WesWorld

Danish Army Doctrine, known to the Danish Army as "Fluid Battle"

Danish Army doctrine is focused on defeating elastic defenses and dealing with blitz offensives.

Deep Penetration for Elastic Defenses
Using the highly mobile disposition of the Danish Army, the enemy harassed via multiple or parallel operations which prevents/delays the concentration of enemy forces. The Airforce is to paralyze enemy movements by complete air superiority, thereby limiting enemy tactical/operational information. Several points of breakthrough are to be achieved and extremely mobile forces are to penetrate deep into the enemy strategic zone and destroy enemy reserve and strategic capabilities. This movement would force either the enemy to lose operational depth in an effort to re-establish a continuous defensive line or lose strategic capability.

Fluid Defense for Blitz Offensives
Unlike previous doctrines emphasizing static and semi-static defenses, the new Danish Army doctrine demands operation of very fluid defensive units. This units are broken down to company level which operate as counter-blitz units. Mobile forces pick at the enemy lines of thrust and re-position immediately. Occasionally the enemy is to encounter local strong-points which are formed either by cities defense, local terrain facilitating ambush, and heavily armored units. These blunt the enemy momentum by making it costly to engage directly. These are presented, engage in short battles, and then retreat to another position as other units delay the enemy forces. In doing so, the army attempts to upset the enemy ability to discern where to maneuver to, rather than limiting it's ability to maneuver.

Airforce elements are organically attached to this teams and this AirLand combination work to shatter enemy momentum and cohesion. At the same time, the army is to pursue "Deep Penetration" in order to shatter enemy ability and will to conduct further operations.

The "Fluid Battle" doctrine assumes a clear advantage in information and flexibility over the enemy, and the force structure reflects this fundamental requirement. The ultimate goal of Fluid Battle is to make any attempt to take Danish clay sufficiently costly to deter nations from seriously considering and enacting on it.

Modification of the M44E2 (AVRE) will occur soon after limited production. Due complaints about the vulnerability of the loader during the reloading of the Spigot Mortar, Ordnance decided to replace the 290mm Spigot Mortar with a 210mm Breech-loading Mortar (ala 21cm GrW 69). As a result, the applique armor was thinned slightly.

Hull Side & Rear Armor: 100mm --> 85mm

"Jaeger AVRE" M44E2A2
Crew: 4 (Driver, Gunner, Loader, Commander)
Weight: 52 metric tonnes

Length: 6.3 m w/o gun
Width: 3.73 m over tracks
Height: 2.80m over cupola

Primary Armament: 1 x 210mm L/14 Mortar - Breechloader (40 rounds)
Secondary Armament: 1 x 7.62mm MG (Bow - 3125 rounds), 1 x 7.62mm MG (AA - 3125 rounds), 1 x 12.7mm MG (Coaxial - 600 rounds)

Hull Armor Upper: 175mm@45 / 85mm / 85mm@45
Hull Armor Lower: 120mm@45 / 85mm / 85mm@45
Turret Armor: 120mm / 75mm@30 / 75mm
Engine: 500hp 6-cycl Diesel
PWR: 9.62 hp/tonne
Suspension: Double Torsion Bars
Track Type: Dead
Wheels per side: 7
Track Width: 762mm
Ground Pressure: 79.3 kPa (11.5 PSI)

Range: 160km (road), 80km (offroad)
Speed: 31kph (road), 16kph (offroad)

The V44 is meant to be the backbone of the army, equipping it's mechanized infantry formations. The V44 was formed from the requirements of Fluid Battle, which emphasized general mobility. Motorized infantry suffer from lack of mobility on dismount and the inability to bring such transportation deep into battle zones. The V44 is the Danish answer to the doctrinal requirement. Armored vs infantry 0.5" (12.7mm) fire and armed with a high ROF 20mm gun (ala Oerlikon), it is to dispatch enemy light armored vehicles and trucks as well as provide powerful suppressing fire via the 100mm Mortar (ala 10cm NbW 40).

