WesWorld

This is the final military part of the war to post, me, HoOmAn and The Canadian have cooked up some interesting stories and some interesting war lessons.

As ever we'll leave you in the safe hands of the historian and expert on the war Dr. Gerund.

Extract from ‘The South American War: A Perspective Twenty Years On’ by Dr. Gerund 1966 published by Cordoba Military History

Chapter 10: The Final Months at Sea

Wild Horses Rampant: The Pony Express
The famous “Pony Express” was reformed in August, the RSAN Arion (and from October RSAN Pegasus after her quick repairs) formed the 9th Cruiser Squadron at Mar del Plata alongside the three Fenris class DDLs RSAN Freki, RSAN Cerberus and RSAN Kweldulf. They made several successful raids and by October had become a regular feature either bombarding ports or harassing convoys. By early November the “Pony Express” had raided Necochea four times, Rawson twice and Puerto Santa Cruz once. Five convoys were intercepted and nine merchant ships sunk and the destroyer E101 was sunk on the 11th October by gunfire from Cerberus and Kweldulf as the plucky Argentine skipper tried to make a torpedo attack in order to buy time to allow the convoy to scatter.

On September 9th the Argentine Naval Chief of Staff, Almirante Peablo, called together his entire planning staff and the commanders of the cruiser and destroyer flotillas to discuss the measures needed to stop the "Pony Express". It was decided to step up seaplane patrols around all major naval ports and to fly at night when moonlight conditions permitted. It was decided that the new replacement ships on loan from Italy (the 6th Destroyer Squadron with four ex-Italian Turbine Class destroyers under the command of Capitan de Navio Garibaldi and the 3rd Escort Squadron with six ex-Italian 1917 Guardino (FB) Class escorts under the command of Capitan de Navio Garbes) and the cruiser Fortaleza would begin to conduct nocturnal operations off Rawson, Comodoro Rividavia and Viedma in roughly equally sized groups. These groups were to shadow the enemy cruisers to allow larger units to come into the battle and also to make torpedo attacks to cripple or sink the cruisers.

Despite a couple of fleeting contacts this scheme had been a failure but on November 17th was the first battle with the new “Pony Express.” PB104 and PB105 (two ex-Italian 1917 Guardino (FB) class frigates) were on patrol in murky weather off Viedma on the night of November 16-17 when the 9th Cruiser Squadron 1st Division consisting of RSAN Arion and RSAN Freki sailed past within 6,000 yards heading on a parallel course. Lacking torpedoes they opened fire with their 3in guns, at the same time the African ships spotted the Argentine frigates and opened fire with their 88mm guns. The cruisers were hit several times before the range widened and the superior speed of the African ships left the frigates behind. None of the hits were serious but one secondary mount on Freki was wrecked and a fire started aft on Arion. The Africans turned northwest just as the ex-Italian destroyer Turbine arrived. Engaged by Arion’s 150mm guns she closed to launch six torpedoes. Her forward 130mm twin mount scored two hits on Arion’s quarterdeck. The torpedo spread was wide and as Turbine turned to escape the heavy fire aimed at her it seemed as though all the torpedoes would miss. A large explosion and a geyser of water were seen in the flare-illuminated night but Turbine disengaged and carefully shadowed the two ships, backing off when the enemy shells came too close.
It was soon apparent something was wrong as the African cruisers turned north and then southeast. It was hard for the Turbine not to run into the enemy formation as the enemy suddenly swing and she was hit by splinters from numerous near-misses. A torpedo had struck Freki right aft warping the starboard propeller, jamming the rudder and the stern had partially collapsed. Arion closed within 10,000 yards and started firing salvoes at Turbine to keep her away. Splinters from near-misses sprayed the ship and one dud ripped straight through the forward superstructure blasting the wheelhouse and severing the steering controls and the telegraph controls to the engine room. Turbine turned away and her skipper took control of the ship from the after position.
The heavy cruiser La Argentina had sailed at top speed from her convoy and by now was only ten miles astern of the African cruisers. Her skipper, Capitan de Navio Parker, put the ship on full alert and at 04:32 fired star shell to illuminate the enemy, this helped the Africans to hit Turbine astern with a 150mm shell and the latter ship withdrew further south to rejoin the two frigates. At 04:39 La Argentina fired her first salvo at the Freki which was now only making 5kts and was still circling to starboard. As the third salvo straddled, the Arion made a high speed dash between La Argentina and Freki laying a smokescreen and firing all guns. La Argentina opened the range but was not hit, as Arion turned to cross the ‘T’, La Argentina fired a spread of torpedoes and turned to port to escape the ‘T’ and eventually both cruisers after a brief duel retired. Capitan de Navio Parker now decided to wait for dawn and radioed shore for aerial support. La Argentina kept up sporadic fire on the RSAN Freki which was hit at least once forwards. Freki was still able to reply and her forward turrets barked every time the Argentine cruiser got too close. At 05:30 firing stopped and as dawn broke Parker found the Freki slowly sinking below the waves with the Arion no where in sight. The African’s realising that RSAN Freki could not be saved and that enemy heavy units would arrive after dawn preferred to scuttle the stricken ship and make their escape. For his failure to sink both ships Capitan de Navio Parker was relived of command and posted to a shore job.
[Note]
RSAN Arion now rated 91%, RSAN Freki rated 0%
La Argentina rated 97%, Turbine rated 95%, PB104 and PB105 rated 98%

