[Sent via diplomatic cable from the German embassy in Lima to Berlin, for delivery to the Generalstab, with a copy for delivery to General Guderian at Grafenwohr.]
December 12, 1933
Report of General Hans Kundt on the Peruvian armored advance
On the 11th of November, the Peruvian panzer regiment, reinforced with a cavalry brigade of two regiments, set off across the Secure River after their 6th Infantry division had made a breach in the Bolivian lines. By the 9th of December, this same force entered the Bolivian capital of Sucre.
By the time the battlaion reached and took Sucre, only 15 vehicles were still in working order, the rest having either been destroyed, damaged, or broken down. Most of the vehicles involved in the nearly month-long campaign had broken down at least once and been repaired during one or more of the pauses to wait for supporting units (infantry, artillery, cavalry, or supplies).
The infantry battalions, mounted in trucks, had great difficulty keeping up with the panzers, by the latter stages of the campaign the remaining trucks were being used strictly to bring up supplies and artillery, none could be spared to transport the infantry so the panzers were reduced to a marching pace even when they could have moved faster.
The cavalry brigade as a supporting unit did not work as well in practice as hoped: the march speeds were simply too different and the cavalry tended to be left behind in a bound then catch up and mill around aimlessly after a battle was over, or stumble into a counter-attack. They did prove somewhat useful, though, in recovering bogged down vehicles..
A costly lesson was learned in a couple of engagements: unsupported panzers against a prepared position will pay a high price. Most of the tank losses came in a pair of engagements where the panzers had outrun their support and encountered an enemy force that held a positional advantage and had weapons that could damage the Peruvian Vickers panzers (such as a 75).
Lessons learned:
1 - There is no point to a panzer that moves faster than it's support - a panzer is a formidable weapon, but by itself it is much less so and much more vulnerable than when it is supported by infantry and artillery and can work with the other arms.
2 - The trucks used cannot stand up to the stress of combat useage in this terrain, very few were still operational at the end of the one month of advancing. Additionally, their cross-country speed was terrible, even when they were fresh and had not yet begun to breakdown.
3 - The panzers needed to be more reliable, too many were lost for too long due to overheating, breaking a track, and other minor mechanical failures. Getting stuck will happen, it's impossible to always avoid all poor terrain, but the rate of breakdown was clearly excessive.
4 - Communications are a key - panzer operations can move more rapidly than infantry operations can, and this speed of movement means opportunities can appear more rapidly than in infantry operations. If the commander does not know the opportunity exists, he can't respond to it, so the panzer units must have a way to report to higher commanders.
5 - Panzers as support - panzers armed with machineguns or machineguns and cannon proved very useful in supporting the infantry against dug-in infantry or infantry in field fortifications. For dealing with these sorts of targets, Germany should look into mounting infantry guns on a panzer, as the larger high explosive shell would have great effect on field fortifications.
6 - When available, airpower can serve as artillery support - at times, the Peruvian aerial forces were the difference between victory and defeat, as they provided support to the advancing or waiting troops while the units artillery was being deployed or trying to get to the battle. At other times, the aerial forces took no part in the battle, due to time of day or weather.
This post has been edited 1 times, last edit by "Hrolf Hakonson" (Feb 13th 2007, 2:52am)