Berlin, The Admiralstab, Thursday, 11 November 1948
It had taken some days to prepare for the formal after-action review of Operation Pegase – the number of reports filed by the participants required considerable time to prepare, review, collate, and analyse was but one hurdle. Senior officers were called from important duties to deliberate on and contribute to the Alliance’s first major operational exercise. The recently concluded Exercise Shaka contributed its own delay. Nevertheless the conference room now saw gathered many of the most important officers of the Alliance navies, and Generaladmiral von Fischel called the meeting to order.
“Gentlemen, as you know, Operations Pegase marked a major step forward in obtaining the strategic objectives of the Alliance. While not all of these were fulfilled at this juncture, I believe that in the main satisfaction can be taken in what has been achieved. Let us begin by examining the details.”
He thereupon turned the briefing over to Kapitän zur See Karl-Friedrich Merten, Director of Naval Operations.
“The principal objective of Operation Pegase was to test the ability of a unified Alliance squadron to carry out maritime warfare against an opposing force, rather than a mere table-top exercise. Over the past year Operation Wachsame Entschlossenheit has permitted the development of tactics and procedures, and the training of crews, that would allow Alliance vessels to operate in an effective manner. This objective was achieved.”
He thereupon called upon Vizeadmiral Siegfried Engel, the commander of the Alliance task force, denominated as Force Bleu, and Contre-amiral Ernest Bailly, commanding the opposing FO Bayard, to summarize their respective plans and initial movements relating to the exercise, setting the stage for the detailed commentary that would follow.
Merten interjected. “The deployment of FO Bayard from its normal station at Dakar to Casablanca was permitted by the exercise umpires, simulating as it would a British force operating from Gibraltar. Otherwise, FO Bayard would have been severely hampered in reaching the exercise area in a timely manner.”
Further summary followed, covering FO Bayard’s initial deployment to the central portion of the North Atlantic, and Force Bleu’s passage through the Denmark Strait.
“The Analysis Team commends Admiral Bailly for his foresight in choosing a position where Force Bayard could limit the scope of activity of Force Bleu whichever course it might take.”
It was at this juncture that Kapitän zur See Heinrich Gerlach, Director of Naval Intelligence, stood to speak to one of the imponderables that had intruded on the exercise.
“The apparently and surprisingly swift movement of the Home Fleet led us to believe that the British were over-reacting to the exercise, and this information was conveyed to Admiral Engel, which may have unduly limited his freedom of action. We now know that the movements of heavy units from Portsmouth was partially linked to the Royal Navy’s own planned exercise in the North Atlantic, and also with its long-anticipated redeployment to its northern bases.”
Capitaine de Vaisseau Honoré d'Estienne d'Orves, commander of the cruiser Marseillaise and a participant in the exercise, then picked up on the surface operations that marked the middle part of the exercise.
“Our initial actions to intercept merchant shipping was aided by poor weather conditions, that degraded the search capabilities of both FO Bayard and the British force which, as we had been advised, had be deployed to ‘observe’ our activities. On the twenty-sixth of September a detachment of Force Bayard made contact with surface elements of Force Bleu, but quickly broke contact.”
Kontr-Admiral Giorgi Abashvili raised an objection. “Do you believe that a British force would have been so quick to retreat in the face of a force of which it would have had incomplete intelligence?”
“No, Admiral, I do not. However, the umpires ruled the action prudent at that point in the exercise.”
Capitaine de fregate Jean des Moutis took up the presentation of the Analysis Team at this point. “The first carrier contacts on the twenty-seventh proved to be illuminating. The first strike was successfully broken up by the Force Bleu combat air patrols. The dradis equipment on the air defence cruisers was able to pick up the incoming aircraft at extreme range and vector fighter aircraft to totally disrupt the incoming strike. Admiral Engel then exploited the superior electronic warfare capabilities of his ships to first, disorient the incoming strike commanders at a critical moment and then, deploy his escort vessels in a most effective manner and inflict heavy losses on the second FO Bayard strike.
Admiral Abashvili again stood. “From the perspective of the Russian Federation Navy we find that Admiral Engel’s use of the electronic warfare and antiaircraft capabilities of his ships was one of the most important lessons to be learned from this exercise. Admiral Engel should be commended, and I recommend that he draw up a handbook covering operational procedures for the joint use of Alliance forces.” His words were followed by a murmur of approval.
Des Moutis continued to review the second day of carrier contacts. “By judicious use of his more numerous air assets Admiral Bailly was able to achieve significant damage to Force Bleu, completing FO Bayard’s strategic objective of denying it the uninterrupted ability of pursue the guerre de course. The cost to his own air groups was heavy, and had the exercise not ended shortly thereafter it is possible that the strategic balance could have been reversed.”
Kapitän zur See Heinrich Bramesfeld, Director of Plans picked up the thread at this point. “One of the premises of the exercise was that the opposing force, in the case FO Bayard, would be constrained to act in a manner consistent with the Royal Navy. From our observations we deduced that the opposing force would not avoid a surface engagement – the British having shown a proclivity to engage in them during their own exercises.”
“I chose not to do so. Having achieved the overall strategic objective for FO Bayard to do so would have risked victory conditions for no great benefit. As Capitaine des Moutis has noted, the strategic balance could have been reversed.” While at sea Bailly had long discussions with the exercise umpires on this very point, and had convinced them to permit him the freedom to avoid a night action through manoeuvre.
“Yes,” Bramesfeld admitted. “Our knowledge of what a potential adversary might do in certain circumstances is imperfect. A similar question arouse regarding the proposal from Capitaine de corvette Grosjean regarding a night strike by FO Bayard’s aircraft. Here the umpires came down on the other side of Occam’s Razor.”
The return of Force Bleu to the North Sea covered in a brief manner and kept to the point. The assembled officers awaited the closing summary and recommendations, which Merten rose to deliver.
“Point One. As Admiral Abashvili has noted, development of a formal handbook for employment of electronic warfare, antiaircraft batteries, and coordinated ship-handling should be developed as rapidly as feasible. Admiral Engel has agreed to that he and his staff will undertake this.”
“Point Two. The lessons of Operation Wachsame Entschlossenheit should be disseminated throughout the Alliance naval forces to support inter-operability of ships and crews.
“Point Three. That an exercise of similar nature be scheduled at a point in the future once procedures and doctrine have been coordinated to further test the ability of Alliance naval forces to act in a cohesive manner. We recommend that for this exercise a non-German senior officer be selected to command the Blue Forces for the event.”
There was a murmur of surprise among those assembled. The expected technical criticisms were not highlighted in the presentation; perhaps they would appear in the formal written report.