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Thursday, December 1st 2011, 6:45pm

Le Spectateur militaire

Le Spectateur militaire

Le Spectateur militaire is a professional privately-published monthly journal. First published in the 1700s, Le Spectateur militaire covered military reports from around the world, but fell into disuse in the early 1900s. In 1941, it was re-started by several retired French officers, who adopted a more journalistic style with monthly features, special reports, and peer-reviewed professional articles. The French Defense Ministry supports the journal through distribution to military schools and field units, but does not exercise any control of the journal's content.

Regular Features:
- Military Unit Spotlight: focuses on a unit or type of unit fielded by either the French military or another world army.
- Literature Review: reviews literary works of interest to military readers.
- Letter from the Ministry: a monthly letter written for distribution by the Minister of National Defense.
- Revue d'action militaire: Publishes declassified after-action reviews of military engagements (some being modern, some historical).

Further regular features will be added as use and inclination permit.

Published Articles:
Guide to articles published so far on the forum

Special Article: Small Arms Calibers: The New Wave - From the May 1941 issue.
Over the last five years, a number of prominent world armies have substantially shifted their major small arms calibers, with some powers taking up particularly daring stances. Other armies have shown more caution or conservatism, often for well-justified reasons. What should the military spectator make of this small arms sea-change?
Read article

Military Unit Spotlight: The Dinassaut - From the June 1941 issue.
A Dinassaut is a shorthand term for the Division d'Infanterie Navale d'Assaut, or the Naval Assault Infantry Division. It forms the main striking power of the Fusiliers Marins.
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Special Article: Preparing to Fight the Last War - From the July 1941 issue.
It is a common saying in the Western world that militaries often prepare to re-fight the war they last fought. While this saying is often offered as a criticism of the conservatism of military leadership, learning from the victories and defeats of the past is a vital part of an officer's task. It is not enough for a military to merely study its campaign histories and draw on a list of lessons learned: the military must make those lessons applicable forward into the future as well.
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Literature Review: Le Corps noir and Les Actes des Aigles - From the August 1941 issue.
Within the last year, two historical novels (Les Actes des Aigles by Pierre Michaux and Le Corps noir by Piet Luns) have been published narrating a fictional major war involving the South African Empire.
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Military Unit Spotlight: The Syrian Armed Forces - From the September 1941 issue.
The Syrian Armed Forces were created in 1936 prior to Syrian independence, originally as independent branches of the French armed forces. Upon the independence of the Syrian Republic, the French-trained native units earmarked for the purpose became the Syrian Armed Forces.
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Letter From the Ministry: October 1941 - From the October 1941 issue.
"This year we have seen some dramatic changes and new challenges for the French military to overcome. In April, the Armee de Terre instituted one of the most radical reorganizations since the end of the Prussian War decades ago..."
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Literature Review: Guerre des îles Petite - From the November 1941 issue.
Guerre des îles Petite (tr 'War for Little Islands'), published in September 1941, is a collaborative work by six Western authors discussing the recently ended South China Sea War, fought between China and the Philippines in late 1940.
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Military Unit Spotlight: The Yugoslavian Pandurs - From the December 1941 issue.
Yugoslavia's Pandurs have gained a high level of professional regard for their actions as part of the League of Nations Afghanistan Field Force...
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Special Article: CNS "Chiloe" and the Porte-avions d'escorte Concept - From the January 1942 issue.
With the increased emphasis many navies place on naval aviation, naval designers and theorists have begun working to determine such things as ideal size, speed, and other operational parameters for aircraft carriers.
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Special Article: The Legion Russe at the Battle of the Nations: August 1917 - From the February 1942 issue.
"Into the palatial Hofburg, once the seat of the Holy Roman Empire, stormed a thousand of the rough and defiant men of the Russian Legion, who finished alone what Mother Russia had started three years before: to tear down the flag of the great power of Central Europe."
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Special Article: Les Pingouins Africains - How the Armee de l'Aire Serves the French African Colonies - From the March 1942 issue.
The Nord Pingouins of the Armee de l'Aire bring civilization to Western Africa.
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Literature Review: Bruits de guerre lointaine - From the April 1942 issue.
The military fiction book Bruits de guerre lointaine by Pierre Michaux is the second book in a military fiction quartet written by wargame umpire Pierre Michaux.
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Military Unit Spotlight: XIe Corps d'Armée - From the May 1942 issue.
The XIe Corps d'Armée is the most powerful military force garrisoned in the French African territories. Composed of three Light Armoured Divisions, the IXe Corps is the successor unit to the traditional cavalry units garrisoning North Africa since the 19th Century.
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Special Article: The Fisherman and the Hunter - The Battle of Agiastirio and the Death of the Lyran Imperial Navy - From the June 1942 issue.
On the morning of September 18th, 1391, Atlantean prince and admiral Theron Palmeiro defied a pope and sailed with a hundred ships to conquer the Lyran Empire.
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Literature Review: La nouvelle génération - From the July 1942 issue.
La nouvelle génération by psychologist Charles Lemoine, published in May 1942, is a study on the mindset of the so-called "New Generation" of military officers and soldiers.
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Special Article: The Battle of the Atacama and Operational Design - From the August 1942 issue.
As the Southern Hemisphere winter settled over the Atacama Desert in June 1932, the Chilean and Bolivian armies battled for control of the Antofagasta Region.
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Special Article: Dogs of War - From the September 1942 issue.
Many of the dog's capabilities, including keen senses not as finely developed in humans, make them important participants in modern war.
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Revue d'Action Militaire: The Ziz Valley Campaign, Part One - From the October 1942 issue.
Following the defeat of Abd el-Krim's Army of the Rif Republic in the Battle of Meknes, French forces began pushing south into the Ziz Valley, aiming to crush the remaining Berber rebels.
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Revue d'Action Militaire: The Ziz Valley Campaign, Part Two - From the November 1942 issue.
With a population of twenty-two thousand, the Moroccan city of Midelt serves as the capital of the eponymous Midelt Province and one of the main commercial centers of central Morocco. The city's importance as a population center, its growing mining industry, and its strategic central location made it a main target for the French counterinsurgency forces as they retook control of Morocco.
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Revue d'Action Militaire: The Ziz Valley Campaign, Part Three - From the December 1942 issue.
Upon liberating Midelt, the French field intelligence officers received a wealth of intelligence sources amongst the local Arab population, and planned a detailed operation, code-named Dragon Noir, to enter the mountains in order to find and destroy caches of enemy weapons and food.
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Revue d'Action Militaire: The Ziz Valley Campaign, Part Four - From the January 1943 issue.
On September 2nd, 1938, French paratroops of the 1ere Regiment Chasseurs Parachutistes recaptured the Moroccan city of Midelt during Operation Dragon Rouge. Berber troops briefly resisted this attack before fleeing to the Atlas Mountains. In Operation Dragon Noir, the 2nd Battalion of the 1ere RCP defeated a significant force of Berbers in the mountains south of Midelt. Simultaneously, the 1ere RCP's 3rd Battalion marched overland to seize the city of Rich in Operation Dragon Bleu.
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Revue d'Action Militaire: The Ziz Valley Campaign, Part Five - From the February 1943 issue.
Through the month of September 1938, the 1ere Regiment Chasseurs Parachutistes launched three operations (Dragon Rouge, Dragon Noir, and Dragon Bleu) against Berber insurgents in the Ziz Valley of Morocco. These three major operations successfully returned control of the region to the French authorities after several months hiatus. However, significant rebel Berber forces still remained in the area, hiding in the mountains, including the Berber leader, Ismail Mokhtari.
Read article

Special Article: Intermediate Caliber Repudiation? - From the March 1943 issue.
On February 12th, the German Heereswaffenamt Ballistische und Munitionsabteilung (the Ballistical and Ammunition Branch of the German Army Armaments Office) confirmed reports that they would procure the Swiss SK-42 rifle, known to the German Army as the G5, for standard use by all branches of the Heer. Le Spectateur militaire's staff believes the real reason for the Waffenamt's decision is not as simple as it first appears.
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Special Article: The Atlanteans in Ireland - From the April 1943 issue.
The harbour of Cobh, Ireland now serves as the base for the sloops and destroyers of the Irish Naval Service, but twenty-six years ago, another navy's destroyers filled the anchorage. These destroyers flew the gold, red, and black banner of the Imperial Atlantean Navy. Their job was to protect critical Entente shipping on the Western Approaches.
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Military Unit Spotlight: École de guerre aérienne in Limoges - From the May 1943 issue.
Associated with the Armee de l'Aire's fighter-pilot training system, the École de guerre aérienne (Eng. "Air War College") is an academic school intended to instruct both pilots and commanders about the past, present, and future of air combat.
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Special Article: Bolivia Buys a Navy, 1931-1933 - From the June 1943 issue.
As the Bolivian military prepared to attack Chile to begin the Andean War, military dictator General Jose Ignacio Gazcón authorized the re-creation of the Bolivian Naval Forces, starting a strange three-year military misadventure that ranged from the west coast of South America to the posh hotels of Monaco and the shipyards of Poland.
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Literature Review: La Brigade du Diable and the World of the Future - From the July 1943 issue.
The novel La Brigade du Diable (tr. "The Devil's Brigade"), published in March of this year, has achieved a spot on French bestseller lists ever since its publication, a feat attributed to both its outstanding writing and the depth of its ideas. Authored by wargaming umpire Pierre Michaux and François Genefort, this novel inhabits the science fiction genre of Jules Verne and Arnould Galopin, being set in the near-future of the 1970s.
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L'analyse de l'équipement: The Polish 26TP wzór.40 and wzór.42 - From the August 1943 issue.
Faced with the obsolescence of their tank forces and without a clear successor to their current line of tanks, the Polish Bron Pancerna controversially determined to license-produce the German Panzer IV medium tank at PZInz.
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Special Article: The Irish Military's Bantry Bay Exercises - From the September 1943 issue.
In early August, our special correspondent was able to observe one stage of the Irish Army's summer military maneuvers.
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Literature Review: Sous un ciel de feu - From the October 1943 issue.
Sous un ciel de feu (Eng. "Under a Sky of Fire") is the long-anticipated third book in a popular military fiction quartet written by French wargaming umpire Pierre Michaux.
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Special Article: Iron Hand Over Benevolent Heart - From the November 1943 issue.
Although created for Indochinese nationalists, the martial art of Viet Vo Dao now serves as part of the training for Indochina's Forces de sécurité territoriaux.
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Revue d'Action Militaire: Ambush at Chefchaouen - From the December 1943 issue.
Shortly before dawn on August 21st, 1938, a convoy of military supplies set out from Tetouan, Morocco, bound for the military garrison of Chefchaouen. It was ambushed later in the day by Berber rebels.
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Special Article: Leaving Tocopilla: A Study in Defeat - From the January 1944 issue.
In June 1932, the Chilean Navy began an operation to evacuate an exhausted battalion of mountain troops from the town of Tocopilla.
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Military Unit Spotlight: Polish Armed Forces - From the February 1944 issue.
Since their founding in 1917, the Polish Armed Forces have protected the country of Poland.
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Special Article: The Indochinese Naval Forces - From the March 1944 issue.
Bordering the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand, Indochina possesses approximately thirty-nine hundred kilometers of coastline. Numerous navigable rivers and deltas cut through the landscape, requiring patrol and policing. To help police this vast area, the Indochinese Parliament created the Patrouille Navale Indochinoise (PNI) to serve as the region's coast guard force.
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Special Article: Schweizer Panzer - From the April 1944 issue.
Only in recent years has the Swiss Army started to pay attention to the development of armoured and mechanised infantry units, reflecting changes in the understanding of armoured warfare within harsh terrain.
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Literature Review: La nécessité d'un Missile Intercepteur - From the May 1944 issue.
La nécessité d'un missile intercepteur (Eng.: "The Necessity of an Interceptor Missile") was recently published by Birkhäuser in Switzerland.
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Revue d'Action Militaire: Uyuni: Tanks Clash in the Andes - From the June 1944 issue.
In the frozen pre-dawn hours of March 18th, 1933, Chilean troops of the Army of Valparaíso-O'Higgins massed outside the Bolivian town of Uyuni. For the first time in the Andean War, the Bolivians were on their home ground, facing the Chilean Army as it pushed slowly through the Andes Mountains toward their objective of Potosí.
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Nouvelle Technologie: New Power Plants for Warships of the Future - From the July 1944 issue.
The great navies of the world have depended upon the steam turbine to power their largest and fastest warships, but future warships may not be powered by steam at all.
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News and Rumors: August 1944 - From the August 1944 issue.
Submarines receive flapper valves; VG.640 displayed to observers; Jet engines promised by Gnome-Rhone; 13th RDP wins Triathlon.
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Literature Review: Marée haute - From the September 1944 issue.
Marée haute (Eng. "Flood Tide"), the fourth and final book of wargaming umpire Pierre Michaux's quartet about a fictional war between the United States and the South African Empire, decisively closes off the account.
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Table of Contents - From the October 1944 issue.
"Brazilian Armoured Forces", "San Juan Earthquake: Overcoming Challenges in Airborne Logistics", "Maskirovka: Deception and Dissemination as a Tool of War Preparation", "Chinese Amphibious Capability: Dragon From the Sea", "Battle of the Azores, October 1769: Atlantean Invasion Repulsed by Iberia", "A Proposal for Statoreactor Propulsion".
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Military Unit Spotlight: Czechoslovakian Fast Division - From the November 1944 issue.
At the core of the Czechoslovakian Army are three elite divisions organized as the national strategic reserve forces. These three divisions, called "Fast Divisions" in the Western media, are sometimes regarded in foreign press as the Czech equivalent to the armoured forces used elsewhere in the world. This is in fact an oversimplification of the facts, the result of trying to impose familiar ideas and doctrines on unfamiliar concepts.
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News and Reports: First Battalion of the Indochinese Marines Inaugurated into Service - From the December 1944 issue.
The 1st Marine Battalion of the Indochinese Territorial Security Forces received its colours today in a ceremony at their newly-constructed caserne in Ha Long.
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Special Article: Low Countries Armour - From the January 1945 issue.
The armoured forces of the Low Countries share many uniquely interesting features not found elsewhere in the world, both in terms of equipment and organization.
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Special Article: With Groupement Scipion in the Inner Niger Delta - From the February 1945 issue.
On the Inner Niger Delta, the Legionnaires of Groupement Scipion work to combat the rising threat of banditry within the region.
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Military Unit Spotlight: Indochinese Ground Forces Expand In Size and Scope - From the March 1945 issue.
On February 2nd, the Indochinese Governing Council approved an expansion of the Indochinese Territorial Security Force, a locally-raised military force under the authority of the autonomous regional government.
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Thursday, December 1st 2011, 6:46pm

From the May Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Small Arms Calibers: The New Wave
Article from Le Spectateur militaire.

Over the last five years, a number of prominent world armies have substantially shifted their major small arms calibers, with some powers taking up particularly daring stances. Other armies have shown more caution or conservatism, often for well-justified reasons. What should the military spectator make of this small arms sea-change?

The Intermediate Cartridge: the Allure
Without any doubt, there are benefits to adopting a round midway between the full-sized rifle rounds of the Great War days and a lighter pistol round. Armies around the world have demonstrated their interest in developing and fielding reliable semi-automatic or even fully-automatic weapons to arm their troops, replacing the bolt-action rifles of yesteryear. Through experiments and field trials, these designers have learned that the cartridges used twenty years ago for bolt-action rifles cause difficulties for semi-automatic rifles, exerting heavy recoil forces on the action of the bolt. By downsizing the cartridge, the firearms designer is able to construct a rifle that is both lighter and often just as sturdy.

The second great benefit to the soldier is the drop in recoil, which allows for a shooter to more swiftly re-align his sights on the target for follow-up shots. It also opens up the possibility for fully-automatic settings on fairly light weapons.

However, by downsizing the length and width of the cartridge, the range and striking power of the round is substantially reduced. According to reports set out by armies testing experimental small arms, many intermediate cartridges may have less than half the effective range of their larger predecessor cartridges, although most have somewhat more. This is mainly due to a decrease of volume in the case, although it can be partially made up through the use of more modern propellants.

In most cases, the semiautomatic rifles introduced for service in the last decade have generally been chambered primarily in a smaller intermediate cartridge, with only four exceptions: the Czech ZH.29, the Belgian SLR40, the Mexican Mondragon, and the Swiss-Bulgarian SK.36. In all other cases, the new intermediate cartridge generally arrived in service at approximately the same time as a nation's first true semiautomatic rifle, with the exception of the German Army, which introduced the 7x40 cartridge for bolt action rifles several years before they introduced their companion semiautomatic rifle.

Battlefield Utility
Advocates point to several indicators that the intermediate rifle cartridge is not only here to stay, but a truly superior alternative to older full-power cartridges. During the Wilno Rebellion, reports from the Lithuanian Army indicate most rifle fights took place at approximately a hundred and fifty to two hundred meters range in the countryside, and less than fifty meters range in built up areas. This resulted in the Lithuanian Army forming several assault companies armed quite heavily with submachine guns, which provided them with unequalled firepower in close-range fights under a hundred meters. The experience of the League troops during the following Wilno Crisis has generally confirmed that this was by no means a unique experience to the Lithuanians.

Indeed, in much of Europe, the line of sight distances due to terrain, ground cover, and structures, are often less than the maximum range of a full-power rifle cartridge fired from a bolt-action rifle. Soldiers have demonstrated in such situations that they are unlikely to shoot effectively at targets more than four hundred meters distance, due to both the accuracy of their rifles and the quality of their sights. With most intermediate rifle cartridges reaching out to effective ranges between three and four hundred meters, there is no unused "range capacity".

Other battlefields elsewhere in the world offer differing results, however. The Irish, Yugoslavian and Czech armies deployed in the League of Nations mission to Afghanistan report that infantry fights occurred either at point blank range (under twenty-five meters) or at ranges in excess of four to five hundred meters. The Irish reported that in most cases, only two or three members of a rifle squad, namely those with the most firearms experience, generally felt comfortable shooting at over three hundred meters range. These few soldiers who developed the skills to fire effectively at long distances were credited with the great majority of kills for the entire squad. The available reports from the Persian Civil War, the Peruvian Civil War, and the Andean War seem to give the same results regarding the range of rifle fights. More mixed results, however, originate from the South American War, where rifle fights occurred at all ranges.

Based upon these examples, the casual observer may thus presume that a country's willingness to adopt a new cartridge may be based at least in part on the terrain they intend to fight upon.

Other Considerations
One of the greatest objections to introducing an intermediate rifle caliber comes from an army's desire to maintain a standard round for both rifles and automatic weapons. Since the use of the Chauchat in the Great War, most powers have adopted light machine guns such as the bestselling Browning Automatic Rifle and the Czech ZB.30 light machine gun. These weapons generally fire full-power cartridges, and military experience has shown the desirability of maintaining a powerful cartridge for this class of firearms. The adoption of an intermediate cartridge for rifles results in the need for multiple types of ammo to be distributed to an average rifle squad, or the need to replace or rechamber the squad's light machine guns for the new intermediate cartridge.

This is the difficulty which has plagued the German Army since the adoption of their radical 7x40mm round. The 7x40 is the smallest and lightest of the new intermediate cartridges, and the German Army deemed it unsuitable for use in the rifle squad's belt-fed MG33 machine gun, which continues to use the 8x57 Mauser cartridge. Although German soldiers have expressed their liking for the extremely light weight of their most recent infantry rifles, there remains a group within the Heer, particularly among the mountain troops, that critiques the round's poor performance at ranges above two hundred meters. Rumours have implied that the German cartridge designers are trying to address this issue with more modern propellants, in place of the existing propellants used since the late 1890s. The Indian Army adopted the 7x40 round as well, continuing their tradition of Teutonic-philia. No Indian officers have ever commented for good or ill on the adoption of the German round, although military observers in the Persian Civil War have indicated that Indian infantrymen equipped with the new round were "perpetually outranged" by Persian Nationalist troops. However, European officers speculating on the Persian Civil War concluded that in most cases, the lack of range never significantly hindered Indian troops due to their substantial superiority in materiel and supporting arms.

Like Germany and India, the United States' adoption of the 7x51 round (.276 Pedersen) was not accompanied by the switch in light machine gun calibers, although the Browning BAR and a new machine gun from Johnson have been demonstrated in the new round. The US Army, however, has given hints that it is considering the possibility of rechambering its squad automatic weapons to the 7x51. The American round represents one of the most conservative intermediate calibers yet proposed, in contrast to the radical German round; and all experts will acknowledge that the round is still powerful enough for use in a squad machine gun..

