WesWorld

Ladies,
Gentlemen,

there has been some fighting in the Indian and Pacific Ocean in the 1920s, the Nords clashed with the Argentineans and finally the South American War. Naval designers all over the world must have drawn their conclusions from all this.

So what are your lessons learned when you look at the naval engagements in WesWorld? Doctrines, design, ship classes, armament, other equipment - what kind of impact had, have or should have the naval battles fought so far?

Peng wrote the following as the lessons learned by Nordmark from the war over South Georgia, most of which I have tried to implement

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SOME NORMARCHIAN LESSONS DRAWN

Based on a general review of the events in the South Atlantic, the Normarchian forces did drawn some conclusions.


* There is a general lack of transport capacity to meet the needs of the Coastal Rangers. A need is seen for some type of ship that has a good capacity for men and equipment, a good turn of speed, and facilities for rapid unloading in port. It is thought that the need may be met through ships adhering to the qualitative limitations of the numerically unlimited categories within the Cleito Treaty.
* Firecontrol within the fleet is not drilled as extensively as one would have wished, and this led to problems in generating enough hits. It is presumed that this has been the result of a return to a pre-war routine, wehre the ships are laid up for parts of the year, being mobilised for crisises and drills. The navy and government now agree that having the fleet continuously manned and drilled is necessary to maintain the credibility of the fleet.
* Future capital ships of the navy should have significantly more armour than current capital ships.
* There should be a significant increase in the number of barrels carried as main armament on future capital ships.
* Conning towers seem to not have served their purpose, there being a marked tendency that hits on conning towers left persons inside incapacitated, and persons outside able to continute functioning. Splinter protection seems to be a general lack of command spaces.
* Current efforts to prevent magazine conflagrations on capital ships work sufficiently.
* Casemates do not offer sufficient limitation of damage to secondaries following hits by medium and heavy shells.
* Turrets offer sufficient limitation of damage to secondaries following hits by medium and heavy shells.
* Existing turretdesigns for light and medium guns place unacceptable limits on rate of fire
* Torpedoes carried by capital ships do not get used.
* Existing torpedo defence systems are unlikely to be sufficiently effective against current and future torpedoes.



This results in the following:


* Experimental fast naval transports are design and trialled within the two mentioned categories of the treaty.
* The fleet is kept mobilised permanently.
* New ships will have focus on armament and protection, at expense of speed.
* New ships, and old ships significantly reconstructed, are likely to not have heavily armoured conning towers.
* Current efforts at preventing magazine conflagrations, and preventing flash from spreading in the ammunition system, will continue. Care will be taken to isolate magazines and supply-systems from each other. Further efforts may be undertaken, if they do not complicate the overall system.
* New ships, and old ships being reconstructed, will be equipped with secondaries placed in turrets.
* New turret-designs for medium and light guns will facilitate better rate of fire.
* No ships larger than cruisers are to carry torpedoes in any form or way.
* New torpedo defence systems will be applied to new capital ships. These will be subject to testing before implementation.



With regards to the defence of South Georgia, the following actions are to be taken:


* Gustavshald Fortress is to be established at South Georgia. The fortress is to contain guns of 11cm, 15cm, and 21cm calibre, taken from decommissioned coast-defence ships.
* The fortress will have 11cm, 15cm, and 21cm forts covering the inlets to Stromness Bay, West Cumberland Bay, East Cumberland Bay, and PRicne Olaf Harbour. 11cm forts will cover Godthul.
* Gustavshald Kystjegerregiment is to be established at Gustavshald Fortress. The regiment will have two battallions of Coastal Rangers.
* Gustavshald Festnings Kystartilleriregiment is to be established at Gustavshald Fortress. The regiment will have one normal and one heavy artillery battallion.
* The Coastal rangers will establish and man observation stations across the island, observing in particular Maiviken, Fortuna Bay, and also other sites likely to be the targets of naval landings in case of war.
* All forts, batteries, observation stations, garrisons, and settlements are to be provided with telephonic communication
* A Naval Squadron is to be permanently stationed at South Georgia. The Naval Squadron is to consist of two light cruisers and five purposebuilt large patrolvessels.
* South Georgia is to have regular calls by mailships operating on Nordmark's South Atlantic mail services.

