies.

I thought the Iberians would handle the Atlantic Ocean with only support from the Italians if needed.