Unlike many powers, France, Atlantis and Russia adopted a single intermediate cartridge design for both semi-automatic rifles and squad machine guns, introducing the 6.5x51 alongside the FM37 machine gun and the SVT-36 rifle. This was another conservative cartridge choice, and all three powers continue investigating other alternatives.

One of the best new intermediate cartridges tested in recent years is the British 7x43 (or ".280") rifle round. Although the case length is only a few millimeters longer than the German 7x40, the British round possesses substantially better accuracy and muzzle energy, and testing demonstrated that the round had particularly good performance at long ranges, unusually for an intermediate round. In the short term, the British round (which has yet to reach service in a modern semiautomatic rifle) may prove to be almost ideal.

Summary
The proliferation in semiautomatic rifles drives the rise of the intermediate rifle cartridge, but a number of key questions about the most ideal mix of range, power, and recoil remain unanswered.

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Thursday, December 1st 2011, 6:46pm

From the June Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Military Unit Spotlight: The Dinassaut
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Military Unit Spotlight is a monthly feature which focuses on a unit or type of unit fielded by either the French military or another world army.

What is a Dinassaut?
A Dinassaut is a shorthand term for the Division d'Infanterie Navale d'Assaut, or the Naval Assault Infantry Division. Its acronym is DINA. It forms the main striking power of the Fusiliers Marins (the ground warfare component of the French Navy), with two DINAs currently in service.

How is a Dinassaut formed?
A Dinassaut is composed of three demi-brigades plus supporting units. Two of the three Demi-brigades are composed of infantry units, with between two to three battalions of infantry, each composed of three infantry companies. The third demi-brigade is composed of one to two armoured cavalry regiments, an engineering squadron, and an amphibious artillery group. In general, each demi-brigade has approximately 2,500 men. The Dinassaut also includes a substantial Groupe de commandement amphibie (GCA) which is charged with overseeing the organization of the landings, the unloading of troops and cargo, the evacuation of wounded, and communications between ship and shore.

The individual assault infantry companies are called Dinassaut Companies, and are numbered in series (for example, Dinassaut 4, Dinassaut 6, Dinassaut 14). The companies are able to serve as independent commandos, particularly in Indochina, where they are paired with gunboats and landing craft in order to form small self-contained riverine warfare units.

How is a Dinassaut equipped?
The infantry component of a Dinassaut is armed with the small arms normally used by most French soldiers, although there is a very high ratio of newer weapons, such as the MAS-36 semiautomatic rifle and the FM-37 light machine gun. Grenades, sidearms, mortars, and other light weapons are all fairly standard, although consideration has been given to acquiring highly reliable, lightweight weapons which will still work after immersion in saltwater, or when dirtied by sand.

The Dinassaut diverges from regular Armee de Terre units in the field of vehicles. Although the acquisition of vehicles is just getting underway, many of the new vehicles will be amphibious, such as the Transporter Blindé Modèle 1942, an armoured, amphibious infantry carrier equipped with a heavy machine gun. The Unic ACM-4 (or Amphibie camion militaire) amphibious truck, based on the Berliet GBC-4 truck built for the French and Russian armies, also is on order for the non-combat troops. The Fusiliers Marins and the Armee de Terre are also evaluating the amphibious Panhard P120 scout car. Interestingly, the Dinassauts have also received a unique amphibious trailer which can be towed behind a TB-42 or a ACM-4, both in the water and on the road. This open trailer, notable for its boat-like hull, can carry either a full squad of infantry and their gear or a considerable quantity of cargo. Smaller trailers are also being designed.

The armoured component of a Dinassaut will be made up of Char-6 Bruyere light tanks, although older tanks will remain in service while production of the Bruyere gets underway. The Bruyere is not amphibious and must wade ashore from a landing craft, but is one of the most powerful and well-armed light tanks in the world, having a 7.5cm gun. It is possible the larger, much more potent Char-8 Montbrun medium tank could also be used by the Dinassaut's armoured component.

Another key piece in the Dinassaut's equipment roster is their landing craft. Operated by the sailors of the French Navy, the Dinassaut can come ashore in great force even if they lack amphibious vehicles by using the EA-13 or EDA-55 landing craft. The EDA-55 is also capable of landing up to thirty-five tons of materials or a single Montbrun medium tank.

What is the tactical and strategic role of the Dinassaut?
A Dinassaut's chief goal is to conduct an opposed amphibious landing on a hostile shore, and win a beachhead sufficient to allow the landing of heavier divisions of the Armee de Terre. A Dinassaut lacks much of the combat staying power of a regular infantry division, having less artillery, fewer antitank and antiaircraft assets, and fewer immediate supply units. A Dinassaut would depend heavily on follow-up units of the Armee de Terre in the event of a hotly-contested landing. However, extensive naval gunfire support and close air support aircraft help offset the lack of artillery.

Some officers have rasied the possibility of using the Dinassaut in land campaigns, specifically for the task of spearheading assaults across major rivers. These operations could be undertaken as a subset of their normal naval-oriented operations, and the Dinassaut's projected amphibious vehicles could be quite useful in carving a beachhead on the far bank of a river, allowing engineers space to safely build pontoon bridges to carry an assault forward.

Some of the companies of the 1er DINA, deployed in Indochina, have already started to be used for detached service as riverine warfare companies. In this role, they often dispense with their vehicles and depend entirely on the gunboats and landing craft of the riverine flotillas.

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Thursday, December 1st 2011, 6:46pm

From the July Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Le Spectateur militaire - "Preparing to Fight the Last War"
Incorporating the Lessons of Past Combat into Future Military Planning

I. Preparing for the future by planning for the past
It is a common saying in the Western world that militaries often prepare to re-fight the war they last fought. While this saying is often offered as a criticism of the conservatism of military leadership, learning from the victories and defeats of the past is a vital part of an officer's task. It is not enough for a military to merely study its campaign histories and draw on a list of lessons learned: the military must make those lessons applicable forward into the future as well.

II. Doctrine and its foundational assumptions
Military doctrine is, in brief, "the way armed forces plan and prepare to fight" or "the central idea of an army" [1]. Doctrine reflects the character - both strengths and weaknesses - and foundational assumptions of a nation-state. A study of doctrine is not as glamorous as the study of tactics, because doctrine incorporates not only a study of tactics but of strategy, logistics, training, and socio-political factors. Doctrine does not tell an armed force about how to fight, but how to think about fighting.

Each nation develops their own doctrine for their armed forces through a series of self-evaluations of their own needs and desires. A small but industrialized country may develop a doctrine emphasizing mobility or technical prowess in order to exact horrific casualties against a numerically larger but less industrialized opponent. Two evenly-matched powers may develop a doctrine to emphasize some of their perceived national advantages in order to more easily defeat the other. In developing a doctrine, a nation must develop an idea of their own identity and mission, then analyze how to carry out their mission.

When a nation's commanders understand their doctrine, they understand how to be versatile while still working towards the overall goals of their military.

Conflict offers armies the ultimate crucible in which to test their doctrine. Inevitably, a nation will discover new things about themselves and their enemies, and potentially the greater nature of war, thus challenging their own doctrine. If the army does not react to these discoveries, then even if they have proven victorious in the struggle, they have lost a particularly valuable educational experience that may result in defeat in a later war.

III. How militaries learn lessons from war
Prominent French military writer Alain Kaprisky, noted for his comprehensive work on the Franco-Prussian War and the Guerre mondiale, has written "the surest way for an army to learn is to let them survive a major defeat; the surest way to continue in ignorance is to let them win only easy victories." Kaprisky reasoned that a victorious army with bad doctrine, tactics, or equipment has little initiative to consider change, as their current doctrine has proven sufficient so far. On the other hand, Kaprisky points out that "defeat wipes the slate clean; ignorant theories are discarded, antiquated generals are forced to retire, old destroyed equipment is replaced with new, and experimental new ideas are belatedly considered."

In the aftermath of their defeat and withdrawal from the World War, the Russian Army underwent a series of major changes intended to rebuild the strength and capabilities of the armed forces. New doctrine was written and new equipment acquired, leading to the strong Russian Federation Army of today. In a similar way, the German Heer, though first limited by treaty, rebuilt itself phoenix-like into a modern and highly flexible fighting force, showing particular ingenuity in developing armoured forces. They have proven so efficient at this task that other armies, even Entente powers which contributed to the German defeat, have moved to emulate them.

However, defeat is not the only means for an army to learn new lessons of war. In many circumstances, armies may learn due to - or in some cases in spite of - their successes. An example in point is Atlantean Marshal Thule-Saulius's campaigns of the World War, which prominent continental strategists regard as one of the first campaigns of the "modern mechanized war", and which counterbalances the Western European ideas of the bloody static front. The Atlantean Army learned very different lessons from this theater of war, and their experience, together with the Hundred Days Campaign and Allenby's decisive triumph at Megiddo, reportedly inspired the German school of thought for mechanized warfare.

One of the most important tools adopted by the French Army to help learn the lessons of combat is the Revue d'action militaire or RAM (tr. "Military Action Review"). This incorporates the experience of all the participants of a battle, exercise, or other major event, clearly narrating the course of events, analyzing the lessons learned, and proposing solutions for problems encountered. During the Rif-Atlas War of 1937, the French Army's analysis of their RAMs contributed substantially to a shift in overall French military doctrine.

IV. Learning from the wars of others
An army in a period of extended peacetime is obviously unable to draw on the lessons of combat. It is important, therefore, that armies take the opportunity during peacetime to analyze the actions of other countries involved in combat. This first began in the 19th Century, and became well-known during the Crimean War and more particularly the American Civil War. Many European states sent observers to report on the events of either the Union or Confederate armies - or in some cases both. Many observers returned to Europe to pen some of the classical accounts of the American Civil War, even though in many cases their observations suggested that the lessons were not applicable to modern European strategy. (See Blanchard, Les observateurs militaires et la guerre civile américaine, 1929 for further discussion.) The practice of military observers has nevertheless continued into the 20th Century, though not all combatant nations have been open to formal military observers. One of the most recent examples was the Western Afghanistan deployment by the League of Nations, which eventually saw an unusually high number of military observers.

In other cases, nations may have to depend on hearsay from the combatants, or even engage in active espionage to learn about the conduct of battles. While events analyzed using these methods may become clearer over time, a major concern in the short is the accuracy of the data received. For instance, during the recent Persian Civil War, the combatants attempted to use the western press to disseminate their own version of combat, with the goal of seeking foreign support and undermining aid to their opponents. The intelligence agencies of both sides thus conducted serious counter-espionage operations aimed at establishing an incorrect but politically-palatable version of events. While such deception operations are more difficult in the west due to an active free press, if a government is able to marshal a sufficiently commanding majority of news sources, it can establish an "authoritative version" of events. Such actions, while militarily necessary, can all seriously hinder or mislead a neutral power's attempt to learn from another country's war.

V. Learning the wrong lessons
Inevitably, a military may look at a series of events from within their own set of national assumptions and take away an incorrect lesson from the event. Oftentimes, this comes through a misinterpretation of the available information. Just as individuals evaluate new information through their own preconceived notions, so do armies. For example, in the aftermath of the Great War, a number of highly prominent French officers espoused a theory of defensive war intended to recreate the bloodbath battles of 1916, but entirely to the terms of the French defender. This plan, which focused on a line of fortresses, supported by artillery and massive tanks, ignored the lessons of 1917 and the so-called "Hundred Days" campaign, and the equally-important fluid operations of Field Marshal Thule-Sauilius. This is a classic example of an army's leadership learning the wrong lessons from a war, and discarding one of the greatest rules of warfare: the purpose of war is the defeat of the enemy, and not merely to avoid your own defeat.


Notes:
Note [1]: J.F.C. Fuller

Quoted

Case Study I: French Light Aviation Forces in the Atlas-Rif Revolt
The Situation: The rebellion of Berber tribesmen in Morocco saw the Armee de l'Aire handed an unusual challenge. The Armee de l'Aire had, through the 1930s, focused on what it saw to be the most likely sort of coming air-war, with strategic bombing supported by air-defense and reconnaissance operations. This theory appeared to be reinforced by observation of the South American War, although the supposed inviolability of strategic bombers was reevaluated. The Atlas-Rif Revolt, however, had no occasion for the strategic bomber, and light aviation assets were required to deal with small bands of nomadic, desert-dwelling rebels. In addition, the Armee de Terre required cargo aircraft to drop parachute troops. This was a particular weakness for the Armee de l'Aire of the day.

The Lesson Learned: The lightest bombers in the French arsenal, the Breguet 690 and the Loire-Nieuport LN.401 dive bomber, both saw immediate service in the conflict. The LN.401 lacked the payload to be truly useful, carrying only 225kg of bombs. The larger Breguet 690 was more expensive to operate but proved more useful and survivable, and sparked further orders for the type. Another unique innovation during the war was the use of helicopters, specifically the Dorand G.IIb. A group of these helicopters, purchased to equip a trials group in 1937, arrived in Morocco in 1938 and proved themselves in spite of their mechanical woes. One to two Dorands often accompanied military convoys, and on at least a dozen certified occasions, the presence of the helicopter proved decisive in disrupting a Berber ambush. The tribesmen often fired on the helicopter, thus giving away their position, or fled the scene upon the helicopter's overflight. The Armee de l'Aire also demonstrated a marked weakness in cargo aircraft, but this shortcoming proved hard to overcome in the short term; the military often had to lease civil aircraft in order to accomidate their own needs.

The Response: The Armee de l'Aire took immediate steps to acquire new aircraft based on the lessons of the Atlas-Rif Revolt. The Nord Normandie, a four-engine transport first conceived in 1936 and ignored by the Air Force, abruptly received a much higher level of official support, although as of the date of writing the Normandie has not yet entered production. The Armee de l'Aire also acquired the license to build the Swiss C-3603 ground-attack aircraft, some of which appeared in the late stages of the Revolt and showed excellent versatility. However, inter-service rivalry between the Armee de Terre and the Armee de l'Aire led to the foundation of the Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre (ALAT) in early 1939, with the new organization being responsible for operating helicopters and light spotting aircraft. ALAT's relatively junior status and the limited development work to date on helicopters has prevented the organization from exerting much influence, however. Purpose-designed ground attack aircraft are currently in development, including a counter-insurgency aircraft being jointly designed with Thailand, and other designs proposed by Arsenal, Bloch, and Breguet.


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Case Study II: The Chilean Navy's Amphibious Force
The Situation: In 1937, when war broke out between the Peruvian government on one side, and the Colombian and Chilean allies on the other side, the Chilean forces faced a difficult opponent: not the Peruvian armies, but the geography of the border. In the high, dry regions of the Andes, Atacama and Altiplano, supplying troops for an overland campaign would prove unimaginably difficult. While the Chileans could count on a railway connection for defense within their own borders, they knew they could not supply any troops attempting to move north into Peruvian territory, where no railways or high-capacity roads existed. Instead, the Chileans depended on their time-tested method: the "naval descent", as practiced in the War of the Pacific, moving up the coast with navy-supplied landing forces. However, times had changed since the 19th Century, and the Chilean military identified several factors they saw as crucial to the success of a "Naval Descent": naval supremacy, aerial supremacy, and a tenable, high-capacity landing zone. While the Chilean Navy quickly worked to achieve naval supremacy - and achieved aerial supremacy with the help of the Atlantean and Chilean Air Forces - it was the third requirement that proved difficult. The long coastline of Peru is often rocky or desolate and there are few deep-water ports, all of which were defended by Peruvian forces. The Chilean commanders, after testing the Peruvian defenses during the Pisco Raid, discovered to their alarm that they lacked the capability to disembark ground forces sufficient to achieve decisive success in a "naval descent". The war ended before Chilean forces could resolve the difficulties they faced.

The Lesson Learned: By the end of 1937, the Chilean Navy had analyzed the results of the Pisco Raid and their own inability to conduct their expected "naval descent". The problem they found was twofold. While the Navy had four old destroyers converted to troop transports, these were at best suitable for landing small opposed raiding parties. Landing in wooden surfboats was a wet, dangerous affair, with the troops exposed to enemy fire as they landed. Further, there was no capability to land the larger accoutrements of war - artillery pieces, tanks, and trucks full of supplies. Only through an uncontested coup-de-main (as occurred in the Pisco Raid) could the Chileans hope to seize the sort of port necessary to land and supply follow-on units. The Chileans determined they needed a method of landing a sufficient body of men, as well as their supporting mechanized or motorized elements, on a contested open beach. This capability required both specialized ships specifically designed for the purpose and a substantial change in Chilean doctrine.

The Response: At the end of the war, the Chilean Navy consulted closely with both allied navies and ASMAR, the indigenous Chilean shipbuilding firm, then conducted a number of theoretical staff exercises to build a new doctrine. Requests went out to civil industry for possible equipment to re-equip the Chilean Marines to improve their capabilities. By the end of 1939, the Chileans ordered three modern landing craft capable of discharging troops or light vehicles, evaluating them for future orders, and in 1940, ASMAR laid the keels of two landing ships, and after evaluating the landing craft, placed a sizable order. These light landing craft can be launched from merchant ship lifeboat davits, allowing the Chileans, in emergencies, to convert civilian steamers into troopships. As of the date of writing, the Chilean Navy boasted three purpose-built landing ships with three more under construction; the Chilean Marines also started receiving deliveries of an amphibious truck that can swim ashore with troops or cargo. This activity has not been relegated solely to new equipment, but also to training. In 1938, the Chilean Marines published a new doctrinal handbook, then revised it in 1941. Amphibious exercises were conducted in January, and further exercises are in the planning stages for later this year. The Chileans have also continued very close cooperation with their allies, seeking further experience and knowledge.


Quoted

Case Study III: Czechoslovakian forces in Afghanistan, 1940-41
The Situation: As part of the League mission to aid the Kingdom of Afghanistan in driving out rogue Persian Nationalist elements, the Czechoslovakian Army agreed to contribute a composite force consisting of a cavalry regiment, a motorized infantry battalion, an artillery regiment, and an armoured battalion. Experience in combat soon demonstrated to the Czech leadership that their composite force, which the Czech leadership hoped would offer flexible alternatives to all possible missions, was ill-equipped to work together. The pairing of horsed cavalry and tanks proved a particularly disastrous failure, as the tanks were either limited to the advance of the horsemen or deprived of their support. In turn, the motorized infantry could follow the tanks on the road, but rarely across country. The Czech commanders swiftly addressed organizational shortfalls through ad hoc reorganizations and unit retaskings, and are set to complete their deployment and return to Europe in the next few months.

The Lesson Learned: The Czech leadership felt horsed cavalry would be most valuable and flexible for use in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, and intended to support it with quantities of motorized infantry and tanks. The Czechs learned that the horsed cavalry was valuable for patrols emphasizing a light footprint or in close country, but was ill-suited for cooperation with mechanized units. As of current reports, the Czech troops have more regularly fought dismounted. By contrast, the motorized infantry battalion performed admirably, particularly in collaboration with and in support of the Czech tanks. The use of dedicated and well-trained sniper units also received high admiration. The Czechs and Irish also imitated the Yugoslavian Army in the creation of a Pandur unit for light infantry operations.

The Response: The greatest challenge for the Czechoslovakian leadership will be taking the lessons of the Afghanistan deployment and making them applicable to the modern battlefield of Europe. Already, the Czech Defense Department has indicated that they intend to fully motorize all their remaining horsed cavalry, and shall retain only a few small units for patrol and security operations, and will form their tanks into a number of armoured brigades. Skoda has begun work on an armoured infantry carrier similar to those designed in France, Germany, and elsewhere; and new tanks are reportedly being designed. The Army leadership has also proposed the idea of the "Motor Submachinegun Battalion", a truck-mounted infantry unit armed almost exclusively with automatic weapons, which would provide unparalleled firepower in close country. Regardless of the measures that are finally adopted, the Czechoslovakian Army clearly has already learned much but wants to learn more from their Afghanistan experience, and are demonstrating both industriousness and ingenuity in applying those lessons back to the defense of their homeland.

5

Saturday, December 3rd 2011, 4:16am

From the August Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Literature Review: Le Corps noir and Les Actes des Aigles
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Literature Review is a monthly feature which reviews literary works of interest to military readers.

Within the last year, two historical novels (Les Actes des Aigles by Pierre Michaux and Le Corps noir by Piet Luns) have been published narrating a fictional major war involving the South African Empire. The two books, published only two months apart, share a similar settings and have seen equivalent sales in the French market. Both authors have never published a book before, and are more widely known for their works in other fields.

