Excerpt from "The Sword of Bharat: History of the Imperial Army 1900-2000", Imperial Publications, Mumbai , 2003
"The Bharati Army took advantage of the opportunities presented by the Baluchistani Operation and the Persian Civil War to observe the effectiveness and utility of their new weapons and other materiel, organization, and tactics in combat operations and a number of improvements were found necessary.
Materiel:
Among the infantry weapons, the Bhandara 1929 machine gun was found to be subject to stoppages in rugged field use and the use of a twenty round detachable magazine made difficult to achieve concentrated substained fire. Research on a new machine gun was accelerated, examples of the German MG33 were obtained for further examination. The higher rate of fire of the MG33 machine gun and being belt-fed were considered significant advantages to seek a license for the weapon.
The effort expended by Bharat in the development of artillery of all types was found to be justified. According to Colonel Rajput, operations officer for Kureekkal, the Baluchi themselves testified to the effectiveness of the Bharati artillery fire on the attacks on Quetta. The defenders had received warning of air attacks with the appearance of Bharati aircraft and the bombing had been of limited duration. The sustained artillery fire, however, wore down the resistance of the garrison of Quetta.
The 90mm antiaircraft gun was found to be especially effective in engaging bunkers and prepared fortifications. The Bharati Relief Assemblage made reference to this in attacking the Persian fortifications at Sirhan and Kerman. According to the Bharati Assemblage account, the gun could penetrate the walls of bunkers and buildings reinforced as strong points.
The Bharati Sher and Gaada tanks were found to be unsatisfactory in operations, and the newer Ajgar III armored car were useful only for reconnaissance. This served to confirm the belief than the older tanks should be replaced by newer models. The armored Jagganathas henceforth started to be equipped with Argun B's and C's as fast as possible. The heavier of the two, the Argun C, was singled out by General Singh as a highly effective cruiser tank to be produced in quantity. The Sher tanks were either scrapped or used for training, and eventually the Gaada tank chasis were utilized as gun-platforms for the self propelled gun units organized for assault operations. Studies began for a replacement of the Ajgar III armored car. In general, the supply of spare parts and system of maintenance for tanks was found to be inadequate for the needs of the tanks in combat. Is ironic that the well organized tank maintenance units assigned to the Chinese Group Dragon were used as the model for the development of combat maintenance units.
Organization:
Singh recommended that battalion and regimental headquarters of mechanized units should be located farther forward to direct the battle. Headquarters should be more mobile, restricted to a few armored vehicles, and well equipped with radio communications. He also recommended better communications with the supply columns and trains of the mechanized and motorised units.
The cavalry brigades were found to have little staying power in sustained operations in Persia. This was considered to be the nature of the fighting in Persia, where the small cavalry brigades were asked to fill roles hardly suitable for them. No changes were made at the time but studies were started to find a more balanced unit.
The need for the development of an unit fast enought to be capable to follow the mechanized divisions and deal with enemy strongpoints bypassed by the Mechanized forces was recognized. The General Staff began studies for the development and organization of such units, later named motorized divisions.
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