Hartmann, Commander, Supply and Service Force, spoke first.
“Logistics support for this series of operations began in late October, when the fleet oiler Memelland departed in company with the aircraft carrier Wallenstein and her consorts. As the Wallenstein was, at this stage, carrying out a civil-related mission and had not embarked her full air group additional stores could be loaded board her, reducing the burden on the Memelland. During voyage to South America full advantage was taken of port calls to resupply bunkers, rations, and other necessary stores obtained through the Etappendienst.”
Hartmann continued. “Anticipating the need for additional tanker support the fleet oiler Lipperland with an escorting destroyer was despatched to the South Atlantic in early December, ready either to assist the Memelland or to support the larger fleet exercise as circumstances dictated. The port of Recife proved a useful staging post in this regard.”
“With the replenishment ship Donau detached to East Asia Squadron and the need to continue training in home waters only the replenishment ships Neckar and Ruhr were available to accompany Admiral Ruge’s task force; these, with the aforementioned fleet oilers, were expected to be able to provide the necessary logistics support for the exercise as foreseen. However, those expectations were misplaced as the carrier task force was obliged to remain at sea for an extended period.”
The chief of the supply force reviewed the subsequent despatch of additional support vessels to the South Atlantic; the replenishment ship Werra and two oilers in late January; three fleet oilers and two other supply ships in March. “Despite the best efforts of the Etappendienst to provide support through chartered merchant vessels, the distances to friendly ports, where such transfers were carried out, exposed the dangers of complete reliance on such methods. Further, the commitment of so many of our existing supply vessels to support of a single task force so far from friendly bases rendered effective support of any other major deployment problematic.”
At this point Capitaine de vaisseau Morin inquired. “Would it not have been reasonable for the task force to call at a friendly port to resupply?” It seemed a logical question. Hartmann looked in the direction of von Fischel who took responsibility for the answer.
“One of our objectives for this exercise was to test the surge capacity of our existing fleet train,” he explained. “The discovery that despite considerable investment our current resources are insufficient to support the level of deployment anticipated in wartime is of considerable importance. There are also political and diplomatic constraints under which we must operate.”
Konteradmiral Wagner, Chief of the Etappendienst, now took up the theme.
“Few difficulties were found in supporting the aircraft carrier Wallenstein during her South American cruise; adequate notice allowed the stockpiling of bunkers and other necessities at her ports of call. The arrival of the carrier task force in the area strained the existing supply system to a significant degree.”
He signalled for the curtains to be parted to reveal the map again, which had been updated to focus on the South Atlantic. “Recife and Fortelaza, are our primary support points in Brazil; Port of Spain in Trinidad became a vital source for bunkers obtained from our Atlantean allies, carried forward by chartered tankers. Dakar in Senegal was useful as a transfer point between such civilian vessels and the oilers of the fleet train. Distances and the relatively undeveloped infrastructure of ports in this particular region limited the logistical support the Etappendienst was able to supply.”
“Astern fuelling from commercial tankers proved to be a laborious and time consuming task, reducing the ability to transfer fuel from chartered vessels while underway. Where oilers could be detached from the task force to rendezvous in harbour faster transfer rates could be obtained; of course, this was offset by the additional transit time from the ports in question to the operational area. In retrospect greater reliance ought to have been placed on large support tankers, which can refuel alongside.”
To some present it sounded as if Wagner was reciting a litany of excuses; the more senior officers present were more conscious of the limitations under which the Etappendienst operated. Shorn of her colonies and overseas bases at the end of the Great War the Kriegsmarine had long laboured under the restrictions of the Versailles treaty. For the few overseas cruises carried out in the 1920s and 1930s, the arrangements of the Etappendienst had proven more than adequate. As German warships ventured around the world in far larger numbers it was clear that greater efforts would have to be made to obtain base rights abroad; but that was a political rather than military consideration.
Wagner concluded with his recommendations before relinquishing the podium to Hartmann.
“Efforts should be made to stockpile necessary supplies in greater quantities at existing outposts of the Etappendienst. Where circumstances permit, additional out-stations should be established to extend the range in which Etappendienst support is available. Lastly, short of establishing formal fleet operating bases abroad, the Etappendienst can only serve to supplement the fleet train, not substitute for it.”
For his part, Hartmann reported on the need for additional units of the fleet train, particularly those supply ships that were to have been acquired under the 1947 estimates, which had been deferred. He also alluded to a planned reorganisation of the service forces, one which would make better use of existing resources.