WesWorld

Strategic Defense Review - January 1938
Conte Admiraglio di Rosso

Summary
This report looks at the current state of Italian defence policy and examines what future challenges are likely to be encountered. Firstly, the strategic defence of Italy is covered, then her overseas interests and finally possible allied operations. Recommendations are made to rectify any problems and meet likely future needs.

Preamble
Since the end of the great war in 1918, the defence of Italy has been safely assured without recourse to conflict. This peaceful period has enabled continuous and profitable growth, leading to the current, strong position of Italy. Investments in newer technologies, especially in the aeronautical sector, have enabled Italy to become a world leader. Whilst this has placed Italy in a similar position to the other major European powers; France, Germany and the UK, Italy’s political position has barely improved and remains away from the centre of Europe. Only two decades after the great war, it is again a new, resurgent and expansionist Germany that is becoming the major continental power. France is focused mostly on their alliance with Atlantis and Russia, whilst militarily seeming occupied with their holdings in South East Asia. The UK has rejected its century’s old hands off policy and by militarily allying with Germany and Nordmark. It is felt that any near term change in the political situation is unlikely.

Europe

France is the other major power in the Mediterranean, with the majority of her fleet in close proximity to Italy at their base in Marseilles. A significant portion of her naval strength is deployed in the Pacific and the current situation in the region means it is unlikely for those vessels to be deployed in the Med. Their Mediterranean fleet consists mostly of older vessels and with new construction being intended for Pacific operations it is likely that the strength will diminish. The number and type of such vessels would require almost the full strength of the Italian Navy to contain them, leaving few vessels available for overseas commitments. The reasons for France’s deployment are uncertain, with many analysts believing that it is aimed directly at Italy and Iberia. We believe this to be unlikely given the relations between our two countries and recent unparalleled economic cooperation. The much larger growth in the size of France’s army, to 80 divisions, is equally worrying, but with most in the North-East, it is probably indicative of French thinking. The likelihood of any real threat from France can probably be considered as negligible and little action taken to compensate. It is the recommendation of this report that a committee be formed to examine the state of Italian defences along the border.

The greatest threat to Italy’s strategic position comes from the North with the new resurgent Germany freed from the shackles of Versailles. Is it only two decades since Germany plunged the world into an unprecedented world war? Germany has already made significant inroads towards expanding towards her former size. The expansionist nature of the current administration is worrying, with Austria being wholly absorbed, eliminating a useful buffer state between. Elsewhere the situation is similarly disconcerting, with the rapid military intervention and occupation of Lithuania and significant pressure being exerted on regaining the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. It is worrying that German interests may soon turn southwards again to the Italian Tyrol. Militarily, Germany already poses a large threat, considerably outnumbering the Italian army, yet their re-armament continues at an accelerating pace. On the naval scene, Germany is a long way away and it is expected that their large modern navy would not be useful in a situation. The land and air forces are more of a threat, especially with the development of new strategic bombers that could easily be used to strike at Italian industry in the Romagna. If current information is correct, current Italian aircraft would not be able to defend effectively. New high performance types should be acquired, along with an effective means of early warning and control, in order to properly defend Italy’s manufacturing heartland. On land, with the experience of the previous war, it is expected that any invasion would progress slowly through the heavily fortified Alps leaving plenty of time for reinforcements to be brought to bear. Qualitatively, the Italian army has older, less effective weapons, especially with regards to armoured vehicles. The current modernisation program should be accelerated with a view towards fully equipping all regular units within the next five years. It is not known whether Germany will act militarily, but caution should be used in this regard and plans made accordingly.

Greece has become increasingly isolationist over the past decade, with its attention primarily on Anatolia and the Dodecanese. The large programme of defence spending, especially the number of light units, appears to be severely taxing their economy. The Greek’s current large margin of superiority over Turkish forces is likely to continue over the next decade, even with cut backs in further construction. Although a large force on paper, it is thought that the expense in new construction has lead to reduced training time. The single fleet base near Italy is unlikely to support sufficient numbers of vessels for effective operations, especially given the proximity to the major Italian naval base at Taranto. The effect of any likely Greek operations is expected to be small, the small Italian enclave in Albania being the only possible gain. Disruption of the trade route to Port Said could also be effected, though this could be nullified by adopting a more coastal route much closer to Cirenaica. It is thought that conflict will be unlikely, unless Greece becomes less isolationist, the nature of which transition would allow time for a fuller appraisal of the situation.

