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To: CinC Navy Adm. Antonio Moreno Smith
Defence Minister Vice Adm (ret). Juan Perez Benedicto Hood

MA/R045/31

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Corrientes Acceptance and Trials Report

Construction quality: Overall all six are built to a good standard and all are broadly within the correct weight limits. All have withstood rough weather well although Entre Rios suffered some stress.

Armament Notes: The license built 100mm guns are of good quality and the mounts have so far stood up to service use. The shields have been most welcome in rough weather. The AA guns are also of a good standard. Accuracy has been very poor, see note below.

Fire Control: Very poor, no fire control other than two German style hand-held AA rangefinders has been shipped. These can be mounted on a light tripod. Although the ships were built for close-in night fighting such omissions are very poor. Any future ships of this class must have a proper fire-control director. Searchlights work but bulb life is low.

Torpedo Armament: Overall let down by poor mounts. The bearings have excessive oil consumption and frequently jam. New oils have been tried without success. May affect the Mendoza Class too.

Anti-submarine weapons: The depth-charge racks work well. Little ASW training has taken place yet but will before shake-down is completed. Hampered by lack of ASDIC.

Radio and other navigational equipment: Radios have worked well; no flying boat homing receivers have yet been fitted. Long range sets suffer from some interference. Compasses etc all tuned and working well. Covered bridge well equipped and working well. Window wipers may be fitted for use in poor weather. Open bridge lacks enough equipment. Internal telephone system on some ships is useless due to technical problems. May be removed and extra speech tubes fitted instead.

Engines and other machinery: There have been serious problems with the turbines. Entre Rios has lost some blades; Comodoro Py had to be towed back to port twice because of turbine failure. Technical staff promised solutions but as yet they have failed to increase reliability. Gearboxes too are unreliable and newer German gearboxes are to be fitted in the next batch. Boilers are fine and working well and oil consumption is falling as they break-in. There have been some internal leaks from the fuel tanks which have been sorted. Bilge pumps and diesel generators working well. Steam powered capstan for anchors not yet in use.

Performance: On trials all ships made good speeds and achieved the contract speed. CORRIENTES 30.12kts, ENTRE RIOS 30.56kts, MISIONES 30.07kts, COMODORO PY 30.27kts, MURATURE 30.60ks and BATHURST 30.54kts. In service cruising speed is easily attained and held for more than four hours.

Crew Habitation: The crew have suffered from poor accommodation. The galley is too small and accidents have occurred (one cook severed a finger and another was burnt by boiling corn beef hash) and refrigeration for meat is lacking. Asbestos panels for insulation while being effective have poor brackets and some have come lose in storms. The officers’ quarters have uncomfortable beds and the toilets do not always work. The Capitan of the Murature has complained of the bad colour scheme in his cabin and poor furniture. The crews wash area and heads are of a good standard but still are poor compared to foreign ships. Overall these problems of space and comfort could reduce morale on long cruises. Air cooling systems were planned but never fitted. This must be addressed before the summer months.

Crew Capabilities: The six new crews are composed of a mix of experienced sailors from the older destroyers with untrained conscripts. The ratio of untrained to trained sailors is 4:1. This has affected training but the schedules are on time and the December Fleet Exercise will prove the final test for these men. Overall morale is high and they are willing to learn. In the opinion of the High Command these ships are expendable as are their crews so most of them are of lower quality than other warship crews. The best are being saved for the Mendoza Class.

Report on Naval Exercises Dec 15-23 1931 Operation Blue Turtle
To: CoS Marina Argentina, Min of Defence, CinC Infantería de Marina, CinC Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina, Admiral Inspector Training, Admiral Inspector Gunnery, Adm. of Fleet and Commanders of all combat formations
Ref: M119/Re09/31

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FORCES TAKING PART (BLUE FORCES FRIENDLY RED FORCES EMEMY)
1st Battleship Squadron LIBERTAD and CAPITAN GASCÓN (Almirante Bendicto) BLUE
2nd Battleship Squadron PATAGONIA and PAMPAS (Almirante Peablo) RED
1st Battlecruiser Squadron SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD (Vice Almirante Dominguez) BLUE
1st Cruiser Squadron PUEYRREDON, VEINTICINCO DE MAYO and ALMIRANTE BROWN (Vice Almirante Bouchad) RED PUEYRREDON BLUE
2nd Cruiser Squadron NUEVE DE JULIO, COMODORE PY, HIPOLITO BOUCHARD, ESPORA (Contra Almirante Murphy) RED NUEVE DE JULIO BLUE
PRESIDENTE SARMIENTO RED
2nd Destroyer Squadron Six 1914-16 Class Destroyers (Capitan de Navio Ricardo) BLUE
1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron (1st Capitan de Navio Bahia) RED
Gunboat Support Squadron two Parana Class and Patria (Capitan de Navio Smith-Sabatini) BLUE
1st River Fire Support Squadron (Capitan de Corbeta D’Silva) RED

JUDGES
A team of three judges were attached to each fighting ship or one for smaller vessels. All gunfire is of course not live and damage is simulated in accordance with the judge’s rules. Smoke shells, practice bombs and blanks were used. Some land fighting saw the safe use of HE and live rounds for realism.

PHASES

1) Blue force invades Tierra del Fuego. Amphibious landing and assault and land battle to test Marines. Red act as defenders and use air patrols and DD patrols.
BLUE invasion force consists of; 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, Pueyrredon, Nueve de Julio, 2nd Destroyer Squadron, Gunboat Support Squadron and six transports, one tanker and minelayer Fulton acting as transport.
RED defending forces consist of; 2nd Cruiser Squadron minus Julio, 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron and 1st River Fire Support Squadron

2) Red counter attacks with coastal forces
Forces as above.

