WesWorld

Quoted from "Brockpaine"

Neat map!

Thanks.

It does help putting things into a visual perspective. Unfortunately, it does not detail the placement of the major aeronautical plants, but one takes what one can find.

Sometimes there are things that are improbable but true. In the years leading up to the Italo-Ethiopian War in the 1930s the Imperial Ethiopian Army did attempt to acquire modern armament and train personnel in their use. One such weapon was the ubiquitous Oerlikon 20mm light antiaircraft gun. I found this photograph of Ethiopian personnel training in the use of the weapon on a Swiss firing range.

For my liking, they have ranged the guns far too close and no one seems to be wearing hearing protection.

The Praga RV 2-ton tactical truck, manufactured by the Ceskomoravska Kolben-Danek company of Prague, makers of the popular TNH series of light tanks, was one of the most numerous military trucks of Czech origin produced during the interwar period. On a Czech military discussion forum I found information regarding its production run, which I have tabulated below:



By standards to which we are familiar, little more than 3,000 units over a span of six years does not seem large; it is certainly larger than the number of Tatra 82/92/93 tactical trucks produced – 1,637 between 1935 and 1941, but puny by American or even West European standards – the average production was less than 50 units per month, and the best performance – in 1936 – was slightly less than 160 units per month. This begs the question – why was CKD – which obviously had a money-spinner on their hands – unable to meet demand?

Alice Teichova’s work, “An Economic Background to Munich”, provides some clues to possible general and specific explanations for the inability of CKD to respond to potential demand for trucks.

Compared with American, British or West European firms CKD was relatively small – its nominal joint stock capital was only 37,500,000 Czech crowns = $1,316,250, and its assets amounted to only 766,000,000 crowns, the equivalent of $26.8 million. In 1937 it made a profit of $491,400 – a 37% return on capital but less than 2% on assets. At this point in time it held orders worth 819 million crowns - $28,746,900 – more than the company’s assets.

What this indicates that for its vehicle, tank, locomotive and other lines of business CKD was gathering orders faster than it could execute them. It lacked the access to capital and commercial credit that its competitor Skoda possessed – which was a part of the European Schneider combine and was backed by a consortium of British and French banks to the tune of £5,250,000.

In the wider picture of the Czech economy the combination of a high level of cartelization and the effects of the Great Depression had contracted the Czech economy and left it without significant spare capacity for expansion; and without injections of capital from investors no new capacity could be built. Skoda, with its international contacts, was able to do so; CKD could not.

The production data tells its own story – produced in a number of different series over a six year span CKD had no opportunity to really build up a continuous production line for the RV – its best performance was in 1936, where it edged its monthly production to nearly 160 vehicles, as mentioned above. During this period the firm was also producing five different models of passenger cars, nine other truck designs, and motor busses – not the least to mention its tanks, tractors, trams and locomotives – CKD was a highly diversified manufacturing firm and not only a manufacturer of trucks. This model is reflective of manufacturers in Eastern and Central Europe.

In Wesworld we have taken to presuming that factories operate on a more rational, less diversified model, and that they are not starved for capital and have ample opportunity to expand their capabilities. It is a model more reflective of the postwar period, or of American and British practice rather than European.

Further to Bruce's information regarding naval expenditure, there are some interesting comparisons between pre and inter-war British naval spending in DK Brown's 'Nelson to Vanguard'. It also shows the effects of the Depression, a trend missing in WW.

Using the price index (1866 = 100)
1912-14 was 85.
1923 129
1924 139
1925 136
1926 126
1927 122
1928 120
1929 115
1930 97
1931 83
1932 80
1933 79
1934 82
1935 84
1936 89
1937 102
1938 91
1939 94

In other words, the value of money was roughly the same during the 1930s as it was just before the First World War.

Navy Estimates (£ mil)
1911-13 varied from £45-52 million
1923 58
1924 56
1925 61
1926 58
1927 58
1928 57
1929 56
1930 52
1931 52
1932 51
1933 54
1934 57
1935 60
1936 70
1937 78
1938 94
1939 69

Therefore, Brown argues that allowing for inflation the total sums voted during the 1930s were about the same as the peak years before the First World War even though the GNP had doubled in that time.

