WesWorld

I just read a book "Japan-China war at Sea" by Piotr Olender.

It is a book about 1894-1895 war between China and Japan.
Chinese admiral Ting Ju-chang after hearing about the Japanese attack ordered his fleet too find and destroy the enemy. In RL he did not found the enemy and after receiving orders returned to base.

Lets say he did found Adm. Ito forces and fought a battle early in the war.

Ting had a lot of things going against him. His ships were older and smaller, crew quality was lower, and his ships carried mostly AP shells with were in efficient versus un-armoured Japanese cruisers hulls.
He dose however have two battleships witch in the battle of Yalu showed that there are basically immune to Japanese artillery.

His fleet can, if not outright destroy the invading forces, damage them enough too push them back. Without control of the sea Japan cannot win the fight in Korea. It armies will have little to none supplies while Chinese can resupply there units.

So If Japanese first offensive action turns out to be a failure what will Empire of Japan ascension to power look like.

The war basically made Japan bankrupt. It were the war reparations that kept there country going.
Will this humbling defeat curb Japan ambitions?
Will victorious Chinese without the RL contributions paid manage to stabilise there economy in the coming years?

How will the future of those two countries look like if China wins the first round of there struggle that lasted in RL till 1945?


I posted this on another forum and did not get an answer.With the crowd here being more navally minded I hope You have some thoughts.

Interesting idea. Eastern Asia and associated history isn't my forte, but here's some of my thoughts.

If Japan was repulsed by China in the war, then I think we'd be unlikely to see the historical Russo-Japanese War in 1905. That one was a close-run thing for Japan, too; they showed they could defeat an Asian power, but it still bankrupted them.

A Chinese victory probably won't remove the criminal governmental mismanagement or their warlord problem. The Japanese adapted their culture to bring in new technology and modernize their empire; but the Chinese weren't. So, quite simply, I see the Japanese adapting to their defeat much better than the Chinese will adapt to their victory.

I'd anticipate that another Sino-Japanese war would likely follow as soon as Japan thought they were ready - maybe around the same time as WWI, when Japan can take advantage of the distraction of the Great Powers. Without defeating first China then Russia, though, Japan will not be thought of as a Great Power - a *potential* player, but not a player.

If Japan loses to China, I'm skeptical that they'd feel ready to engage Russia in 1905. That means no Tsushima and the effect on both battleship development and the development of Japanese "Decisive Battle" strategy.

It could change China quite a bit, with the increased prestige of the Emperor he might be able to pull off the "Hundred Day reforms" and possibly avoid the disasterous regencies of the Dowager empress. Ofcourse even if the fleet found the Japanese it was probably plagued by the same troubles that were encounterd in the Battle of the Yalu River (where the fleet discovered that coal powder had been put into the some shells instead gunpowder).

Russia would still be around to make demands on Korea with nothing to fear from Japan.

Battle of Yalu was lost by the Chinese more because of disastrous tactic chosen by adm. Ting.
His formation was broken in the first minutes of combat.
Battleships Ting Yuan and Chen Yuan shown that they are a force to be reckoned with at Yalu.

Chinese need only to repulse the Ito. They don't need too sink his ships. With contested sea control China will launch there amphibious landings.

Still over all political situation is disastrous.
They are a feudal power in industrialised times.

It wasn't Tings tactics at Yalu, it was the fact that the captain of the ship his flag was on either was incapable of following orders or egnored them completely, as ting ordered his ships to change course in such a way as to expose the flagship but put the rest of the fleet in a better possition to fire on the Japanese.

It also didn't help that Ting was killed in the opening salvo from his own ship (ordered by the same captain) because of the flagships poor design, the German designers noted that an ahead bearing salvo was ill advised because it fired over (or rather through) the flying bridge, right where Ting stood.

Quoted

Originally posted by thesmilingassassin
It wasn't Tings tactics at Yalu, it was the fact that the captain of the ship his flag was on either was incapable of following orders or egnored them completely, as ting ordered his ships to change course in such a way as to expose the flagship but put the rest of the fleet in a better possition to fire on the Japanese.

