Report on Naval Exercises Dec 15-23 1931 Operation Blue Turtle
To: CoS Marina Argentina, Min of Defence, CinC Infantería de Marina, CinC Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina, Admiral Inspector Training, Admiral Inspector Gunnery, Adm. of Fleet and Commanders of all combat formations
Ref: M119/Re09/31
TOP SECRET
FORCES TAKING PART (BLUE FORCES FRIENDLY RED FORCES EMEMY)
1st Battleship Squadron LIBERTAD and CAPITAN GASCÓN (Almirante Bendicto) BLUE
2nd Battleship Squadron PATAGONIA and PAMPAS (Almirante Peablo) RED
1st Battlecruiser Squadron SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD (Vice Almirante Dominguez) BLUE
1st Cruiser Squadron PUEYRREDON, VEINTICINCO DE MAYO and ALMIRANTE BROWN (Vice Almirante Bouchad) RED PUEYRREDON BLUE
2nd Cruiser Squadron NUEVE DE JULIO, COMODORE PY, HIPOLITO BOUCHARD, ESPORA (Contra Almirante Murphy) RED NUEVE DE JULIO BLUE
PRESIDENTE SARMIENTO RED
2nd Destroyer Squadron Six 1914-16 Class Destroyers (Capitan de Navio Ricardo) BLUE
1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron (1st Capitan de Navio Bahia) RED
Gunboat Support Squadron two Parana Class and Patria (Capitan de Navio Smith-Sabatini) BLUE
1st River Fire Support Squadron (Capitan de Corbeta D’Silva) RED
JUDGES
A team of three judges were attached to each fighting ship or one for smaller vessels. All gunfire is of course not live and damage is simulated in accordance with the judge’s rules. Smoke shells, practice bombs and blanks were used. Some land fighting saw the safe use of HE and live rounds for realism.
PHASES
1) Blue force invades Tierra del Fuego. Amphibious landing and assault and land battle to test Marines. Red act as defenders and use air patrols and DD patrols.
BLUE invasion force consists of; 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, Pueyrredon, Nueve de Julio, 2nd Destroyer Squadron, Gunboat Support Squadron and six transports, one tanker and minelayer Fulton acting as transport.
RED defending forces consist of; 2nd Cruiser Squadron minus Julio, 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron and 1st River Fire Support Squadron
2) Red counter attacks with coastal forces
Forces as above.
3) Red reinforcements from north met by Blue fleet for fleet action.
BLUE force consists of; 1st Battleship Squadron, 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, 2nd Destroyer Squadron and Nueve de Julio.
RED force consists of 2nd Battleship Squadron, 1st Cruiser Squadron minus Pueyrredon and 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron
BATTLE REPORTS
The planned invasion was around the town of Rio Grande on the eastern coast of Tierra del Fuego. Banderas No. 1 and No. 2, Regiment de Artillería de Campaña No. 7 and Banderas No.2 and No.3, Tercio de Infantería de Marina No. 25 were placed in defensive positions around the town. Also the normal garrison Regimenta Infantería No.22 took up defensive positions along the coastline. Two batteries of 75mm M1931 guns and a battery of 155mm M1931 were deployed in the area. A full command post was created in the town equipped with two long-range and three short-range radios. Gen. Pallegos was in overall command of the forces. Col. Suárez was in command of all Marine forces.
The invasion planned by Vice Almirante Dominguez was a simple plan. Regimenta de Infantería de Marina No.3 was the main invasion force along with three independent Tabors under the command of Maj Gen. Allvere. Tabors 1 and 2 would disembark south of Rio Grande and attempt to encircle the Red artillery batteries and the town. Reg No.3 would attack north of the town and make a flank assault before occupying the town. Tabor 3 was to be used as a reserve force.
PHASE I LANDING
The transports were loaded during the morning of Dec 14, the ships sailing out to the start positions that afternoon. The BLUE forces left Comodoro Rividavia and practiced convoy formation and station keeping. The RED forces left in the morning to take up positions and begin patrols in the area. These operated all night and failed to discover the BLUE fleet. The small river gunboats were stationed in a small inlet about eight miles north of Rio Grande. The MTB A-4 was standing by with the main RED force as a despatch vessel, Contra Almirante Murphy deciding not to trust radio communications in case they were intercepted by the enemy. (Throughout this exercise the RED forces relied on other methods than radio for most communications and manoeuvres). At 01:00 the north and south convoys split for the final run.