The pattern of spending however was very different. During 1911-14 £25-30 million of the Estimates for each year were for shipbuilding. Compare this to the 1930s.
(£ mil)
1930 5.3
1931 5.3
1932 6.8
1933 8.4
1934 10.2
1935 10.5
1936 13.9
1937 28.0
1938 34.8
1939 46.1

So while naval expenditure was roughly the same as 1911-14, much more of the budget was going towards pay and pensions and other support costs rather than new construction.

Breakdown of construction spending by ship type - 1930-39
7 BB 21%
7 CV 13%
46 CL 35%
110 DD 17%
36 Subs 5%
138 Sloops 9%

As Brown rightly points out, spending more was not the answer, the limits on yard and slip capacity meant that even spending the agreed sums was hard enough. In 1939 there were only 266 slips over 250ft in Britain and 134 available for warship production. For example, the oft-quoted Czech armour purchase (12,000 tons plus 2,000 tons planned - 10,000 tons delivered) to make up the 15,000 tons short-term shortfall in home capacity was of less importance in the end because of delays in deliveries of gun mountings etc.


Comparison with USA
Brown compared construction costs between the UK and USA and found that British yards were superior despite several bottlenecks and problems.
An early US DE took 1 million man-hours, later reduced to 700-600,000.
The British Rivers needed 400-350,000 man-hours.
A River cost £240,000, a US-built Colony (similar design) £570,000.
US submarine workers produced 3.8 tons a year, British submarine workers 8.8 tons per year.
A Liberty ship cost £450,000, a British Empire ship £180,000.
A Liberty needed 650-500,000 man-hours, an Empire only 350,000.


Wartime Building Costs (£ mil)
Hulls 294.9
Propelling Machinery 182.3
Auxiliary Machinery 55.5
Fairmile boats 23.1
Total 555.8

Armour 15.2
Gun mountings and air compressing plant 100.6
Guns and ordnance stores 43.9
Electrical and scientific apparatus 201.0
Admiralty Supply Total 360.7

Cost by type (£ mil)
BB, CV and CL 96 (23%)
DD 88 (21%)
Escorts (53 (13%)
Mine ships, trawlers, boom vessels etc. 38 (9%)
Light coastal craft 51 (12%)
Landing vessels 61 (15%)
Total £414 (100%)

Building Times
BB 54 months 46,000 man-months
CV 46 months 31,115 man-months
Fiji 28 months 15,017 man-months
Dido 28 months 8,214 man-months
M Class DD 28 months 4,991 man-months
Hunt 15 months 2,944 man-months
Corvette 10 months 922 man-months
Submarine 20 months 2,700 man-months


Brown goes into profits in great length, but since we don't sim these in WW I won't go into these in depth, but the comparisons between commercial and navy yard construction costs are alarming, as are some of the pre-war profits.
For example;
Vickers made 41.6% profit on KGV and 868.6% profit on submarine HMS Truant and 77.7& on Unbeaten.
Smiths made 40.8% on the corvette Gladious.
Lower profits are obvious at H&W, 9.1% on Formidable and 15% on the minesweeper Bangor.
I feel if we simmed profits in WW, then our warship materials each quarter would have much less buying power!

Interesting statistics... and good food for thought; which reminds me I ought to pull out my copy of "Ships for Victory" - I think it has more detailed information on the man-hours for constructing a Liberty Ship.

I found an additional article by Ales Skrivan on Czechoslovakian participation in the interwar arms trade, “On the Nature of Arms Production in Interwar Czechoslovakia”. He touches on a number of interesting points but the most salient one was a summary of the sales of the Skoda Works; I have abstracted the data from it and converted Czech crowns to dollars at the rate of 1 Crown = $0.0351.



Skoda was one of the largest industrial combines in prewar Czechoslovakia, and during the interwar period grew substantially. Its strategic alliance with the French Schneider concern gave it access to capital that helped finance sales within carefully-drawn territories. Alice Teichova’s “An Economic Background to Munich” gives an excellent treatment to the relationship between Schneider and Skoda, one that emerged as early as 1919.

The data presented shows the scale of the growth of the Skoda concern. Between 1925 and 1938 its sales grew by more than 280%; on average nearly 40% of annual sales comprised arms and armaments – with figures in immediate prewar period exceeding 60%. In the last three years arms exports comprised more than one third of Skoda’s total sales.

It is therefore no surprise that Skoda figures in Wesworld as a major supplier for many nations; it reflects historical truths. The historical ties between Skoda and Schneider are not as strong – I believe that there are stronger ties in Wesworld between Skoda and Belgian/Dutch financial circles than French – and it is more an autonomous factor. But the fact that the cost of refurbishing the artillery parks of Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Persia – some of Skoda’s historical customers in the later interwar period – rose to more than $20 million should frame our future thoughts in turning to such a source.