During the design process of the V4X program, it was attempted keep the vehicle below 10 metric tonnes to keep it transportable via air. However, after some review it was decided the airborne capability was not worth the very steep cut in combat capability of the vehicle.

V44, Infantry Fighting Vehicle
Crew: 3 (Driver, Gunner, Commander)
Passengers: 11
Weight: 23.5 metric tonnes

Length: 6.2 m w/o gun
Width: 2.91 m over tracks
Height: 2.30m over cupola

Primary Armament: 1 x 20mm L/85 Autocannon (450 rounds), 1 x 100mm L/17.7 Mortar - Breachloading (60 rounds)
Secondary Armament: 1 x 7.62mm MG (Bow - 3125 rounds)

Hull Armor Upper: 25mm@45 / 25mm / 25mm
Hull Armor Lower: 25mm@45 / 25mm / 25mm
Turret Armor: 25mm@30 / 25mm@30 / 25mm@30
Engine: 500hp 6-cycl Diesel
PWR: 21.3 hp/tonne
Suspension: Double Torsion Bars
Track Type: Dead
Wheels per side: 9
Track Width: 400mm
Ground Pressure: 65.7 kPa (9.53 PSI)

Range: 320km (road), 200km (offroad)
Speed: 92kph (road), 60kph (offroad)

Quoted from "Logi"

V44, Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Couple comments on this guy. First, I don't think we have seen anything like it in WW so defiantly a unique project that seems to fit the needs of the Danish army well. Second, I presume that the 20mm cannon and 100mm mortar are mutually exclusive? Third, I feel the speeds are a bit optimistic for a tracked AFV of this era; where/how did you get the figures from?

Indeed, the 20mm is meant to be the main gun with the 100mm mortar being only for anti-concentration/fortification use. This would be similar to the original design for the M3 Lee, but... you know... with things working as intended.

The speed is the same as the M18 Hellcat but with a better PWR than the Hellcat. For most basic figures, I use Tanksharp, then downgrade whatever it spits out to be lower than similar historical vehicles in the same time frame.

I have to agree. This is a very revolutionary vehicle, and part of a very revolutionary doctrine. I would like to see some more information on the background of this vehicle, and how the Danish Army reached its conclusions on the need for such. Given Denmark's likely opponents in any ground combat scenario, it seems overly aggressive and almost improbable.

Quoted from "Logi"

Indeed, the 20mm is meant to be the main gun with the 100mm mortar being only for anti-concentration/fortification use. This would be similar to the original design for the M3 Lee, but... you know... with things working as intended.

The speed is the same as the M18 Hellcat but with a better PWR than the Hellcat. For most basic figures, I use Tanksharp, then downgrade whatever it spits out to be lower than similar historical vehicles in the same time frame.

I am a bit uncomfortable with this design, but would like to hear others opinions before continuing to discuss it.

Quoted from "snip"

Quoted from "Logi"

Indeed, the 20mm is meant to be the main gun with the 100mm mortar being only for anti-concentration/fortification use. This would be similar to the original design for the M3 Lee, but... you know... with things working as intended.

The speed is the same as the M18 Hellcat but with a better PWR than the Hellcat. For most basic figures, I use Tanksharp, then downgrade whatever it spits out to be lower than similar historical vehicles in the same time frame.

I am a bit uncomfortable with this design, but would like to hear others opinions before continuing to discuss it.

As noted, I too am rather taken aback with the vehicle. It seems to jump several levels of technology.

I concur with Bruce and Snip - this design's a bit over the top for me. I don't necessarily have a problem with a full-tracked infantry carrier (several Wesworld countries have built them), but none of those vehicles had such a combination of speed, armour, firepower, etc. I think Denmark's current line of half-track vehicles will be far superior, since they'll have better fuel economy, easier maintenance, a longer service life, etc.

I can see why... I'll try to answer your question first though.

Quoted

I would like to see some more information on the background of this vehicle, and how the Danish Army reached its conclusions on the need for such. Given Denmark's likely opponents in any ground combat scenario, it seems overly aggressive and almost improbable.