It also didn't help that Ting was killed in the opening salvo from his own ship (ordered by the same captain) because of the flagships poor design, the German designers noted that an ahead bearing salvo was ill advised because it fired over (or rather through) the flying bridge, right where Ting stood.

Ting died form his own hand in Weihaiwei at night of 12/13 II 1896.
He was injured in the early stage of the battle as You described not killed.

He ordered a line formation with BB in the centre exposing his flanks, I think that is a disastrous tactical decision.

Your correct on Tings demise, however the fleets initial formation was line abreast when it encountered the Japanese fleet.

According to Royal Navy advisor Lieutenant William Ferdinand Tyler, the Captain of Dingyuan diliberately egnored Tings orders to change formation and also gave the order to fire resulting in Ting being wounded.

It also doesn't help that the Chinese crews hadn't even had gunnery practice and apparently had shells filled with everything from Concrete to water in them. This to me is the main reason why they lost the battle as the shells didn't do the damage that they should have.

Sorry, I did not said it right.
Formation was ships side by side with BB in centre. Line abreast as You wrote.

Your point about ignoring orders is also correct.

Chinese shell were ineffective yes.
Still I believe that with all that Ting has going against him,he can still win a strategic victory, by repulsing the Japanese.

His crews are poor, crew morale is mediocre at best, ships are inferior. Shells craptastic.

Ito won by braking the enemy formation insuring panic in the lines and some times outright dissection.

Ting chose the bad, in my eyes, line abreast formation. But even with it, put the BB on the flanks and battle will turnout quiet differently.

With BBs on each flank Ito will not be able to disrupt the side as easy as he did. For him to outright brake the enemy lines he will have to attack the centre.

You mentioned Tyler.

He wrote that signalling error was the reason for side by side formation. He writes that Admiral Ting ordered column with BB is centre. However this seams unlikely. One both Ting and Henneken(a German advisor, land artillery officer) did not seen the mistake.
Second Three directives that Ting gave before the battle.
-All ships are to support there neighbouring ships.
-All ships are to point there bows to the enemy.
-All ships are to follow the flagship.
Ok first one is somehow possible but the second invalidates Tyler claim.

Granted I haven't read the book "Japan-China war at Sea" but the info I've seen credits Tylor as the most credible source on the Chinese prediciment.

Fleet strength seems fairly even to me and the Chinese did manage to get some hits but those damn sabotaged shells did them no good.

Quoted

Originally posted by thesmilingassassin
Granted I haven't read the book "Japan-China war at Sea" but the info I've seen credits Tylor as the most credible source on the Chinese prediciment.

Fleet strength seems fairly even to me and the Chinese did manage to get some hits but those damn sabotaged shells did them no good.

The shell problem is a big one, plus Chinese had the magazines filled only to 70% capacity, and only 20% of that were grenades/ HE shells rest was solid shot AP rounds with when hit went through Japanese cruiser not doing much damage.
Actually how much of those Solid shots were sabotaged, as You put it, HE shells is unknown.

Mutsushima was hit by two 305mm shells one went through the ship and fall in the water other exploded starting fires. It is assumed that one was a AP and the other a HE shells. They both may have been HE one may just been filled with sand instead of explosives.

As for Tyler and his credibility. Although his works are often quoted they are sometimes overruled.
The author came to conclusions that European advisor tended to overplay they importance.
Something I'm inclined to agree on.

From my understanding there were also European advisors on board the Japanese converted liner as well?

Saykyo Maru? Support Cruiser.
Not that I'm aware of. It had Kabayame naval chief of staff on-board, so maybe You right.

That one took part in the battle practically by accident and was more of a trouble for Ito than help. It sailed together with Akagi the other weakest ship in the fleet.

Not too much trouble, she took some of the fire from the Chinese ships IIRC, lol. Sure helped out the warships!