Vice Almirante Dominguez began the bombardment at 04:10 Dec 15 having sailed into the area undetected. Enemy forces had seen the ships when at sunrise and therefore the defences were fully manned and ready. Trinidad duelled with coastal batteries at long range. Her 10” and 8” guns knocked out five guns. Pueyrredon also began firing at the southern batteries and the judges deemed she had been hit five times by 155mm shells knocking out one 130mm mount.
At 04:20 the lager transports began disembarking the troops into four smaller coasters, three barges and seven fishing vessels. These smaller vessels already have heavy equipment and guns aboard.
Delayed by a strong swell the small vessels did not begin the run-in until 05:35. Pueyrredon had been forced to withdraw after several more hits but her 8” guns blasted two more 75mm guns in pillboxes.
At 05:54 the South Force began unloading troops largely unhindered. *Further land operations will be described later in the report. The Gunboat Support Squadron (two Parana Class and Patria) under the command of Capitan de Navio Smith-Sabatini began close-range bombardment. Two more 75mm guns were knocked out and more were swiftly pulled back. At 06:10 a 75mm pillbox sank Fulton while trying to lower her boats. This pillbox would hold out until an infantry charge against it three hours later.
At 05:32 radio warnings had reached the two Corrientes Class vessels Entre Rios and Misiones nearby on patrol and they attacked the north convoy. Capitan de Navio Honero on the Rios led the two ships into a quick charge. At 30kts they raced to the scene. At 06:02 Honero ordered a hard-a-starboard turn. This brought them parallel to the convoy. They closed the range and launched eight 21” torpedoes. Three were judged hits. Bathhurst and King were on the far side of the convoy and only now did Honero spot them. The two DD charged into the convoy and chased off the Misiones. She was cut off and trapped between Bathurst and King. Pummelled at close range she was sunk. Meanwhile Rios had worked round the destroyers and sunk another transport by gunfire and made off to the south. The two DD did not follow as Capitan de Navio Rodriguez feared another attack from the other RED forces in the area. Rios then made it back north safely to rejoin the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron.
At 06:30 Avro 504 bombers began bombing the transports. Only two hits were obtained, one on Patria and one on a fishing vessel. Six aircraft were shot down by light AA fire.
At 07:23 a 75mm battery set up on the coast undetected fired six salvoes at Parana in the south group. She was hit five times and knocked out. By this time Neuve de Julio had formed with the six destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron and was patrolling to the north. Trinidad and Pueyrredon now moved back from the landings to herd the transports into a small convoy and two fishing boats were used to ferry supplies.
Phase I Results: BLUE had successfully landed the force on the shore. Tabor 3 was still at sea. Blue had lost five transports out of nineteen. Pueyrredon had been damaged but could still fight and only two 130mm mounts on the port side were judged to be knocked out. RED had managed to sink a large proportion of the north force and this effected the landings. Capitan de Navio Rodriguez was dismissed by Vice Almirante Dominguez at 07:40 and Capitan de Navio Roho was placed in command.
PHASE II RED COUNTERATTACK
Contra Almirante Murphy by 11:30 had assembled his entire force. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron (COMODORE PY, HIPOLITO BOUCHARD, and ESPORA) was lined up spaced by 1000m. On the starboard side was the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron (now only five ships). Moving along the coast was 1st River Fire Support Squadron whose task was to sink any transports near the coast and harass BLUE troops on the shore. The weakened north force was the main target. On the BLUE side Neuve de Julio and the 2nd Destroyer Squadron under Contra Almirante Moreno was still patrolling the northern area about five miles from the north convoy now sailing in Tabor 3 to reinforce Regimenta de Infantería No.3. Trinidad and Pueyrredon was escorting this force and by 11:30 beginning a bombardment.