Summaries
Le Corps noir (Eng. "The Black Corps") by Piet Luns (a Dutch author) narrates the story of a theoretical second war between the South African Empire on one side, and the ABC Alliance on the other. Originally published in 1939 in Amsterdam as Het Zwarte Korps, the book was translated into English, French, Iberian and German, entering print earlier this year. Luns is a journalist interested in military affairs, and reported on both the Wilno Rebellion and the South American War during his career. Le Corps noir follows Gran Uruguayan character Alphons de Vries, a member of the South African Royal Black Watch. This unit, which actually exists in real life, is supposed to be the Empire's "elite of the elite", trained in all manner of combat and absolutely loyal to the South African royal family. De Vries is dismissed from this unit in the opening chapters of the book due to a run-in with a superior officer, the treacherous and conniving Colonel Abraham Verschoor. With his military career presumably over, de Vries meets up with a Brazilian dancing girl and ends up in Rio de Janeiro, where he discovers a plot by the Brazilian military and their villainous leader, General Lardo, to construct giant rockets to bombard South African cities. De Vries escapes the Brazilian secret police and returns to Montevideo, exposing the Brazilian plans and Colonel Verschoor's treason, although Verschoor escapes and flees to Argentina. In order to preempt the nefarious Brazilian plot, the South Africans launch a military invasion of Brazil, although Argentina and Chile join the war as Brazil's allies. Although de Vries is exonerated of his offenses he does not return to the Royal Black Watch, instead forming a unit of "commandos" who become specialists in infiltration and sabotage missions against the Brazilian super-rocket program. In the end, de Vries and his commandos kill Colonel Verschoor and General Lardo, ending the super-rocket program for good.

Les Actes des Aigles (Eng. "The Affairs of Eagles") by Pierre Michaux delves deeply into its subject in the first book of the planned quartet. Michaux, who served as the French naval attache in Gran Uruguay during the South American War, is clearly on familiar ground narrating his tale, which revolves around a war between the South African Empire and the United States. According to Michaux, the plot of the book came about from a five week long kriegspiel which Michaux umpired in 1938. The plot begins with a series of short political moves to set the scene, followed by a South African preemptive strike on an American fleet anchored in Brazilian waters. The attack, reminiscent of the historical Rio Raid, comes as a shock to the unprepared Americans, with two battleships sunk. The US is outraged by this coup de main, and the war follows swiftly on land, sea, and air. Michaux follows dozens of well fleshed out characters - Americans, South Africans, and others - across the sprawling scene of the action, which ranges from the biting cold of Cape Horn to the equatorial reaches of the Indian Ocean. The book ends with the South African capture of Rio de Janeiro, but the massive American economy is clearly getting serious about the war.

Commentary
The plot of Le Corps noir is fast-paced and enjoyable overall, although the plot suffers due to the thin character construction. Many of the book's villains lack depth and motivations, with the treasonous Verschoor apparently betraying his country more for his own personal entertainment than any concrete reasons. However, the South African characters, even the Commandos, are similarly shallow, and de Vries himself comes across as more of an over-the-top caricature than a solid well-rounded character. In addition, de Vries' womanizing, apparently intended to add depth to his character, is more annoying than interesting.

The war between South Africa and its enemies is glazed over in the course of the book, and Luns treats the Argentines, Brazilians, and Chileans with disdain as "self-important banana republics", more suited to swagger and posturing than actually forming a competent threat. By contrast, all of the South Africans are shown as unusually competent and intelligent. This removes some of the interest in the plot as de Vries and his commandos are never seriously challenged or threatened by their opponents, and only the treacherous Verschoor manages to do anything more than momentarily inconvenience them. The book's conclusion is plainly obvious far in advance of the actual ending, and many readers will finish the book still looking for satisfaction.

Les Actes des Aigles, by contrast, benefits from Michaux's role as a wargames umpire, and both combatants are treated with a relatively unbiased approach, a refreshing change after Le Corps noir. The South African sneak attack which sets the story in play, while treated as "dastardly" by the American characters, is logical and sound according to the South African point of view. The characters are entertaining and feel alive. The rivalry between the South African and American admirals Isaac Dooyeweerd and "Iron Mike" Phillips is highly entertaining, while the predicament of the US Marines trapped with the Brazilian Army in Rio de Janeiro paints a distressingly moving account of modern land warfare. Throughout it all, Michaux displays a broad competence not only of naval combat, but also land and air combat, which clearly required no small amount of detailed research and firsthand experience.

In sharp contrast to Le Corps noir, Les Actes des Aigles demands a reader seeking more than a few hours of mere entertainment, as Michaux addresses a number of deeper issues regarding both national and international politics, economics, the rules of war, and diplomacy. Despite giving such lavish attention to these issues, the book does not suffer for readability.

Both authors are reported to be working on sequels to these first books, and the second book in Michaux' series, Bruits de guerre lointaine, is reportedly to be published in March 1942.

6

Sunday, December 18th 2011, 3:21am

From the September Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Military Unit Spotlight: The Syrian Armed Forces
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Military Unit Spotlight is a monthly feature which focuses on a unit or type of unit fielded by either the French military or another world army.

Creation of the Syrian Armed Forces
The Syrian Armed Forces were created in 1936 prior to Syrian independence, originally as independent branches of the French armed forces. Upon the independence of the Syrian Republic, the French-trained native units earmarked for the purpose became the Syrian Armed Forces. Training and equipment, have all followed the French model, and most officers are graduates of French military academies. Total manpower is estimated at less than twenty thousand men.

As part of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence, Syria is responsible for aiding the French in wartime, including allowing French aircraft use of Syrian airspace. In exchange, France guaranteed Syrian borders and places no tariffs on military exports to Syria.

Organization
As of 1941, the Syrian armed forces are divided into four major branches. The most senior of these branches, dating back to before Syrian independence, is the Syrian Police and Border Troops, which is responsible for enforcing the law, reducing civil disorder, protecting private and government property, patrolling Syria's land borders, and manning border-crossing stations. The Syrian Army is responsible for territorial defense, while the Syrian Air Force is responsible for assisting the Army and defending Syrian airspace. The smallest and most junior service is the Syrian Navy, which is responsible for the defense of the Syrian coastline and protection of the country's territorial waters.

Three of the four branches of the armed forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) are grouped together in the Ministry of National Defense, which reports to the nation's president. The Police and Border Troops are placed under the authority of the Syrian Ministry of the Interior.

Syrian Police and Border Troops
The Police and Border Troops are descended from the French Gendarmerie, and many of the current officers were Syrians employed by the French during the Mandate. This force is responsible for civil protection and border control. The Police and Border Troops may be involved in aiding criminal investigations, but this task usually falls to other groups better equipped for the task.

Syrian Army
At the present time, the Syrian Army fields two infantry brigades, three defense battalions, one engineering and supply battalion, and one antitank company. See Figure 1. Manpower is estimated at no more than thirteen thousand men total, including support staff. Syrian officials have acknowledged that further growth of this force is almost certain, but is proceeding slowly due to fiscal reasons.

Much of the infantry gear was passed on from French stockpiles, although Syria introduced earlier this year a new uniform pattern, produced locally, which bears a strong resemblance to the previous French-supplied uniforms but differs in color. A modest quantity of the earliest-production MAS-36 semiautomatic rifles was provided to Syria upon independence, although these rifles ended up in the use of the most high-profile police troops. Most regular infantry formations have been equipped with war-capture Mauser rifles, all manufactured before 1917. FM-24 light machine guns are used exclusively, though there have been unproven rumours of FM-37 machine guns being sold to Syria.

Quoted

Figure 1: Syrian Army, 1941
- 2 Infantry Brigades: ~4,200 men (1 infantry regiment, 1 artillery battalion, 1 reconnaissance squadron, 1 heavy mortar company, support troops)*
- 3 Defense Battalions: ~950 men (includes AA troops)
- 1 Engineering and Supply Battalion: ~850 men
- 1 Antitank Group: ~250 men
- Total Manpower: ~12,350 men + Military Staff, HQ, & support troops


Syrian Air Force
The Syrian Air Force was first formed in late 1937 using in-country equipment purchased from the Armee de l'Aire. At the present time, a large minority of SAF pilots are foreigners involved in training the next generation of Syrian pilots. Syria's greatest weakness is their lack of a training program, whether it is basic or advanced training, or even mechanic and ground crew training. At the moment, Syrian pilot candidates are sent to basic training with the French Air Force, although there have been high-level discussions about sending pilots for training in Turkey, or putting together a local pilot training academy. Operations are based around Damascus, although a number of small landing fields are scattered around the country, mostly left from the French Mandate period.

Following independence, the Syrian Air Force acquired a total of sixty aircraft, with the largest portion being elderly Breguet 19 light bombers, which have doubled as training aircraft for the last few years. However, the most modern aircraft are the twenty-two ex-Armee de l'Aire Dewoitine D.520 fighters which form the 1st Fighter Squadron. Syria also fields three army cooperation squadrons (with eight Breguet 19s each), one bomber squadron with eight LN.411 dive bombers, and one flight of six liaison and transport aircraft. The Ministry of National Defense has expressed interest in modernizing the Air Force and recently gave a report to the Syrian Parliament on how to modernize the aircraft fleet, but financial issues mean that any major changes will be several years coming.

Quoted

Figure 2: Syrian Air Force Order of Battle, 1941
- 1x fighter squadron: 22x Dewoitine D.520 fighters
- 1x bomber squadron: 8x Loire-Nieuport LN.411 dive bombers
- 1x transport escadrille: 4x Caudron Simoun liaison aircraft, 2x Bloch MB.220 transports
- 3x army cooperation squadrons: 8x Breguet 19 light bombers each
- Total: 22x Dewoitine D.520s, 8x Loire-Nieuport LN.411s, 4x Caudron Simoun liaison aircraft, 2x Bloch MB.220 transports, 24x Breguet 19 light bombers (60x aircraft total)


Syrian Navy
The smallest and newest branch of the Syrian armed forces is the Navy. Although officially founded in late 1938, no armed vessels were acquired until an EA-13 utility craft arrived from France in 1941, followed by the announcement of an order of four French-designed patrol boats, which will be delivered over the next few months. Under the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence, the French are responsible for protecting the Syrian coastline and merchant vessels until such time as the country is capable of doing so themselves.

7

Thursday, January 5th 2012, 4:22pm

From the October Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Letter From the Ministry: October 1941
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Letter From the Ministry is a monthly letter written by the Minister of National Defense (Jean-Marie Lemaréchal) for distribution.

This year we have seen some dramatic changes and new challenges for the French military to overcome. In April, the Armee de Terre instituted one of the most radical reorganizations since the end of the Prussian War decades ago, with the formation of the new Armoured Cavalry Branch and increased emphasis on total mechanization. The increased reliability of motor vehicles and tanks has demonstrated a revolutionary change in the way the great armies of the future shall fight their wars. We have resolved to remain not only one of the preeminent armies of this continent, but one of the most forward-thinking Great Powers of the world.

I was speaking recently with several gentlemen, retired Great War veterans of my acquaintance, who told me of their dismay at what they called 'the demise of the French Army', pointing to the disbandment of over forty French infantry divisions, the last of which will be formally demobilized at the beginning of December. I pointed out to them that the army we are creating, made possible by such dramatic tightening of the collective belt, shall be one of the most modern and best-trained forces in Europe and the world, embodying the national goals and strengths of the French Republic. A modern army, more than ever before, depends upon its training and the strength of its discipline, and the 1941 reorganizations have already been effective at raising the standards of the army.

A side-effect of the army reorganization has been an increase in funds available for several key aspects of the modernization plan. Most observers have focused on the increasing purchase of new military equipment, but other changes will more directly affect the soldier. The first of these, already approved by the Parliament Francaise, is a series of benefit increases for enlisted military personnel and their families, such as an increase in the food and housing stipend for married enlisted personnel in order to adjust for higher standards of living. The Army has also set aside money for increased readiness training for active units.

A major change planned for the new year will be in the field uniforms of the Army. After a considerable amount of study into adopting camouflage for field uniforms, the Army leadership has approved the "1941 Lizard Pattern" camouflage for adoption by ground troops. Two seasonal versions (summer and winter) are currently finalized for use in both the metropolitan and outre-mer regions, although North African troops will continue to wear their 1936 Desert Pattern uniforms. The new Lizard camouflage is designed to be more effective at camouflaging soldiers in the many types of environments they may fight in.

One recent decision made by the Ministry of National Defense within the last few weeks was to propose the retirement of two of the Marine Nationale's Bretagne class battleships. This will permit the release of trained crews for the Libertie-class fast battleships expected to complete in April of next year. The Marine Nationale has suggested that the most recently modernized ship of the Bretagne class, the Lorraine, be retained for several more years.

8

Wednesday, January 25th 2012, 8:22pm

From the November Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Literature Review: Guerre des îles Petite
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Literature Review is a monthly feature which reviews literary works of interest to military readers.

Guerre des îles Petite (tr 'War for Little Islands'), published in September 1941, is a collaborative work by six Western authors discussing the recently ended South China Sea War, fought between China and the Philippines in late 1940. The 369-page work attempts to neutrally diagnose the causes of the conflict, as well as the course of the war and its resolution in the Peace of Saigon.

The book begins with a section by French-Vietnamese journalist Huong Martin. Martin provided a detailed history of the various claims regarding the Spratley Islands, the 1936 Sino-Philippine co-dominium, the Philippine withdrawal from the SATSUMA alliance, and the 1940 Filipino territorial waters claims which led to the initiating incidents of the war, including the culminating 'Tabanao Incident'. Martin also discusses the attitudes and diplomatic actions of the various Great Powers, including Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, and the United States.

The main portion of the book details the war itself, focusing on the combats and general air, land, and naval strategy employed by the Chinese and Filipinos. The authors heavily cite declassified official documents and official news releases, although the authors specifically note that most official documents remain classified and a categorical study of the war will probably only be done ten years from now, once more documents are released. Despite this, the authors are able to weave together a rough continuum of the major events of the war, including the political reactions of the non-combatant nations.

American journalist Herman Rothfurt adds his own small contribution by discussing the effect the South China Sea War had on the Long administration and the US elections, while Huong Martin discussed the political side-effects in French Indochina. The authors finish up the main body of the volume by detailing the Saigon peace conference.

The authors add several appendices wherein they lay out a thesis regarding the outcome of the military aspect of the war. The authors agree with popular opinion that the Chinese won the military aspect of the war, but they postulate that the battles were in fact closer than previously admitted, and the Filipinos largely lost due to poor exercise of command and control. The authors also speculate about the effect of media (newspapers and radio reports) on the combatants, and the mistakes by the politicians of both sides that resulted in the breakdown of relations. Finally, they speculate on the long-term trends which will result from the conflict.

From a literary point of view, the book itself is not particularly well-written, most likely due to the limitations of corporate authorship. The two sections written by non-French-speaking authors are poorly translated and lend to some confusion in the narrative. Many of the details of the conflict itself, while interesting, cite wartime news releases, with the inherent inaccuracy and bias that entails. Despite this, the authors have managed to assemble an informative and comprehensive series of overviews about the war and its resolution. This volume would be improved by more research and a single main author who could bring together the various viewpoints, each of them valuable to the scope of the subject, and knit them together into a single, well-composed work.

9

Friday, February 3rd 2012, 8:33pm

From the December Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Military Unit Spotlight: The Yugoslavian Pandurs
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Military Unit Spotlight is a monthly feature which focuses on a unit or type of unit fielded by either the French military or another world army.

Yugoslavia's Pandurs have gained a high level of professional regard for their actions as part of the League of Nations Afghanistan Field Force. The Czech and Irish armies both created brand new units explicitly based on the Pandurs, while other nations have made their own nods to the Yugoslavian troops. Despite their influence, the Pandurs are still relatively little-known outside professional circles.

What are Pandurs?
The term 'Pandur' originated from irregular Balkan militia serving the Austro-Hungarian Empire, although other nations such as Romania have also fielded pandurs. The modern Yugoslavian troops are elite light infantry, organized into three battalions. The mountainous nature of Yugoslavia and the country's surrounding regions lends itself well to light infantry and small unit warfare, whether in attack or defense, in support of larger military units or partisan operations. All of the Pandurs are volunteers, and many of the troops are fluent in regional dialects such as Bulgarian, Greek, Hungarian, and Italian. The 3rd Pandur Battalion, which deployed in 1940 and 1941 to Afghanistan with the League, is not as regionally specialized as the other two units.

Organization and Equipment
Unlike many military units, the Pandur battalions maintain a very fluid standard of organization and equipment, depending on their assigned mission and locale. This gives them the ability to rapidly adapt to new and changing circumstances as the situation demands, tailoring their equipment and organization to the mission at hand. One of the signature pieces of equipment, though, which the Pandurs carry in quantity, is the Zastava Ordinance Works M37 submachine gun, which gives the troops overwhelming close-range firepower. A number of other regional armies such as Bulgaria and Greece have similarly distributed high numbers of submachine guns and other automatic weapons to their light infantry forces.

A number of the Pandurs were trained in Germany as combat parachutists in the late 1930s, and some served in this role in Afghanistan.

Notable Actions
The 3rd Pandur Battalion joined the League of Nations Afghanistan Field Force in mid-1940, serving as one of the first participating Yugoslavian units in country. The Pandurs impressed all who saw them at work in battles such as Gereshk and Lor Koh, as well as conducting small-unit actions to maintain the integrity of supply lines and bases. These small unit actions, though conducted in the deserts and mountains of Afghanistan, are indicative of the sorts of roles the Pandurs are specialized to do.

Influences
As a result of the Yugoslavians' successes in Afghanistan, both the Irish Army and the Czech Army decided to form their own units based on the Pandur battalions. This influence was strong enough that the Czechs determined to use the term pandur to refer to their own forming units.

10

Wednesday, March 14th 2012, 2:51pm

From the January Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

CNS Chiloe and the Porte-avions d'escorte Concept
by Capt. Marcel Alphonse Fouroux.
Article from Le Spectateur militaire.

With the increased emphasis many navies place on naval aviation, naval designers and theorists have begun working to determine such things as ideal size, speed, and other operational parameters. One of the major issues discussed by the theorists is how to best reduce cost for construction and operation, which has led to the envisioning of the Porte-avions d'escorte concept.

The Porte-avions d'escorte is an aircraft carrier converted from a merchant ship, or an aircraft carrier built in civilian yards using civilian-sourced equipment and construction techniques. This process allows for substantial cost savings during the construction of the ship itself. Operational costs are similarly lower, as such a ship would use a more economical civilian diesel or steam turbine engine. Such emphasis on utility exacts a price. Most aircraft carriers built from the keel up have extensive armour suitable for their size, as well as extensive internal subdivision to help with damage control. Speed usually exceeds thirty knots, which is vital for the operation of the embarked air group. Civilian-built ships lack the internal subdivision, the armour, and usually the speed.

Relatively few navies have built a ship like the Porte-avions d'escorte, instead preferring to spend their money building more effective vessels or converting existing military ships, such as older cruisers. Many of the first aircraft carrier and seaplane carrier prototypes, however, were conversions of merchant ships, particularly during the Great War period, when the desired low cost outweighed the weaknesses. The Indian Navy has specialized in the type, converting a collier into their first carrier Otta, then a troopship-liner into the Lathi, and more recently, converting the Aruval, Vel, and Katar. The Chilean Navy has also made the Chiloe, a ship I've had the opportunity to inspect firsthand. As it's one of the only modern examples of the type that can be inspected by Western observers, it merits close attention as one of the prime exemplars of the type.

The origin of the Chiloe came as a result of the theories of Admiral Eduardo Moore, then the commander-in-chief of the Chilean Navy, and a preeminent advocate of carrier aviation. Moore noted the attrition suffered by his naval aviators in the Andean War and the Peruvian Civil War, and quickly determined that a lengthy war would swiftly deplete Chile's cadre of trained naval aviators. Alarmed by this prospect, Moore arranged to substantially increase the number of naval aviators, and pushed for the acquisition of a training carrier. The construction of the larger Chilean fleet carrier Libertad, begun in 1938, helped make this a high priority, as the new ship would require a cadre of trained naval aviators and their associated deck personnel. A training carrier would help create these crews.

Like many ships of her type, the Chiloe was born in a civilian yard as a civilian ship. The Chilean government's merchant marine directorate, DIRECTEMAR, ordered her as a fast passenger-cargo ship, but was having difficulty finding a civilian shipping line willing to lease or buy the vessel. Her transition to military ownership was swift, as she was already owned by a government agency. Unlike most other escort carriers, the Chiloe had no intervening civilian life, as the Chilean Navy acquired the ship before she was completed. The ship's unfinished state allowed the Chilean naval yard, ASMAR, to make a more efficient conversion than might otherwise have been possible, which is visible in several aspects of her construction.