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

The historical ties between Skoda and Schneider are not as strong – I believe that there are stronger ties in Wesworld between Skoda and Belgian/Dutch financial circles than French – and it is more an autonomous factor.

I think you may be remembering the tenuous links between Fokker and Avia. Pretty sure I've never encountered any mention of ties between Skoda and Belgo-Dutch firms.

Might be worth reiterating the tie between Skoda and Schneider on my part...

Quoted from "Brockpaine"

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

The historical ties between Skoda and Schneider are not as strong – I believe that there are stronger ties in Wesworld between Skoda and Belgian/Dutch financial circles than French – and it is more an autonomous factor.

I think you may be remembering the tenuous links between Fokker and Avia. Pretty sure I've never encountered any mention of ties between Skoda and Belgo-Dutch firms.

Might be worth reiterating the tie between Skoda and Schneider on my part...

I definitely recall the linkage between Fokker and Avia; I thought the Benelux/Czech connection went further. If not, that's probably a good thing. As for the tie-up between Schneider and Skoda, I think that might be best kept at arms length.

;)

EDIT:


To give an idea of the scale of Skoda exports, I found on the Axis History Forum website some data on OTL Yugoslav orders with Skoda for field artillery -it doesn't include antitank artillery, or antiaircraft artillery, both of which were also supplied to Yugoslavia by Skoda.

136 each – 75mm Vz.28 mountain guns
300 each – 80mm Vz.30 field guns
72 each – 100 mm Vz.30 light field howitzers
20 each – 150mm M.28 heavy guns
10 each – 220mm Vz.32 heavy mortars
24 each – 105mm Vz.35 heavy field guns
36 each – 150mm K2 heavy field howitzers

The EC-2 Liberty Ship constructed in American shipyards during the Second World War has been the subject of much discussion and comparison over the years. Frederic C. Lane’s “Ships for Victory”, which chronicles the efforts of the US Maritime Commission during the war years, has an extended treatment on the Liberty ship, as well as other US Maritime Commission designs, and it is well worth reading. It has considerable statistical information on the Liberty ship, which I will touch on here.

The table below indicates the average costs for building of Liberty ships in the shipyards involved in the program.



As Lane’s work notes, the cost of materials and fittings for a Liberty ship was standard across the nation, and the divergence in costs is primarily due to labor – both the wages of shipyard workers and the number of man-hours expended. Given the number of workers in any one of the emergency shipyards, wage-rate differences could make quite a difference in the aggregate. On average, the Liberty ships built in the Lower South were $200,000 more expensive than Liberty ships built elsewhere – but had those yards not been established, tapping the available labor pool, some six hundred vessels would not have been built. In wartime, such a trade-off is acceptable.

The web site Shipbuilding History is a treasure trove of detailed information about ships constructed in United States and Canadian shipyards, particularly during the years of the Second World War.

The many data tables found there give insight into another facet of the Liberty Ship Program – the reduced building time as yards perfected their skills and their materials flow. The table below represents the output of one yard, that of the J.A. Jones Company at Brunswick, Georgia. I have stratified the data to show the “rounds of the ways” – the Maritime Commission’s term for each successive launching from a particular shipyard.



As is clear the time required to construct a Liberty ship dropped dramatically between the first and third ship for each round of the ways. This represents the perfection of the prefabrication process and the learning curve of the shipyard workers – and the buildup of assemblies in sections of the yards off the ways. Compared with conventional shipbuilding methods it might have been more expensive, but given the need for tonnage reducing construction time from ten months to little more than two is a fair trade off.

In its size and scope, and in its sheer output, the Liberty Ship Program was a unique effort.

In “Arms for Spain”, Gerald Howson provides a detailed account of arms and military equipment supplied to both sides in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. Though overshadowed by the headline-catching aircraft and tanks supplied by the Soviet Union, or the famed Condor Legion, Poland played a surprisingly large role in the supply of arms and ammunition to Spain, principally to the Spanish Republicans. Its motive was not political but mercenary – through the Government-controlled Syndicat Exporti Przemyski Wejennego (Export Syndicate of War Industries) it funneled more than £5 million worth of war material to Spain.