The weather was now clearer, cloud cover was minimal, and aircraft were continually over the fleet, only two or three at any one time but enough to inform Contra Almirante Murphy of where the BLUE forces were. Vice Almirante Dominguez was very worried by this constant presence and found only Pueyrredon had an effective AA armament, this ship shooting down two aircraft. At 11:57 Julio spotted Py steaming south about eight miles away. Py spotted Julio at about the same time. Immediately Moreno informed Dominguez and steamed straight at the enemy to close the distance. The six destroyers split into two groups to port and starboard. Murphy simply turned port and crossed the T. Soon all three cruisers let off a salvo of 120mm shells. None hit. Moreno then turned starboard to enable his full broadside, the port group of destroyers began a smokescreen and while the starboard group cut behind Julio and followed under cover of the smoke. The range was now three miles and closing. Having a speed advantage Murphy outran the Julio and turned starboard to again cross the T. No hits had been obtained by either side. Meanwhile the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron and the 2nd Destroyer Squadron clashed at full speed. In a close range melee two Corrientes were sunk by gunfire while Bathurst was sunk by 100mm gunfire and two torpedo hits. The 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron broke off towards the open sea but the faster destroyers chased them down and sunk another before coming to the aid of Julio. By this time Julio had been the focus of three ships and enough hits had been obtained to knock her out. She steamed on but was unable to bear many guns. Murphy steamed south to intercept the convoy.
At 12:48 Contra Almirante Murphy began lining up to attack the convoy now disembarking troops. Trinidad and Pueyrredon put up a hail of fire which deterred him. By now the 2nd Destroyer Squadron had cut off his retreat. They closed and made a torpedo attack but scored no hits. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron fled to open sea joined by her remaining torpedo boats.
At 13:04 the 1st River Fire Support Squadron appeared and began firing their light cannon at the transports. One fishing vessel was declared sunk and the others began to move off. They briefly strafed the troops before turning round and heading off north. Another bombing attack failed to hit any ships. The MTB A-4 made an independent attack without prior orders and sank the America while at anchor.
Phase II results: RED had successfully made a counter attack with superior numbers. While losses on both sides were relatively light both sides had suffered damage that weakened the forces. RED now only had two Corrientes Class torpedo boats left. Without adequate screening forces the judges felt it unwise for RED forces to attempt another day attack. A small night attack was possible but not likely effective. The disembarkation although delayed was not halted. BLUE forces had suffered serous damage to Julio and lost a destroyer. Only seven transports had been lost. The core element was undamaged and continued to offer fire support. BLUE still had the power to defend itself against the RED force.
PHASE III OCEANIC BATTLE
For this phase all land based planes now became BLUE forces. The aim was to find and destroy a RED reinforcing fleet coming from mid ocean. This operation is deemed to be separate from the landing operation and therefore ships “sunk” in the previous battle were now fully combat read. This phase allowing for redeployment etc began on Dec 18.
BLUE forces under Almirante Bendicto consists of; 1st Battleship Squadron (Libertad and Gascon), Trinidad, 2nd Destroyer Squadron (only five destroyers) and Nueve de Julio.
RED force under Almirante Peablo consists of 2nd Battleship Squadron (Patagonia and Pampas), 1st Cruiser Squadron Veinticento de Mayo and Almirante Brown and 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron (a full six ships). RED has an advantage in having the latest Italian rangefinders and fire-control equipment. This is balanced by the crew’s unfamiliarity with this equipment despite a week of intensive gunnery training prior to these exercises. Libertad and Gascon have modern rangefinders and have been high scorers on gunnery exercises. The 14” is a superior weapon in hitting power and range than the 12” of the P Class.
Almirante Peablo had deployed his force as follows; 1st Cruiser Squadron line astern three miles ahead of both battlecruisers in line astern with three torpedo boats on each beam. He was steaming SW towards Tierra de Fuego north of the Falklands. He was about 40 degrees latitude, 600 miles east of Bahia Blanca when discovered. Almirante Bendicto had created a scout force of Julio and two destroyers about thirty miles ahead. The main line was Libertad, Gascon and Trinidad. Three destroyers formed the van in a V formation.
The Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina had begun flights with the sole serviceable Curtiss WW1 vintage flying boat and three Heinkel seaplane fighters backed up by ten Avro 504 seaplanes and landplanes. Serviceability was poor and many sorties were abandoned. Two 504s were lost without trace at sea. Radios were too few and unreliable. The Pampas had two brand new Westland Wapiti seaplanes abroad and these scouted ahead of the RED force. It was these planes that spotted the Julio on day three of the Phase. Julio did not spot the aircraft. Almirante Peablo simply altered course to avoid them.
On the bridge of Libertad Almirante Bendicto was pacing clearly in a mood. “Where are they! I have no spotters [seaplanes] and I have heard nothing from the air force. Nothing! Moreno has seen nothing, is he asleep! Where are they? We do I hear nothing”. Suddenly an ensign entered the bridge and handed Capitan D’Silva a message, “Sir Nueve de Julio reports, one large vessel six miles northeast of my position, am moving closer to investigate and identify.” Bendicto turned and simply said “good increase speed to flank.” Thirty minutes later another radio message confirmed what the vessel was, the Admiral was not happy. “A cargo ship! Damn can’t he distinguish a battlecruiser from a tramp steamer, the fool. Reduce speed to 19 kts, steady as she goes.” It would be a long morning. By the afternoon a cold front had swept over the RED force shrouding it in thick cloud. Winds were force five to six and conditions bad. The RED force slowed to 15kts and began taking advantage of the natural cover.
07:22 Dec 22
Julio in the dying storm made contact with the RED fleet. Undetected Contra Almirante Moreno moved his force astern of the RED force and radioed a brief message. Meanwhile Almirante Peablo was having problems. His small torpedo boats were being swamped by the waves and were unable to keep up; now the fleet had slowed to 12kts. His seaplanes could not operate and he was blind. Almirante Bendicto immediately put his powerful fleet onto a collision course for the RED force hoping to make contact during the late morning. By now the front had passed and the weather was beginning to improve slightly.
08:12 Curtiss flying boat radios position of RED fleet to Almirante Bendicto. The navigation officer plots the enemy at only nine miles west of them only to realise the pilot has mistaken them for the RED fleet.
At 11:46 the battle began. By 11:00 Peablo had moved his cruisers closer and the force was now steaming at 23kts. At 11:26 Pampas launched a Wapiti and it soon found Moreno’s small force following about eight miles astern. At 11:42 it spotted the Libertad and another two big ships ahead on a bearing to cross their path. Peablo knew he was trapped unless he acted fast. He ordered a battle turn to port and a fast retreat at 31kts towards Moreno’s force. The 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron was to fire a screen of torpedoes towards Bendicto’s force and lay a smokescreen. Peablo was copying Admiral Scheer and hoped this ‘Jutland’ would work in his favour. Almirante Bendicto ordered his 14” gunned ships to open fire at long-range and soon Pampas was straddled before she completed her turn and raced off. A sailor on Gascon spotted the torpedo tracks first and this ship moved forcing Trinidad to veer off course, then Libertad followed by turning into the torpedo tracks while the destroyers began engaging the little torpedo boats. It took several minutes to get the line back in order and Trinidad sped off at 24kts adding her firepower to harass the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron.
Moreno soon closed for the attack and his two destroyers went after the Patagonia. King was considered sunk but not before she put two torpedoes into Patagonia’s hull. Julio was sunk by a hail of 12” and 7.5” gunfire and Yucuman was also sunk. The 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron had lost three ships but was still able to cover the retreat and they surrounded the Patagonia now making only 18kts. Almirante Bendicto saw the stricken vessel and ordered his three ships to fire everything they had at Patagonia; he smiled every time a salvo went in “another hit, and another! Yes, yes pound her, another hit!” His crew cheered their success as Patagonia was ruled as sunk. Patagonia had put up a stiff fight and added by her advanced rangefinder equipment had hit Gascon six times disabling some of the 4” casemates and slowing her by three knots. Two Correintes were also lost.