Quoted

General Specifications, CNS Chiloe
Dimensions: 170m x 18.9m x 5.8m
Displacement: 11,000 tons (approximate, normal displacement)
Speed: 24 knots (maximum)
Armament: 1x13cm gun, 8x7.6cm guns, 16x4cm guns
Aircraft: 24 planes


A curious aspect of Chiloe's construction is her power plant. The ship has Chilean-licensed versions of Burmeister and Wain maritime diesels which can economically power the ship to eighteen knots. A subsidiary steam turbine, also civilian sourced, can raise the maximum operational speed, but this is unusual except during flight operations in no-wind conditions. Although some navies have shunned the diesel engine due to concerns about reliability, the Chileans have observed that the B&Ws have had fewer issues at their normal operating speed than a steam turbine of comparable power.

The Chiloe, as a result of her civilian origins, has very little in the way of protective armour, and her crew refers to her, somewhat skeptically, as a "one-torpedo ship." Although internal subdivision was improved during her final construction, it does not compare to a purpose built military warship in any way. Shock testing in 1940 revealed that a number of the civilian-sourced fittings failed when subjected to relatively minor close impacts, such as would occur with a near miss by a bomb. As the Chileans primarily use the ship for training naval aviators and deck crews, this relative fragility is not a major concern during peacetime, but if the ship is ever to be used in war, it could be a critical issue.

In her training role, the Chiloe carries twenty-four ENAER Coati-Ns. The Coati is a modern all-metal monoplane designed for advanced training of pilots. The Coati-N variant, powered by the nine hundred horsepower Austral Streiff radial, was developed for use on aircraft carriers, made with non-corrosive metals and equipped with a tailhook and strengthened fuselage. Although not a war plane, the Coati has two machine guns and wing racks for light bombs or depth charges. This airgroup, while not militarily formidable, allows the Chilean Navy to train numerous pilots in carrier landings. In wartime, the Coati would be a useful anti-submarine aircraft, as it is easy to maintain and fly, even from a carrier deck.

Although the Chileans employ the ship almost exclusively for training, the Chiloe has been used in a number of major military exercises to determine the ideal military role of a ship of her type. These exercises usually see her airgroup exchanged for visiting squadrons, operating aircraft as varied as the F4U / F4E Corsair naval fighter and the heavy Alicanto bomber. Operating these aircraft is tricky for a ship as slow as the Chiloe. Chilean research has shown that a torpedo-laden Alicanto requires a hundred and twenty meters of take-off run with a twenty-five knot headwind - a sizable amount of real estate on a deck only a hundred and seventy meters long. In calm weather conditions, the Chiloe may also have difficulty achieving the minimum necessary airspeed over the ship's flight deck, and aircraft parking configurations further complicate operations. Chilean-built F4E Corsairs are more forgiving of space, but have their own tricky handling issues. This has led to a regular use of the single steam catapult for almost all air operations with aircraft beside the Coati. The catapult permits the Chiloe to operate more aircraft at the same time. Although the launch rate is slower, more aircraft can be spotted at the same time on the flight deck for launch. The ship also is not forced to operate at her difficult-to-attain maximum speed.

In 1941, the data the Chilean Navy acquired while operating the Chiloe and its other carriers was worked into a handbook, which was in turn distributed to a number of cadets at the Escuela Navale, Chile's naval academy. These cadets familiarized themselves with carrier operating doctrine and worked out a six week long series of naval kriegspiels, evaluating different methods of organizing and employing aircraft carriers of all types. This experience confirmed that the fleet carriers, such as Chile's Libertad, were worth their weight in fighting power. The large carrier's mix of speed, protection, and large air wing gave an operational flexibility that light and escort carriers could not match, even when the smaller ships were grouped to give approximately similar aircraft numbers. The escort carriers, in order to compose enough mass for an air strike, required significant collaboration between ships and squadrons, resulting in delays planning a major combined operation. By contrast, a fleet carrier, as it is able to mass a full air-strike on its own, can streamline such collaboration.

Despite these unsurprising findings, the cadets determined that escort carriers, if formed into a well-organized task force, could hold their own in a surprising number of situations. The cadets determined that four to six escort carriers, carrying between a hundred fifty and two hundred planes, was ideal from an operational standpoint, maintaining enough air-power to be potent, but not overwhelming a single commander's ability to exercise command and control. This sort of operational group was strategically the equal of two fleet carriers when on the offensive. On the defensive, the cadets determined that the fleet carriers had a much more pronounced edge, both in defending themselves from air and surface attack and surviving damage from attackers that got through. As one slight advantage to operating more numerous but smaller carriers, however, was that damage to a single ship eliminated a smaller percentage of a task force's strength, both by causing attackers to dissipate their strength against multiple targets and by allowing undamaged ships to continue operations.

At the end of the day, then, what results ought to be drawn from this ship?

Chilean Navy officers familiar with the Chiloe emphasize that, at least in peacetime, the ship's greatest shortcomings are relatively unimportant, and the operational economy it allows is highly desired. In wartime, the dangerous risks run by such relatively fragile vessels may be offset by acquiring them in numbers and employing them en masse for mutual protection. However, at the same time, the Chileans emphasize that there is no substitute for quality.

Author note: Capitaine de corvette Marcel Alphonse Fouroux served for two years at DCNS before becoming the French naval attache to the Chilean Navy. He is a qualified naval aviator.

11

Saturday, March 31st 2012, 6:13pm

From the February Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

The Legion Russe at the Battle of the Nations; August 1917
Article from Le Spectateur militaire.

Summer, 1917: war-ravaged Europe shook to the sounds of falling empires. In the far east, the Russian Empire, making fresh peace with the Central Powers, reorganized itself into the modern democratic Russian Federation. In Asia, the still-defiant but wretched Ottomans, sundered from their German and Austro-Hungarian allies, faced off against the British General Allenby in the Holy Land. On the blood-soaked Western Front, the French, British, and Canadians rose from their trenches to begin the Hundred Days Offensive. The Italians finally crossed the Isonzo.

And in Vienna, the ancient regime of Austria-Hungary tottered and collapsed into the pages of history. Into the palatial Hofburg, once the seat of the Holy Roman Empire, stormed a thousand of the rough and defiant men of the Russian Legion, who finished alone what Mother Russia had started three years before: to tear down the flag of the great power of Central Europe.

The Legion Russe
In December 1915, the men who stormed the Hofburg had no foreknowledge of what lay a year and a half in their future. French Minister Paul Doumer, on a visit to Russia, asked for an expeditionary force of three hundred thousand Russians to join the fighting on the Western Front. Though Czar Nicholas II was in favor, much of the Russian High Command opposed the idea, and only agreed when the French promised to fully equip and supply the troops, and place them in units under Russian generals.

Before the Russian Expeditionary Forces could make the long trek into the west, plans changed. In February of 1916, an Atlantean general, Damon Thule-Saulius, waded ashore at Akcay in Turkey, with two hundred and fifty thousand men of the Army of Asia. Their goal was the city of Constantinople, which not months before had withstood the British and Australians in the dismaying Gallipoli Campaign. Thule-Saulius had no intention of repeating the disastrous mistakes of Gallipoli, and within six months, the Atlanteans smashed the Ottoman defenses and forced Sultan Mehmed to flee ignomiously to Sansun. The Turkish Straits were opened, and battered Bulgaria defected to the Entente rather than to face the coming storm alone. The Russian Expeditionary Forces went not to the killing fields in France, but were gathered in the Black Sea ports of Crimea. From there, protected by Atlantean warships, they joined the Entente's Army of the Orient as it prepared to liberate conquered Serbia and plunge into the soft underbelly of the Central Powers.

Although the Straits were opened, it was too late for Russia, which sought an independent armistice in March of 1917. To even the most understanding of the Entente powers, this was a dismaying and treacherous betrayal, though hindsight suggests that it was necessary and saved Russia from the carnage of a terrible civil war. For the Russian Expeditionary Forces in the Balkans, it was a bitter defeat, made more difficult by the suspicions of their former comrades in arms. Many of the troops of the REF were disarmed and set to work in labour units, but several thousand vowed to continue fighting as the Russian Legion.

The Russian Legion (Fr. Legion Russe), at its height, barely exceeded three thousand men, and remained under the operational aegis of the French Army, which equipped them with field kit and uniforms; but like all French troops in the Balkans, they carried new Atlantean-made Lycurgus rifles, a concession to the dominant Atlantean-led nature of the Army of the Orient. Administratively, the Legion Russe was usually paired with a French colonial unit, or the French Armenian and Czechoslovak Legions.

The Invasion of Austria-Hungary
In May of 1917, Thule-Saulius was promoted to Field Marshal of the Army of the Orient. The Atlantean general showed little appreciation for the gesture, though, as he was too busy planning for his next offensive - Operation Iron Wolf, his name for the invasion of Austria-Hungary. Facing him, in command of four hundred thousand battle-hardened German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers, was the redoubtable August von Mackensen. Against such a foe, Thule-Saulius could allow no mistakes to mar his campaign; Mackensen was slippery and very dangerous.

To defeat Mackensen and overthrow Austria-Hungary, Thule-Saulius brought one and a quarter million men from eleven nations. Five hundred thousand men of the force came from Atlantis and its far-flung empire. Alongside them were the Balkan powers, with the Romanians at the forefront with two hundred thousand men. Greece and Montenegro brought their own contributions, while the war-weary Serbians hungered for the defeat of Austria-Hungary, which had nearly destroyed their country in the past three years. Former enemy Bulgaria, having sensed the turn of the tide, added hundred and eighty thousand to the ranks of the Entente. France, Italy, and Britain, as well as the troops of Commonwealth members Australia and New Zealand, joined the ranks. In this great mass of soldiers, the three thousand men of the Legion Russe were merely a drop in the bucket.

Unlike the stalemate of the Western Front, the Army of the Orient fought a war of movement and momentum. Thule-Saulius, in the general field orders issued in May 1917, wrote "We advanced yesterday, we advanced today, and we shall advance again tomorrow. Throw the enemy back on his heels; never leave him room to catch his breath." Mackensen struggled daily to stem the tide with deceptions, planned retreats, and powerful counterattacks. In the spring of 1917 he launched a punishing campaign called the Third Mackensen Offensive, hammering away at the Romanian Army in the Battle of Arad, but the Romanians held and Entente forces elsewhere surged forward. Thule-Saulius and Mackensen fought a seesaw battle over Subotica, which finally ended late in May when Todorov's 1st Bulgarian Army stormed across the Danube, outflanking Mackensen's position. Mackensen expertly extracted his forces and redeployed, aiming to spoil any further advances.

In the warmth of June, Thule-Saulius, pleased by the defensive preparations of the previous week, sent his million troops surging forward onto the Pannonian Plain. They were supported by brand-new tanks, armoured cars, and airplanes, in one of the first modern examples of a combined-arms operation. The Entente advanced: three kilometers, five kilometers, ten kilometers, snatching up prisoners and supplies. Even Mackensen's most heroic efforts could only slow the advance. At the Battle of Lake Balaton, Georgi Todorov's Bulgarians outflanked the Austro-Hungarians. A force of French and Serbian troops led by Sarrail besieged and took Zagreb, which fell in July after two months of heroic resistance. The Romanians reached Miskolc, defying Mackensen's best efforts to stop them, and on the 10th of July, the Atlanteans raised the bull over the city of Budapest. From the banks of the Isonzo and the Dalmatian Coast to the mountains of Slovakia, Austria-Hungary shook to the force of the blows.

For much of this campaign, the Legion Russe served in the rear, guarding prisoners and protecting supply lines against expected partisans, of which there were few. But on July 9th, German troops spearheaded a local counterattack in the region of the Neusiedlersee, exploiting a gap left between French and British divisions. With the British division cut off and embattled, Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, commanding the left wing of the Army of the Orient, ordered forward the Legion Russe. At the Battle of Donnerskirchen, the Legion Russe held the line, suffering four hundred killed and wounded in a brutal, courageous fight that lasted only six hours. The Legion's commander, Colonel Nikolai Kasyanov, received the French Legion of Honor for his defense, and a dozen soldiers were decorated.

Their worth, loyalty, and fighting spirit proven in combat, the Legion Russe was rotated to the front lines for the greatest of the Army of the Orient's battles: Vienna, immortalized in history as the Battle of the Nations.

Iron Wolf's Million
The accomplishments of the Entente's Army of the Orient hides beneath the shadow of the Western Front. The Atlanteans set foot in Asia Minor in February 1916, and they ended the war in Munich in November 1917. In twenty-two months, they marched over two thousand kilometers, their advance averaging three kilometers a day when troops on the Western Front counted their gains in meters. Some of the greatest cities in Europe - ancient Constantinople, captive Belgrade, Budapest, Bratislava, Vienna, Prague, and Munich - echoed to the sounds of the army's advance. The use of gas - so terrifying at the Somme and elsewhere - was rare.

Eleven nations pledged their military might to swell the ranks, and with each nation at the table, there was the constant threat of disunity. Many of the national commanders were vain and pompous; others were of marginal competence, while a number of stars first shone in the ranks of the Army of the Orient. Throughout nearly two years of campaigning, Thule-Saulius fought as many battles with his own subordinates as he fought with Mackensen. In his memoirs, Bulgarian general Vladimir Vazov wrote: "While Thule-Saulius was an indifferent tactician, he was an excellent composer of grand strategy; but no general I have ever seen was his equal in organizing and motivating his officers. At the head of three million men, the stress was immense; but the Field Marshal would meet with his commanders, give them a quiet smile, praise their good deeds and command them to undertake every order to his wishes. He learned how to work with even the most trying of subordinates, and convinced even the most arrogant and egotistical to accept his orders. He steered armies with a whisper."

American newspapermen covering the war, seeing the multinational army, jokingly called it "Thule's Zoo", but in the aftermath of the Battle of Vienna, dubbed it "the Army of All the Nations." It was an apt name. Among the ranks of the British troops were Irishmen who would in only a few years declare their own republic, Sikhs from Pakistan and dark-skinned Kenyans. The French and Atlanteans brought ferocious troops from Morocco. Both the Greeks and the Bulgarians claimed their own Macedonian regiments.

Though their origins were disparate, the Army of the Orient was melded together with a single goal, and possessed of an élan worthy of a crusader. The soldiers who pushed forward each day knew the terrible arithmetic of the Western Front, but they also recognized that such carnage was not their fate. Though the Army of the Orient often faced savage fighting, most of the soldiers expected to survive the campaign - and most did.

Into Vienna with the Legion Russe
In July of 1917, when the Legion Russe reached the front line, their numbers had fallen to two thousand men. Combat attrition and sickness, a constant threat to the army, whittled down their numbers in July, particularly after the unit suffered four hundred killed and wounded in the bloodbath at Donnerskirchen.

Colonel Nikolai Kasyanov, who commanded the Legion Russe for most of its existence, was informed on July 24th that his unit would be participating in the coming attack on Vienna. Rumors among the troops quickly spread; Austria-Hungary was breathing its last ragged breath. Not two weeks earlier, a hundred and thirty-five thousand Austro-Hungarian troops, badly demoralized, had mutinied between Budapest and Lake Balaton, surrendering without a fight to the advancing Entente forces. On July 20th, Austria-Hungary asked for an armistice, but rejected the Entente's demands for unconditional surrender. The reticence of the Austro-Hungarian government, however, had little effect on the army defending Vienna, which suffered desertions and mass surrenders. Only the continuing presence of the ninety thousand German soldiers under Mackensen's command prevented a complete collapse.

Though the Austro-Hungarians expected Mackensen to fight for Vienna, the German general realized the city was a trap he could not be drawn into. Strong Atlantean and Romanian forces ranged to the northeast, advancing onward from Bratislava. At a command, they could turn west and dash along the banks of the Danube, cutting off any retreat from Vienna. Thule-Saulius had on previous occasions demonstrated that the Danube was a minor barrier: in May, the Atlantean engineers created in two days a group of pontoon bridges that allowed the Bulgarian First Army to cross and nearly outflank Mackensen's defense at Subotica, and Mackensen was wary of any further traps. His goal now was the safe extraction of his German troops from the collapse of Austria-Hungary.

On the morning of August 1st, after a desultory artillery bombardment that was more noise and smoke than actual fire, the Entente moved forward. British Brisfits and Atlantean Spads roamed over the city, driving away the remnants of the Luftstreitkrafte and the K.u.K. Luftfahrtruppen. The Legion Russe advanced along the Triester Strasse, meeting little resistance aside from some looters, who Kasyanov arrested and sent to the rear. The Legion's objective was the Westbahnhoff, but when the Russians reached the railway station, they found British armoured cars already in possession.

Turning northeast after a brush with fleeing Austro-Hungarian defenders, the Legion Russe advanced along the Mariahilferstrasse for two kilometers, taking prisoner more looters and accepting the surrender of nearly a hundred Austrian deserters. Captain Yevgeny Makeyev, the Legion's intelligence officer and a close friend of Colonel Kasyanov, later related "We all had very poor maps of Vienna, and most of us had very little idea how far into the city we'd come. The Colonel received orders to keep advancing, and so we followed the road."

Shortly before noon on August 2nd, the Legion stumbled into the undefended and nearly abandoned Maria-Theresien-Platz, and spotted the Austrian flag still flying over the nearby Hofburg. Makeyev, in his memoirs, described the scene: "For a few moments, we stood in shock, amazed that our long campaign had led us here, to the centerpiece of the Austrian Empire. Then one of the sergeants shouted 'Forward, ura!' and the whole of the Legion, a thousand men strong, charged to seize the palace. None resisted us."

As the Russians swept into the palace, other troops seized neighboring landmarks. The Hofbibliothek and the Vienna State Opera house, to the southeast of the Hofburg, were occupied only a few minutes later by the reconnaissance troops of the 3rd Atlantean Zouaves Regiment, who posted a guard against looters, while the French 339th Infantry Regiment seized the Austrian Parliament and the Vienna City Hall.

By the evening of August 3rd, Vienna was wholly in Entente hands. Fighting inside the city itself had been minimal, as Mackensen concentrated on fleeing the doomed city rather than a heroic and futile defense. Even in full retreat he proved dangerous, however; at Asperhofen, thirty kilometers west of Vienna, a German Eingreif division struck out at pursuing Greek troops on the afternoon of August 2nd, causing heavy casualties and disrupting the Entente pursuit. On August 4th, the Austro-Hungarian government accepted the inevitable and ordered all its troops to lay down their arms. On August 6th, they surrendered unconditionally, with Thule-Saulius accepting the surrender outside the Hofburg. While the formalities were carried out, the Legion Russe stood guard around the palace, observing the events.

Mackensen escaped Vienna and withdrew to Linz, which he defended until mid-August before retreating to Salzburg. At Salzburg, his desperate troops, the last veterans of the Balkans Campaign, held off Thule-Saulius and the Atlantean Army for two days while Louis Franchet d'Espèrey encircled and finally trapped the extraordinarily capable Mackensen, who reluctantly surrendered to his longtime enemy.

Shorn of their allies, the German Empire fought on alone after the fall of Vienna and the surrender of Austria-Hungary; but the writing was on the wall. On November 11th, 1917, Germany accepted an armistice that would end the Great War.

Of the Legion Russe, approximately eleven hundred men returned to Russia following the end of the war. Colonel Kasyanov, who had led the Legion through most of its existence, was not among them, being killed by a German sniper outside Munich on October 31st. He was the last man of the Legion Russe to die in action before the signing of the Armistice.

12

Friday, April 13th 2012, 5:33pm

From the March Issue of Le Spectateur militair

Les Pingouins Africains - How the Armee de l'Aire Serves the French African Colonies
by Jean-Christophe Houdon
Article from Le Spectateur militaire.

"Look - look, elephants," my pilot says, pointing a bronzed finger out the window of his plane. "Can you see them? Let me circle around once."

"I see them," I reply, while searching for my camera. "I've never seen so many."

"There are forty, forty-five adults, and six or seven young." My photos won't turn out due to the glare of the sun on the glass, but I am amazed to see these animals in the wild. Once my pilot circles back to our original heading, he tells me of other creatures he's seen here in the expanse of southeastern Tchad. Lieutenant Lionel Robert has been in Tchad since 1938, but grew up in Africa. Born in Algiers to settlers from Provence, he joined the Armee de l'Aire during the Rif-Morocco War and earned his wings. He loves the continent so much that he volunteered for a job in one of the most isolated regions on Earth.