Some conclusions the KM has drawn:

So far the actions in the South Atlantic have pointed to the possibility that carriers are better strike platforms than the KM suspected (the KM's plans for carriers focused more on fighters than attack aircraft). The vulnerability of carriers to other ships came as no surprise, and the KM has no plans to install heavier armor than currently planned on the Peter Strasser class ships, or any follow-on units. Carriers are very vulnerable if intercepted, and if they are important, they need to be escorted accordingly when they are vulnerable.

One thing that has leaped out at the KM officers analyzing what has happened is that, in operations in the southern winter, almost every battle has taken place either at night or in reduced visibility conditions, rather like what Germany expects should combat erupt in the North Atlantic winter. Ranges have been relatively short, putting belt armor at more of a premium than deck armor, and who detects whom first very important. For instance, if Pampas had detected the South Africans first, rather than the other way around, the Argentine force might well have been able to maneuver away from contact and made it home safely.

The raid on the Brazillian fleet at harbor has definitely piqued the KMs interest and concern, suggesting that fleet anchorages need additional defenses, particularly against airborne torpedoes. Those defenses could include fighters, AA guns, possibly barrage balloons, torpedo nets, and other defenses. Dive bombers are also a concern, but they could be dealt with by the same defenses that would defend against torpedo bombers.

Submarines have been useful vs merchant shipping, but not particularly vs warships. This matches the experience from WWI.

To some extent I have to realize that a Naval staff are likely to view events through a filter favorable to their preconceptions.

The Hertogs served their function, stopping the faster and heavier armed Brazilian BCs. This creates some peace of mind regarding the Zeven Provinciens.

The short ranges are not as interesting, as the Dutch forecast considerable fighting both at night and among the islands, which has led to the continued retention of heavy belts.

The numerous shorts in some actions I am unsure how to evaluate. They would not be widely known, and if known would likely be subject to biased viewing. They could likely be dismissed as old and poorly insulated wiring which the Dutch will not find an issue because we did it better

The use of large combatants as raiders has verified a concern that they might be used independent of their Great War fleet screen role.

So far speed has not been a great determinant, though it has entered into some battles. To a limited degree, this has led to some reconsideration over a new CA type.

The Pony Express raids are of interest to the Dutch, given their fast light cruisers- particularly the Wadden Einlanden might be suited to nighttime tip n run raids.

Carriers are viewed at justifying Dutch doctrine at this time. The Dutch are fielding several small carriers mainly because thats what the build schedule best allows, but also due to the view that they can be easily damaged and knocked out of action. 1 big carrier may be more efficient, but 2 smaller can be in two places and it should be harder to knock out both. This also happens to be a very convenient argument when you want 4 carriers and Clieto did not provide tonnage for 4.

A further element is that at night/storms CVs are limited or inactive and in the pre-radar time, incoming may not be detected soon, and two flight decks can scramble fighters faster. Now, armor is not something they have yet dealt with, they are watching Italian developments closely. Events in S.A. are being viewed as supporting the Dutch view.

Due to a reported AANM fleet problem, the Dutch assign a pair of CLs as a screen and then use the CVs to provide fighter cover for the nearby fleet (20-30nm). Should an enemy surface force appear, the CV runs for the fleet while the cruisers fight. This distance can be closed up at night for greater security.

Primary duty is anti-aircraft, and with the casualty rates in this war, they look to be able to take on and disrupt quite large strikes. A small strike group is meant primarily for reconn, but also for limited anti-shipping strikes.