By 12:50 Vice Almirante Bouchad on board Veinticento de Mayo reformed in a line Mayo, Pampas and Brown. His plan was to steam at full speed and cross the T across Bendicto’s rear and hit his weakest vessel Trinidad. Under cover of a squall he managed to get to 12” gun range and Pampas and Trinidad duelled. Bendicto tried to turn sharply to starboard to get his 14” guns into action but Bouchad’s cruisers stuck to Trinidad and began pounding the three BLUE destroyers who made a brave torpedo attack that was unsuccessful. Trinidad was judged to have her rear 10” and starboard 8” aft turret disabled and her stern flooded. Bouchard then turned south to outrun the 14” battleships under a smokescreen laid by Brown. It was this vessel that was hit by no less than four 14” salvos. She was sunk. Bouchard now fled the scene but the three destroyers kept following them for thirty miles and making torpedo attacks.
Dec 23
During the morning Almirante Bendicto was looking for the Pampas. His force now consisted of just the Libertad and Gascon, trailing behind, with two destroyers. Trinidad was en-route home. They had entered the storm front again and visibility was poor. The elderly Curtis at 12:40 spotted the Pampas just east of Peninsula Valdes. Almirante Bendicto was some fifty miles behind and well out of range with his ships just making 13kts. A small aerial force of six Avro 504, two Heinkel HD 58 seaplane fighters and a Hawker Audax was sent to bomb them. They scored only one hit on Mayo and three aircraft were lost and a 504 was written off on landing. That afternoon Vice Almirante Bouchad bombarded Rawson. The exercise was called off at 16:00.
THE LAND FIGHTING
Tierra del Fuego. Banderas No. 1 and No. 2, Regiment de Artillería de Campaña No. 7 and Banderas No.2 and No.3, Tercio de Infantería de Marina No. 25 were placed in defensive positions around the town. Also the normal garrison Regimenta Infantería No.22 took up defensive positions along the coastline. Two batteries of 75mm M1931 guns and a battery of 155mm M1931 were deployed in the area.
At 05:54 the South Force began unloading troops largely unhindered. Tabors 1 and 2 soon moved inland with support from Parana. By 06:30 they had reached the first defence line. Bandera No.3 Tercio No.25 mounted a small counterattack but without artillery support his failed as light 75mm howitzers were unloaded on the beach from a shallow draught barge beached on the coast. The commander of Bandera No.3 TIM/25 moved forward some new 75mm M1931 guns that had been moved out of the area following the bombardment. At 07:23 they fired on Parana knocking her out and then switching to the invading BLUE forces now approaching the hills behind Rio Grande. Heavy fighting all day left the invaders exhausted but supplies were coming ashore despite sporadic bombing and shelling. The 75mm battery held out until it was overrun at 15:45. By nightfall Tabor 2 was pinned in the hills facing another set of defending trenches. The hillsides were barren and coverless and by dawn they had retreated back to the beachhead. Tabor 1 now occupied about a third of Rio Grande and formed a defensive stronghold centred on the school and some of the coastal defences. Firepower was aided by four captured 105mm guns.
The North Force consisting of Regimenta Infantería No.22 was decimated by the convoy attack and only a third of the troops arrived in the port area. Support from gunboats helped and soon they occupied the church and dockyard. By 13:00 Tabor 3 had arrived to strengthen the weak bridgehead. At 15:10 a massive barrage began a RED counterattack that broke through to the port and captured a small barge unloading there. Tabor 3 was forced into the hills only to meet fire from hastily dug foxholes and trenches. Tabor 3 tried to capture them but was wiped out by 17:00. Cut off around the church the infantry troops fought on until 10:20 the following day. During the night a platoon managed to get as far as the hardware store before running into a Vickers MG emplacement. Naval gunfire support helped Tabors 1 and 2 to move on and capture another battery and move into the town. They captured the command post after a half-hour fight and after this RED defences soon became less effective. Tabor 1 sent small groups to make feint attacks. They just failed to reach the church in time. Gen. Pallegos and his staff escaped to a secondary command post outside the town but this lacked any radios and only had three telephone lines. This telephone system could not be used because BLUE forces had disabled the exchange network. By evening TIM/25 had begun attacking the beachhead and all ships pulled out. Naval gunfire was helpful but 155mm guns were moved forward on the hills to bombard the gunboats. By 13:00 the next day Tabor 1 was encircled in the town while Tabor 2 was now south of the town trying to regain the beach. Maj Gen. Allvere surrendered his troops at 14:20 and the exercise ended. The fleet tanker arrived at 17:40 and refuelled the smaller ships that set off for the starting points for Phase III that night.
