The Admiralty had met to discuss the intelligence reports of increased construction of amphibious assault vessels in Germany and what that might indicate and how best to respond to the threat.
The Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir William Jock Whitworth, began by outlining the current construction and strengths, highlighting Germany now possessed 16 large transports and around 230 landing craft of various types, a force probably twice that of the Navy's capability, which of course was spread amongst three fleets globally. More worrying was the sign this construction was not slowing.
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear-Admiral Eric Longley-Cook, added a little detail from the latest reports by the naval attaché to Germany, Captain Alfred Burcough and other sources, such as MI6. This was mostly technical detail, it fell to the First Lord of the Admiralty, A. V. Alexander, to outline the political aspects; "Gentlemen, for some time past it has become clear through political channels from Paris, that the build up of auxiliary support forces was a conscious effort by the Grand Alliance partners to divide their resources, the main aim being the sending of a large fleet to the Pacific if war broke out with China. Germany would supply a repair and resupply organisation along with a taskforce to support the Russian Pacific Fleet. Now its probable this amphibious programme is for the same aim, even so it is evident that such a force would be used to attack the British Isles, most probably from harbours in France along the Channel, with perhaps some larger units crossing the North Sea."
Longley-Cook added his summing up, "the fleet is mostly short-range craft, transporting it to the Pacific would be difficult, the threat to our security cannot be ignored. Most of the fleet are short-range craft, at most a strike across the North Sea, the Channel more likely but those harbours would be closer to our airfields and of course Germany would need to secure superiority in the North Sea. Even so, 230 landing craft are probably not sufficient to make a serious invasion possible, especially if the Army was already mobilised, the German strength suggests at present sufficient for an intervention task force but not a serious invasion of any magnitude."
The meeting then discussed ways and means. Much of the coastal defences built during the early 1930s was still operational though only partly manned and at any rate only a line of last-ditch defence. Alexander pointed out that the government would hardly fund a radical fortification programme, even modernising the forts would be unlikely. One suggestion was to build a line of Maunsell Forts as had been constructed by the Philippines along the east coast, again cost was an issue. The Third Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, pointed out the success of the Seaward Defence Programme overseas, it seemed possible to adapt those designs for inshore defence of the British Isles, manpower would be an issue but several older destroyers and minesweepers were already being replaced. The Fifth Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Denis William Boyd, responsible for the Fleet Air Arm wondered in RAF Coastal Command could be interested in covering the inshore area with dedicated maritime patrol, indeed would it be possible to now lobby Whitehall to turn over Coastal Command to the Fleet Air Arm to form a striking and reconnaissance force. Alexander thought that was unlikely at present, but with a new government likely soon, anything might be possible.
The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Bruce Fraser, summed up the feelings of the Imperial General Staff, that any chance of neutralising the threat was deterrence by seapower and threat of direct action. He noted Bomber Command had already a list of naval targets in its bombing lists, not all the targets the Navy wanted destroyed but certainly strength at home seemed the best option. The Commander in Chief Home Fleet, Admiral Edward Neville Syfret, quipped that the best defence would be to get China to invade Russia and let them siphon off German seapower to the Pacific to be minced up there. Alexander would feed back the need to apply gentle diplomatic pressure following the election, assuming Labour was returned to power. If not, the Tories would have to pick up the baton.