Two days later Necochea was raided again and the 2nd Division remained a constant threat throughout December making no less than six bombardments and four convoy intercepts sinking 15,000 tons of shipping. The loss of RSAN Freki forced the 9th CS to reform with RSAN Pegasus joining the 1st Division for two homogenous divisions (two Arions and two Frekis). RSAN Cerberus was bombed in Mar del Plata harbour on January 5th (rated 93%) but other than that no Argentine warship ever fired upon the “Pony Express” after the destroyer Rioja came under fire while protecting a small coastal convoy in mid January. By early February the “Pony Express” had raided Necochea six times, Rawson twice and Puerto Deseado once. Only four convoys were intercepted but five merchant ships were sunk. Two Chaco Class escorts were sunk in defending these convoys.

To be continued...

The Underdog Fights Back: Argentine Naval Operations

Operation Black Tiger in July 1935 had been a defeat. Although the RSAN was forced to divert resources to hunting the Argentine Navy and it lost a carrier and suffered other losses and damage, the Argentine Navy lost enough cruisers, and a battlecruiser, to seriously cripple any future offensive sorties. African losses were soon made up from transfers from other regions but Argentina had no such luxury. Her replacements were stuck in Germany and Japan owing to the blockade and home built ships were no bigger than escorts and handful of destroyers were started.

In October 1935 Vice Almirante Moreno took the battleship Libertad and the cruiser Almirante Brown on two nocturnal raids on Mar del Plata with limited success. Both raids went well without losses but after that RSAF aerial superiority prevented any warships operating from Bahia Blanca in daylight and the torpedo boats Murature and T-102 were sunk by RSAN operated de Graaf DB-7A “Stinger” dive-bombers as they attempted to intercept an African convoy heading for Mar del Plata on November 29th.

The battlecruiser Patagonia made three sweeps off Tierra del Fuego to search for a suspected RSAN carrier unit operating in those waters during December-January but then fuel shortages forced her to be tied up. The un-modernised battleship Capitan Gascon was laid up in October and her crew released to other ships. Only a skeleton engineering crew was kept aboard and gunnery crews to man her guns as a floating battery in Comodoro Rivadavia harbour. This left the Libertad as the sole “Big Gun” warship afloat in the Navy.

The 1st Cruiser Squadron comprising the heavy cruiser Almirante Brown and the light cruiser General Belgrano (Vice Almirante Dominguez) were used mainly for patrol work to catch the “Pony Express” although the Belgrano made some nocturnal raids on the Mar del Plata area in December at considerable risk from mines and torpedoes. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron comprising the light cruisers Nueve de Julio, Comodore Py, Hipolito Bocuhard and the heavy cruiser La Argentina (Vice Almirante Murphy) were on convoy duty and from January 1936 were used as lone hunters in the Southern Atlantic trying to sink straggling African merchants. After three unsuccessful sorties the cruisers went back to convoy work. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron with the three ex-Atlantean cruisers Eclipse, Orca and Fortaleza (Contra Almirante Velazco) formed Force G in mid November to cover the Tierra del Fuego area from RSAN raiders. This operated until the middle of January. The 4th Cruiser Squadron with the refitted 1910 Class scout cruisers Commandante General Irigoyen, Francisco de Gurruchaga and Captain Fernando Derbes (Capitan de Navio Bahia) provided heavy AA protection to convoys and they also served as transports for the Marines.

The 1st Destroyer Squadron with five Mendoza Class destroyers Mendoza, Rioja, Murature, Jujuy and Hercules (Contra Almirante Gomez) were held as a reserve force to escort the bigger warships. The destroyer leader Sarandi and the modern destroyers Simon Bolivar and Contra Almirante Barbera made up the 3rd Destroyer Squadron which escorted every major operation. The 2nd Destroyer Squadron with six 1916 Class destroyers Cervantes, Yucuman, Juan de Garray, San Juan, San Luis and Santa Cruz (Capitan de Navio Roho) and the 4th Destroyer Squadron with three 1914 Class destroyers Salto, San Juan and Bathurst (Capitan de Navio Honchez) were operated soley on convoy duties alongside the 5th Destroyer Squadron with the rebuilt 950ton Escort Destroyers E101, E104 and E105 (Capitan de Navio D’Stanza).
The 6th Destroyer Squadron with its four ex-Italian Turbine Class (Capitan de Navio Garibaldi) had the “Pony Express” detection role explained above.

The only remaining part of the much vaunted torpedo strike force the 1stTorpedo Destroyer Squadron had just three Corrientes Class torpedo boats at Bahia Blanca (Capitan de Navio Stellos D’Annucio) and they mainly provided support to the minesweepers. The only major anti-convoy raid resulted in the loss of Murature and T-102 (see above). Thus by the end of January only three of the twelve ships built remained afloat.