The effectiveness of aerial attack on shipping is viewed with alarm. Shortly after I took over the Dutch, I decided that in 1928 you were pre-dive bomber, while level bombers lacked adequate sights for high-altitude bombing. So low altitude level bombing and torpedoes would be the threat, likely by long range bombers or seaplanes. Hence the higher levels of 40mm vs. 20mm in order to hit those torpedo planes prior to launch, as well as take out larger aircraft.

This concept has also made the smaller CV look attractive as no dive bombing group was needed.

However, in this war, dive bombing has been very effective, hitting even small craft with regularity, and causing major damage to the fleet base. Dive bombing has been underestimated by the Dutch, and higher levels of 23mm are needed on all vessels.

The base raid itself was concerning, as small forces did large damage. Previously long range level bombers such as seen at Montevideo, Kommando (Ninja) raids, minisubs were the prime worries, but CV raids now make the list.

This adds to the levels of concern regarding possible enemy forces and moves AAG for harbors further up the coast defense list. Substantial AAG components have been long planned, and in some cases implemented, but light 23mm have not been included to date. Further fighter groups (likely 1xseaplane fighter group/base incase land strips are compromised) and exploration of long-range warning systems will be investigated.

As noted in point 9 of my response to the August news, attrition rates among planes is quite high. Land based AA, Naval AA, and fighters have all proven to inflict high loss rates. This makes Eduard Land's dismantling of the reserve airwings as a cost measure look foolish. Those extra pilots will be needed, as will spare planes. Further this will spur greater efforts to make planes more survivable.

Attrition among light units is a concern, as they are being knocked out at a higher rate than expected. The Dutch have invested heavily in small units as part of the "low" element of the navy, but they may need to build to a higher base level.

Not enough yet for a detailed list.

But for Australia:

Carriers need heavier escorts. The 7.5" gunned cruisers I had planned as carrier escorts are to be replaced by 13.5" gunned ones.

The BC/CV unter killer groups Im building are just the thing to bring down raiders, construction of them will continue.

Bad weather is no concern, can be ignored

The carrier raid is seen as an anomaly. Aussie carriers will continue to be used as scouts.


As for Mexico:

More interest is being placed in the air war. Nothing yet on the sea war.

Its rather difficult to apply lessons learned from these conflicts to anything Italy is likely to be heavily involved in. The most important thing to come out of the Danish-Indian spat was the need for improved seakeeping on ships likely to operate outside the Med. Theres a large jump in the seakeeping abilities of Italian ships, especially destroyers after this spat.

Level and dive bombing seemed to be quite effective in the conflicts (Philipines as well) but this doesn't really coincide with Italian tests against armoured targets. This lead to the adoption of larger AP bombs (250kg and 500kg) but in order to lift these weapons a large powerful plane was required which is only just coming into service. Attack with torpedoes remains the preferred method because of the larger amount of damage caused and the increased hit rate. Vulnerability of aircraft on the attack run has been noted and lead to a program of improving the torpedoes for higher speeds. The current type is able to be launched at speeds of up to 350knts. Another interesting torpedo (a historical one) is a parachute retarded type that can be dropped from level bombers...

Low visibility isn't really an issue in the Med. with actions expected to take place at 200-250hm. For closer night actions there are a bunch of cruisers armed with 152mm guns.

All in all, Italy hasn't been that close to the conflicts so there hasn't been many things to learn. The only active role was with a fighter squadron in Argentina. The bits and pieces there being disseminated around Italy currently. Most important, increased armament over 7.7mm for knocking down bombers.

For Atlantis:

The battle between the Hertogs and the Rios shows that Atlantis could use more fast battlecruiser types. an attempt was made to reaquire the Azeas class from the Greeks, who have found it more aconomical to retain them so an alternative needs to be found.

It might also be a good idea to dig up some of the old 12" guns from storage and build larger escort cruisers in an effort to make it costly for raiders to attack convoys.