Turkey is similarly mainly concerned with the Greek presence in Anatolia, yet with recent events is also forced to look east to Armenia and Persia. The main force of the Turkish navy is deployed in the Mediterranean and could prove problematic given the proximity to Port Said. The lack of recent intelligence reports gives some uncertainty to Turkish thinking and possible future moves.

The UK has significant interests in the Mediterranean, although the largest of these, the Suez Canal, is shared with Italy. At the same time, the UK has deployed massive force to its Mediterranean Fleet, with five battleships and two aircraft carriers. Along with the large number of cruisers and destroyers, this presents a very real challenge to Italian naval superiority in the region. It is projected that the current Italian navy could defeat such a force, but it is likely to be reinforced heavily. Given the close proximity of interests and territories, it is unlikely that a confrontation would stay limited to the Mediterranean and would most likely rapidly escalate. Currently, there have been no conflicts of interest with the UK, though the Mediterranean Fleet is a major cause of concern. With an alliance with Greece, the only other country of significance in the region is Turkey for which such a fleet has overwhelming superiority. Diplomatic actions are also disconcerting, with the recent alliance with Germany and Nordmark completely upsetting the balance of power in Europe. The other major European powers, Italy and France, stand little chance against such a power block. The UK and Germany have solidly cemented their position in Europe with actions that have gone unnoticed by the rest of the world. Care will have to be taken to watch for further moves and steps taken to ensure that Italian interests are secure.

On the naval front, Yugoslavia presents little threat with few modern vessels. Her strategic position is weak, being surrounded by Italian territory on all sides. The short coastline holds only two ports of note in which to hold the entirety of her navy. The greatest threat comes from the light forces at her disposal, the short distance giving the possibility of disruption of coastal traffic in the Dalmatian archipelago. This was noted some time ago, with the resultant refitting and redeployment of the Palestro class torpedo boats. The recent large purchase of light craft from Mexico warrants the situation being re-examined. The other threat posed by the Yugoslav navy comes from the three German-built submarines. Although only of a small coastal design, these could be a major threat to capital units. As a result, a number of anti-submarine units are based at Brindisi across the Straits of Otranto. On land, the situation is less clear with a number of disconcerting incidents occurring along the border. It is widely acknowledged that Yugoslavia wishes to regain control of Dalmatia and Slovenia towards her part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is not sure to what lengths Yugoslavia will go to fulfil her goals, whether full scale invasion is to be attempted. Current indications suggest this to be very unlikely. From recent information obtained, it appears that a concerted attempt is being made towards helping eastwards leaning peoples gain political control. It is believed that Italy has little to fear militarily, although approaching parity of numbers, the Yugoslav army is a shambles unsuited for effective operations. It is expected that should Yugoslavia pursue a militaristic route, there will be some period of time for a build up of forces to occur. This would allow for Italian reserve units to be called up, with the possibility of reinforcement from Aegis units. A close check should be kept on Yugoslav actions, but they are not perceived as a real threat. Changes in the political situation could occur over the next decade so it is suggested that plans for possible defensive actions be drawn up.

Nice paper, interesting analysis.

Can´t wait to see what you think about Italys position outside Europe....

An interesting read indeed. Some well thought out points in this document.

Italy is right in saying the Mediterranean Fleet is aimed at them, it is because the Italian fleet is the only other credible threat to British interests in the region. Others points of interest are the agreement with the French similar to the pre-1914 split of naval coverage, there is some kind of agreement with Greece already but me and Alt Naval never got around to a text and of course the NATO Vs AEGIS bloc increases tensions. It's interesting to see Italy feels encircled by German and Britain, a weird reversal of 1914.

Yugoslavia seems to be largely written off but I'm sure we'll see that change before 1938 is out!

Can't wait to see the rest.

China is anxious to know, how Italy's position in the Indian Ocean will be.

Quoted

Originally posted by Red Admiral
Europe

Elsewhere the situation is similarly disconcerting, with the rapid military intervention and occupation of Lithuania and significant pressure being exerted on regaining the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.

Got to wonder about the comments about Lithuania: Germany was very careful NOT to occupy Lithuania, and while Germany did contribute a force to the LoN peacekeeping forces, when Letowska and his men rebelled against it, Germany kept it's hand limited to providing additional air support, as opposed to sending one of the infantry corps stationed in East Prussia.

The Sudetenland issue I have no comment on at this time, it's a possible read on the situation.