On February 7th 1936 the Libertad supported by the General Belgrano fired on the 9th Scout Squadron 2nd Division (RSAN Ajax and RSAN Achilles) at long range during a transfer operation to Puerto Deseado. Libertad fired six salvoes before the enemy cruisers disappeared behind a smoke screen but at least three near-misses and one hit was observed. The 14in shell entered the deck just behind Achilles S2 105mm mount, it penetrated the thin 50mm armoured deck and exploded just abaft the after boiler room bulkhead. The steam lines to the after starboard turbine room were severed and the turbine room destroyed. Most of the crew in this space were killed or wounded and the boiler room was evacuated. Her speed slowed to 25kts but both ships escaped [Achilles rated 86%]. A scout seaplane from the RSAN Thjazi found the two Argentine warships around an hour later but within thirty minutes five Navy operated I-100 fighters appeared overhead to escort them into harbour.
After another two day long sweep to find the 9th Scout Squadron both Argentine ships returned to Comodoro Rivadavia.

The carrier battle, the world’s first carrier versus carrier battle in history, in January was the sole major action in the later months of the war.

From the start of the war the Argentine Naval Staff felt that their Brazilian allies had a poor navy. Its cruiser fleet was obsolete while the rest of the navy was top heavy with a small class of destroyers more like mini cruisers. Training and morale was felt to be poor and the destruction of the Brazilian Navy by aerial strikes and surface action seemed to confirm these feelings. Almirante Peablo, Naval CinC wrote in mid 1935, “We are shackled to a corpse, useful and brazen on land but on the waves a port-loving coward.” Poor co-operation during the early phases of Operation Black Tiger in July 1935 led to more disasters and the planned deception voyage was late due to communication problems. It is fair to say the Argentines found the neutral help from Chile in checking merchants and giving weather reports much more practical than the "fleet in-being" sitting in Rio de Janeiro. Argentine merchants felt too vulnerable to sail along Brazil’s coast despite assurances of protection and this had an impact on import levels. No Brazilian warship ever got through the RSAN screens at Mar del Plata to give Argentine troops some off-shore fire support despite promises to do so.

Quoted

Originally posted by Hood
It is fair to say the Argentines found the neutral help from Chile in checking merchants and giving weather reports much more practical than the "fleet in-being" sitting in Rio de Janeiro.

Chile is happy to help their Argentine ally. (And, to tell the truth, happy to be observing the lessons needed to build a better navy, without the losses of trying to learn those lessons firsthand.)

Little Boats: Coastal Warfare on Both Sides

Mine warfare was carried on both sides throughout the war. The waters around Mar del Plata and Necochea saw the brunt of these operations. By night each side laid both defensive mine belts and offensive mine traps and in daytime tried to clear the enemy’s work. Losses from mines accounted for four Chaco class ships in the final months of the war but most minesweepers were sunk by aircraft or bigger warships in the last two months. After the loss of the cruiser General San Martin most mine laying was carried out by the Minelayer Squadron (Capitan de Navio Esperanto) with four Chaco Class sloops. They only repaired the defensive mine belts and by August no more offensive mine belts were laid in Grand Uruguayan waters.

As the land war got nearer Necochea most units retired to Bahia Blanca and found the voyage to the mine belts too hazardous even with special AA escort Chaco Class ships. When Necochea fell to African forces no further sorties were made and from that point on under strong RSAF fighter support RSAN minelayers and minesweepers operated around the clock without losses despite some Argentine destroyer raids during January 1936. The minesweepers RSAN Eberlanzia and RSAN Faucaria were both lost to mines in late January.

As the battle lines rolled forwards the RSAN minesweepers ventured further and further south during November. On the night of the 3rd RSAN Carruanthus was sunk by a mine. The following night the Argentine Navy sent out a Chaco Class sloop and three Project 611 patrol boats to hunt for minesweepers while two other Chacos laid new mines to repair the defensive belts around Bahia Blanca. Just after midnight two of the R-Boats of the RSAN force ran into the Argentine escorts. In the fight that ensued R66 scored three quick hits on a 611 boat (P2021) which caught fire and sank while R65 received a hit from a 100mm shell which, thankfully, was a dud but it caused serious damage. R66 was sunk by the Chaco Class boats with 100mm gunfire as she attempted to retire. One of the Argentine minelayers was hit by three enemy shells killing four seamen and injuring six more. The importance of mine warfare was underlined when just days later the destroyer RSAN Eukrante hit a mine and foundered on November 9th. Then on November 13th a convoy heading for Buenos Aires suffered a loss when a stray mine hit an oilier. The brave crew of R34 tried to rescue crew from mined oilier but caught fire in the blazing slick and had to be abandoned. A raid of Argentine I.Ae4 torpedo bombers caught the convoy and they sank a 9,800 ton grain ship with two torpedoes and the patrol boat Look-Out was damaged by a 250kg bomb (rated 88%). On November 22nd the minesweeper RSAN Drosanthemum was damaged during clearing operations when a mine exploded near the ship (rated 56%) but she was the last lost or damaged that year apart from RSAN Ash damaged by 37mm rounds from an MAS Typo 1000 MTB during sweeping operations on December 9th.

On the night October 1/2 a sweep of three R boats along the coast supporting a minesweeping operation cost R31 when the latter was sunk by fire due to bad handling of signal ammunition. On the 11th a heavy bombing raid by FAA bombers on Montevideo Harbour resulted in the destroyer leader RSAN Garm damaged by a bomb near-miss (97%) and UJ19 was sunk by a lucky direct hit.