Some of the arms were factory fresh – including 25,000 Wz.29 Polish Mauser rifles and 525 Wz.28 Polish Browning Automatic Rifles – but most were surplus dating to the First World War, in poor condition and for the most part without spares. Among the items were:

172 pieces of artillery – mostly Krupp and Skoda field pieces in 75mm, 77mm and 80mm – without sights, limbers or other ancillary equipment, invoiced at £233,720

1,573,200 hand grenades at an aggregate cost of £229,247 – about three shillings each

2,392 machineguns – including Lewis light machineguns, German Maxims and Austrian Schwarzelose – valued at £172,353

59,100 rifles – including the new Mausers mentioned above, Austrian Mannlichers and French Lebels – priced at £169,872

126,110,000 rounds of small arms ammunition of various calibers at £1,662,218

32 rather tired Renault FT-32 tanks sold for £232,000 – some £7,250 apiece

The appendices in the book go into the details of individual cargos in far greater detail; and similar information is provided for the Soviet supply effort to the Republicans.

This information is, of course, provided as a public service for those who would arm Wesworld belligerents; we would want you to know the value of your goods on a seller’s market. :D

As mentioned above, Howson’s book “Arms for Spain” contains much data 1on Soviet arms shipments to Spain, drawing in large measure on Soviet sources.

The use of Soviet aircraft in Spain is well documented – and deliveries comprised:

92 examples of the Tupolev SB twin-engine bomber
161 examples of the Polikarpov I-15 bi-plane fighter
276 examples of the Polikarpov I-16 monoplane fighter
31 examples of the R-5 light bomber
93 examples of the RZ light bomber
4 examples of the UTI training aircraft

Also well documented is the role of Soviet armored vehicles in Spain – their deliveries included:

281 examples of the T-26 light tank
50 examples of the BT-5 fast tank
40 examples of various BA-type armored cars
20 examples of various FAI-type armored cars

Russia supplied considerable amounts of artillery, including

250 M30 37mm and 147 M32 45mm antitank guns, 64 M31 76mm antiaircraft guns and nearly 500 field guns and howitzers. The latter comprised few modern weapons and consisted of such weapons as Krupp 77mm M16 field guns, 4.5-in Howitzers of British origin, 107mm field guns of Japanese origin obtained during the First World War and 76mm Putilov M1902 field guns.

Russia supplied more than 400,000 rifles to the Spanish Republicans – but the first Mosin-Nagant M1891 rifles did not arrive until June 1937. Prior to that, and continuing afterwards, the Russians provided a mixed bag of small arms that included French Lebel rifles in 8mm, Lee-Enfields in .303-inch, Arisakas in 6.5mm, and Winchester M1895 lever-action rifles in 7.62mm. The supply of light machineguns – 12,414 units – was equally mixed, including modern DPs, Lewis guns and Chauchat machine rifles of questionable utility. The 5,366 heavy machineguns supplied included St. Etiennes of French origin, American-made Colt “Potato-Diggers” and Vickers guns.

The total value of Soviet deliveries has been quoted variously but Howson allows a value of $171 million – though he devoted an entire chapter to the sordid topic of Soviet prices.

Unlike the Liberty Ship, or other American wartime merchantmen built in vast numbers, less is written about the various merchantmen constructed in British shipyards throughout the Second World War. In contrast to the United States Maritime Commission, which designed, ordered and owned the huge merchant fleet constructed between in the war years, many of the vessels constructed in Britain were to builders designs, and many yards constructed a variety of vessels as dictated by needs and availability of materials.

The yard of William Doxford and Sons, of Pallion, Sunderland, was exceptional in this regard, focusing its wartime program almost exclusively on one type of vessel – its so-called Doxford Economy Freighter. This design was evolved by Doxford in the early 1930s, with the first, the MV Sunderland, emerging in 1935 to the order of B.J. Sunderland and Company.

The initial design was a motor ship powered by 3-cylinder 2-stroke opposed piston engines of proprietary design, manufactured in Doxford’s own engine works. Other details were: Length (waterline) 420 ft. Length (registered) 429 ft.; Molded beam, 56 ft. 6in. Depth, 35 ft. Speed loaded, 11-12 knots. Whereas the traditional tramp steamer could barely average 10 knots and burned 30 to 40 tons of coal a day, the motor ships could average 11 knots on just over 9 tons of oil.