LESSONS
1) The Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina put up a very poor performance. Reequipping must proceed with speed. Radio equipped aircraft are needed as are more seaplanes for scouting. A new flying boat type is badly needed. The direction finding equipment fitted to the Corrientes Class will become standard. A flying boat when it finds an enemy force will emit a homing signal which surrounding ships can track. Bombing was very poor and more training is needed.
2) More modern ships are needed. The cruisers are too slow and antiquated. Lack of destroyers was a key issue. More are needed and by next years exercise we should have many more units to work with.
3) The Infantería de Marina needs much more modernisation. Leaders have to be trained in both attack and defence. More support weapons are needed as are radios, especially lightweight short-range radios. The artillery batteries are now more modern but more work needs to be done.
4) Gunnery was very good and our standards cannot be allowed to drop.
5) The torpedo is the main weapon to sink ships or cripple them severely. More must be fitted to the fleet. Perhaps a Torpedo Cruiser will be studied. Submarines will also address his problem.
6) The need for scouting forces. Partly to be met by the new Atlantis-designed cruisers but the Naval Staff is now looking at a seaplane carrier to augment this force.
7) Some commanders are inept and will be replaced. Capitan de Navio Rodriguez was dismissed by Vice Almirante Dominguez and Capitan de Navio Roho will take over his command. Rodriguez will be assigned a desk job. Capitan de Navio Honero after his daring attacks during the exercises may receive a promotion.
The construction of new pillbox defences armed with new 75mm and 155mm guns is necessary to protect against large calibre shells.
9) Amphibious operations are very hazardous and unloading troops very difficult without the kind of support craft the Indians are now developing. Any future operations of this kind would be very hazardous.
10) Intercepting a force at sea without good intelligence is almost impossible unless luck and chance are positive factors. More scout forces are needed as are aircraft.
11) The battleship fleet is in excellent shape and Argentina now has among the most powerful ships in South American waters. The Libertad Class are very powerful while the Patagonia Class is fast enough to outrun older and slower vessels. Libertad’s refit must include modern AA weapons and turreted secondaries. Underwater protection must be improved too.
12) Cruisers, as the fleet is today the cruiser fleet is obsolete and practically useless against modern warships. By 1934 much of these weaknesses will be addressed by new construction. More heavy cruisers are also needed.
13) Destroyers, they put up a good fight but more are needed. Torpedo boats when handled with élan can be very effective. These boats must be considered expendable in order to fully use them to their best advantages.
14) AA defences across all ships must be improved; the new 115mm DP gun will address some of these issues as will the new HA M31N AA fire rangefinder.
15) The river gunboats are best employed on rivers and not at sea. The armament is too light for anti-ship work and the next batch may be more heavily armed.
16) More use of radio intelligence must be used. Transmissions must be intercepted and evaluated and if possible bearings taken of the origin of transmission. Such information could aid search and interception as well as revealing enemy strengths. It is recommended that the naval cipher now used is changed twice a year. More training in this area is needed.
Appendix I 1932 Naval Training Plan
Battleships: Gunnery, damage control, tactical manoeuvres at high speed.
Cruisers: Scouting, gunnery, avoiding torpedo attacks, AA gunnery
Destroyers: Gunnery, co-operation with heavy units, operating with élan and improvisation
Transports: Efficient troop loading and unloading, convoy operations
Aircraft: spotting, radio communications, bombing
Appendix II Biographies of key personnel
Gen. Pallegos; age 56; born 1875, joined army 1891 and became an officer cadet, in 1911 attached to Military Staff and promoted brigadier, in 1921 after the war with Nordmark he was promoted to Lieu. Gen. and then in 1925 became Inspector General of Training and promoted Maj. Gen. and in 1930 was finally made full General and posted as Fuego District Commander. An infantry officer he has an appreciation of what machine guns and artillery can do in defence, spent four years 1916-19 in Europe during Great War studying British trenches and operations.