January 1936 was just as active and round the clock laying and sweeping cost three ships, on the 8th UJ59 was sunk by four Vanquish II torpedo bombers although two of the latter were shot down by return fire. Two days later UJ56 struck a mine but was towed into Necochea (rated 49%). On the 15th shortly after dusk the sweeper RSAN Frithia hit a mine forward but the boat was recoverable and was towed into harbour by a commercial tug (rated 66%). February 27th saw the minesweeper RSAN Delosperma damaged by mine and then scuttled off Mar del Plata while on a night time mission. Even during the ceasefire mines still claimed more casualties, among the military ships sunk were the minesweeper RSAN Gibbaeum on March 23rd and R26 on the 26th.


The Motor Torpedo Boat fleet of Argentina was used widely as a propaganda tool pre-war but war losses reduced the fleet to just nine boats, most of them Italian types built under licence. Some spectacular results were obtained, for example on the night of January 4/5th 1936 two MAS 501 Type MTBs were drifting near a buoy on the main channel to Mar del Plata, at 00:34 they suddenly attacked a convoy of three steamers and a liner. Three torpedoes hit and two enemy ships went under, the MTBs roared away for safety before the convoy escorts could even open fire. [The 4,300 GRT SS Klassenstrasse was hit amidships and sunk, the 2,000 GRT steamer Mermaid was sunk and the 8,500 GRT liner SS San Palomar was hit forward but made it into port]. Losses October to February were two MAS 501 types and one Type 2B.

There is no doubt that such raids proved a nuisance to the RSAN but although such results were rare there is no doubt that the RSAN High Command learnt some lessons and began a research programme. The 1st S-Boat Flotilla at Mar del Plata was the only such RSAN unit and although they did sink two Argentine merchant ships in October 1935 [1,200 GRT SS Cabo Nor and the 3,000 GRT SS Palm Adventure] they were also used along the Rio Parana as motor gunboats and acted as pilot vessels for incoming convoys.
Late in autumn 1935 the 3rd S-Boat Flotilla was formed up in Rio Grande. This build-up was not completed until December. However, only six of the Type 34 S-Boats were delivered, built under licence by Alvarez & Sons in Rio Grande, before production changed to the better Type 36 boats (SOD February 36), therefore the 3rd S-Boat Flotilla saw no active use during the war.

On January 6th the RSAN mounted a large attack on an incoming convoy from Europe via the Cape as it neared Bahia Blanca. Five MTBs took part in the raid supported by the submarine F14 to guide them in. Coming in under a squall they made a quick attack but the convoy escorts were altered and the destroyers Cervantes, Yucuman and Juan de Garray opened fire and laid a smokescreen. S10 was sunk by gunfire alongside S11 when they got caught in crossfire but S9 and S12 escaped with splinter damage. Two torpedoes hit a 6,000GRT tanker, the S.S. Madeline de Fleur, which exploded and sank. The rest of the convoy dispersed successfully.

As weather conditions improved during the summer another MTB raid was planned for November and this went ahead during the early hours of November 28th. The force lay at wait near a buoy and made a high-speed interception of a lone fast merchant ship when two Italian MTBs appeared on the scene. S1 tried to close in to make a torpedo attack but suffered multiple 20mm hits and she began to leak and foundered shortly afterwards. S2 managed to escape with minor damage from MG bullets but the Argentine M3 was hit several times and one engine broke down.


To be continued...

Argentina had three River Fire Support Squadrons equipped with MGBs, these were only used on the Rio Paraguay and the Rio Parana. Although well armed with automatic guns they proved too light for fire support but were useful AA ships. Their diesel engines meant a hit was not as disastrous as in the MTBs. Attempts to build Italian MZ1 type support craft failed owing to other war priorities. Four MGBs were lost during the last months of the war along the Rio Parana, all but one from shore fire. The last being sunk by a B-12 Marauder bomber in Formosa harbour on February 2nd. The African R-Boats were used as versatile fire support vessels, minesweepers, patrol boats and ASW boats and suffered heavy losses but they proved the backbone of the RSAN coastal fleet and were more than equal to any Argentine light craft they might meet. The Argentine analogue was the Type 611 patrol boat armed with a 75mm gun, by the war’s end the 611L2 was entering service with two 75mm guns. Various AA variants did not enter service but were planned. Owing to the geographical situation no reinforcements could get from the Argentine coast up the Rio Parana, this running through the heart of Grand Uruguay.

The MGBs were supported by the gunboats. The Argentine Gunboat Support Squadron pre-war had two new ships, the Los Andes class, and three older gunboats. One of these, Patria was damaged and used as a static battery, and another, Parana, was rebuilt. These boats gave fire support to infantry attacks, shelled enemy batteries and sank enemy reinforcement convoys. On December 4th R30 was sunk by gunfire from the Argentine Gunboat Support Squadron during one of their last offensive sweeps. The Rio Parana Support Squadron was formed with requisitioned UPAF rebel-operated ex-Paraguayan gunboats, of these Humiata and Paraguay were the most powerful equalling a destroyer in firepower. After the September victories over the ex-Dutch Gruno and Putten classes which rebuilt RSAN strength on the river the Argentine ships were used mainly as escorts.