Like Italy, Atlantis has several 6" gunned CL's that offer a decent night fighting capability. As for visibility issues radar will likely recieve abit more attention on future designs.

Atlantis still veiws the CV as a scout, though their ability to hurt and slow enemy units hasn't been lost on the Admirals and has only been afirmed by the carrier raids against Brazil.

The success of the Pony express has also afirmed the view that smaller ships make better raiders, its less costly when they are lost and it frees up larger units for other roles.

I think people are too involved in the use of convoys. In the current conflict it makes much more sense for South Africa to send independant merchant vessels across from Africa to South America and only bother escorting really high value vessels. Then again, use liners as troopships and simply stick a cruiser with it as an escort and plow across the ocean at best speed. The Argentine and Brazilian submarine fleets are pitifully small to do considerable damage. The surface fleets are more powerful, but if they come up against a merchantman to sink to it, it'll howl their position like hell and bring down everything SAE has to bear. You've also got to consider that convoys reduce your carrying capacity by around 20%, its only if losses are prohibitive that they are worth it.

Some lessons for the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and the British Army.

The Navy feels the doctrine of a strike carrier is still sound and a surprise attack can be very effective even on a major port. While the RSAN carrier strike can be seen as a one-off the Argentine land-based raid on Beunos Aries also proved very effective. Thus British bases must have more AA protection and fighter cover based nearby.

The sinking of the RSAN Hammer is seen as an unfortunate circumstance. The Argentine Navy was heading for the convoy routes and instead ran into the carrier group in foul weather. No amount of armour can save a carrier in such a situation but the Admiralty believes had the weather been better and a proper aerial patrol flying then such a situation would not have occured. Therefore British carriers must be able to operate aircraft by day and night and in poor weather conditions.

With the arguements above a dedicated 'big-gun' carrier escort seems wasteful and a force of cruisers are just as capable for defence.

The losses in sloops and minor vessels might be higher than estimates based on Great War experience, enemy aircraft must be factored in to shores close to enemy air formations. Therefore coastal craft need more AA weapons.

Many mines have been laid but sinkings by mines have been few. Proof barrages work by forcing a enemy to avoid them but also proof that some mines are not reliable enough.

Radio-location devices must be installed in major units. The Admiralty also shares the German point of view on weather conditions in the Atlantic.

Battlecruisers are still very vunlerable to proper battleships if their speed is compromised. Pampas had chances to escape but even wihout poor weather it seems unlikely in a straight fight that she could have outfought a battleship.

The Royal Air Force is now questioning the formation of large strategic bomber forces. The RSAF use of such bombers has been small scale but the successes seem to be small and little serious damage has been casued to industry. Likewise FAA attacks on SAE targets at night have been largely a waste of effort.

Tactical bombing is very important. The RAF considers the need for a smaller single-egined ground-attack aircraft of Hurricane size to complement the Battle and Balmoral bombers which are best suited to attacking fixed targets (bridges, crossroads etc).

The swtich to 20mm cannon for anti-bomber armament is vindicated but eight .303in MGs are still formidible in the dogfight.

A good observer organisation is needed to deal with incoming raids in order to scramble fighters and get them at operational alttudes before the enemy arrives in the target area.

The Army recognises that independant tank formations are the way forward in both attack and defence allied to mobile infantry to form the focus of the attack and to counter-attack in defence. This confirms work done in the Army since 1926.

The self-propelled gun is a useful assault weapon but the Army perfers the standard infantry tank with a 3in howitzer since it can be operated alongside tanks for protection and has good armour and 360 traverse.

The British platoons need more automatic fire and mortar support, firepower is key in attack and defence, artillery cannot replace close-support.

The German army would, if asked, agree that support tanks (in Germany's case, Panzer IVs) are often superior to assault guns (in Germany's case, StuG IIIs), but the cost difference is substantial enough that the Heer intends to continue to purchase assault guns.