Denmark has only two real opponents: Germany and Nordmark.
As far as the Army is concerned, Nordmark's threat is heavily blunted by the Danish Navy - which is very well funded. Thus the main threat to Danish soil is German aggression. It's not likely due to political factors that Germany would engage in an invasion of Denmark, but that is a poor substitute for a plan.

Hence the Danish Army's focus is on inflicting disproportional damage to the German forces and if possible force an end to the war in a more favorable position than unconditional surrender. To reach this goal, the Danish Army must overcome a few very challenging problems.

1) Complete lack of strategic depth, in addition to almost completely lacking any adverse terrain to tanks.
2) Overwhelming numerical inferiority in comparison to German forces
3) A high degree of mechanization and large number of hard units in the German forces deployed near the Danish border. This means a very narrow firepower and mobility gap between any possible Danish and German forces.

To deal with these three problems, the Danish army has to adopt a new and radical doctrine. The usual methods to deal with such problems (as historical), presume that the country has some combination of strategic depth, numerical superiority, or organizational superiority.

...

In Soviet Deep Battle, numerical superiority (in the form of large mobile reserves and multiple breakthrough points) combined with great strategic depth (>100km operational zones) were to be used to absorb any thrust into the front-line and then counterattack decisively.

In the German Elastic Defense, relatively deep but static defenses are used in the same manner. Unlike Deep Battle, Elastic Defense entailed a main defensive line with most of the forces. Deep Battle rather focused on large mobile reserves.

In the series of ideas that formed the so-called "Blitzkrieg", the operating country was to overcome numerical superiority with organization superiority. Organization superiority entailed greater ability to focus forces for local numerical superiority at focal points. Standard keil und kessel tactics were then used, exploiting these local breakthroughs, to whittle down the enemy's numerical superiority. This, however, presume the operating country has forces much more mobile and flexible than the enemy's forces.

The American "anti-blitz" tactics entailed removing the enemy's ability to maneuver by using small flanking attacks to force the enemy to turn inwards, reducing it's frontage, so as to protect itself. However these tactics require numerical superiority as well as great strategic depth.

...

As I've detailed, Denmark has no strategic depth and no numerical superiority. Hence it cannot use any of those above doctrines. In addition, it cannot count on having much operational superiority over German forces. Indeed, it takes a lot of effort for Denmark to even keep up in technology with Germany. As I see it, Denmark is the most unfavorable position, as it is, it is (with standard doctrine) impossible for any German invasion of Denmark to end without the total annexation of Denmark by Germany.

Denmark cannot depend on the protection of allies or diplomatic moves. For the former, Denmark would be overrun in a matter of one or two weeks. For the latter, Germany is quite friendly with all it's larger neighbors. Nordmark and Germany have a historical together and indeed, they could potentially agree to split Denmark. In short, I don't see any large country willing to go to war with Germany over Denmark, although they may frown on that move.

So the responsibility to the defense of Denmark and it's sovereignty falls squarely on the Army's shoulders, a heavy burden. As I intend to write it out IC, the severely underfunded state of the Danish Army and strange disposition of it's force is the result of the a very conservative power group in the Danish Army. The new generation of officers grow increasing disgusted with the state of the Danish Army, which seems to them to be a paper army in comparison to the armies of major European powers. This is turned into a reform movement with officers identifying themselves as "Transformationalists" over the 1938-1945 period, which results in the "Fluid Defense" doctrine.

I intend this movement to be very successful in the Danish Army due to it's underfunded status, but failing in the Navy and Airforce, which are much better funded and the industrial-military complex there much stronger.

... To be continued (Regarding why Fluid Defense is the counter to Germany & how the V44 fits in)

I don't see how you can look back on the previous Danish Army developments and conclude it is "underfunded." They've consistently fielded home-designed gear which is on par with (and sometimes more advanced than) the Great Powers, equipping a large percentage of their ground forces.