Robert is one of a dozen pilots of the Armee de l'Aire who fly Nord Pingouins in Tchad. The little single-engine planes, known by most of the world as the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke Bf108, replaced Caudron Simouns and other, older planes in African service.

The Pingouin, the handiwork of Nord's factory in Méaulte, diverges from its Germanic cousin through the use of a Renault engine, though the version now being built, the Noralpha, uses a Lorraine-built version of the original Argus inline. The Armee de l'Aire has over a thousand of the type in service, and they range across the world - from Paris to Guiana, Tchad, and Polynesia. Robert's Pingouin, the cowling decorated with a cartoon of the antarctic bird, was the ninety-ninth aircraft off the production line, and still shines in a silver aluminium paint scheme.

"Now look down there," Robert tells me, reaching across and pointing out my window. "We're just past Sarh. The Chari River is down there - do you see the green farm circles on the ground? Two years ago, that was all wilderness. I photographed this area from the air in preparation for an irrigation project to improve regional agricultural production. Last year, I flew in a dozen workmen who assembled a windmill that pumps water from the rivers to the fields. The project's about half-done, but by next year that agriculture project should grow enough food to feed about a quarter of the province's population."

I asked what other duties Robert and his fellow pilots performed. "Last week, I flew the Governor-General of Tchad to meet with the British in Abuja. And yesterday, two officers of the Legion Etranger. A lot of our work is flying officials around to different airstrips, but we also carry a bit of cargo on occasion - mostly high value but light-weight cargoes like medicines. If we need anything bigger brought in, though, we have to call for a twin or three-engine cargo liner. We also conduct aerial patrolling - watching the borders, looking for bandit incursions, that sort of thing."

Robert landed his Pingouin at the Sarh airstrip and delivered several bags of mail to troops from the fort. He pointed to the battered carcass of a plane at the end of the field. "Wasn't my best day, that one. The engine seized up a few moments after takeoff, and I had to put her back down in a hurry. I was lucky it didn't happen thirty seconds later, otherwise I'd have been in real trouble."

An average of three planes a year are lost in Tchad alone due to the conditions. Back in the air returning to N'Djamena, Robert tells me about one of his squadron mates who didn't come back. "He was flying medicine up to the north. The doctor at the missionary station was treating a local epidemic, I don't remember what it was. He came down sick with it himself. Bernard loaded up his Pingouin with medical supplies and flew into the airstrip at Bardai. Well, can't really call it an airstrip, since it's really just a flat space. He delivered the medicine and took off again, but he never made it home - we think he ran into a sandstorm and got forced down. We looked for him for three weeks, but there's not a trace. The Tibesti is rough, empty country."

Two days later I got to see the Tibesti Mountains from the back seat of another Pingouin, this one flown by Lieutenant Antonin Petit. A former officer of the Legion Etranger, Petit is African by way of the Caribbean, where his ancestors worked as slaves on a plantation. "The Legion is my fatherland," he proudly proclaimed to me. "But I couldn't march with my company after the Rif Berbers took half my left leg." He tapped his metal prosthetic. "I'm too young to roll over and die, so I learned wireless telegraphy. Picked up flying from an instructor in Fes, and managed to swing a new career. I can fly even with the stump leg, so the Armee de l'Aire gave me a Pingouin."

The Tibesti Mountains are a dark-hued smudge on the horizon, but they loom closer as we fly north. The earth below is a dusty volcanic red, and crater-topped mountains rise up towards us. We land in on a sandy airstrip near a border fort, looking north into Libya. Petit's job for the day is to deliver two Army mapmakers and their equipment. Much of this region is still vague scribbles on a map. At the airstrip, we found another aircraft unloading gear - an African Condor of the Institut Géographique National. The plane was going back to Niamey later the next day, so I bid Petit farewell and hitched a ride.

The Institut Géographique National operates two of the Chilean-built "African Condors" for use as aerial photography planes. The aircraft are piloted by Air Force reservists and spend most of their time collecting aerial photographs. One of my fellow passengers, a geologist, told me the IGN could use another half-dozen and still keep all the aircraft busy. "The photography is quite useful for large-scale surveys," he explained. "Let's say you're a colonial official who wants to improve agriculture, let's say the production of cotton. The aerial photographs can help you figure out what regions can support a crop, and which ones can't. Or you can use them to follow the movements of animal herds, or determine weather patterns."

My geologist companion left the plane at Agadez to visit the new mine at Arlit, and several civilians boarded for the flight to Niamey. Both IGN and the Armee de l'Aire allow Europeans to travel on their larger aircraft if the space would otherwise be wasted. My fellow passengers were German and American medical missionaries serving with the Tuaregs who work the new COMINAK mine. One of the missionaries, Mark Dundie, was interested in my research. He and two other doctors, both Germans, came to Arlit a year ago when the mine opened. Today, he was accompanying a Tuareg child of fourteen, and the girl's parents, to Niamey where he'd arranged for an advanced treatment which will hopefully stop the growth of a disfiguring tumor on the girl's face.

"The colonial administrators usually like to have missionaries around," Dundie told me. "There's a surgeon I know who runs a medical school in Niamey - it's the only one in the Niger region. He could be making a comfortable living in Philadelphia, but instead he's training new doctors here in Africa. That has an effect on the city - black native doctors who raise the standard for local health and education. As your colonial governors push for more economic growth, there's a need for an educated middle and upper class among the Africans. Some of the administrators don't approve why we come to Africa - educated Africans don't work mines or grow cheap cotton, or they dislike that we're working to convert the natives. But I think most of them approve, which is why they are so accommodating in giving us seats on the aircraft."

We disembarked from the plane at Niamey, the regional capital of Niger. Only twelve years ago, Niamey had a population of only a few thousand people, but has started a dramatic period of growth. I was invited to stay with the governor-general of Niger, Louis-Albert Feyen. Governor-General Feyen's home is large for most local buildings, but aside from its size is not what I'd have expected from a colonial governor's mansion. It is not proof against the yellow-brown dust of the region. Feyen suggested that I wait in Niamey another two days before trying to return north. "There's a big plane coming in from Algiers," he said. "I hope the airstrip is large enough for it."

Feyen took me around the city in his official car. "The population of the town doubled last year. It's hard to keep track of how many people are actually here, but I think there's nearly eighteen thousand people here now. It's small to a Parisian, but Paris has centuries of growth and infrastructure. Here, there are limited sewers and no pure drinking water. Many of the Africans build their shanties wherever they want, regardless of whether or not the government calls it a street or not. Sooner or later, all the uncontrolled growth is going to cause a health epidemic and there's going to be a lot of criticism from people about why we did nothing. My aide and I have started working with the local African leaders on a new Planned City, though."

When we got to the airfield, I asked Feyen about how important it is to the city. "Absolutely vital," he told me. "There's no railway to Niamey, so anything coming into the city has to come by air, by truck, by camel, or by foot. Five years ago, I came by truck. The most miserable week of my life. But now that the airfield's here, I can get to Ouagoudogou or Abijan without taking three weeks of my life. As mining picks up in Arlit, planes will start coming in with mining experts, and people will come to serve the miners, and then people will come to serve the people who serve the miners. I'm planning for a city of two hundred thousand by 1970, and the development of the airport is going to be critical to that, particularly if no railway comes through."

Feyen pointed out a trio of Nord Pingouins on the airfield. "Those may not look like much, but they're one of our best connections back home. In some ways, we're running West Africa almost like an empire of islands. These growing cities are like the islands, and the Sahel, the desert, the scrub brush, the forests, those are the oceans. The planes help hold it all together and bring civilization."

13

Monday, May 7th 2012, 8:52pm

From the April Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Literature Review: Bruits de guerre lointaine
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Literature Review is a monthly feature which reviews literary works of interest to military readers.

Bruits de guerre lointaine (Eng. "Sounds of Distant War") is the second book in a military fiction quartet written by military wargame umpire Pierre Michaux. In his first book, Les Actes des Aigles ("The Affairs of Eagles"), Michaux narrates the opening stages of a war between the United States and Brazil on one side, and the South African Empire on the other. For the South Africans, the war has gone well, as they've bloodied the nose of the American navy and captured Rio de Janeiro. However, the American and Brazilian defeats have hardened the fighting spirit of both nations, and American industry began ramping up for a long struggle.

As the book opens, the action evolves on land and sea. Although the Brazilian Army suffered a terrible defeat in the Siege of Rio, their remaining forces are regrouping in Minas Gerais, around a small but growing American mechanized corps led by Lieutenant General David Starkweather. Opposing him in command of the South African general Nicolaas Blomkamp, the victor of Rio, who plans an armoured advance into Minas Gerais in order to seize the rich Brazilian province and capture the temporary Brazilian capital at Belo Horizonte. While the armies of Starkweather and Blomkamp clash in eastern Brazil, the US Navy tries to disrupt the South African sea lines of communication. Having suffered losses in the opening stage of the war, the US Fourth Fleet must depend on Vice Admiral Michael Phillips' four carriers and their two battlecruiser protectors.

Readers of Bruits de guerre lointaine will also be treated to a freestanding novella set in the same timeline. Titled Le bord du nuage (Eng. "The Edge of the Cloud"), the story follows the crew of the American armed merchant raider USS Yosemite operating on the Indian Ocean as the ship and others like it disrupt the flow of oil from the Dutch East Indies to South Africa.

In this installation of the planned quartet, Michaux again proves his technical expertise. Although a reserve naval officer, former naval attache, and wargaming umpire, Michaux shows an unusual proficiency in understanding land and air warfare, apparently the result of meticulous research. Continuing with his pattern from Les Actes des Aigles, Michaux details political and economic concerns in the way each of the combatants participates in the war. In Le bord du nuage, Michaux also delves deeply into the concepts of international law and neutrality, as American commerce raiding forces South Africa to transfer their vital tankers to another flag. Despite Michaux's technical fluency, the narrative only bogs down in a few places, and the emphasis remains on the characters and action.

Michaux's greatest strength in the novel, however, is his disinterest in portraying one side or the other as heroes or villains. This is most evident in the author's treatment of the gritty Minas Gerais Campaign, with the American Starkweather and the African Blomkamp both being likeable characters, each duty-bound to fight and win. Michaux also follows smaller characters, such as the American tank commander Sergeant Johnnie Wade and a South African pilot, Lieutenant Piet van der Byl.

Like its predecessor volume, Bruits de guerre lointaine is highly recommended for readers seeking a broad and insightful postulation of modern war. Michaux has announced that the next novel in the series, Sous un ciel de feu, will be published sometime next year.

14

Wednesday, June 13th 2012, 1:36am

From the May Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Military Unit Spotlight: XIe Corps d'Armée
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Military Unit Spotlight is a monthly feature which focuses on a unit or type of unit fielded by either the French military or another world army.

Overview
The XIe Corps d'Armée is the most powerful military force garrisoned in the French African territories. Composed of three Light Armoured Divisions, the IXe Corps is the successor unit to the traditional cavalry units garrisoning North Africa since the 19th Century. The IXe Corps brings together all of the tank and mechanized infantry strength of a modern combined-arms formation.

Organization
XIe Corps, composed of the 1re, 2e, and 3e Divisions Légère Blindée, represents nearly one-third of the units organized by the Armoured Cavalry Branch of the French Army. While the XIe Corps includes other units, including a rocket artillery regiment, antiaircraft batteries, and support units, the three Light Armoured Divisions form the greatest portion of the corps' strength and striking power.

The Light Armoured Divisions differ substantially from the division blindée pattern used in mainland France. Each light armoured division is made up of three "Demi-brigades de Combat", a reconnaissance regiment, a divisional artillery regiment, an engineering division, and other various support units. The constituent Demi-Brigades are, in turn, composed of one tank battalion, one mechanized infantry battalion, one mechanized artillery group, and a motorized supply and repair column. This mix of units, inspired by the writings of German and American armoured theorists, gives each of the three demi-brigades a great deal of combined-arms flexibility, permitting the demi-brigades to operate as individual, self-contained battle groups with just over two thousand men, forty-two tanks, and twelve self-propelled artillery pieces.



These small self-contained armoured units build on the experience of the Rif-Atlas War, where small ad-hoc French armoured units deployed to support infantry formations engaged in fighting the rebel Berbers. Under the guidance of aggressive young armoured officers, the tanks became the arm of decision, and the infantry was forced to motorize and work alongside the tanks as mutual support. This same result was replicated by the League of Nations forces operating in the recent pacification of Persian Nationalist groups in Afghanistan.

Unit History
The 1re Division Légère Blindée was formed in 1939 as an ad-hoc unit composed of independent tank, artillery, and infantry units drawn from the Rif-Atlas War in Morocco. These "march" units required a period of significant reorganization which lasted from 1939 to 1941. Despite the long gestation period, the 1re Division remains one of the most experienced armoured units in the world.

The 2e Division Légère Blindée was formerly designated the 5th Cavalry Division, and was deployed in the French Mandate of Syria. When the French Army withdrew from Syria, the 5th Cavalry Division was moved first to Lebanon and then to North Africa. In 1941, with the formation of the Armoured Cavalry Branch, the 5th Cavalry Division's constituent regiments were mechanized and re-tasked, and the entire division was re-designated.

The 3e Division Légère Blindée, composed jointly of French Algerian volunteers and native conscripts, has a long history of deployment in Algeria, composed of such storied and longstanding cavalry regiments such as the 2e Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique. In the 1941 army reorganization, he chasseurs regiments lost their horses and were paired off with Algerian a number of Algerian tirailleur battalions to form the 3e Division.

Equipment
The XIe Corps d'Armée, as benefits one of the Armee de Terre's premier field corps, has received priority in new weapons. The infantry components were the among the first units in Africa to fully convert over to the MAS-36 semiautomatic rifle. However, new vehicles are being delivered at a slower pace. The Army intends to equip the entire corps with the new Char-6 Bruyere cavalry tank and the Panhard VCI-41 infantry carrier. To date, the 1re Division has been brought up to full strength with the new equipment, and the 3e Division expects to fully re-equip by the end of August. The 2e Division, however, is still using older Lorraine 38L VBCP infantry carriers. The division's tank battalions also field a large number of older tanks being phased out of service elsewhere, including the Renault D1 and D2, the Somua S35, and the Renault R35 and R40 light tanks.

Like the tanks, the artillery is likewise undergoing significant modernization. Each Light Armoured Division fields three groups of twelve self-propelled artillery pieces; the CDA-6 Lauriston (based on the Char-6 Bruyere tank chassis) being the most common. The CDA-6 comes in two versions, one (CDA-6A) with a 75mm gun, and a second (CDA-6B) with a 105mm howitzer. The 105mm-armed vehicle is most strongly favored at the present time.

Included in the XIe Corps' equipment are the 132mm truck-launched rockets belonging to the 2nd Regiment d'Artillerie Portée. This artillery regiment is equipped with a number of trucks fitted with sixteen launch rails for the Russo-Atlantean designed 132mm artillery rocket. Together, this artillery system can fire over eight hundred artillery rockets at a single target in the space of only a few seconds, although reload time suffers when compared to regular artillery. Nevertheless, the RAP provides considerable supporting firepower to the corps commander.

15

Tuesday, June 26th 2012, 5:25pm

From the June Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

The Fisherman and the Hunter - The Battle of Agiastirio and the Death of the Lyran Imperial Navy
by Capitaine de frégate Valentin Brault
Article from Le Spectateur militaire.

On the morning of September 18th, 1391, prince and admiral Theron Palmeiro defied a pope and sailed with a hundred ships to conquer the Lyran Empire. Boniface the Ninth, in a papal bull issued the previous year, had forbidden further Atlantean expeditions against Lyra's island empire. In exchange, the Lyran king donated large tracts of land, fifty tons of silver, and a hundred tons of orichalcum to Boniface IX and the Catholic Church. Boniface's edict, purchased with Lyran treasure, temporarily frustrated the Atlantean hopes of reuniting their island continent under the control of the Cosimas Dynasty in Cleito, but the frustrations were short-lived.

The Lyran Wars
The conflict between Lyra and Atlantis was the fruit of seeds sown fourteen centuries before by the Roman Empire. At the end of the 1st Century BC Lyra and northeastern Atlantis were overtaken by the expansion of the Roman Empire, at the end of a time known as the Atlantean Dark Ages. Once one of the great maritime empires of the ancient world, Atlantis had declined by 1200 BC. The Romans, coming to Atlantis and Lyra, thought the Greek-speaking peoples of the region were poorer and more backwards than even the provinces of Britannia. However, the Romans found the copper mines lucrative, and climate of northeastern Atlantis was ideal for growing grain nearly year-round, provided sufficient rain or irrigation was available. An independent Atlantean kingdom nevertheless remained in the Cleito Province, reviving Greek culture in the Antiroman Renaissance.

Following the fall of Rome, Lyran kings adopted the title 'Imperator' and cast themselves in history as a successor state of the Roman Empire, much in the same light that the Byzantine Empire is seen today. Lyra's kings claimed jurisdiction over all Roman territories within reach, and used Roman symbolism, such as the Imperial Eagles, until the 11th Century. By contrast, the mainlanders saw the entire island continent as the domain of the Greek-derived people, and sought to unite the region under the control of Cleito. The Lyran Empire was thus always regarded as little more than a rebel state. Although the Atlanteans were distracted by a long series of wars with the Visigoths, who invaded after the fall of the Roman Empire, in 934 AD, 1062 AD, and again in 1194 AD, the Atlanteans launched major expeditions to conquer Lyra and end the perceived civil war. In 1194 AD, the Atlantean general Brencis captured much of Lyra, and Atlantean colonists began arriving in Lyra to incorporate the island back into the larger empire. However, by 1232, the Lyrans had again assumed control of the entire island.

As a result of these expeditions, many Lyrans thought of themselves as Atlanteans first and Lyrans second. Lyran-born Atlanteans, occasionally known as Lanteans or Lantaroii, proved to be a fast-growing and dynamic minority, while the so-called Lyranards fell into a slow decline. Lyran kings were never able to shake Lantean cultural self-identity, and often stirred up local revolts when they attempted to rule in their own right, rather than merely governors of the island. As both Atlanteans and Lyrans spoke the same language (Atlantean Greek), the Lyran Wars resembled more a nine hundred year civil war, between two competing royal dynasties, one Greco-Atlantean and one Roman-Atlantean. Lantean Lyrans prevented the Lyrans from accepting any alliance with the Visigoths or Moors aimed at Cleito.

By the 14th Century, the Atlanteans had at last driven out or conquered the Visigoths, and assumed a tenuous control over the entire mainland of the island continent. The Atlantean emperors who had long tolerated de facto Lyran self-rule, increasingly disapproved of Lyra's independence, launching punitive expeditions in 1309, 1318, 1323, 1347, 1365, and 1369. These expeditions, while they thrilled the Lanteans, inflamed die-hard Lyranards and encouraged a growing internecine guerrilla war in the Lyran countryside. It became clear to both sides that further collision, on a massive scale, was imminent.

Defense of the Lyran Empire
In 1391, the defense of the Lyran Empire rested on the shoulders of two men. The first was Archbishop Athanas of Illusus, the preeminent member of the Lyran Catholic Church. Athanas was renowned for his venality and depravities: a visiting Italian priest famously commented that the Archbishop held more orgies than masses. Unlike its growth in mainland Atlantis, Catholicism spread quickly in Lyra, to such a degree that by the 1300s, the overwhelming majority of the population looked to Rome for spiritual leadership. A number of pagan groups held out in the mountainous Lyran interior until 1378, when Athanas, newly placed as archbishop, provoked Emperor Leontiois to launch a 'crusade' against the pagans in exchange for substantial loans from the church. Leontiois led an army into the interior and killed over fifty thousand pagans, destroying all records of their religion. So effective was the campaign that it was not until the 1880s that archaeologists found written records of these people.

Among the many pies that Athanas stuck his fingers - always for his own power and profit - in was international politics. In 1384, Athanas convinced Pope Urban VI to make him the archbishop not only of Lyra, but Atlantis as well. This Urban did, but only after Athanas greased the palms of a papal emissary. This gained Athanas a considerable yearly tribute of money from the Catholic church holdings in the mainland, nearly equal to his income from Lyra itself. However, mainland Atlanteans by and large did not share the Lyran adherence to Rome. Atlanteans, at least on the mainland, practiced a Christianity more familiar to the followers of Greek or Russian Orthodoxies. Athanas's acquisition of the Atlantean archbishopric, made unilaterally by Pope Urban in opposition to the Atlanteans' own wishes, gained Athanas more enemies than friends. However, it endeared Athanas to the members of his own power-base - the predominantly Catholic Lyrans - and the Emperor Leontiois. Indeed, the Final Lyran War, launched in 1391 by Theron Palmeiro, was in no small part Atlantis's reply to Athanas' political machinations. It fell to Athanas to carry out the first of the Lyran two-stage defense against the growing Atlantean Empire. Armed with gold and silver from the Lyran bishoprics, Athanas brokered alliances with Atlantean enemies, bought and sold Atlantean spies, and agitated for Rome to raise an army of Catholic 'crusaders' to invade and conquer the island continent.