In the main, the ground fighting has matched up with Heer expectations quite well, the size of the terrain vs the size of the armies is resulting in conditions more reminiscent of the Eastern Front in the Great War than the Western Front. One possibility that has occurred to the Heer, though, is that while there are armored vehicles being built that essentially replace the light infantry gun (the 75mm), currently none have even been investigated that mount an equivalent of the heavy infantry gun (the 150mm). This is probably worth looking into.


The Luftwaffe was quite surprised by the poor showing of some of the large bomber forces, and is eagerly awaiting reports from Nordmark on what happened with their Boeing Type 299s. The delays in any fielding of large bombers by Germany due to the failure of the BMW-139 engine may be more fortitious than General Wever thought.

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The Luftwaffe was quite surprised by the poor showing of some of the large bomber forces, and is eagerly awaiting reports from Nordmark on what happened with their Boeing Type 299s.

I seem to remember that most of them were cut to pieces by the Italian squadron. Having not tail gun is rather a problem. For strategic bombing in general, it may work better if planes weren't thrown in so piecemeal. Say RSAAF focussed all its available bombers on a single target and had multiple waves make it over in a day. Then again, the ranges are so short its possible to make multiple sorties.

For land warfare the big Italian armoured cars seem to be doing ok, but paper thin armour and unreliability plague the M13s in Argentine service.

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Originally posted by Hrolf Hakonson
The German army would, if asked, agree that support tanks (in Germany's case, Panzer IVs) are often superior to assault guns (in Germany's case, StuG IIIs), but the cost difference is substantial enough that the Heer intends to continue to purchase assault guns.

The Lt-35 has always intended to have a 75mm Howitzer version, as a turreted gun is seen as better for the assault/counterassault role the tank is meant for. S.A. generally supports this.

However, for accompaning infantry, the Lithuanians used their IG aggresively, but took high crew losses as a result. So light crew protection is useful, but pushes the weight to where a SP version is desirable. So 'assault guns' to accompany infantry will likely be more common in the future for the Dutch. The question is how to make it cheap and effective.

Interesting how people are getting radically different lessons from this.

Forgot one other thing;

The Turret Fighter. Developed mainly with RAF doctrines a rethink propmpted the cancellation of outstanding Defiant orders and any future turret-armed type. Now it seems the turret fighter is a success. The FD-2 Hornet used by the RSAF has been shown to be able to attack bombers from any direction, including a ventral attacking raking the bombers engines and bomb bay with impunity. Flank attacks also have been successful and nose guns means up to two targets can be engaged at once. In defence against fighters the turret fighter has superior firepower to single MGs hitherto employed on two-seat fighters. So rather than the turret replacing the wing armament it seems better to supplement them. Of course there is a weight penelty to this but it seems in the anti-bomber role a comprmise worth taking.

The FD-2 actually turned out much more successful than expected. She´s still in danger when attacked by more agile single-seat new generation fighters. The turret is not heavily enough armed to drive away an attacker that decided to push through.

The RSAN is also surprised of the great success the Ponies had/have. That relatively old design (1927) was original designed for the Indian Ocean should conflict errupt with the Italians. When this did not happen they became some kind of white elephant. Only when the RSAN high command saw there is nothing comparable in South America it became an option to use them in that theatre with some success.

The loss of RSAN Hammer is seens as unlucky. CVs are nto meant to slug it out with heavy surface units. Due to their limits to operate planes all day and all night there will always be a chance they are caught by surprise. What the carriers did proof is their capability to attack fixed targets such as ports and ships at anchor further away from the home lands than RSAF bombers could do so. The RSAN CVs also proofed valuable scouts but as strike platform they failed so far. In more than one case the flyboys could not sink a ship and had to call for a nearby cruiser or other warship to do so. The CV has also proofed not perfect for blockade duties. While it can detect blockade runners more easily (if weather permits) it is not the right platform to stop those ships and search them for contraband. Therefore a carrier always needs to operate with other warships which - compared to a cruiser - binds more ressources.