Attempts to send RSAN ships upriver even with infantry support was rare until February (between October 26 and 29 an attempt was made but both GBD4 and R19 were sunk by artillery and another attempt to destroy a particularly troublesome shore battery on December 10th led to GBD1 being sunk by artillery and bombs from T-17 Tucan ground attack aircraft) when three sweeps were made bagging ten barges and a river steamer but where these boats did operate they caused severe losses to Argentine units on shore. No Argentine gunboats were encountered, most were either under repair or laid up owing to fuel and spares shortages placing the onus on the MGBs.

GBD8, a former vessel of the Dutch Gruno class, was badly damaged and beached under enemy fire on September 15. Deep inside Argentine controlled territory the RSAN decided there was no chance of recovering the vessel. During October the RSAF made three raids to sink her. The first suffered losses from I-01 fighters and a local AA battery and withdrew, the second with six B-12 bombers scored only two near-misses and the third made poor attacks through low cloud and no hits were made. By this time Argentine engineers had boarded the vessel and made a survey for a salvage operation sometime in November. This was postponed owing to the bomb damage and the RSAN was preparing a daring operation to sink her. On December 3rd a company of infantry and a handful of engineers set off in four canoes upriver travelling by night and hiding up during the day. On the 6th under the cover of darkness they managed to get aboard the GBD8, silently killing the few sentries onboard. The infantry set up a watch on the shore while the engineers went below to set demolition charges. They found a small group of naval sailors busy pumping out the engine rooms, a quick fire-fight erupted but no activity was observed onshore. After ten minutes a regular patrol by an MGB (MGB2) passed by, a sailor onboard shouted over a greeting in Spanish, the African sentry waved back and called back. Then their luck changed, the lookout on the MGB spotted two canoes and shone his searchlight onto the GBD8. The uniforms of the RSAA men clearly stood out and they opened fire. Three crewmen on the MGB were killed but her 37mm shells ripped into the decks most of the soldiers were either killed or jumped overboard. The engineers jumped from the ship as the charges went off.
The following day most of the African soldiers were rounded up and the damage inspected. Work resumed on GBD8 on December 14th but then another RSAF raid three days later by six de Graaf DB-7A "Stinger" dive-bombers scored four direct hits with 250kg bombs from 8,500 feet and the battered wreck was finally destroyed.

Near the end of the war the RSAA made a big push up the Rio Parana and on February 21st the attack began supported by thirty RSAF fighters and bombers and the remaining strength of the RSAN river units. The first day saw two troop-carrying barges sunk with heavy loss of life. A particularly difficult entrenched battery of Argentine 75mm guns was engaged on the 22nd by GBD3 supported by R23 which landed two platoons of infantry to outflank the battery. R23 pulled away from the bank and took two direct hits, the skipper of GBD3 moved closer inshore to cover the survivors to the shore but his forward gun took a direct hit and as he tired to pull away his stern was hit and the rudders jammed. Two near-misses began flooding the boiler room, the remaining guns managed to knock out two 75mm guns but another three hits sent the boat to the bottom. On the 24th as the LCDS Nagelfar duelled at long-range with a 155mm battery she was hit once with slight damage forwards. While steaming back to her makeshift staging post a flight of Tucan T-17 armoured attack planes made two strafing runs and hit her with three small 50kg bombs which stared small fires and smashed open her superstructure. She managed to get back to her mooring safely (rated 62%).

Torpedoes Los! : Submarines at War
Both sides were hampered in the submarine war by lack of numbers and training. Argentina only had five modern submarines and the Squadron commander Capitan de Navio Mendez was the only officer in the Navy with enough theoretical knowledge and practical experience to command this unit. The RSAN had greater numbers, trained crews and the advantage of knowing all the likely convoy routes and the harbours the Argentine convoys had to use. This is largely why the Argentine Navy used most of its service vessels on convoy duty. The big problem for the RSAN was the age of the H and J Class submarines and the older torpedoes. Argentine made torpedoes were of inferior quality and it has been estimated that as many as 45% were duds or failed to even leave the tubes. Only one Argentine submarine, the Sante Fe, was lost but from November 1935 the submarines were forced to leave Bahia Blanca and were instead based at Rawson. This increased transit time to the killing grounds and RSAN spotter planes and bombers proved a constant hazard. Both Salta and Spiro were damaged by strafing and near-misses in December 1935 and in February Salta was depth-charged and returned home early. Thus in the final months the Argentine submarines sank only six ships totalling 26,150 tons. In contrast the larger RSAN fleet (five H Class and three J Class) sank 17 ships totalling 125,500 tons with only one loss H16 on 23rd January (F11 had been a previous loss to depth-charges off Brazilian coast on October 5th and E4 was lost while on patrol in the Southern Atlantic to unknown causes on October 17th and H3 on the 21st but post-war research linked this to a depth charge attack the same day on a suspected ASDIC contact by Argentine destroyers some 35 miles southwest of Comodoro Rividavia). November 17th saw another submarine sunk when K12 fell victim to depth charges off Bahia Blanca from Mendoza, Rioja and three Project 611 boats during a two hour hunt after K12 had torpedoed the 4,500ton coastal steamer San Lobos. On December 14th the Brazilian Navy scored its last success when K14 was damaged by depth-charges but she managed to escape and later surfaced and made it home without serious mishap (rated 76%).
1936 saw more losses to the elderly boats of the RSAN, it is assumed that on January 15th E12 was lost to causes unknown when she failed to send a report form that day onwards. Then on January 23 the H16 was sunk by depth charges while attacking Argentinean convoy 15nm SE of Rawson. Her skipper was Captain Ludwig with nine ‘kills’ to his crew’s credit. The attacking Argentine ships were two ex-Italian Turbine Class destroyers and three Project 611 Class patrol boats dropping their charges under signal command from the ASDIC equipped destroyers. Only five miles away on February 17 the F5 was sunk by depth charges while attacking Argentinean convoy after a four-hour running battle with four Argentine destroyers and two sloops. Around 120 depth-charges were used and eventually the luck of the F5 ran out and the hull cracked apart. F5 had sunk a 3,400 ton grain ship the previous day in the convoy. The K9 failed to come home after her patrol and might have been lost on February 27th to unknown causes. The last submarine loss of the war, officially on March 30th, was K13 when she failed to return home. She was probably lost on February 29th to a bomb dropped from a Fokker seaplane onto a suspected diving submarine target off Comodoro Rividavia.
The RSAN enjoyed much better aerial co-operation and roving AeroDynamics RBW-12C "Albatross" seaplanes provided target information via shore-based radio stations and most sighting reports were relayed within 4 hours. In contrast most Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina Fokker T.IVa seaplanes were used as convoy escorts and none had the firepower or protection to venture much beyond Mar del Plata. Nevertheless the air-ship radio homing beacon proved useful and several times destroyers summoned patrol bombers or vice versa to engage RSAN ships and submarines. The RSAN could only put almost a third of its submarine fleet to sea due to maintenance requirements on the twenty year old submarines. Even a third was a high figure and it often dropped well below that in the harsher winter months and at least 13 patrols were cut short due to mechanical failures.