Seems like Italy's analysis of Yugoslavia is a little off.

I'm also interested in Italy's position in the Indian Ocean. It seems they fear the British and ABUSE must be bad news for them.

Worldwide Interests

Italy is rare amongst the European powers as having paid little attention to colonial expansion during the nineteenth century. As such the only colonial possessions gained were Eritrea and Somalia in East Africa. Unsuccessful military action against Ethiopia in the late nineteenth century gave way to more profitable diplomatic means resulting in the complete withdrawal of Italian control from East Africa in the 1920s. The agreement let Ethiopia expand considerably in return for favourable trade and political representation for the Italian peoples in the country. Large amounts of assistance, specifically with infrastructure, have enabled the country to become much more outward looking with increasing exports of a variety of valuable raw materials. Italy’s investment in the region needs to be secured for the future. With the limited armed forces available, a number of Italian units were first deployed to the region, which have since been withdrawn. A useful training cadre has been established in the new Ethiopian Navy which will serve as a nucleus for further expansion. Current thinking looks at a phased withdrawal with greater emphasis on increasing domestic capability. For the moment, the continued presence of Italian forces is though necessary by both Ethiopian and Italian governments. With little domestic funding available for armed forces, it is Italy that needs to provide protection in the region. The most successful program has been the enlisting of Ethiopians into the Italian armed forces on short commissions in order to easier facilitate future expansion in capability. This program has produced some tensions but is on the whole regarded as having been successful. The economic situation is unlikely to change over the next decade so only modest expansion of Ethiopian force levels will be possible. As a result, Italy will have to carry the defensive burden for the foreseeable future and plan according.

On land, Ethiopia is surrounded by large British territories, though the force levels in the region are extremely small and can only be seen as a police force. The mountainous terrain would severely restrict any landward offensive which would also have to be largely supplied by sea through Egypt or British East Africa. Towards the coast, the terrain is flatter, but also much less hospitable. The area of greatest value lies in the North and the Ethiopian highlands. Further North lies the French colony of Dijbouti which is in a similar situation apart from being completely surrounded by Ethiopian territory. The small force levels in the region again limit any possible actions. Politically, both the UK and France have signalled a move away from colonial expansion, and in the UK’s case, a complete withdrawal in some areas. It is thought that the threat presented is small. In case of conflict with either country, the Mediterranean is a much more decisive theatre.

India presents more of threat, especially considering the recent war on the Arabian Peninsula. Whilst opposing the colonial powers, India has embarked on a program of expansion herself with great effect. Most worrying is India’s unprecedented adventure into Asir. Although now India has supposedly withdrawn from the area, her puppet state remains, along with considerable military force in the region. In any situation, these forces are likely to be cut off from Indian aid due to Ethiopia’s commanding position in the Bab el Mandab, made stronger by the acquiring of the Hanish islands. The force should not be discounted as it is on a similar scale to the current Italian force. Investigation should also be carried out as to the possibility of bombers staging from the area, which could present a greater threat. It is not only the force levels and proximity of Indian forces that are worrying, but the willingness of India to resort to military action. Over the past two decades, she has been involved in numerous wars and is currently in the midst of preparing for another one, with a fuller invasion of Afghanistan expected shortly. Politically, India has also been very active. Dutch sources report considerable assistance being given to anti-government forces in the DEI. The recent agreement with the UK over Pakistan is equally worrying as India increases in size and power even more. It is not known why the UK agreed to such action, seemingly gaining very little. Altogether, India presents by far the greatest threat to Ethiopia. India possesses the greatest amphibious capability in the world and has shown her effectiveness in using it. An invasion of Eastern Ethiopia before a push west is viewed as the most likely scenario. Current forces in the region are totally insufficient to mount an adequate defence and lack any offensive capability for counterstrikes. A fuller assessment of the force levels required should be undertaken.

