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Thursday, May 26th 2011, 1:18am

A Look Forward – On The Ground

(A summary of near-term plans for the Deutsches Heer)

The years 1941 through 1944 will not see significant growth in the manpower of the active component of the Heer; expansion after that date will depend in large measure upon the international situation. The emphasis for the next four years will be completion of the motorisation and mechanisation plans currently in place, the reequipping of the reserves and creation of intervention forces capable of carrying out missions as ordered by the Government.

Current Strength

At the present time the active component of the Deutsches Heer includes: ten Panzer divisions, five Panzergrenadier divisions, thirty-six infantry divisions and six Gebirgesjaeger divisions – a total of fifty-seven divisions controlled by seventeen corps and six army staffs. In addition there are numerous supporting units – artillery, engineer, supply etc – at corps and army level.

Separate and subordinated to the Command of the Field Army (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres) are the intervention forces, which include three brigades of paratroops and glider troops, one special force of combined arms and one battalion for special employment.

Organised as part of the Ersatzheer (Reserve Army) are thirty reserve infantry divisions that could be mobilised in time of war. Each of these divisions is provided with cadres and staff to absorb reservists and be available for service in the field within thirty days of mobilisation. Two reserve infantry divisions are assigned to each of the fifteen Wehrkreis (Military Districts), and if required the Home Command (Heimatkriegsgebiet) can furnish basic corps staffs to control them.

The Panzer Forces

The striking arm of the Deutsches Heer is its panzer arm, comprising five panzer corps each fielding two panzer and one panzergrenadier divisions. The panzer divisions have now been organised on the 1940 Establishment, which produced a better balance between tank and mechanised infantry elements within the division, which permit the formation of tank-infantry-artillery teams on a semi-permanent basis.

The Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung F is presently in large-scale production to become the standard tank for the panzer arm. Production is concentrated in three principal assembly plants – the Krupp Grusonwerke at Magdeburg, VOMAG at Plauen and the new Eisenwerke Oberdonau plant at Linz. It is expected that all older models of tank will be released for training purposes, reutilized as chassis for self-propelled guns or offered abroad for foreign transfer.

Mechanisation of the panzergrenadier units organic to the panzer division are a top priority, and production of the Type 251 armoured infantry carrier has been stepped up; production still lags behind requirements and not all panzergrenadier battalions organic to panzer divisions have received their full complement. A similar situation prevails in the panzergrenadier divisions themselves, which have second call for those vehicles that are available. Currently in production at three factories bottlenecks exist in the production of engines and in the armoured bodies required for these vehicles.

Production of the Sturmgeschutz III has reached acceptable levels, with more than sufficient vehicles to equip the forces in being and build up an adequate war reserve. The decision to standardise on the Type 222 light armoured car has caused readiness shortfalls in divisional reconnaissance units both in the Panzer forces and in the infantry divisions. However, it is expected that production will proceed in the 1941-42 period to achieve the objective of fully equipping the reconnaissance units of all divisions.

The Infantry Arm

The troop tables of the 1940 Establishment provide for more heavy weapons organic to the battalion and the regiment, allowing the formation of combined-arms task forces required to execute operational missions. The infantry division is not seen as a static defensive force – rather it is expected to open gaps in an opponent’s front through which the Panzer arm would execute deep strike to disrupt the enemy’s command and control structure. For this reason great emphasis has been placed upon mobility of supporting weapons and the motorisation of the infantry to the extent practicable; this is presently effected though the attachment of truck units at the divisional level rather than fully motorising individual infantry units on a permanent basis. While extreme advocates for maneuver have suggested formation of fully truck-borne divisions the state of the motor vehicle inventory does not allow such an extravagance at this time.

The specialist Gebirgesjaeger formations will see the introduction of new supporting weapons – principally new artillery pieces – and will adopt new tables of establishment during the period 1941-42. Formation of additional divisions of this type is not expected and it has been suggested that their current number be reduced to provide permanent cadres for newly forming intervention troops.

Intervention Troops

The recognition of Germany’s security interests abroad has called into being specialist formations capable of rapid movement and fulfilling specialist roles.

