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Quoted
Unternehmen Frühlingswind was designed as an unbalanced scenario to test whether a well-handled carrier force could successfully operate in the face of a large surface force. Its secondary purpose was to provide large scale refueling at sea training for a large segment of the fleet. French participation was a contingent element of the exercise and proved to be decisive in denying the surface force sea room in which to operate and in providing additional air assets. The exercise is considered to be a success in this regard – neither carrier task force suffered loss except for attrition of their air groups while significant losses were inflicted upon the Battle Force. However, despite the losses inflicted, the Battle Force could have continued operation for some hours despite the loss of its fleet train.
Quoted
Commander, Battle Force, relied solely on passive antisubmarine techniques in attempting to pass the submarine patrol line stationed at the exit of the North Sea. Due to speed and sea conditions, such passive techniques proved inadequate; the passage of the Battle Force was reported and the contingent participation of the Marine Nationale triggered. Commander, Carrier Force, applied active antisubmarine techniques and air assets to neutralize the submarine patrol line in the vicinity of the Carrier Force. Funkmess-equipped carrier aircraft proved effective in targeting and neutralizing surfaced submarines.
Quoted
The active use of submarine in support of the Force opérationnelle Atlantique proved very useful, supplementing its air search assets. It is recommended that the Commander, Submarine Force, commence development of appropriate doctrine to train crews in cooperation with the fleet at sea.
Quoted
Commander, Battle Force, chose to divide his command in an attempt to locate and bring to battle the French carrier force; while a reasonable decision based on the information at hand at the time, this in the end proved futile. The air search assets of the Battle Force, while given an increased potential area of coverage, were combated by the aggressive air patrols of the French carrier force. The use of an Attaque Contre le Potentiel Aérien by Commander Force opérationnelle Atlantique is considered an innovative and decisive tactic when dealing with an enemy force devoid of defensive air assets.
Quoted
The decision of Commander, Battle Force, to detach the First Cruiser Squadron in pursuit of the cruiser Duquesne, while a valid tactic in terms of surface warfare, failed in its mission due to superior French air reconnaissance, and resulted in the air attack on First Cruiser Squadron. Commander, First Cruiser Squadron, handled his ships to the best of his ability and minimized the losses that could have be incurred in the air attack delivered by the Force opérationnelle Atlantique.
Commander, Battle Force, failed to bring the Force opérationnelle Atlantique to night battle by the slimmest of margins. Commander, Force opérationnelle Atlantique, chose to forego a second air strike on the First Cruiser Squadron and withdraw out of reach of the Battle Force.
Quoted
Commander, Carrier Force, properly adhered to doctrine in maintaining combat air and antisubmarine patrols during the course of the exercise despite knowledge that no creditable air threat existed. The exercise was to be conducted simulating wartime conditions.
Commander, Carrier Force, made use of scout bomber resources to obtain information relating to the location of the Battle Force. Air searches were carried per doctrine, with aircraft carrying 220 kg practice bombs in the event that a suitable target was located. However, this limited the radius of search aircraft and commanders should use discretion to maximize the search radius of aircraft employed.
Quoted
Wireless traffic analysis provided the Commander, Battle Force, with useful intelligence regarding the relative positions of the Carrier Force and the Force opérationnelle Atlantique, and the decision of Commander, Battle Force to commit his command to battle on 19 June was rational on the basis of the information available.
Quoted
Commander, Carrier Force, having located both the Battle Force and its train, chose to effect a night attack on the Battle Force itself. Conceptually, the night attack allowed the test of new equipment and techniques; the results of the attack were disappointing and the loss of aircraft prohibitive for the returns. An attack on the Battle Force’s supply vessels would have been more decisive.
The coup de grace administered by the Force opérationnelle Atlantique against the supply ships of the Battle Force demonstrates the application of force at the most important point, with the result that victory conditions of the exercise were met. Commander Force opérationnelle Atlantique and his subordinates showed excellent judgment in husbanding their air assets to make the strike on the supply ships effective.
Quoted
Commander, Carrier Force, chose to employ strong attritional tactics against the Battle Force, resulting in severe losses to the screening elements of the Battle Force and forcing its eventual withdrawal. Severe losses of aircraft were sustained during these attacks.
Quoted
The current composition of Marinefliegergruppen is oriented to defense, not offense; aircraft carrier doctrine must be oriented to offense. Therefore, it is recommended that the composition of current and future Marinefliegergruppen be reviewed to increase the proportion of strike assets available.
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Fw190M aircraft employed as fighter bombers presently cannot carry a sufficient ordnance load to carry out attacks on any but the smallest warships. Therefore, it is recommended that a modified aircraft capable of carrying a heavier ordnance load, including rocket projectiles, be developed as quickly as possible.
Quoted
The failure to co-locate the Commander, Carrier Force and the Commander, First Aircraft Carrier Squadron, led to delays in communication. Such difficulties were also encountered by Commander, Battle Force. Therefore, it is recommended that flag arrangements be reviewed to assure co-location of task force commanders with their principal subordinates.
The size of the staffs assigned to Commander Battle Force and Commander Battle Force proved larger than necessary; with co-location of other staff assets with the force commanders, it is recommended that the size of flag staffs be reviewed and where feasible, reduced.
Quoted
It is recommended that the inter-operability of communications equipment and signals techniques be improved. The lack of reliable and secure communications between Commander, Carrier Force and Commander, Force opérationnelle Atlantique necessitated a risky rendezvous.
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