German doctrine in Wesworld (as I understand it), relies on the "Blitzkreig" doctrine for offensive operations and Elastic Defense for defensive operations. As far as I can tell, the only difference from the historical Elastic Defense doctrine is a greater depth for the Wesworld version, but I may be wrong on that count.

Hence, the Danish army must be able to at once, stop blitzkrieg advances from running over the Danish army, and avoid getting bogged down in the German elastic defense. That is the origin of "Fluid Defense" and "Deep Penetration".

Denmark obviously cannot change it's situation of strategic depth and numerical inferiority, so the only answer is to attempt to achieve operational superiority. Still both forces are semi-mobile and flexible, the answer cannot lie in "more speed", or vertical expansion of capability. My answer was full spectrum speed, or horizontal expansion of capability. I've been hinting as much whilst I was in the midst of forming the doctrine.

General mobility means every unit in the Danish Army is on wheels or tracks and will mostly stay that way. In this fashion, the Danish army will be able to coordinate infantry and armored units much more quickly since the infantry does not need to catch up. In a semi-mobile force, infantry lags heavily behind the armored forces. This is the method I had intended to use to achieve local numerical superiority over German forces.

This being the only possible advantage over the German army, the question becomes, how can this be transformed into answers to the problems of Blitzkrieg and Elastic Defense?

...

Blitzkrieg relies heavily on momentum achieved after breakthrough. Once breakthrough occurs, blitzkrieg seeks to exploit the time between the re-establishment of a continuous defensive line and the breakthrough moment to seize space. The answer presented by general mobility is the complete removal of a continuous defensive line. Defensive lines rely on static force multipliers, which are not useful towards keil and kessel tactics. Abandoning the defensive line, which has little use to Denmark, allows Denmark to restrict the information German forces have on Danish positions. This blunts the initiative of German forces. Futhermore, the presumed operational superiority allows Denmark to present local strongpoints and then retreat these points mostly intact, which would be impossible without general mobility. This serve to more quickly exhaust the momentum of enemy thrusts, which counteracts Denmark's lack of strategic depth. German forces are then met with counterattacks (which is a standard response to loss of momentum).

Since this operational superiority is very fleeting for the Danish army, it cannot rely on keil and kessel tactics to blunt Germany's numerical superiority. There simply won't be time to whittle down the pockets and the cost of destroying these pockets is felt much more dearly in Denmark than Germany. Hence, I borrow from Deep Battle, which itself was designed to deal with German elastic defense. Instead of hoping to have enough time to destroy pockets, penetrating units are to go deep into the enemy strategic zone, outpacing the less mobile German units, to inflict damage on strategic assets and paralyze reserves.

...

When I mentioned "In a semi-mobile force, infantry lags heavily behind the armored forces.", I was referring to motorized infantry, or infantry who ride APCs (battle taxis) and then dismount to fight. Due to the nature of these APCs, they cannot be taken deep into enemy territory, since they frequently are open-topped (inviting to grenades and snipers) and lack any armament to justify their (costly) existence on the battlefield. As such, whenever a fight breaks out the infantry must dismount (which takes time), and find better positions. When this fight is over, the infantry must find their APCs again or if they are retreating, ride tanks in vulnerable positions or get encircled.

As such if a fire-fight occurred, in which the engagements are short as "Fluid Battle" emphasizes, the dismounting infantry is barely any better than foot infantry. These tiny engagements are a huge drag on the mobility of the unit as a whole. In addition it limits the pursuit ability of the armored units since they must separate from infantry to pursue, which opens to the armored forces to annihilation via ambush. These motorized infantry give no organizational superiority and in Denmark's case, liable to force a war of attrition, which Denmark will lose badly.

Mechanized force, in which infantry is totally protected and can choose to remain inside the vehicle, is necessary for infantry formations to achieve mobility in fire-fight engagements. The vehicle they ride will be next to them when and if they dismount and fight. These vehicles need some organic fire capabilities to justify their front-line use, which is the purpose of the 20mm L/85 and 100mm mortar. These two factors is the origin of the organizational superiority.