Maj Gen. Allvere; age 47; born 1884, joined army in 1899 as 15 year-old runner, worked up through the ranks reaching Major by 1922, he fought during the 1921 war and sustained an injury, in 1924 he became the aide to the new European Military Commission then based in Switzerland and he swiftly rose to the rank of Colonel, recognising the need for young officers to lead the Infantería de Marina he swapped services and was attached to the training department until 1928, he was made a Maj. Gen in 1931 partly as recognition of his work and he is the youngest in the Argentine Military.
Almirante Bendicto; age 55; born 1876, joined Navy as an officer cadet after leaving Cordoba university in 1897, he specialised in gunnery and became in due course gunnery officer of the Rivadavia in 1918 after serving on most of the heavy cruisers and ironclads, he missed the 1921 war owing to TB but he recovered and was promoted Capitan de Navio in 1923 and commanded the Independencia, in 1927 he commanded the Libertad as Rear Admiral, promoted to Vice Adm. he was head of the gunnery school from 1929-31 and recently he was promoted to full Admiral and is the de-facto Admiral of the Fleet. He prides himself on knowing all the sailors names on the Libertad and although quick tempered and impatient he has a clear decisive mind and he believes heavy accurate gunfire will sink any ship, he has little faith in the attacking capabilities of aircraft.
Almirante Peablo; age 49; born 1889 the youngest Admiral for many years this fine sailor graduated from the Naval Academy Class of 1910 as the best of the year, taken under the wing of Admiral Gomez-Chiladeo as his aide he learnt his trade not just from books but also at sea, shipwrecked twice and given an award of bravery in 1917 he rose to become a Capitan de Navio by 1919 and commanded the destroyer division from 1920-22 seeing action in the 1921 war, post-war he was on the Naval Committee which looked into the defeat and later chaired a series of lectures on naval tactics, by 1925 he was promoted Rear Admiral and was in charge of the War Plans division, a position he held until 1929 when he rejoined the active fleet as the 1st Cruiser Division commander, in 1930 he became Vice Admiral and in early 1931 was made responsible for fleet reconnaissance and drafted the recent Light Scout Cruiser specification and judged the final entries, now a full Admiral he will command the new fast wing of the Navy. Perhaps the most gifted tactician the Navy has he has studied all the great naval battles and leaders and has absorbed the latest in naval technology.
Vice Almirante Dominguez; age 52; born 1879, joined Navy as officer cadet and specialised in engineering, he became the chief engineer of many warships including Trinidad during his active duty until he entered the Naval Academy in 1922, passed out in 1925 as a full Captain and commanded a series of destroyers and light cruisers until made Rear Adm. in 1929 and placed in command of 1st Cruiser Division, he studied naval tactics under Peablo and in late 1930 was placed in command of Trinidad and promoted to present rank. A sound officer who is capable of planning and tactics he lacks any real fighting qualifications and has always been referred to by his crews, with affection, as the ‘grease monkey’, he is good at getting results and efficiency, key qualities which promoted him after the effects of 1921.
Contra Almirante Murphy; age 50; born 1890, joined Navy in 1910 and became an officer cadet at his Captain’s insistence in 1914, graduated 1917 and joined the Destroyer force and from 1921 commanding several destroyers and working up the ranks, in 1928 he joined the training division until he requested active service again and resumed his active service as a Rear Adm. commanding a cruiser squadron. A destroyer man he favours the torpedo over the gun and always acts with the élan of a destroyer skipper, he likes combat to be fast and close quarters, only his abrupt forthright views have prevented his further promotions. He is a close friend of Moreno having been his commanding officer several times.
Contra Almirante Moreno; age 36, born 1895, an exceptional officer who has spent almost all his career at sea, wounded during the 1931 war he lost his right eye, determined to carry on sailing he worked up through the ranks and got his first command at 29 in 1924 of a patrol boat, destroyers and torpedo boats followed and by 1928 he was commanding a destroyer squadron, in 1930 he was made Rear Adm. and in 1931 moved to Peablo’s staff concerning scouting and was given the chance to exercise his ideas during the exercise, he is slated to become the head of the new Tactical Formation and Combat School at the Academy.
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