The second defender of Lyran independence was a more martial figure. Janix Arrantzale, born in 1326 to a family of Illisus fishermen, went to sea at age eight. The Arrantzales, who's surname meant "the fisherman", owned a small fleet of seagoing galleys, and oftentimes brought home more than just fish. By age nineteen, Janix commanded his own ship and sallied repeatedly into the Tauran Sea to raid Atlantean merchant ships and seaside villages. Labeled a pirate by the Atlanteans and a patriot by the Lyrans, Janix spent thirty years in a rough and violent existence on the border of the law. In 1373, Janix and his two sons were captured by Atlantean troops during a raid, and imprisoned in the fortified citadel of Xanthus. Escaping from the prison, Janix broke his hip but evaded pursuing guards. However, the hip set poorly and never entirely healed, leaving Janix nearly crippled for the remainder of his life.

Despite his injury, Arrantzale remained a nigh-legendary figure, such that in English-language studies he is known as the "Lyran Robin Hood." Though he gave half of all his spoils to widows and orphans, his personal affluence rose and by 1380, he owned half as many raiding galleys as the Lyran Navy. In the opinion of the adoring Lyrans, no exploit was too audacious, no legend was unbelievable, and no Atlantean treasure ship was well enough guarded. Yet despite his heroic stature to the Lyran people, Arrantzale rarely inspired the loyalty of his seamen - and more often, their fear. A man of terrific energy, his anger was formidable, and he reportedly once killed a man for taking the prime cut of meat at the table.

In 1386, with tensions rising between Atlantis and Lyra, Emperor Leontiois asked Arrantzale to command the Lyran fleet. Arrantzale held out until he received a substantial barony and title, and the king's promise to marry his youngest daughter to Arrantzale's oldest son. Leontiois, perhaps impressed or intimidated by Arrantzale's reputation and popularity, was forced to reluctantly agree, giving him the relatively small port town of Aufidus as his demense. In the space of two years as naval minister and commander, Arrantzale poured money from the Lyran treasury into construction of new shipyards, large city walls, and slave-worked plantations to feed the new populace. For every pound of silver spent by the treasury, though, Arrantzale spent a pound of his own silver to match. Today, Aufidus is the second city of Lyra, and one of the largest in the Atlantean Empire. Early in 1390, Arrantzale left the construction projects in the hands of his son, and took the Lyran fleet to sea; he did not even deign to inform the king about his intentions. Landing on the island of Greater Aeaea, Arrantzale brazenly bluffed the local king into surrender, and renamed the island Leonis, in honor of his emperor. Moving on to Lesser Aeaea, Arrantzale overwhelmed the small local Atlantean garrison before returning home. Not two months later, he again took the fleet to sea, this time with a thousand embarked soldiers, and successfully invaded the island of Capris. When thirty galleys of the Caprisene navy challenged Arrantzale's fleet of eighteen, the Lyran defeated them in a brilliant battle.

The Hunter
Unlike his archnemesis Janix Arrantzale, Theron Palmeiro was no larger than life figure. Born in 1366, Theron - his name meaning "Hunter" in Atlantean - was illegitimate. His father was Prince Antoipatros of Lyra, the younger brother of Lyran Emperor Leontiois, who carried an embassy to Cleito in 1366. Theron's mother was the sister of Atlantean Emperor Nicomediois III Cosimas, and Theron was raised in the imperial court at Cleito. As an illegitimate son, he was not perceived as a threat to either the Atlantean Cosimas dynasty nor Leontiois's own fledgeling House of Illisus, and well educated. He became a fervent follower of the Atlantean Orthodox Church, and Patriarch Petriois IV of Cleito later remembered him as "a young man with a dull face, but with a blinding gleam of intelligence and ambition in them." At age eighteen, he left the court and spent two years visiting various religious sites around Atlantis, and in 1386 A.D., he returned to the court to marry the seventeen-year-old Princess Demostrate, a marriage arranged by his mother.

As part of his duties as a peripheral and "disposable" member of the Atlantean royal family, Theron was sent overland to Duecalion in 1387 with orders to help Crown Prince Nicomediois IV raise a fleet and subdue the rebel islands of Selini, Charon, and Thanatos. While the heir of the kingdom lived a carefree existence, spending shipbuilding money on wild parties, Theron built a small fleet, hired local seamen, and sailed away to put down the rebellion, leaving the bewildered Nicomediois IV standing on the beach. With only fifteen ships and two thousand men, dubbed "The Korsarios", Theron recaptured the islands. The indomitable Princess Demostrate sailed with the expedition, breaking all the ancient gender roles by commanding a group of archers.

Theron's suprising success in the northwest won him both friends and enemies. Crown Prince Nicomediois IV became the most formidable of these enemies, although the Atlantean Emperor approved of Theron's personal initiative. Patriarch Petriois IV also took a greater interest in Theron, who firmly attached himself to following the Atlantean Orthodox Church.

In 1389, Emperor Nicomediois III sent Theron as his special emissary to the Lyran Empire to demand an end to pirate raids on the Atlantean court, such as the ones carried out by Janix Arrantzale. While in Illisus, Theron met his father for the first time. The meeting was tense but uneventful. The Lyran court refused to acknowledge Theron's ambassadorial status, and by the end of 1389, Theron had returned to the mainland. Emperor Nicomediois III, impressed at his nephew's performance in Lyra, ordered him to organize an expedition and fleet to invade Lyra and reunite it with Atlantis.

Atlantean Preparations and Innovation
In 1380, with Lyran piracy on the rise and led by violent and uncompromising Lyranards such as Janix Arrantzale, the Atlantean Empire took stock of its armaments and began building up for war. Although the Atlantean Emperor Nicomediois III could bring to bear extensive resources from around his empire, Atlantean shipbuilders and military commanders had an often-overlooked innovative advantage.

The island continent of Atlantis long harboured some of the finest shipbuilders of the ancient and medieval world, who learned to build strong and seaworthy ships to cross the long stretches of the Atlantic. While the Lyrans, as an island people, shared this shipbuilding culture, after 1370 the Atlanteans successfully introduced a number of shipbuilding innovations.

Foremost among the new innovations was the carvel-style of hull construction. Atlantean records date this to at least 1384, when the Atlantean Navy ordered six "carvel galleys of the oceanic class." Unlike clinker-built ships, with their overlapping wood planks on the hull, carvel-build ships were stronger, larger, and could carry a more lofty sail-plan than their predecessors, all highly important for voyages out of sight of land. Matched with the new hull construction was a rudder on the sternpost, replacing the oar-like rudders of the ancient peoples.

In 1387, when Theron Palmeiro began building ships for the invasion of Selini, Charon, and Thanatos, he acquired the services of a shipbuilder known to history as Philippoios of Duecalion. The eight galleys Philippoios built for Theron's expedition were carvel built and unusually long and heavy for their time, and rigged on three masts. Although clumsy in the shallows, these sea galleys were highly suitable for the open ocean, and may have carried some of the first gunpowder-fired weapons in Europe, although surviving records are unclear. At least some of the "sea galleys" appeared later in the invasion of Lyra, although they seem to have served as transport ships. However, Philippoios appears to have accompanied Theron to Eridanus, where he built thirty ships of a similar design. Another fifteen were built at ports along the Tauran Sea, and gathered at Xanthus.

These new ships were called "sea galleys" or pelagioi, but in reality they were anything but the traditional galleys. Long and heavily-built, they had a higher main deck than any galley. Although they still had oars, the pelagioi depended on their sails for propulsion in most cases. Most of the pelagioi built for the invasion of Lyra had three masts, square-rigged on the fore and mainmast, a lateen sail rigged on the mizzenmast, and a sharp prow and bowspirit. Theron's flagship Azeas, the largest of the pelagioi, had four masts. Naval architects and historians would later call Philippoios' designs a 'proto-galleass' or 'proto-galleon'. By 1391, perhaps half of the Atlantean pelagioi were armed with cannon, in one of the first concerted efforts to bring gunpowder artillery to a naval battle. Although no illustrations and very few accounts remain, it seems plausible that the Atlantean cannon were generally small barrels made of iron or bronze, firing a variety of loose shot, like oversized shotguns. These small weapons were primarily used to sweep enemy decks of men, rather than to damage the ship itself.


A comparison of the Lyran galley and the Atlantean pelagioi.

Invasion 1391
At dawn on September 18th, 1391, Theron's flagship Azeas signalled the Atlantean fleet to follow them out of the harbor at Xanthus. Following them were dozens of transport ships, including cogs 'hired' from their civilian owners and loaded with Atlantean pikemen and crossbowmen. Azeas led the armada south through the Tauran Sea until they crossed the Lyra Strait, making landfall east of Illisus. Theron's goal was the port town of Agiastirio, where he expected a warm welcome from the Lantean-dominated population. Agiastirio's name, meaning 'Sanctuary' in ancient Atlantean, was an apt descriptor of the bay, which was deep, enclosed against storms from the sea, and possessed of excellent supplies of fresh water and food.

At Agiastirio, Theron's fleet made contact with sixty-five smaller galleys coming down from Acestus, as well as another group of transports and embarked infantry. Agiastirio's civic leaders met the Atlantean troops as liberators, and Theron quickly ordered the infantrymen unloaded from the transports.

The invasion caught the Lyrans by surprise. Though they had spent years preparing for another Atlantean attack, the Lyrans had become overconfident from Boniface's papal bull demanding an end to Atlantean invasions. To most Roman-oriented Lyranards, it was inconceivable for the Atlanteans to risk papal displeasure through open defiance. They did not recognize that the predominantly Occidental Orthodox Atlanteans cared very little for Papal opinion, particularly with Boniface struggling to solve a major schism with Avignon.

Despite the surprise of the Lyranards, their response was rapid. The Lyran Army, composed of fifteen thousand men, quickly gathered near Illisus, where they prepared to fight off a siege. Like much of the period warfare in Europe, there were few drawn battles in Atlantean or Lyran warfare, but rather a series of sieges. A powerful army, unopposed on the field, would romp around the countryside and besiege walled cities, and, if weakened by lack of supplies or disease, might withdraw before forcing the submission of the city. While cannon started to appear in the armies, its use as a siege weapon remained many years in the future.

Arrantzale, with his growing fleet in Aufidus, quickly sailed. It is a remarkable fact that, despite the relative weakness of the Lyran Empire at this late hour in its history, Arrantzale mustered a hundred and fifteen galleys of various sizes, outnumbering the Atlantean invaders in ships. Along with the galleys, Arrantzale brought twenty of his own merchant ships, older vessels which he intended to send into Agiastirio's harbour as fireships. The Lyranard admiral's hope was that, with their fleet destroyed, the Atlanteans would fall prey to disease and actions by Lyran cavalry. It was no idle hope; the Atlantean incursion of 1323 had suffered just such a fate.

Arriving at Illisus in mid October, Arrantzale received reports from Lyranard spies observing the activity at Agiastirio. Arrantzale was encouraged by the fact that Theron seemed to have taken few precautions, anchoring his warships in three columns inside the bay. This perfectly suited the Lyran plan to send in fireships, setting the clustered Atlantean warships ablaze, then sweeping in to finish off the fleeing remainder. Arrantzale was also encouraged by his numeric advantage, with a hundred and fifteen war galleys to the Atlantean sixty-five.

Battle Royale
Theron, contrary to the rumors he fed Arrantzale's spies, was quite well-prepared for the arrival of the Lyran galleys. The Atlanteans pressed local fishing boats into service, spreading them out in cordons, and reinforced by the fastest galleys. Theron's forty-five powerful pelagioi anchored in a sheltered but shallow anchorage several miles north of Agiastirio's main port, where Lyranard spies had not spotted them. Finally, in the expectation of Lyran fireships, on October 16th, Theron re-deployed his galleys toward the mouth of Agiostirio's port, away from the main anchorage.

Late in the afternoon of October 31st, Theron's cordon of fishing boats began signalling the arrival of Lyran warships. Theron quickly put his own plan into action. In the fading light, Azeas signalled and the Atlantean fleet followed her stern-lamps into the gloomy night. The pelagioi formed up astern of Azeas, making five columns of nine ships, while the regular Atlantean galleys formed up in a crescent behind them.


The battle formations of the Lyran and Atlantean fleets. Click to enlarge.

With the fall of darkness, a wind from the northeast sprang up and blew steady. This placed Theron's Atlantean fleet upwind from Arrantzale, and frustrated the Lyran's intentions to use fireships against the anchorage. Throughout the clear night, the Atlantean and Lyran fleets maintained their distance, waiting for dawn to begin closing; but the two fleets could see the stern lamps on each others' ships.

As the sun slowly crept up, Theron ordered Azeas to raise all her banners and turned west to begin the battle. Theron's five divisions of pelagioi followed him towards the Lyran fleet, with the sun rising directly behind them as they closed. Blinded by the light, the Lyran watchmen were unable to count the Atlantean ships, but they remained confident of their numeric advantage. Unlike battles under sail from later eras, both the Atlanteans and Lyrans entered the fight under a cloud of colorful banners - sometimes fifteen or twenty banners on each ship, very few of them standardized. The sails of Lyran ships were dyed with the purple cross potent.

Theron's main force of pelagioi, formed into their dense column, crashed into the center of the Lyran galley fleet. The Lyran galleys quickly swarmed the outnumbered pelagioi. Counting on their believed superiority of numbers, the Lyran galleys maneuvered madly to attack the larger pelagioi. However, the Atlantean innovations proved to be decisive. The decks of the average pelagioi were sometimes two meters higher than the decks of the Lyran galleys, and the Lyran marines had to scramble up the sides of the pitching ships as Atlantean archers, ensconced on the higher decks and the fighting tops, rained arrows down on the decks with near impunity. Once the Lyrans managed the tough climb onto a pelagioi's deck, they encountered Theron's Korsarios.

The veterans of Theron's island campaigns, the Korsarios now rank as one of the finest naval infantry forces of the medieval age. Although the modern Atlantean Corsairs, their direct descendents, are armed with rifles and machine guns, Theron's Korsarios were trained to fight in armour on the decks of ships. The average Korsario wore a barbute (a close-fitting helmet reminiscent in form and function of the ancient Greek hoplite helmets), greaves, a solid steel breastplate, and a kite shield. Although most Korsarios were armed with short, broad-bladed stabbing swords and short-handled boarding pikes, their signature weapon was the morgenster, a version of the European morningstar. Swung overhand, a Korsario would rain punishing blows down on the heads of their enemies. Fighting together on the deck of a ship, the Korsarios played the role of heavy infantry.

As the Lyran galleys mobbed the pelagioi, the lighter-armoured Lyrans struggled to gain a foothold on the higher decks, only to come into close contact with the Korsarios, backed by the more lightly-armed and armoured Atlantean seamen. According to most accounts, whenever the Lyrans managed to gain their desired foothold, the Korsarios formed into an armoured mass and inexorably advanced, erasing the Lyrans' gains. The pelagioi were not just higher and larger, but their crews were more numerous as well; while a galley might boast over two hundred men, both rowers and marines, the average pelagioi at Agiastirio had nearly three hundred and fifty men. The men of the unengaged pelagioi inside the main column clambered over to their sisterships, where they joined the crews of the engaged ships. The formation of pelagioi soon resembled not a naval battle, but a siege of a single floating wooden castle.

While the fight raged in the center, the rest of the Atlantean galleys, the smaller and older types, advanced in a crescent around the main fight, enveloping the distracted Lyran galleys. When the Lyran galleys realized, belatedly, that they were enveloped, many of the crews panicked and turned their ships to flee. Arrantzale, on his flagship near the center of the melee, was distracted by the fight developing with the Atlantean pelagioi, and did not see either the double envelopment by the Atlantean galleys or the panic around the fringes of his own fleet. As the flanking Atlantean galleys turned inward, they came to the aid of the beleagured pelagioi, ignoring those Lyran galleys that elected to flee.

Surrounded by the Atlantean galleys, and befuddled by the near-impregnable pelagioi and the Korsarios aboard them, some sixty Lyran galleys were trapped, with nowhere to flee. The beleaguered Korsarios aboard the pelagioi, though exhausted by the fighting, pushed down off their higher decks and began boarding the smaller Lyran galleys, already depopulated by the work of the marine crossbowmen. By noon, the Battle of Agiastinio was decided, although the fighting continued well into the heat of the afternoon, as the Atlanteans pushed to overwhelm the last fanatical Lyran resistance.

By the end of the day, the Atlanteans had captured eighty Lyran galleys, and accounted for an estimated six thousand prisoners. An estimated ten thousand Lyran sailors perished in the fighting, and only thirty-five Lyran galleys escaped back to Illisus. Janix Arrantzale was not among them, being captured aboard his flagship. Theron, mindful of Arrantzale's past daring escapes from Atlantean prisons and under strict orders from the Emperor, took no chances, hanging him for piracy. Though Theron dealt brutally with the Lyran admiral, he was far more judicious with the surviving sailors, taking them ashore, restoring many of their personal possessions, treating the wounded, and offering thousands a chance to serve under the Atlantean banner. Many of the Lyran sailors accepted the offer.

Although victorious, the Atlantean forces did not escape unscathed. Although no Atlantean ships were captured, eight galleys and four pelagioi were badly damaged in the fighting, and sank during or shortly after the fighting. An estimated three to four thousand men died, and an untold number of others were injured, many succumbing to their wounds in later days.

Aftermath
The victory at Agiastinio was decisive. Unlike previous punitive expeditions, the Atlanteans had no intent to withdraw, and the port of Agiastinio became their base for all other operations in Lyra. The surviving remnants of the Lyran Navy never again left Illisus; blockaded in, the ships were beached or sunk in the shallow waters of the harbour, moldering away as the Atlantean armies sieged Illisus. The Lyran capital held out until 1396, when its starving citizens stormed the Lyran palace, murdered the still-defiant Emperor Leontiois and his family, and presented their heads to the Atlantean generals.

Theron Palmeiro, the victor of Agiastirio and the planner of the conquest of Lyra, returned to Cleito in 1394, where most gave him a hero's welcome. However, Theron soon became ill, probably from a wound received earlier in the year, and he died in early 1395. His enemies, including Emperor Nicomediois IV Cosimas (1398-1414), attempted to purge his name from history. Although this attempt at rewriting history was ultimately unsuccessful, Theron remains a relatively shadowy figure in Atlantean naval history, and only in modern days have historians and researchers started to uncover more facts about the life of Theron Palmeiro.

By the end of the 15th Century, Lyra was an integral part of the growing Atlantean Empire. The island's naval traditions remain deeply-rooted despite the result of Agiostirio, and even to the present day, Lyra contributes more sailors per capita to the Imperial Atlantean Navy than any other Atlantean province; and many of the key figures of the later naval wars with Spain and Iberia are Lyran natives. While unification was accomplished quickly, Lyran integration took much longer, and the islanders maintain a unique sort of pride in being both Atlantean and Lyran

Author: Capitaine de frégate Valentin Brault is head of the Musée national de la Marine's annex at Toulon. An accomplished naval officer, he is one of Europe's foremost experts on medieval naval warfare.

16

Wednesday, July 11th 2012, 11:18pm

From the July Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Literature Review: La nouvelle génération
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Literature Review is a monthly feature which reviews literary works of interest to military readers.

La nouvelle génération by psychologist Charles Lemoine, published in May 1942, is a study on the mindset of the so-called "New Generation" of military officers and soldiers. As a military doctor, Lemoine was attached to the French forces assigned to quell the Rif-Atlas Revolt in Morocco in 1937. His observations, as well as studies undertaken since his return to France in 1938, have informed the context of La nouvelle génération.

Lemoine identifies two groups within the ranks of the French armed forces: the grande génération, a group of soldiers and officers remaining from the Great War, and the nouvelle génération, composed of younger officers and soldiers who entered the armed forces over the last twenty years. The author points to a number of sociological differences between the two groups. The Grand Generation retains the prestige and battle experience of their Great War combats, and generally opposes 'doing things differently'. The New Generation, however, is strongly interested in modernization, new theories such as mechanized and airborne infantry, and a disdain for what they perceive as outdated and irrelevant combat traditions. Although Lemoine delves deeply into the psychological profiles of these two polar opposites, he often defines them as "forward-thinking visionaries" and "retrospectives."