Without such a vehicle, there is no doctrine that could blunt any German invasion.

Quoted from "Brockpaine"

I don't see how you can look back on the previous Danish Army developments and conclude it is "underfunded." They've consistently fielded home-designed gear which is on par with (and sometimes more advanced than) the Great Powers, equipping a large percentage of their ground forces.

That is why the Danish army is a "paper army". It may have fielded gear on par or more advanced than the Great Powers, but the force structure is severely understaffed as you recall. Looking at the "Danish Army" as detailed in the encyclopedia, I got the impression that few units had more than a handful of any of the Danish gear. This results in what I would call a "prestige army".

It has fancy gear to present during military parades, and the numbers of divisions, etc. look impressive on paper, but it lacks substance. It is understaffed, lacks an equivalent motorization/mechanization level as the Great Powers, and have a very spread out force. There's few units located in Danish home soil and in strategic positions where they can response to an attack. There are precious units wasted in the likes of West Africa, Somalia, the Caribbeans, and other far-flung, lo-value locations. The army is only capable of showing the flag and not any real operations.

Edit: I suppose it depends on what you count as "large percentage". As I see it, compared to the German armored battalion, the Danish army as a whole has a pitiful amount of capable armored vehicles.

For the details of the V44, it is not particularly well armored. It has 25mm of armor which is only sufficient to protect vs 12.7mm (0.5") or smaller fire. 12.7mm MGs have 22mm (AP/I) to 25mm (AP) penetration at 100 meters according to British Ordnance charts. Really, anything larger (15mm and otherwise) will penetrate. I presume most infantry units will have a 37mm or larger anti-tank gun somewhere which will dispatch the V44 just as easily.

As for the speed... I only need it to be ~60kph minimum so I can drop it's speed severely. I can attempt that (without checking any numbers) by dropping the engine power to ~300 hp, the weight to ~21 metric tons,and speed to 60kph.

Quoted from "Brockpaine"

I think Denmark's current line of half-track vehicles will be far superior, since they'll have better fuel economy, easier maintenance, a longer service life, etc.

I disagree. Half-tracks have poorer cross-terrain mobility and are more mechanically complicated as it comprised of two systems in one chassis. The benefit of the half-track as manifested in fuel economy is unnecessary since it is to be attached to armored elements, which invariably have less range than half-tracks. That additional range is therefore wasted. The answer to the maintenance and service life issue come down to the capabilities gained. In this case, I believe the tracked vehicle offers sufficiently better operational capability such that the additional cost is worth the price tag.

Edit: I'm open to shortening the 20mm beyond L/85, but I had wanted to increase commonality of parts by using Oerlikon/Hispanos for the 20mm gun.

Have you looked at the size disparity of the Heer versus the Danish Army? In the event of a conflict between Germany and Denmark I seriously doubt that the Danish Army would have a change of attaining the "deep penetration" it seeks, given the preponderance of German mobile forces, German air superiority and the extremely narrow front upon which operations would take place.

Quoted from "Logi"

The Airforce is to paralyze enemy movements by complete air superiority, thereby limiting enemy tactical/operational information.

Quoted from "Logi"

The "Fluid Battle" doctrine assumes a clear advantage in information and flexibility over the enemy, and the force structure reflects this fundamental requirement.

These are critical assumptions I don't believe you can reasonably make.

The assessment that Germany is Denmark's primary potential land foe is sound, I would make that assumption as well.

I pondered these questions myself, playing Romania and bordering a behemoth. My thoughts were;

1) Don't fight Russia.

2) We really don't want to fight Russia.

3) We really really don't want to fight Russia.

4) If we have to fight Russia, get lots of other people to help us (hopefully)!

5) If we have to fight Russia, try to make ourselves an expensive morsel. Hmm, there's lots of rivers which we can use bordering Russia, what can we do with that?

6) Russia doesn't want to fight anyone if she doesn't have to. Then let's not fight Russia.