ASW Warfare: An Argentine Perspective
Argentine anti-submarine tactics were hampered by the lack of ASDIC sets and the lack of enough trained operators to use the sets they had. Italy had provided trainers and equipment during the early 1930s. These personnel stayed throughout most of the war and a shore based school at Bahia Blanca moved to Rawson in mid 1935 but once war began most practical ship-based exercises stopped.
The main ASDIC set was the commercially available Italian Langhiri-Florisson set that offered a basic capability but was very much inferior to the latest Italian, British and South African sets. These sets were fitted to the Italian-built destroyer leaders Heroina and Sarandi, all seven Mendoza Class destroyers and the two 1933 Class Destroyers. That left 16 destroyers, three Guardia Class sloops and all the wartime built Chaco and Project 611 Class patrol boats without ASDIC. Generally one ASDIC equipped destroyer would lead two ‘dumb’ patrol boats over the target and would fire a flare or signal lamp to command the two ‘dumb’ boats to release a pattern of depth charges. Since most convoys had no ASDIC equipped warships the aim was to attack any surfaced submarine target and to keep them dived to wear out their battery power and to hamper their visibility to hamper the acquisition of new targets. This explains the relatively low kill ratio when the large expenditure of depth charges is added to the calculations. Even before the war was over plans were drawn up to convert the 1916 Class destroyers into proper ASW escorts with new ASDIC and plentiful numbers of patterns. All too often during the war escorts had to break off attacks when supplies of depth-charges ran out.

ASW Warfare: An RSAN Perspective
The RSAN already had a considerable experience of anti-submarine warfare from the Great War but its tactics had hardly changed, indeed submarines had not really changed since 1918, and the standard depth-charges had not been improved over the years. In 1932 a one-ton depth charge was proposed but not followed up. Argentine submarine attacks were made mainly in open waters out into the Atlantic but a lack of numbers meant only one submarine would attack at any one time. The standard tactical drills and lost contact procedures meant that the RSAN escorts could bracket a submarine using ASDIC and continue attacks for a long time. Although the small depth charges did little damage unless the exact depth and position was accurately plotted the RSAN ASDIC equipment was on par with the latest available and often even the sound of the RSAN ASDIC was enough to deter the Argentine submarine skippers. Only one Argentine submarine, the Sante Fe, was lost but this is more a reflection of the meagre force rather than any failure on the part of the RSAN. Indeed by early 1936 they had formed sweeping groups which sailed ahead of convoys actively hunting for submarines and forcing them to stay submerged and thus enabling the convoy to pass safely.

A few months ago I tallied up all the submarine actions I could find in the relevant threads. Here's what I got at that time...

Quoted

February 1935
- Argentine (?) H-class lost; depth-charged by escort while attacking tanker.
- Ship in the River Plate killed by submarine or mine
- Attack on possible submarine, no kill

March 1935
- Submarine Santa Fe sunk by escorts during failed attack on Achilles cruiser

April 1935
- Submarine attacks RSAN Hyperion off Montevideo, fish miss and DDs launch depth charges; probable kill of Brazilian SS. Submarine known to sink freighter earlier.

May 1935
- Submarine Salta sinks four large cargo ships in nineteen days
- Submarine Santiago del Estero sinks two tankers from convoy; hour-long depthcharging but no kill
- SAE sub H-15 fails to report

June 1935
- Two ARA subs sink four SAE transports.
- Brazilian SS sinks Nansemond, a 12,500 ton troop transport despite escorts. ((Only 234 men out of 2867 could be rescued.))
- SAE submarine on minelaying mission attacks ARA convoy; depth-charged. SS makes torpedo attack on two escorts, sinking one; convoy escapes.