Doxford constructed a series of thirty such vessels before war was declared in September 1939, with most of them finding places with British owners – four were on the stocks at the outbreak of hostilities and were launched between September and November 1939. The yard would go on to construct more than seventy of these useful ships – indeed, with the exception of two tank landing craft, Doxford built little else during the war years. It must be remembered that few British shipyards were equipped to build pre-fabricated vessels like the Liberty, and that Doxford’s yard had only six building ways; turning out that many ships under wartime conditions using traditional techniques was an exceptional performance.

Only two dozen of these vessels were built to Government order; most were constructed – even during the war – for private customers under Government license. The worth of the design was proven by the fact that after the Second World War motor ships became the norm for British tramp operators.

I recently acquired a copy of Czechoslovak Armored Fighting Vehicles 1918-1948, and discovered that it contains a wealth of information and is thoroughly illustrated. Of greatest information to me are the data tables for vehicle production. I thought I would share a few of them, starting with the Panzerkampfwagen 38(t), a vehicle well known to us.



The first 150 vehicles, designated Ausführung A by the Wehrmacht, were in fact ordered for the Czechoslovak Army in July of 1938, though none were delivered before the incorporation of Bohemia-Moravia into the Reich. The production of these vehicles was at a rather sedate rate of approximately 21 units per month - though there was considerable variation.

At the end of 1939 orders were placed for an additional 325 vehicles - 110 Ausführung B, 110 Ausführung C, and 105 Ausführung D - production of which occupied 1940 and saw production rise to approximately 30 units per month; not a huge increase in the rate of production considering Germany's presumed wartime needs. It was also in this timeframe that the 90 vehicles of the Ausführung S - originally ordered by Sweden - were completed for German use.

Orders for 275 additional vehicles were placed in November 1940 under the designation Ausführung E, which were followed by the Ausführung F, of which 250 were ordered in May 1941. The rate of production in 1941 increased significantly to approximately 56 per month, indicating the increased priority accorded armored vehicles in anticipation of Operation Barbarossa. Orders were placed in July 1941 for an additional 1,000 vehicles, 500 of the Ausführung F and 500 of the Ausführung G - though only 306 of the former were completed as gun tanks and none of the latter.

The drop in the production of Panzerkampfwagen 38(t) gun tanks during 1942 is reflective of the type's supersession in that role. The numbers cited do not include the 37 TNH-type tanks supplied to Slovakia as the LT.38.

This information I find insightful in showing what the CKD tank plant was capable under wartime conditions.

The use of the Panzer 38 as the basis of self-propelled by the Wehrmacht is very well known, and the Marder III self-propelled anti-tank vehicle was one of the major types constructed on the chassis. Below are the monthly production figures for the two principal types.



During production the chassis layout was changed from that of the gun tank, with engine at the rear, to an engine-forward chassis, the Ausf. M – that resulted in a more efficient fighting vehicle. All of the SdKfz139 vehicles, armed with the 7.62cm PaK36, were of the Ausf H design, with engines at rear, as were the first 275 examples of the SdKfz138 vehicles.

As the data table shows, production figures varied widely, with 1943 perhaps forming a typical year, during which production averaged sixty-five vehicles a month.

The Panzer 38 chassis was also used as the basis for an infantry support vehicle, providing mobility to the 15cm heavy infantry gun. These vehicles were produced at the same time as the Marder III series of SP antitank guns, and their combined production numbers give a sense of the capacity of the CKD plant operating under war conditions.

Perhaps the most famous and most effective derivative of the TNH chassis was the Panzerjaeger 38 “Hetzer” tank destroyer, which emerged from the factory early in 1944 and saw very large scale production in the last year of the Second World War.

In addition to the CKD factory in Prague the Skoda works in Pilsen was brought into the production scheme, with a not inconsiderable contribution. Yet CKD alone was able to sustain an average monthly production rate in excess of 130 vehicles, despite wartime disruptions. Of course, this was obtained thanks to ruthless production methods; nevertheless, it is an example of what could be obtained.



If nothing else, this shows that the relatively unsung CKD firm was a major source for the Wehrmacht’s armored vehicles, and defines the contribution one factory can make to national output of war material. However, CKD did more, as I will note in a follow-up post.

Besides its prewar production of motor vehicles, and its very substantial production of tanks and other armored vehicles during the Second World War, CKD was also Czechoslovakia’s premier manufacturer of tracked artillery tractors. Developed in the late 1920s and entering production in the middle 1930s, CKD/Praga manufactured more than nine hundred such vehicles in four series, principally for export; surprisingly, Turkey was by far the largest user.