1-4 and 6 probably apply in Denmark's situation. 5 is where I think your going off a bit, you have the right idea in trying to make yourself an expensive morsel but I don't think Elastic Defense is the way to do it. If you want to make an expensive morsel, dig a big ditch both wide and steep with no bridges across the breadth of Jutland, bordering Germany, build some fortifications that make the Maginot Line look like a child's sand castle behind that, ring them with enough AA to make an Eben Emael a nasty proposition, and repeat the same on any airfield in Denmark with enough artillery emplaced to make any Paratroop or glider landing an expensive undertaking. Do the same with all strategic objectives the Danish Army can forsee in Denmark. Fortify all expected landing beaches to the same level as the fortifications behind the Jutland Dike. All this is very expensive, and will bankrupt Denmark several times over.

Or, you can just plan not to fight Germany 1 vs 1.

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

Have you looked at the size disparity of the Heer versus the Danish Army? In the event of a conflict between Germany and Denmark I seriously doubt that the Danish Army would have a change of attaining the "deep penetration" it seeks, given the preponderance of German mobile forces, German air superiority and the extremely narrow front upon which operations would take place.

I have... I mentioned it with regard to numerical superiority. But the historical "blitzkrieg" doctrine was created specifically for numerical inferiority and narrow fronts. I strongly doubt there cannot be penetration of the German line, especially since German doctrine is that of elastic defense, with little modification from historical. The historical elastic defense was a great war doctrine poorly adapted to the mobility of armored units.

Quoted from "Brockpaine"

Quoted from "Logi"

The Airforce is to paralyze enemy movements by complete air superiority, thereby limiting enemy tactical/operational information.

Quoted from "Logi"

The "Fluid Battle" doctrine assumes a clear advantage in information and flexibility over the enemy, and the force structure reflects this fundamental requirement.

These are critical assumptions I don't believe you can reasonably make.

Why not? I agree with the airforce point, but all doctrines have their flaws and unanswered questions. I do not intend the "Fluid Battle" doctrine to be the holy grail. Without direct testing in battle, it is merely theoretical. For example, AirLand Battle never dealt with the question of significant enemy reserve forces.

As for the information and flexibility requirement, that depends on the organization of the forces and it's gear. I don't see how the assumption is unreasonable, since it is intended that the Danish army will have to build that capability itself.

Quoted from "TheCanadian"

I pondered these questions myself, playing Romania and bordering a behemoth. My thoughts were;


...

1-4 and 6 probably apply in Denmark's situation. 5 is where I think your going off a bit, you have the right idea in trying to make yourself an expensive morsel but I don't think Elastic Defense is the way to do it.

Elastic Defense is a quite static defense. It is done by infantry strongpoints rear of a reconnaissance line. It is not nearly as mobile as it's name sounds. As for 1-4&6... I detailed why I didn't see them as possible in Denmark's situation.

Quoted from "TheCanadian"

If you want to make an expensive morsel, dig a big ditch both wide and steep with no bridges across the breadth of Jutland, bordering Germany, build some fortifications that make the Maginot Line look like a child's sand castle behind that, ring them with enough AA to make an Eben Emael a nasty proposition, and repeat the same on any airfield in Denmark with enough artillery emplaced to make any Paratroop or glider landing an expensive undertaking. Do the same with all strategic objectives the Danish Army can forsee in Denmark. Fortify all expected landing beaches to the same level as the fortifications behind the Jutland Dike. All this is very expensive, and will bankrupt Denmark several times over.

I mentioned why that was a terrible idea. As you say, it's expensive, but heavy static defenses are also useless. Denmark is great "tank country"and any local penetration of the line can quickly be used to overrun the entirety of Denmark.

Quoted from "TheCanadian"

Or, you can just plan not to fight Germany 1 vs 1.

That's quite unhelpful and not likely. If nations followed that line of thought there would be no need for doctrine for Israel and it would not have fought well in it's Six Days and Yom Kipper wars. Iran would not need to plan around any foreign aggression and would simply crumble under any hint of force by other countries. If countries planned that way, they would and should expect to fare about as well as Vietnam after the Sino-Vietnamese war, in which the aftermath was the setting back of it's economy by several decades.