The other major regional power is the South African Empire which can call on much greater armed forces than either Italy or Ethiopia. The recent war in South America has somewhat weakened her with the emphasis placed on repairing war damage. The great size and demands of the Empire restrict what forces are available at any one time, the possibility is that slightly more than half could be available for operations in the Indian Ocean at any time. Although having great superiority at sea, South Africa was unable to make serious difference to the land war in South America. There is a distinct lack in power projection capability with the navy being primarily focussed on sea control. Remaining regional tensions in the area are likely to tie down considerable amounts of African forces for the foreseeable future. South Africa has not been expansionist of threatening in nature, seeming content with its current stranglehold on sub equatorial Africa and South America. Large numbers of bases, ships and aircraft are arranged in the Indian Ocean but the lack of power projection capability limits their effectiveness. The vast majority of Ethiopian trade passes through the North and the Red Sea to Europe and beyond, rather than the Indian Ocean, so any disruption of trade will be small and limited to coastal traffic. The most potent units are the large oceanic submarines which could slip into the Red Sea and cause considerable problems. Unless South Africa develops a much greater amphibious capability the actual threat to Ethiopia is viewed as small. Her large navy would find more utility in a wider regional war due to her alliance with India. South Africa has sufficient forces for sea denial in the Indian Ocean. A combined Indian-African offensive would be very problematic for defence of Ethiopia. It is recommended that diplomatic means should be pursued as a means of separating the two countries, it being unlikely that enough forces could be deployed for effective defence.

Interesting view of the Indian situation in regard to their strategic needs.. Very reasonable using the info at hand (the secret parts of ABUSE are unknown) .

Allied Operations

As part of the Aegis alliance structure, Italy could be asked to come to the aid of the other signatories in a variety of scenarios and theatres. The main probable areas of action are Central America and South-East Asia, both a considerable distance from Italy, and Italian bases. It is the last that is perhaps most pertinent to the problem as there are currently few resources available for supplying a fleet at sea. The army has been reduced in size to one that is only really suitable for home defence, it cannot conceivably be deployed away from the Mediterranean. Even with an expansion in the size of the army, there is little capacity to transport such a force or affect a successful amphibious landing. Some small capability is possible for short range, but there is no force suitable for oceanic use. Although larger in size, the air force would have similar problems in deploying abroad. The large distances involved preclude the use of air transportation, leaving surface transport as the only option, possibly through enemy controlled waters. Small fighters could conceivably be disassembled and transported on normal merchantmen, but larger aircraft present a problem. There is also the need to transport the supporting ground forces and supplies. Neither the air force nor army can realistically meet Italy’s commitments as part of the alliance and would require the navy’s help in order to for them to do so. The navy itself is in a stronger position to render assistance but most units are suited to Mediterranean operations. Only the most modern vessels could conceivably be deployed outside the Med for long periods of time. The lack of support units would severely limit their effectiveness. As a result, currently the only role Italian forces can provide is that of a watchman for European waters. This would allow valuable allied units to be deployed overseas to the theatre of operations but cannot be regarded as a suitable role given Italy’s position as the strongest member of the alliance. A more effective means of meeting overseas commitments should be found.

Operations in Central America are likely to be land orientated with a Mexican thrust down the peninsula towards Panama. The small size of the Mexican navy would likely not prove a difficulty to Aegis forces available and is not really suitable for assisting the progress of the land war, or interfering with allied forces deploying rounding Cape Horn. The Iberian Federation is in a strong position with plenty of depth to blunt attacks. The terrain and climate are likely to impede any invasion. The main role that Italian forces could currently play would be escorting vessels crossing the Atlantic to Central America. Range is a consideration, but most destroyers and frigates have sufficient range to reach Cuba, although effective operations in heavy seas may be more of a problem. Given the lack of Mexican submarines, the major threat would be from light cruisers, which are old and unmodified. The risk would be a larger scale war involving Atlantis or the USA which have a commanding position over probably routes. The much larger disposition of forces, especially the proximity of land based air from Atlantis, makes this a much more difficult problem. Even with the full force of the Italian fleet at sea, it could still be outmatched by either country. Recent diplomatic moves by the Iberian Federation have strengthened ties between the countries and made such a scenario much less likely.

The members of the Satsuma alliance have made plain their desire to remove colonial powers from Asia and extensive armament over the past decade indicates the likelihood of military action. The major part of such a war is expected to be in the South China Sea and the Malay Peninsula. Again, both are a considerable distance from Italian bases. The major route of supply would be through the Red Sea and across the Indian Ocean to the DEI. In this region, Italian forces have a better chance of rendering assistance. India lies squarely across the likely routes of transportation and has considerable reserves of surface ships, submarines and aircraft with which to disrupt traffic. At the same time, India is isolated from the other members of the alliance and is a probable target for offensive action. Closest to Italian bases are some of the major industrial centres of India around Mumbai and Karachi, although close is relative, still some two thousand miles away. Another possible target would be the oil flow through the Persian Gulf. Italy currently has few forces available for such action. The air force is pursuing a new long range bomber with the capability to strike at such targets but numbers are likely to be restricted due to expense. The navy could disrupt traffic and conceivably clear the western seaboard of Indian vessels but requires greater support in able to do so. Such actions would have little effect on the interior of the country. Such a strategy would focus on removing India from the war so as to enable the effective routing of supplies from Europe to the main conflict in South-East Asia. The lack of fleet support units is again troubling given the large distances involved. Overall the situation is more promising than a Central American scenario, given the Italian presence in Ethiopia.