While the book is primarily psychological in nature, the last third of the book evaluates the internal politics of the armed forces, and the conflicts between the two camps. Lemoine identifies the nomination of General Jean-Marie Lemaréchal (identified psychologically with the New Generation) to the post of the Minister of National Defense as a watershed moment for the New Generation soldiers and military thinkers. Lemoine identifies how Minister Lemaréchal has promoted "forward-thinking" ideas and junior officers, won over large groups of neutral or Grand Generation officers, and replaced, retired, or isolated older Great War generals and colonels who were still influencing policy decisions within the Ministry of National Defense. The author also identifies Lemaréchal's role in authoring the Fourteen Principles, which Lemoine identifies as a 'quintessential document of the New Generation military thinker.'

Lemoine approaches his subject through the dispassionate analysis of the medical psychologist, and the average reader should be warned that the writing is aimed primarily at Lemoine's peers, rather than military enthusiasts. Nevertheless, for those with an interest in understanding the mentality of the current and future leaders of the French armed forces, and the ability to work through the higher level thinking Lemoine presents, this book is meticulously researched and informative.

17

Thursday, August 16th 2012, 4:21am

From the August Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

The Battle of the Atacama and Operational Design
Article from Le Spectateur militaire.

As the Southern Hemisphere winter settled over the Atacama Desert in June 1932, the Chilean and Bolivian armies battled for control of the Antofagasta Region. This territory, formerly Bolivia's Litoral Department, was annexed by Chile during the 1879-1884 War of the Pacific, and remained a continuous source of friction between the two countries.

In the 1920s, Bolivian exports of tin skyrocketed, and the government poured their new material resources into the construction of a formidable army intended to defeat Chile and reconquer Antofagasta. Large sums were spent acquiring artillery, small arms, aircraft, and tanks, much of which was smuggled into the country to disguise the scale of Bolivia's militarization. By the end of 1931, Bolivia had over a hundred and thirty thousand men under arms, a terrible strain on an impoverished nation of only four million people. Although border clashes happened regularly, the Chileans had been lulled into a false sense of security about Bolivia's militaristic aims. When the Bolivian Army crossed the border on February 3rd, 1932, the Chilean Army had only forty-six thousand men under arms, nearly a third that of the Bolivian Army.

Despite their overwhelming numerical superiority, the Bolivian Army moved slowly across the Atacama, following the Antofagasta and Bolivia Railway (Ferrocarril de Antofagasta a Bolivia) which ran between the Pacific Ocean port of Antofagasta and the Bolivian city of Oruro. Chilean opposition was disorganized, but their engineers, recognizing the vital role of the railway, sabotaged several key bridges along the line, slowing the Bolivian advance. Despite this, on June 10th, the seven thousand Chilean defenders of Antofagasta surrendered. Chile was cut in two.

The loss of Antofagasta shocked and dismayed Chile, and there was a reckoning to be paid. Chile's top military commander, General Sanfuentes, made the mistake of attempting to place responsibility for the loss of Antofagasta on the heads of his senior officers in the north. Disgusted at Sanfuentes' actions and incompetence, thirty-one senior officers appealed to the president, demanding Sanfuentes removal. On June 12th, Sanfuentes was replaced by General Ricardo Larrain.

Larrain faced a monumental task. Although the Chilean Army had called in their reserves in February, increasing their effective manpower to eighty thousand men, nearly half of the army was still focused in the populous central regions of the country. Almost a quarter of the men serving in the Chilean Army at the start of the war had been killed, wounded, or captured in the conflict, and large amounts of equipment had been lost. The soldiers who remained suffered from low morale and exhaustion, while the senior officers bickered over strategies.

On June 18th, Larrain called a conference at the port city of Taltal. Present for the meeting was Contraalmirante Vincente Foxley, Air Force General Juan Nunez-Jara, and the senior commanders of the field armies. Larrain outlined to his commanders a new strategy for the war, planned using the new theory of Operational Design. The conference lasted twenty hours, but when the officers dispersed in the early hours of the morning, they held the battle-plan for the defeat of Bolivia.

Operational Design
During the Taltal Conference, Larrain and his senior commanders used the principles of operational design to organize their response to the Bolivian invasion. In the months that followed, the Chileans reversed their military failures and exploited their natural strengths and Bolivian weaknesses.

Operational Design is the theory and practice of planning, organizing, conducting, and continuing major military efforts in a theater. It includes elements of both strategy and tactics, linking the two together and enabling their mutual success. As shall be seen, the Chilean Army's mastery of operational design, and the Bolivian Army's ignorance of it, resulted in a decisive Chilean triumph in the Battle of the Atacama. According to the French Army's Field Manual of 1939, "a mastery of the operational art (l'art opérationnel) enables a smaller but skillfully-led and better trained force to swiftly and decisively beat a much stronger enemy."

Larrain began by explaining to his commanders the goal of termination and end-state objectives. These two inter-related concepts identified the desired Chilean outcome of the entire Andean War: the end of the Bolivian invasion of Chile and the restoration of a desirable peace.

In order to achieve termination, the Chileans had to focus on destroying the Bolivian center of gravity. In operational design, center of gravity represents, according to Clauswitz, "the hub of all power and movement... the point at which all our energies should be directed." It represents the source of the enemy's moral or physical strength to fight. Larrain and his subordinates identified several Bolivian centers of gravity. First, the Bolivian people, by and large, firmly believed that Antofagasta was the rightful territory of Bolivia. This would allow the Bolivian population the ability to weather military defeats. The second Bolivian center of gravity was the Bolivian First Army, under the command of General Raúl Angelo Quiroga. Composed of six divisions and almost sixty thousand men, the Bolivian First Army was responsible for recovering the Litoral Department and concluding the war against Chile.

With the identification of the Bolivian centers of gravity, Larrain advanced to the next concept, identifying the decisive points in the theater. These points included not only objectives to attack, but also those points the Chileans had to defend. The narrow-gauge Ferrocarril de Antofagasta a Bolivia (FCAB) represented the most decisive point on the Bolivian side. This railway over the Andes was vitally needed to supply the Bolivian First Army with food, ammunition, and other supplies; if it was cut, then Quiroga's troops would be unable to fight. The port city of Antofagasta, one of the primary objectives of the Bolivian invasion, was similarly a decisive point.

On the Chilean side, however, Larrain identified the ports of Taltal, Tocopilla, Iquique, and Arica as Chile's own decisive points. Chilean control of the sea for the duration of the war was absolute, and these four ports were absolutely necessary for supplying troops in the Atacama. For the armies trapped in the northernmost part of Chile, the ports of Arica and Iquique were particularly vital; if they were lost, then operations in the north would cease. Also important was the Chilean State Railway, which came up to Antofagasta from central Chile, and the Antofagasta-Salta Railway, which crossed the Andes near the battle lines, at the city of Socampa.

As Larrain outlined the decisive points, the port of Tocopilla, one of the points named, was under threat by the Bolivian 2nd Division, under General Cusincanqui. With the capture of Antofagasta, Tocopilla became the last city in the Antofagasta Region which Bolivia claimed as their own territory. Against Cusincanqui's advance, made with ten thousand men, the Chileans had only five hundred men of an exhausted and poorly-outfitted mountain infantry battalion. Although Tocopilla was named as a decisive point in the Chilean lines, Larrain ordered the Chilean Navy to extract the men, surrendering the port to the Bolivians. In doing so, he analyzed the critical factors, including the weak material condition of his defending troops and his inability to send timely reinforcements. These critical factors of time, space, and force resulted in the decision to preserve the lives of the defenders. On June 28th, Tocopilla was taken by Cusincanqui's 2nd Division without a fight.

After ordering the retreat from Tocopilla, Larrain analyzed the situation in the Atacama and determined that the Bolivian Army was rapidly approaching its point of culmination. At this point, the three factors of force (both for the attacker and defender), space, and time come together; the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. As the Bolivian invasion culminated, Larrain and the Chilean Army could expect a window of opportunity. Although culmination may occur many times in a battle or campaign, it usually occurs only once in a war, and Larrain correctly felt that Bolivia's efforts had reached that point.

In analyzing the situation, Larrain sought out the Bolivian Army's critical factors. The foremost of these was the critical supply situation they faced. Although the Bolivians possessed the largely intact and important port of Antofagasta, they had no naval forces to protect merchant shipping which could bring supplies in by sea. This placed the supply of the Bolivian Army solely on the meter-gauge FCAB railway line from Oruro. By severing this railway, Larrain anticipated the rapid degradation of Bolivian resistance in the vital theater.

To sever the railway, Larrain examined his own lines of operation - the actions around the decisive points with strategic objectives. As he organized his campaign to drive the Bolivians out of the Atacama theater, Larrain and his commanders determined on a series of actions to destroy the First Bolivian Army.

The Army commanders at the Taltal Conference discussed whether the ideal lines of operation would be direct or indirect. By following direct lines of operation, the Chileans would attack the Bolivians' strength, attempting to match Chilean combat power against Bolivian. The Chilean commanders who advocated a direct approach had good reason for their arguments. The Chileans were predominantly armed and trained by the Germans and Atlanteans, who have long shown a talent for fielding splendidly well-trained forces into battle. Despite the numeric superiority of the Bolivian Army in theater, the Chilean troops were better trained, both individually and as units. The Chileans also were receiving better equipment, in the form of new 105mm artillery from Germany, tanks and submachine guns from Atlantis, and mortars from France. However, most of the field commanders also agreed that solely attacking directly into the Bolivian strength would be wasteful of troops and material, both of which were finite. By assuming indirect lines of operation, the Chileans intended to degrade Bolivian strength to permit the success of direct operations.

Despite the Chilean determination on indirect approaches, it must be noted that the decision did not rule out a direct line of operations. In fact, the Chileans used a mixture of both direct and indirect operations to achieve simultaneity and depth, overloading the Bolivians with more applied combat power than they could handle. The Chilean Army of the Atacama (a division-sized grouping of battalions and regiments operating to the south of the Bolivians) took on a number of operations along the direct line. This force, under General de Brigada Raúl Sarquis, tied down Bolivian defenses south of Antofagasta. A second, smaller force of five mountain infantry battalions under General de Brigada Agustín Sommermeier (the "Army of Coquimbo"), used a more indirect line of operations, moving into Andes Mountains east of Antofagasta, where they threatened the Bolivian rear areas. The third Chilean force, the Army of the North under General de Brigada Mathias Aravena, operated in isolation from the others north of Antofagasta.

Although the primary focus of operations remained on land combat, the Chileans also worked to leverage their other supporting forces, including air and naval assets. By doing so, the Chileans exploited their advantage of depth. This advantage was strengthened by the synergy of the various commanders. While Larrain exercised total command over Generals Sarquis, Sommermeir, and Aravena, and could force the compliance of the theater naval commander Contraalmirante Foxley and the theater air commander General Nunez-Jara, Larrain himself said: "These men must be led, not ordered. Sanfuentes had pitted against each other, competing for supplies and reinforcements and clear instruction, rather than against the Bolivians. Once we came together, we began to share the same purpose, and motivated to succeed, we all sacrificed to work with each other as colleagues rather than rivals." Contraalmirante Foxley was more succinct. "When we did not work together, we lost. When we worked together, we triumphed."

As the three branches of the armed forces began working together again, the Chileans began to increase their operational reach. The Chilean Navy transported increasing quantities of supplies to the port of Iquique, where General Aravena's Army of the North operated. These supplies - food, water, and ammunition - were placed onto trucks and driven across the desert to the front lines, where the Chileans gathered them into small tabors for resupply. These small mobile resupply camps, as well as the motorized supply columns, permitted the Chilean Army to operate in the harshest parts of the desert with ease, while the Bolivians floundered with their mule-train supply columns.

Propoganda Operations
One of the keys to the Chilean success was their masterful use of propaganda to attack the Bolivian center of gravity. In July, the Chileans began Operation Verdad (Operation Truth) to undermine the Bolivian people's belief in a Bolivian-ruled Antofagasta. Equipped with powerful German-made radio transmitters, the Chileans began broadcasting static on the same channels as Radio Bolivia, overwhelming all their radio transmissions. With the Bolivian radio stations silenced, the Chileans then broadcast their own radio news, Radio Antofagasta, aimed at the Bolivian people, and using Bolivian expatriates. The radio broadcasts, along with popular music and radio dramas, reported on the corruption of Bolivian politicians, the true state of the war, and the desire of Antofagasta's citizens to remain with Chile. Bolivians, denied their state radio, tuned into Radio Antofagasta.

In their attempt to establish their credibility with the Bolivian people, Radio Antofagasta did not shrink back from reporting Chilean setbacks with unusual candor. The chief of Operation Verdad later said "We succeeded because we did not tell lies. We did not tell lies even when the truth could have hurt us. We invited every listener to test our claims, and we gave retractions when we were wrong. Because we told the truth about what they could prove for themselves, they trusted us when we told them what they could not prove for themselves."

Unable to work out a counter Chilean to jamming or the transmissions of Radio Antofagasta, the Bolivian government ordered the confiscation of all civilian-held radios. Chilean propaganda quickly seized on this order as proof that the Bolivian government really did have something to hide from its people, and urged Bolivians to begin questioning their government for the real truth. By attempting to seize civilian radios, the Bolivian government irrevocably harmed their credibility with their people, and sparked significant civil unrest in La Paz and other large cities in Bolivia. Many Bolivians held "radio rallies", where they gathered in city markets to listen to illegal radio broadcasts. Many of these rallies were brutally dispersed by the Bolivian Army, further divorcing the Bolivian people from their government in La Paz.

Much of the population of the Antofagasta Region, primarily citizens of Calama and Antofagasta, fled in advance of the Bolivian occupation. When the Bolivian soldiers entered Antofagasta, they were astounded at the apparent wealth of the region's inhabitants - and shocked at their hostility to the "liberators". The population quickly began a major, locally-led campaign of civil disobedience, and the Bolivian troops in the regional garrisons rapidly concluded that they were in fact invaders rather than liberators. The troops responded with a slowly-elevating level of hostility in turn - harassing the locals, looting houses, and eventually raping and murdering many locals. This only fueled resistance among the populace, and General Quiroga did little to restrain his troops. Radio Antofagasta faithfully reported every claim that came to light - and in many cases, debunked the ones proven untrue.

Operation Verdad also aimed their propaganda at the Bolivian troops, dropping leaflets over army camps. "Shame!" roared one of the more widespread leaflets, challenging the Bolivian atrocities towards local civilians. Other leaflets advocated the benefits of surrender, guaranteeing adherence to the Geneva Conventions, despite Bolivia's rather loose adherence to the conventions. Curiously, nearly half of the prisoners of war taken by the Chilean Army during the course of the war have remained in Chile, either as emigres or as security troops in the Chilean occupied zone. Chilean prisoners of war, by contrast, were forced to work as slave labor, constructing the "Death Road" north of La Paz. All told, though, the propaganda aimed at Bolivian soldiers in the field saw relatively little success.

Battle on the Atacama
In the second half of July, the three Chilean Armies, working according to the plans set at the Taltal Conference, began aggressively maneuvering against the Bolivian forces in the Antofagasta Region. By the end of July, the Chilean Army fielded nearly as many men in theater as the Bolivians, albeit divided into three individual groupings, each with their own objectives. Like a pack of wolves working together to bring down larger prey, they each moved fluidly about the perimeter of the battle, pulling the Bolivian Army apart in futile attempts to engage them.

On July 26th, the Army of the North and the Army of Coquimbo began a coordinated march towards Volcan San Pedro, where they overwhelmed the local Bolivian garrisons and cut the railway near the border. The Bolivian First Army was severed from their supply line. General Quiroga responded, sending two of his six divisions rushing back across the desert to restore their line of communications. The Army of the North, under General Aravena, was forced to return to their base at Iquique, leaving the six thousand men of the Army of Coquimbo to face the eighteen thousand of the Bolivian Army.

Despite an attempt by the Army of the Atacama to press the southern flank, the Bolivians successfully pushed the Army of Coquimbo off the railway. As the Chileans regrouped on the slopes of the Volcan San Pedro, the Bolivians pressed their attack, hoping to destroy the Army of Coquimbo. Most of the fighting took place above five thousand meters altitude, where the combatants struggled to breathe as they fought. Brigadier Sommermeier gamely attempted to hold his position, but finally pulled back to refuse the flank. Regrouping on neighboring Cerro Azufre, the Chileans had no rest, as the Bolivians continued their merciless attacks. After six days of exhausting combat in the high Andes, Sommermeier retreated all the way back to San Pedro de Atacama to rest and regroup.

Although Sommermeier was pushed off the field of battle, his battle-hardened alpine infantry took their toll on the Bolivians. The Bolivian Army admitted over eight hundred killed in the battles of San Pedro and Cerro Azufre, although observers believe the actual figures are at least double. The Army of Coquimbo claimed only three hundred killed, wounded, and missing. Many of the Bolivian casualties came on the afternoon of August 4th, when a squadron of naval aircraft flying from the Chilean carrier Mapuche spotted a troop train moving to deliver reinforcements to the force attacking Cerro Azufre. The naval pilots bombed the locomotive to stop the train, and then strafed and bombed the carriages until they were out of ammunition.

While the Bolivians forced Sommermeier back in the high-altitude battles, the Army of the North began a series of operations on the northern flank of the Bolivian First Army. Under the command of the German-trained General Mathias Aravena, the Army of the North operated in an unusual fashion. Aravena operated only three to four of his twelve battalions near the front lines, and focused his attention on small, easily-obtainable targets, hitting them with tightly-focused attacks by multiple battalions. As each battalion took casualties, it was rotated back to Iquique for rest and replacements, and a fresh battalion was brought forward.

The Bolivians, despite their manpower superiority, could never develop an adequate counter to Aravena's tactics, and General Quiroga resorted to a disastrously heavy-handed approach: late in August, he sent two more of his divisions under General Adolfo Monje to try to smash the Army of the North. However, the Bolivian troops had been on the front lines now for six months, and though they were veterans, they were simply exhausted. By contrast, most of the Chilean soldiers, though they'd been fighting just as long, had been well-rested several times over the preceding weeks and months, and their casualties had been filled with new replacements. Though they were battle-hardened, they were still fresh units.

Once again, Aravena avoided a direct clash and sidestepped the Bolivian forces three times in the space of a week. On September 2nd, the Army of the North made a forced march around Monje's army, and got loose in their supply lines. Rather than attempting to destroy supplies, Aravena's troops slaughtered nearly four thousand llamas the Bolivians used to haul food, water, and ammunition. The blow was decisive. Half of Monje's twenty thousand troops were forced to return to the garrison at Antofagasta, and Monje's following attempts to trap the Army of the North were halfhearted. On September 19th, Monje was killed in action during Chilean mortar attacks, and his force slowly dissolved in coherence and capability.

General Larrain, orchestrating events from his headquarters, dispatched the Army of the North and the Army of Coquimbo to try again to cut the FCAB Railway. With his losses from the earlier battles made good, Sommermeier was keen to have another go. On September 25th, the Army of Coquimbo launched a daring night assault on the Bolivian garrisons on Volcan San Pedro and Cerro Azufre, and then descended into the valley to cut the railway. Once again, the Bolivian Army was cut off.

Supported by the Chilean Navy, General Aravena began moving to retake the city of Tocopilla. On October 1st, the Chilean battleships Constitucion and Libertad steamed into Tocopilla bay, shepherding a flotilla of troop-laden destroyers. Covered by the ten inch guns of the battleships, the Navy unloaded two thousand men into the town. The demoralized Bolivian garrison put up only half-hearted resistance before twelve hundred men surrendered.

With his supplies dwindling, General Quiroga requested permission from the Bolivian government to withdraw from Antofagasta and march back to Bolivia. Though permission was denied, Quiroga began withdrawing his troops to Calama in the hope of launching a breakout. Quiroga never got the chance. On October 3rd, the Army of the Atacama launched a major attack to retake their namesake city. The Bolivian defenders, their supplies and morale low, retreated in disorganization. Only two battalions, part of the Bolivian Army's elite Colorados division, stood their ground, forcing the Chileans to retake Antofagasta over the course of three days of urban warfare. General Quiroga, perhaps feeling it would be better to die with his men, stayed in the city, and was mortally injured in the defense. On October 6th, General Larrain entered Antofagasta to the cheers of the population.