July 1935
- RSAN sub sinks 1910 Brazilian collier.
- Submarine Santiago del Estero sinks four merchant vessels.
- Patrol boats chase off RSAN sub attacking three-ship convoy.

August 1935
- Submarine spotted by escorts and attacked; DDs fire at then depth-charge the sub. No kill spotted. Argentine sub Spiro listed as missing, but later shows up damaged.
- RSAN sub sinks freighter but then presumed lost in accident.
- Floatplane carrier Bölthorn sweeps for submarines.
- Patrol boats attack SAE sub which tried to attack tanker; sub overdue and presumed sunk
- Two RSAN frigates attack sub only to lose contact during air attack.
- Submarine Santa Fe sinks two merchants.

Chile's current opinion:
- The submarine is a weapon of sea denial rather than sea control
- The SAE's quick implementation of convoys and their antisubmarine tactics prevented higher losses
- The South Americans' relative lack of numbers and lower standards of training prevented the Allies from overcoming SAE tactics
- Subs had difficulty sinking larger surface combatants (example: cruisers) - higher cruising speeds might have been a cause
- Submarines are still a weapon to be taken seriously, particularly in the commerce-raiding role

RSAN Naval Operations October-February 1936
This section details all operations not noted in previous sections.

In another attempt to strangle the life lines of Argentina the 6th Torpedo Boat Flotilla
1st Division (RSAN Basset Hound, RSAN Basset Fauve de Bretagne and RSAN Spaniel) was sent to intercept a small four ship convoy of fast merchants heading for Bahia Blanca being tracked by RSAN seaplanes. On November 1st in poor weather the group was split up and only RSAN Basset Fauve de Bretagne managed to make an attack. Her first attack aimed at a steamer failed when the torpedo missed and her second torpedo fired at the Guardia Class frigate Republica actually cycled back due to a fault and struck Basset Fauve de Bretagne midships. The ship broke in two and only 45 of her crew were rescued. Spaniel briefly duelled with Republica but retired to the north-east. While this effort did not succeed on November 19th they attacked a group of merchants forming up sinking three of them without loss before the sole Argentine destroyer San Juan could force them off with gunfire.

The battleships in Montevideo harbour were mainly used for escorting important convoys but they made three successful sweeps along the Brazilian coast going as far north as Natal bombarding several ports and sinking ten merchant ships totalling 134,000 tons. Although the Brazilian Air Force made some raids against the first two sorties without success the third sweep had RSAN Gripper in support and her fighters destroyed ten Brazilian bombers.

The success of these missions enabled the Admirals to plan a similar campaign against Southern Argentina to support the “Pony Express” further north. Planning took all of December but the Battle of the Argentine Sea dislocated the RSAN force and it was not until December 29th that the 6th Battle Squadron supported by RSAN Forge (RSAN Anvil was withdrawn for minor repairs from plane crashing into parked planes on landing resulting in fire, rated 96%, and refuelling) made a raid against Puerto Santa Cruz. Ten DeBroek TB-9A "Petrel" torpedo bombers escorted by twelve DeBroek FC-5A "Mercury" fighters made a bombing raid destroying several harbour buildings and warehouses and that night RSAN Conqueror made a brief bombardment setting fire to the fuel storage tanks and sinking an armed trawler in the harbour. The Conqueror was far out of range of Puerto Santa Cruz’s defences comprising four 75mm M31 L/50 guns and six 3in guns in pits. A whaler, returning to port was sunk by RSAN Garm just after dawn. The Argentine Patagonia supported by the destroyer Hercules on the hunt for the suspected RSAN carrier force altered course further north but did not spot the enemy fleet.

Two days later the RSAN force struck the coast of Tierra del Fuego bombarding a few fishing villages and sinking three small merchantmen. On January 4th RSAN Forge’s "Petrel" torpedo bombers attacked a big convoy and sank a 5,800 ton steamer and near-misses damaged the cruiser Francisco de Gurruchaga (rated 97%). The following day the convoy was attacked again with another steamer being sunk and a tanker damaged and set alight aft. Three TB-9A bombers fell to the convoy’s guns. Patagonia joined the escort force that night and she too was made a target the following day. She was bombed and near-missed and the crippled tanker was sunk. Patagonia left the convoy to hunt for the African ships but they double-backed during the night and passed into Cape Horn. Spotted by the Chilean cruiser Atacama the African force retired and broke into two groups. The carrier group headed north and made a long-range raid on Ushuaia with poor results owing to the weather and the 6th Battle Squadron retired to the east of the Falklands and back home bombarding a small convoy at long-range on the 16th with no success. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron with the three ex-Atlantean cruisers Eclipse, Orca and Fortaleza (Contra Almirante Velazco) as Force G covering the Tierra del Fuego area from RSAN raiders had no success but did sink a suspected African re-supply tanker and shot down one of Forge’s "Petrel" torpedo bombers.
On December 27th the RSAN Mocambique while preparing sortie of a convoy from Cape Town rammed and sank RSAN Sterope which snapped in two when the ships were separated (Mocambique was then rated, 94%).