Very striking analysis, RA. Well done.

The only things that struck me as odd was the absence of any comment regarding the discussed armed forces level of training and experience. You refer to size representing quantity but quality was not part of your analysis. For example SAE armed forces can surely be rated as experienced (combat hardened or what ever you call it) which is also true for some others. So... Why leaving it out?

Quoted

Originally posted by HoOmAn
Very striking analysis, RA. Well done.

The only things that struck me as odd was the absence of any comment regarding the discussed armed forces level of training and experience. You refer to size representing quantity but quality was not part of your analysis. For example SAE armed forces can surely be rated as experienced (combat hardened or what ever you call it) which is also true for some others. So... Why leaving it out?

Very good point. Indian troops have fought in different conflicts for the last 15 years so they also qualify in that assesment

I was trying to avoid specific comments on ship designs etc. in favour of painting the overall picture of what the countries are likely to do and what they can do. I was considering doing some more in depth threat assessments of a few countries but still haven't decided on that, depends how long other bits take me.

Next will be a more thorough investigation of Italian forces. What is available, can it fulfill the tasks identified, what does it cost, what tradeoffs can be made. Already covered a few of these things. Then following will be the recommendations for the next decade.

Quoted

Originally posted by Red Admiral
I was trying to avoid specific comments on ship designs etc. in favour of painting the overall picture of what the countries are likely to do and what they can do. I was considering doing some more in depth threat assessments of a few countries but still haven't decided on that, depends how long other bits take me.

I appreciate your efforts a lot. As I said, it´s a great analysis and shows you´re obviously up to date regarding forces owned by powers around Italy. Surely without some work such analysis is impossible.

I just thought somebody doing such an analysis would also consider quality and was surprised to find out it´s not the case.

Quoted

Originally posted by HoOmAn
I just thought somebody doing such an analysis would also consider quality and was surprised to find out it´s not the case.

Does South Africa having combat proven forces make her more of a threat? It would only be relevant during a possible war, it wouldn't define her actions. Top notch training etc doesn't increase her ability to interfere around Ethiopia. Maybe a bit for some of the submarines, but other more general operations are still governed by the ships themselves. There still wouldn't be the ability to undertake a successful amphibious landing or sustained heavy bombing operations against Ethiopia.

India's active use of her forces was noted, especially what she has been doing with them. The expansionist nature coupled with the means to do so makes her more of a threat.

Really its still looking at what other countries are likely to do, and what they can do.

Point taken. The RSAN hasn´t developed manyamphibious capabilities. For reasons you stated - no interest in expansion. Instead her focus has been on trade protection and sea denial operations (which add another level of protection).

On the other hand the SAE has proven they are willing to use their armed forces if need be.

I´d also say combat proven forces are more of a threat. A general fact. Green forces will always make less of their assets, are unlikely to suprise a prepared opponent.

However, in general I agree with your summary. The SAE poses no real threat as they are unlikely to act aggressive and so the danger for Ethiopia is small unless the later tries a stunt on their own.

Another point not covered is an AEGIS Vs NATO scenario.

In that event its doubtful the Italian Navy would/ could leave the Mediterranean given the British forces there and Atlantean forces between Italy and Iberia and Central America.

Interesting Far Eastern analysis, several options exist but its seems Italy lacks the strength to make serious impact in the region. I'd expect a fast carrier force with supporting battleships but how much impression it would make is an unknowable factor, especially if AEGIS lost its ground bases and ports (I'm thinking a 1942 scenario here).

Quoted

Originally posted by Hood
Another point not covered is an AEGIS Vs NATO scenario.

Its a similar scenario to Mexico-USA-Atlantis or combination thereof. Given the countries relative strengths and geographic positions there isn't much that could be done, hence the need for conflict resolution via diplomatic means. NATO is just too powerful, Italy couldn't "win" without nuclear weapons or some similar advantage. The all scenario isn't seen to be very likely.