Chief of these are the parachute and glider troops, formerly organised under the control of the Luftwaffe and transferred to control on the Heer in mid-1940. At the present time the strength of these troops amounts to eight battalions of paratroops and three of light infantry carried into combat by glider, organised into three brigades. It has been proposed to form these units into a proper division with supporting arms, and to move forward with expansion to create a second such formation by 1944.

A specialist combined-arms force equivalent to two battalions has been organised to act as a rapid-reaction force. Unlike the parachute and glider troops this force cannot be moved by air, but does include mechanised troops and significantly larger allocations of heavy weapons. If called upon it is expected to deploy as a blocking force to gain time for conventional forces to arrive in theatre.

The existence of a specialist long-range reconnaissance unit in battalion strength has recently been admitted. The exact nature of the roles the unit would perform has not been specified.

Challenges

By far the greatest challenge facing the Heer at this time is the demand for motor vehicles to complete the mechanisation and motorisation plans already put in hand. The rationalisation plan drawn up by Oberst Adolf von Schell and adopted in April 1940 has shown great promise – in less than a year from the start of significant production more Uniform Vehicles of the second series (Schell-Programme) were accepted by the Heer than the Uniform Vehicles of the first series, which have been in production for a number of years. However, the available stocks of motor vehicles still falls behind requirements for the Heer as a whole, with the troops of the Panzer arm, the supply troops and the non-divisional specialist formations receiving higher allocations. The supply of drivers for available vehicles is also of concern and the Defence Ministry has suggested to the Ministry of Education that it include mandatory driver training in the curriculum at all technical and higher grammar schools; thus far the Ministry of Education has resisted such suggestions on financial grounds.

A second challenge exists in the provision of modern material to equip reserve formations in the event of their mobilisation; while more than sufficient material exists, much of it is of Great War vintage or otherwise obsolescent.

Development Programs

The Defence Ministry has set in motion a number of developmental programs to address the needs of the Heer. These include:

Development of a new family of small arms to address shortcomings of the current Karabiner 37. Requirements have been issued to industry with proposals due in January.

Development of a new lightweight utility vehicle in the quarter-ton class. Proposals from industry were received in December 1940 and are presently being evaluated.

Development of a heavy antitank gun. Despite the recent adoption of the 7.5 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 40 the appearance of heavy tanks abroad suggests that within the next four years a larger and more capable weapon will be required. Krupp of Essen has been instructed to continue development of an 8.8 cm gun as a successor to the PaK40.

Development of a successor Standardpanzer. A new tank, to become available by 1943-44, is required to succeed the current Panzerkampfwagen IV. Requirements have been issued to industry and proposals will be evaluated in January 1941.

Other needs that have been identified but not acted upon include:

Development of a successor Spahpanzer. A light tracked reconnaissance vehicle, capable of replacing the Panzerkampfwagen II that presently serves in that role, is required. However, to date, industry has not yet been asked to submit proposals, though such a request is likely for the 1941 fiscal year. The Panzer Troops Command has asked for such a vehicle to be available from 1944-45.

Development of a successor Schutzenpanzerwagen. A tracked personnel carrier, intended to replace the existing Type 251 half-track, has been requested. No requirements have been developed and it is unclear whether such will be issued anytime before 1944.

Development of replacement self-propelled artillery pieces to succeed the current vehicles of the “Wespe” and “Hummel” types. No requirements have been developed and it is unclear whether such will be issued anytime before 1944.

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Thursday, May 26th 2011, 11:10am

Interesting

Quoted

The striking arm of the Deutsches Heer is its panzer arm, comprising five panzer corps each fielding two panzer and one panzergrenadier divisions. The panzer divisions have now been organised on the 1940 Establishment, which produced a better balance between tank and mechanised infantry elements within the division, which permit the formation of tank-infantry-artillery teams on a semi-permanent basis.


RF General Staff conducted extensive experimentation as they designed mobile force structure from Brigade, to Division, to Mechanized Corps level, and seem to have reached similar conclusions. German panzer corps provides approximately 1:2 ratio of panzer and panzergrenadier battalions. Ratio in RF mechanized corps is similar, though organized differently.