Not wanting something to happen is a poor substitute for any contingency plan. I also do not believe in the "good" nature of any nation, which always acts in it's own interest. Let's play the hypothetical. If Germany decided to invade Denmark, how would the world respond?

The lesson Denmark should draw from the Sino-Chosen war is that any international response will be late and light-handed. In the meantime, Germany gains almost all of the 11 factories in Denmark, a roughly 30% increase in capabilities. There is a significantly (heavy) reason for German invasion, whereas the reasons for not invading are multiple (weak) reasons revolving around nebulous diplomatic concerns.

Elastic Defense is a viable doctrine, however by its very definition it states that it seeks to delay rather than prevent the advance of an attacker, buying time and causing additional casualties by yielding space (reference Wikipedia). At a little over 29,000 square kilometers however you don't have a lot of space to trade for time, in my view the space you have is fairly precious. If you want to do Defense in Depth, I would suggest Hedgehog Defense against the German mobile forces, with an emphasis on protecting the air space over the hedgehogs. The tactics your doctrine are suggesting is an aggressive counter-attack by your mobile forces against the German mobile forces and while you may inflict casualties in doing so, Germany can afford take losses of 10:1 and still come out relatively unscathed. Denmark can't afford to lose any tanks at all.

As a final rejoinder, I don't suggest that you not plan to fight Germany, rather I don't think your doctrine for fighting Germany will be a successful one, nor is it sustainable for the long-tern which seems to be what you are assuming. Denmark hasn't got many powerful friends, but she hasn't made enemies either. Also, war is simply politics by other means, and Denmark isn't in the position of Israel at any time in its history. WW Germany has sought to expand through trade rather than force of arms. An aggressive take over of a small country which is what I presume is what your planning against, while it may bring about some short term gain with regards to factories, would set back a lot of progress Germany has made diplomatically and economically. Romania, for instance would refuse to sell oil and contraband to Germany, as would the United States both during the war and afterwards, just like the United States is currently doing with China and Chosen now. The world response to the Sino-Chosen war, was more a pox on both your houses, simply because either we supported an expansionist China who has made no secret her desire for more territory or we supported a nutjob who wanted to make his own little empire (the Korean Great Leader that is, not the former player). Most of the Great Powers felt economic sanctions were the extend of our needed involvement. Ironically, it isn't the Danish Armed Forces, no matter how strong they are,which would make an aggressive German takeover an expensive proposition, but the takeover itself because the act would in the long run cost more than any gain felt in the short-term.

Fluid Battle does not entail Defense in Depth at all. I'm not sure where you got the idea. Hedgehog Defense is strongpoint defense.

There is no battle plan in which Denmark can possibly lose no tanks. Aggressive counter-attack reduces force loss in comparison to static and passive variants. Initiative in wars of maneuver is decisive, and passive defenses will be decisively defeated. I think this is a point where we will simply have to agree to disagree.

Your final rejoin makes little sense. Presuming that it's neighbor will not undertake any invasion of it leads to great vulnerability which negatively affects it's ability to prevent war on the diplomatic level. A strong Danish force gives additional leverage in diplomacy. That said, I do not subscribe to your interpretation of Clausewitz's words. IMO the military does not draw strength from diplomatic arrangements but rather the other way around.

That said, simply because you cannot see a situation in the current sphere which such a move is advantageous does not mean it cannot be. There was much said about the squandering of economic and political ties by China in the SCS maneuvers for relatively little gains. However taking the moves as a whole as well as extending the time frame over a larger time-frame display how advantageous the moves are for China. In a similar move, I feel it is rather short-sighted to say a takeover of Denmark is more costly in the long-term.

As for the Sino-Chosen war, I am well aware of the official reasons for the moves by the Great Powers. However, that has nothing to do with the lesson a military will draw from it.