January was largely concerned with the Argentine coastal operations and no less than thirty sorties were made by the coastal defence ships, battleships and cruisers to bombard enemy ports and shore batteries. RSAN Gripper also made several air raids. The Argentine Navy put up a stiff defence backed up by its air force (although the coast north of Bahia Blanca was under total RSAF superiority. The 4th Coast-Guard Flotilla bore the brunt of these operations. On the 5th the DL RSAN Cerberus was hit by a 250kg bomb which failed to detonate (rated 93%) while R16 was lost to shore batteries that afternoon off Bahia Blanca. On the 19th the gunboat RSAN Diogo Ferreira was damaged by 130mm gunfire but due to her brave crew managed to get away to safety and put out two fires burning aft (rated 94%).

The 2nd Division, RSAN Alerter and RSAN Look-Out, made several raids and even bombarded Bahia Blanca on January 12th. Three MTBs managed to get among the African destroyers, two were sunk but one, commanded by a brave Sub-Lieut., launched his torpedoes at RSAN Alerter but both missed. The defences of Bahia Blanca fought back, ten 75mm M31 L/50 in concrete bunkers, eight 155mm M32/45 twin mounts with 100mm shields in concrete emplacements and ten older ex-destroyer 4-3in guns in open mounts in gun pits replied to the African fire. Two of the 4in pits were hit and knocked out but RSAN Alerter took five 155mm near-misses which led to splinter damage.

On a repeat mission supported by the coastal defence ship RSAN Nagelring and the seaplane carrier Bölthorn ended in tragedy. While steaming off Necochea heading west a force of nine FMA I.Ae 4S torpedo bombers and three IMPA Vanquish II torpedo bombers protected by sixteen FMA I-100 fighters spotted the African ships and made a series of attacks. While the fighter escort was engaged by a flight of four F-6D fighters the Vanquish bombers made shallow diving attacks with 500kg bombs and two hit RSAN Nagelring just ahead of X turret causing a massive secondary explosion, another bomb near-missed the bows letting in water. It was obvious her steering was crippled as the ship began to circle. The Bölthorn was caught by three I.Ae 4S bombers which made a daring low-level bombing run across her decks. Although one of the attackers was shot down as she flew over four 250kg bombs smashed into the ship. While the crew struggled to put out the fires vapour from her smashed fuel lines ignited below and the ship was torn open by a giant fireball. Only 160 of her crew were rescued as the ship slowly sank aflame from stem to stern. Three other Argentine bombers were lost as were two of the fighter escort. RSAN Alerter towed RSAN Nagelring (now rated 55%) back to port.

Other ships did not escape damage on subsequent operations; on February 21st the destroyer RSAN Egeria was caught by the 155mm batteries at Bahia Blanca during a nocturnal raid and the four hits caused serious damage aft and wrecked the bridge killing the Captain and two officers and six other ranks. Around 70 of her crew were killed or wounded (rated 76%). Then on February 22nd as two MTBs attempted to land a force of infantry to attack the 155mm battery a searchlight found them and S6 was sunk by light automatic fire while a few 20mm rounds hit S7 but she able to escape.

By the end of February these sorties were halted and the RSAF given the role of silencing the coastal batteries. The Navy went back to oceanic operations and the 6th Battle Squadron finding the Argentine Navy’s sole battleship in active service in port ran free sinking ten merchants in a fast convoy and two Project 611 patrol boats off Rawson. On February 16th they bombarded Puerto Santa Cruz once again, this time drawing the destroyers San Luis and Segui out. They made an attack just before dawn on RSAN Garm but both came under heavy fire and withdrew. Segui escaped with minor damage (rated 96%) but San Luis was hit by three 150mm shells and her steering gear knocked out. She was not sunk as the African force retired out of range of land-based aircraft but needed three tugs to get her home safely (rated 89%). The 3rd Cruiser Squadron with the three ex-Atlantean cruisers Eclipse, Orca and Fortaleza (Contra Almirante Velazco) reformed Force G with Libertad and they made a five day sweep from the 17th to find the 6th Battle Squadron. Orca clashed with Garm on the 20th with indecisive results on either side. RSAN Porto Alegre later that day came out of a squall some 27,000 yards from Libertad and Fortaleza. The battleship fired three 14in half salvoes but RSAN Porto Alegre was able to escape back into another squall. Although Orca attempted to track the African fleet both fleets drifted apart and by the following day were far out of range. The Africans headed south and after sinking an armed whaler returned home.

Hey, it's no fair posting new South American War stuff when I have no internet to read it!!

Quoted

Originally posted by Hood
Planning took all of December but the Battle of the Argentine Sea

Quoted

Originally posted by Hood
Spotted by the Chilean cruiser Atacama the African force retired and broke into two groups.

As an aside, I've never really mentioned in open forum something that Earl and I agreed on when I took over Chile. The Nordish and Chilean naval commanders forged a "gentleman's agreement" to act as neutral as the other party, and established some guidelines on how Nordish and Chilean ships would deal with spotting ships of combatant powers. The Chilean congress, in fact, found the agreement distasteful when they heard of it, but the Navy insisted that it was beneficial for the status of Chilean neutrality, and also to insure no "incidents" happened that could get Chile involved.

Within the scope of that agreement, the Chileans are providing all possible help to the Argentines.

I'll need to come back and read this again when I have more time. Alas, I'm still stuck without permanent internet....