The T6 series – with a weight of 7 tons and capable of towing 6-tons, was the most prolific of the models. Between 1937 and 1939 Turkey would acquire no less than 434 vehicles of this type to motorize its heavy artillery park. Romania placed orders for 221 vehicles, of which 130 were in fact delivered, with the German Wehrmacht seizing the remainder. Portugal ordered 30 examples; they were never delivered and reportedly were still at the factory in late 1944. The German Waffen SS placed orders for 500 vehicles of the type, though only 95 were in fact delivered to them. The puppet state of Slovakia managed to obtain 8 vehicles of an order for 30.

The T7 – with a weight of 8.6 tons and capable of towing 7-tons, was supplied to Turkey, which obtained 40 between 1937 and 1939; the slightly larger T8 – weighing in at 9.6 tons and capable of towing 8-tons, also went to Turkey, which obtained 62 examples. Of the 66 T-9 tractors ordered by the Turks – each capable of towing 10-tons, only 16 would in fact be delivered; the rest were absorbed into the German war machine.

If this were not enough, CKD/Praga also manufactured some 600 examples of the SdKfz6 semi-track for the Wehrmacht.

Thus it is clear that one relatively small firm played a significant role in the supply of armored and other motor vehicles to much of Europe before the Second World War, and continued to supply a substantial and diverse amount of war material under German direction.

The Skoda works had the reputation in the real world, as it does in Wesworld, of being able to provide just about any piece of artillery required – in some cases providing a choice of calibers. The H-series of light field howitzers is a case in point.



This modern weapon emerged in the late 1930s from the earlier F-series of howitzers, which were adopted by the Czechoslovak army as the 10 cm houfnice vz. 30.

Due to the outbreak of the Second World War, the H-series did not have great commercial success. Some were sold to Iran in 1935 under the designation H1, in 10cm caliber. As Skoda would happily customize their designs, the H2, in 10.5cm caliber, was ordered by Latvia – alas, they guns were not delivered, but eventually were sold by the Germans to Finland, who used them against the Russians in the Continuation War. The H3 version was to have been adopted by the Czechoslovak Army as the 10 cm houfnice vz. 39, but this was not pursued after Munich. It is reported at eighty-eight of the H4 version, in 10.5cm, were made and eventually supplied to Romania. The design was revived postwar as the H9 in 10.5cm caliber, and offered, unsuccessfully, for export.

The adaptability of Skoda to meet the needs of its customers resulted in a number of different series of field guns during the late 1920s and 1930s. The E-series of light gun howitzers illustrates this readily.

The E.1 field gun was developed in the late 1920s, and was sold commercially in large numbers to Romania in 7.5cm; a variant, designated EF, was sold to Yugoslavia, who purchased some three hundred examples. The Yugoslav weapons were referred to as 8cm, as was the variant E.1 design adopted by the Czechoslovak Army, the 8cm kanon vz.30 – though the actual bore of the weapon was 7.65cm.

In the 1930s, Skoda improved the design to produce the E.3 horse artillery gun and the E.7 field gun – both modern designs on split trail carriages. Besides being offered commercially, both were to have been acquired by the Czechoslovakian forces, but such plans were overcome by events.

I will admit that the Seven Years War, the titanic struggle between Great Britain and Prussia under Frederick the Great on the one side, and France, Austria and Russia on the other, is far beyond our normal scope of discussion. However, it is a subject of interest to me personally, and, on one of the sites I regularly frequent, I discovered some information that could be of interest to the ship simulating community.

The Seven Years War Project covers many aspects of the conflict, principally the armies involved and the campaigns in which they were engaged. However, it does include information on the fleets of the principal naval powers and the careers of individual ships. It is in this regard that I discovered that the Russian Navy of the period constructed its vessels to a very detailed scheme of regulations, drawn up by no less than Peter the Great himself. Moreover, the site provided a summary of the regulations themselves in considerable detail. It is this link that I would share with you.

The Russian Shipbuilding Regulations were first formulated in 1723 and finalized in 1724, and remained in force for more than fifty years. More than eighty warships were constructed to their requirements, including numerous line-of-battle ships and frigates. As you can see they are quite in depth, specifying the size and spacing of gun ports, the armament to be carried, and the general shape of the hull.

As an item of historical interest, I hope you will enjoy it.