The Bolivian First Army regrouped in Calama in preparation for a breakthrough back to Bolivian territory, but they hesitated too long. The Chilean Navy brought in more reserves, landing them in freshly-liberated Antofagasta, and moved quickly to tighten their grip on the surrounding region. Their new commander, General Carlos Apaza, cancelled the planned attempt to break out to Bolivian territory, and dug in around Calama. Perpetually low on supplies, the Bolivian First Army held out heroically until March 30th, 1933 - substituting blood and heroism for ammunition and materiel. The cost in lives was horrific; by the time the survivors of the First Army surrendered at Calama in 1933, they had paid the toll of thirty thousand dead, and another thirty thousand captured. With the destruction of the First Army came the loss of all Bolivia's new military materiel, ranging from tanks to aircraft.

Summary
With the fall of Calama, the Battle of the Atacama ended. Chile once again controlled the Antofagasta Region. Bolivia, however, refused to end the war quietly. Opportunistic Peru and Brazil, smelling a wounded neighbor, eventually involved themselves, and the conflict reached its inevitable conclusion with Bolivian capitulation in December 1933. The Republic of Bolivia lost control of most of their southern regions to Chilean occupation, and the region of Santa Cruz became an autonomous region in the country under Brazilian control. Worse, the Peruvian government demanded punishing reparations from the Bolivian government, which did not end until the 1937 Cochabamba earthquake.

The Chilean armed forces now teach the Atacama Campaign in their war colleges as a prime example of the success of the operational art. The Chilean Army's adoption of the operational art during the Battle of the Atacama proved decisive in ending Chilean military reverses, and contributing directly to the end of the war.

18

Thursday, August 30th 2012, 10:35pm

From the September Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Special Article: Dogs of War
Article from Le Spectateur militaire.

For many years, humans have trained animals to assist and ease their labors. Dogs, dubbed 'man's best friend', have been no exception, being trained for companionship, hunting, carrying loads, and alerting their masters to danger. Many of the dog's capabilities, including keen senses not as finely developed in humans, make them important participants in modern war.

French Army War Dogs
Although the French Army has used dogs in warfare since at least the 1200s, the current Service des Chiens de Guerre (French War Dog Service) was not founded until 1914 with the opening of the Great War. Under the leadership of the tireless Sergeant Paul Megnin, the French Army incorporated increasing numbers of war dogs in a great variety of roles. By the end of the Great War in 1917, the French War Dog Service fielded more war dogs than all the other Allies combined. Although numbers have declined through the Twenties and Thirties, the Service des Chiens de Guerre remains one of the largest and best organized trainers of military working dogs. The Service maintains a training school at Camp Satory, south of Versailles, where both dogs and their handlers are trained.

Many breeds are currently used by the SCG, but several are preferred. German Shepherd dogs, which have started appearing in the Service, are among the most favored, having an almost ideal blend of the necessary traits desired in a war dog. Many German Shepherds, trained as war dogs by the Germans, were captured during the Great War, and re-trained to heed Allied handlers. The Belgian Malinois, Farm Collie, and Doberman Pinscher are also a prime breeds.

Duties
The primary use of military working dogs has been in sentry duty, where dogs can sniff out approaching enemy troops and alert their handlers. Dogs can be trained to attack interlopers on command. Many of the war dogs trained at Satory are intended for these sorts of duties.

During the Great War, dogs were trained to run messages back and forth between units. This task is uniquely suited for a dog, as it can run faster than a human, and has a lower and thus harder-to-hit silhouette. The Service des Chiens de Guerre organized messenger dogs into two different types: the Estafette, and the Liaison Dog. Estafettes were trained to run messages to a unit, but Liaison dogs were trained to return back. This necessitated training the dog to recognize at least two handlers.

For protecting vital installations such as bases and factories, the Service des Chiens de Guerre also trained enclosure dogs, who were released in a fenced area to attack any individuals trying to sneak in. Many enclosure dogs can be trained in under two weeks, making them cost-effective assistants to patrolling soldiers.

One of the most difficult tasks a dog can be trained for is tracking, as well as alerting their handlers to ambushes. This necessitates extensive training lasting three months. When training is complete, dogs can be used to track escaped prisoners or enemy troops across difficult terrain. They can also use their sense of smell to alert their handlers to potential enemy attacks or ambushes. Dogs may also be trained to sniff out and locate explosives, such as mines.

Humanitarian duties are not neglected, either. Dogs can scent injured soldiers, leading medical personnel back to their location. In times of natural disaster, these dogs can also alert rescuers to civilians buried in snow, or trapped in collapsed buildings.

On the Battlefield
One of the greatest difficulties in the use of war dogs is preparing the human commanders to recognize the capabilities they can offer. In field exercises at the company level, officers are given the opportunity to work with dogs and their handlers in simulated combat conditions, often against opposition troops.

During the Rif-Atlas War, nearly three hundred war dogs were deployed as part of the efforts to subdue the Berber rebels. In one particular example, French troops were sweeping the city of Sefrou for enemy troops. Two war dogs, Azelma and Toussaint, alerted their handlers and led them to an empty house. Digging beneath the loose tiles of the floor, the soldiers found six hundred stolen French rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition. In another incident, two Berber leaders fled into the mountains to escape French forces, leaving behind their laundry. A dog and handler, as well as a platoon of the Chasseurs Parachutistes, used the scent on the clothing to track the leaders for five days into the Atlas Mountains, until they found and captured the two Berbers in a mountain cave.

One of the emerging theaters for the use of war dogs is Southeast Asia, where the extensive jungle lowers visibility to mere meters in places. In this environment, war dogs can scent approaching enemy forces, often over a kilometer away, and direct their handlers to prepare for battle. All the forces deployed in Indochina, from the regular French Army, to the Forces de sécurité territoriaux, and the Légion étrangère, have increasingly included war dogs in their organization.

Summary
Unless human-produced machines can replace the skills and loyalty of a trained military working dog, there is little likelihood that even in this age of increasing mechanization of warfare, the war dogs of the Service des Chiens de Guerre will still have have an important place in the French Army.

19

Monday, October 1st 2012, 11:25pm

From the October Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Revue d'Action Militaire: The Ziz Valley Campaign
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Revue d'Action Militaire is a monthly feature which publishes reports about a battle of military interest. This begins a five-part series on the operations of French Paratroopers during the Rif-Atlas War.

The Ziz Valley Campaign
From May of 1938 onward, Berber rebels under Abd al-Krim had swept into the Ziz Valley, consolidating support for their declared "Republic of the Rif." French military and police garrisons were forced to withdraw in the face of Berber harassment, and Berbers began rounding up people suspected of supporting either the French government or the Moroccan Sultan, Mohammed V.

Following the defeat of Abd el-Krim's Army of the Rif Republic in the Battle of Meknes, and el-Krim's capture on June 4th, the Berber rebels collapsed once again into feuding tribes as the French Army's reinforcements moved in to crush them. The Ziz Valley, cut by the marginal Ziz River, became the stronghold of one of these Berber tribes, led by Ismail Mokhtari.

Mokhtari commanded approximately fifteen hundred mounted tribesmen who had participated in the earliest efforts by el-Krim to establish an independent Berber state in the Rif. Mokhtari's men had composed nearly half of the forces which assaulted the French garrison of Taza in March. At Taza, a group of the Legion Entrangere, supported by a militia formed of European colonists, beat off the attack, causing heavy casualties to Mokhtari's men, as well as other participating Berber forces. Mokhtari withdrew to the Ziz Valley, where his forces recovered their strength. Berber defeats caused an influx of trained fighters fleeing units destroyed by the French Army.

In July, with the situation in northern Morocco stabilized, French forces began pushing south, aiming to crush the remaining Berber rebels. Allied forces in Atlantean Morocco served as the anvil to the French Army's hammer. The Berbers would receive no refuge.



Chasseurs Parachutistes
At the spearhead of the French forces was the 1ere Regiment Chasseurs Parachutistes. First and at that time the only of the French airborne units, the 1st RCP was composed of nearly three thousand of the best-trained, best-motivated fighting forces in the French Army. With justification, the Chasseurs called themselves an elite unit. Every man was a volunteer who'd undergone sixteen weeks of additional training over and above their regular Army training. As paratroopers, they earned a fifty percent pay bonus in exchange for the terrific risks they took in the course of their duties.

Compared to the normal infantry regiment, the 1st RCP was a "light" unit. This meant that firepower was focused at the company and battalion levels, rather than at the regimental level or higher. Supporting forces, such as artillery and supply units, were externalized, and added only when necessary. This permitted the Chasseurs Parachutistes to be more mobile in harsh terrain, and more ruggedly independent in small operations. Against an entrenched enemy, however, the 1st RCP would lack the level of supply and artillery support needed to maintain long-term contact with the enemy. For their combat in the Rif-Atlas War, this balance suited the French Army quite well. In the course of the war, only two battles included more than two thousand combatants on both sides. The 1st RCP's mix of fanatical training and discipline (reportedly second only to the Legion Entrangere), capacity for independent operation, and small-unit firepower made them one of the most desired participants in the battles against the Berbers.

Counter-Insurgency In Morocco
It must be remembered, in any analysis of the Rif-Atlas War, that the conflict was not a bi-polar face-off between European colonial troops and a rebelling native population, but also a civil war between the minority Berber and Arabic peoples of Morocco. Even then, however, the lines between friend and foe were often indistinct. At least one Berber group fought alongside the French Army, operating as scouts and spies, while a number of Moroccan Arabs joined the rebels with the goal of opposing the French.

Despite the combat operations which occurred almost daily throughout mid to late 1938, French forces were able to recover all major cities within two months of Abd el-Krim's capture at Meknes. The Berbers, like the nomadic tribesmen they are, simply fled into the mountains to wage guerrilla war against returning forces. One of the principal tools of the French Army during this period was not the firepower of its forces, but a rapidly-developed intelligence-gathering network. By the end of 1938, French commanders in Morocco had nearly daily intelligence updates from within every Berber rebel unit with more than fifteen or twenty men.

The goal of French counter-insurgency efforts focused not on winning ground battles or control of territory, but in exerting influence on the Moroccans who did not directly support either the Berber rebels, the Arabic sultan, or the French Army. Building on past counter-insurgency doctrine, the French used "oil spots", using the Army to create a protected zone where friendly civilians could live in safety. As the oil spots grew in size, both Berber and Arab collaborators were encouraged to report rebel movements and operations to the French forces, who were then able to protect those who made the reports from rebel retaliation. French retaliations were carefully organized and controlled to prevent excesses, focusing on the primary mission of preserving civilian life and safety. According to French doctrine throughout the war, it was better for one civilian life to be preserved than for ten rebel combatants to be killed.

Dragon Operations
The French Army engaged Mokhtari's Berbers in Ziz Valley over the course of a six month campaign. During that time, the Chasseurs Parachutistes participated in three major and two minor operations in the region, known as "the Dragon series." The first of these operations, Dragon Rouge, will be covered in the November issue. Operation Dragon Noir will be covered in December. Operation Dragon Bleu will be covered in January. The two minor operations, Operation Dragon Gris and Operation Dragon Vert, will be covered in February.

Although other French Army operations took place in the Ziz Valley alongside the Dragon series operations, and the Chasseurs Parachutistes occasionally participated in other operations outside the Ziz Valley at the same time, these five operations, taken in context, provide a deeper understanding into the operational realities of the Rif-Atlas War.

20

Tuesday, October 9th 2012, 1:36am

From the November Issue of Le Spectateur militaire

Revue d'Action Militaire: The Ziz Valley Campaign, Operation Dragon Rouge
Article from Le Spectateur militaire. Revue d'Action Militaire is a monthly feature which publishes reports about a battle of military interest. This is the second a five-part series on the operations of French Paratroopers during the Rif-Atlas War.

Midelt
With a population of twenty-two thousand, the Moroccan city of Midelt serves as the capital of the eponymous Midelt Province and one of the main commercial centers of central Morocco. The city's importance as a population center, its growing mining industry, and its strategic central location made it a main target for the French counterinsurgency forces as they retook control of Morocco.

In July 1938, Midelt served as the headquarters for Berber chieftain Ismail Mokhtari and his fifteen hundred Berber tribesmen, who controlled most of the surrounding Ziz Valley. Mokhtari held his headquarters at the imposing Kasba Outhmane Ou Moussa, organizing the efforts of his three often-fractious lieutenants. Foremost of the lieutenants was Mohammed Mokhtari, Ismail's oldest son and designated heir. The younger Mokhtari was a dedicated firebrand, and it was often all his father could do to restrain him from the worst excesses.

The Arabic population of Midelt suffered most from Mohammed and his men. On July 29th, anticipating French movements to retake the city, Mohammed arrested at random thirty Arabs from the town, and announced that they would be executed if their relatives did not ransom them with information about the identity of pro-French sympathizers. Although a number of Arabs started coming forward with information, the Berbers were never able to put this insidious plan into effect.

Operation Dragon Rouge
On September 2nd, 1938, transport aircraft of the Armee de l'Aire flew over the town of Midelt in the early morning hours, waking the population. As the Berbers and Arabs stumbled out into the streets to see the aircraft, French parachute infantry drifted down to a landing northeast of the town. This was the leading edge of the storm.

The French planned to use a battalion of paratroopers (2nd Battalion of the 1st RCP) in Operation Dragon Rouge, but were unable to procure sufficient transport for more than two companies. Thus, the original jumping force was composed of C Company of 2nd Battalion and D (headquarters) Company of 2nd Battalion (minus the administrative platoon), as well as a trentaine of the RCP's Groupe Franc. In total, two hundred and sixty-one men made the jump northeast of Midelt. The group was commanded by 2nd Battalion's senior officer, chef de bataillon Richard Laurent.

Although outnumbered by the Berbers in town, the Chasseurs Parachutistes expected rapid relief, and anticipated the Berbers would withdraw without battle. The transports that had dropped them off were scheduled to return later that morning to drop the two remaining companies of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, moving on foot, were advancing with support elements from the the 21e Régiment de Spahis Marocains toward Midelt, where they expected to arrive on the 3rd.

Ismail Mokhtari quickly realized that his headquarters was under attack, and responded with immediate initiative, ordering his son Mohammed to take all available men to attack the landing zone. Although uncertain about the true strength of the French paratroops, both father and son knew that the Paras would require a pause to organize and consolidate, and were vulnerable while they did so. Mohammed took around two hundred men and advanced on the landing zone, finding the Chasseurs Parachutistes in relative disarray.

Due to the lack of transport aircraft, the French had procured a dozen airliners from Air France, which they had converted into impromptu air transports. Bomber pilots were pressed into service to fly them, and had received no training on how to undertake parachute operations. As a result, the transport aircraft had formed into an unorthodox formation during the drop stage, and the paratroopers became widely scattered. Although squads had generally landed close to each other, most organization above the platoon level was impossible. In the moment of attempting to sort out this near-disastrous landing, Mohammed Mokhtari's Berbers attacked on horseback.

Fight for the Landing Zone
The Berbers attacked with all the ferocity of warrior nomads. Despite the French paratroopers' organizational disarray, however, they retained several advantages. Unlike many nations' paratroopers, the French soldiers jumped with their weapons, which included MAS-36 semiautomatic rifles and the new MG37 light machine gun. These weapons gave the paratroopers a decided firepower advantage. Additionally, the French Air Force had four to six planes, usually MS.406 fighters from Meknes or Fes, patrolling over the landing zone to suppress large Berber formations.

As the Berber counterattack began, the French squads dug in shoulder to shoulder, forming march platoons from the scattered squads, while D Company brought their mortar squad into operation. Two MS.406 fighters additionally swooped in low to drop a bomb and strafe the gathering cavalry. The initial Berber charge collapsed in the face of overwhelming automatic weapons fire from the encircled French, and Mohammed Mokhtari was injured when his horse was hit, throwing him to the ground. The Berbers fell back. Mohammed, despite his injury, quickly assessed the situation and determined that while wild charges might eventually overwhelm the French defenders, it would cost the Berbers far more casualties than the effort was worth, and played to the French strength in automatic weapons. He spread out his men to encircle the French paratroopers, ordered the digging of trenches, and a chain of snipers to pin down the paratroopers.

The French paratroopers used the interval to reorganize by platoon and company. During the jump and the trailing assault, the 2nd Battalion suffered no killed and only eight wounded, compared to an estimated fifteen KIA and forty wounded amongst the Berbers. (The French Army's after-action analysis, based on the recovery of bodies on the battlefield, later reduced this to ten killed and twenty-five wounded.) In order to break the charge and hinder Berber mobility, many of the French paratroopers preferred to shoot horses, of which eighty were eventually accounted for and buried. Chef de bataillon Laurent saw the Berbers reorganizing, however, and spreading out to encircle the paratroopers' landing zones. As the French were in a fairly open area without much cover, Laurent believed this represented a very severe danger that his men would be reduced by attrition.

As the Berbers began to slowly re-engage in a sniping war, Laurent decided the situation needed immediate resolution. Rather than attacking the Berbers directly, however, Laurent decided to move into Midelt itself. Leapfrogging his platoons, Laurent readjusted his position and then began a bounding advance towards the city.

Fight for the Northeast Quarter
As the French paratroopers moved, they took their heaviest casualties in the course of the battle, losing three men to snipers. The French mortars laid down both smoke and high-explosive rounds to cover the French movements, and the calm air allowed the smoke rounds to be particularly effective in disrupting Berber observation of the French movement. Due in no small part to the mortars, Berber casualties continued to exceed French losses despite the more exposed positions of the mobile paratroops.

Reaching the northeast quarter of Midelt, the French paratroops began skirmishing with the Berber tribesmen who had remained in the city. Due to a lack of communications from Mohammed Mokhtari's group, however, the Berbers in the city believed the attacking French troops were more numerous than they truly were, and believed their comrades outside the city had been defeated and driven off. The Berbers did not panic, but most of them quickly determined to flee while they still had the opportunity. This coincided with Ismail Mokhtari's own analysis, and he left the Casbah only ten minutes before the French paratroopers arrived.

Once in the city, the French paratroopers set about eliminating Berber resistance. Much of this faded away within the first hour, but another paratrooper, this time in the Corps Franc's trentaine, was killed by enemy fire when storming a building.

Second Airdrop
A Company of the 2nd Batallion arrived shortly before noon, parachuting down onto the now-abandoned drop zone. Monitoring the radio communications from the lead elements, Colonel Delarue, commanding the regiment, ordered B Company to wait for a third parachute drop, and their space used for airdropping more supplies.

Under the command of Capitaine Robert Chardin, A Company landed without significant opposition, which was fortuitous because, like the first drop, they were scattered and disorganized. Many of the paratroopers further had to dodge the supply drop which came as they were landing. After gathering up the supplies, Chardin moved his men towards the city. A number of Berbers remained in the area, but they withdrew as the French advanced.

Entering Midelt, A Company made arrangements to join forces with C and D companies. A squad of A Company entered a house with C Company soldiers on the roof, only to discover that the ground floor was still occupied by startled Berbers. The squad commander was killed and two men wounded, but the rest of the squad killed all six Berbers with their rifles and bayonets.

Third Airdrop and Night
B Company arrived in the midafternoon, bringing the Chasseurs Parachutistes up to a strength of just under seven hundred men. Berber opposition had largely ended by this point, with only a few scattered snipers trying to harass the paratroopers. As the 2nd Battalion secured the city block by block, the Arab inhabitants began appearing, offering information about Berber movements and hideouts still present in the city. The French paratroopers responded aggressively to these tidbits of information, capturing eighteen Berbers and killing twelve more.

As night fell, all four companies of the 2nd Battalion remained inside the city to ensure security. With dusk, some Berber tribesmen attempted to sneak back into Midelt to harass French forces, and occasional rifle fire kept the town awake long into the night. With dawn, however, the rest of the 1st RCP, as well as the 21st Moroccan Spahis, approached the town.

Aftermath
The 2nd Battalion suffered only five men killed and an estimated twenty injured during the course of the day's fighting. French troops later accounted for thirty Berbers killed, in addition to eighteen prisoners. Chef de bataillon Laurent speculated that the Berbers removed the bodies of many of their other dead, burying them in secret to hide their true casualties. Although prisoners were interviewed extensively in the aftermath of all operations, this was never fully confirmed.

However, Operation Dragon Rouge remained an unambiguous French victory, as they secured the city of Midelt with minor losses, and pushed Mokhtari and his tribesmen into the surrounding wilderness. It would be their only easy victory of the Ziz Valley Campaign.