3) Red reinforcements from north met by Blue fleet for fleet action.
BLUE force consists of; 1st Battleship Squadron, 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, 2nd Destroyer Squadron and Nueve de Julio.
RED force consists of 2nd Battleship Squadron, 1st Cruiser Squadron minus Pueyrredon and 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron

BATTLE REPORTS

The planned invasion was around the town of Rio Grande on the eastern coast of Tierra del Fuego. Banderas No. 1 and No. 2, Regiment de Artillería de Campaña No. 7 and Banderas No.2 and No.3, Tercio de Infantería de Marina No. 25 were placed in defensive positions around the town. Also the normal garrison Regimenta Infantería No.22 took up defensive positions along the coastline. Two batteries of 75mm M1931 guns and a battery of 155mm M1931 were deployed in the area. A full command post was created in the town equipped with two long-range and three short-range radios. Gen. Pallegos was in overall command of the forces. Col. Suárez was in command of all Marine forces.
The invasion planned by Vice Almirante Dominguez was a simple plan. Regimenta de Infantería de Marina No.3 was the main invasion force along with three independent Tabors under the command of Maj Gen. Allvere. Tabors 1 and 2 would disembark south of Rio Grande and attempt to encircle the Red artillery batteries and the town. Reg No.3 would attack north of the town and make a flank assault before occupying the town. Tabor 3 was to be used as a reserve force.

PHASE I LANDING
The transports were loaded during the morning of Dec 14, the ships sailing out to the start positions that afternoon. The BLUE forces left Comodoro Rividavia and practiced convoy formation and station keeping. The RED forces left in the morning to take up positions and begin patrols in the area. These operated all night and failed to discover the BLUE fleet. The small river gunboats were stationed in a small inlet about eight miles north of Rio Grande. The MTB A-4 was standing by with the main RED force as a despatch vessel, Contra Almirante Murphy deciding not to trust radio communications in case they were intercepted by the enemy. (Throughout this exercise the RED forces relied on other methods than radio for most communications and manoeuvres). At 01:00 the north and south convoys split for the final run.

Vice Almirante Dominguez began the bombardment at 04:10 Dec 15 having sailed into the area undetected. Enemy forces had seen the ships when at sunrise and therefore the defences were fully manned and ready. Trinidad duelled with coastal batteries at long range. Her 10” and 8” guns knocked out five guns. Pueyrredon also began firing at the southern batteries and the judges deemed she had been hit five times by 155mm shells knocking out one 130mm mount.

At 04:20 the lager transports began disembarking the troops into four smaller coasters, three barges and seven fishing vessels. These smaller vessels already have heavy equipment and guns aboard.

Delayed by a strong swell the small vessels did not begin the run-in until 05:35. Pueyrredon had been forced to withdraw after several more hits but her 8” guns blasted two more 75mm guns in pillboxes.

At 05:54 the South Force began unloading troops largely unhindered. *Further land operations will be described later in the report. The Gunboat Support Squadron (two Parana Class and Patria) under the command of Capitan de Navio Smith-Sabatini began close-range bombardment. Two more 75mm guns were knocked out and more were swiftly pulled back. At 06:10 a 75mm pillbox sank Fulton while trying to lower her boats. This pillbox would hold out until an infantry charge against it three hours later.

At 05:32 radio warnings had reached the two Corrientes Class vessels Entre Rios and Misiones nearby on patrol and they attacked the north convoy. Capitan de Navio Honero on the Rios led the two ships into a quick charge. At 30kts they raced to the scene. At 06:02 Honero ordered a hard-a-starboard turn. This brought them parallel to the convoy. They closed the range and launched eight 21” torpedoes. Three were judged hits. Bathhurst and King were on the far side of the convoy and only now did Honero spot them. The two DD charged into the convoy and chased off the Misiones. She was cut off and trapped between Bathurst and King. Pummelled at close range she was sunk. Meanwhile Rios had worked round the destroyers and sunk another transport by gunfire and made off to the south. The two DD did not follow as Capitan de Navio Rodriguez feared another attack from the other RED forces in the area. Rios then made it back north safely to rejoin the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron.

At 06:30 Avro 504 bombers began bombing the transports. Only two hits were obtained, one on Patria and one on a fishing vessel. Six aircraft were shot down by light AA fire.

At 07:23 a 75mm battery set up on the coast undetected fired six salvoes at Parana in the south group. She was hit five times and knocked out. By this time Neuve de Julio had formed with the six destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron and was patrolling to the north. Trinidad and Pueyrredon now moved back from the landings to herd the transports into a small convoy and two fishing boats were used to ferry supplies.

Phase I Results: BLUE had successfully landed the force on the shore. Tabor 3 was still at sea. Blue had lost five transports out of nineteen. Pueyrredon had been damaged but could still fight and only two 130mm mounts on the port side were judged to be knocked out. RED had managed to sink a large proportion of the north force and this effected the landings. Capitan de Navio Rodriguez was dismissed by Vice Almirante Dominguez at 07:40 and Capitan de Navio Roho was placed in command.

PHASE II RED COUNTERATTACK
Contra Almirante Murphy by 11:30 had assembled his entire force. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron (COMODORE PY, HIPOLITO BOUCHARD, and ESPORA) was lined up spaced by 1000m. On the starboard side was the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron (now only five ships). Moving along the coast was 1st River Fire Support Squadron whose task was to sink any transports near the coast and harass BLUE troops on the shore. The weakened north force was the main target. On the BLUE side Neuve de Julio and the 2nd Destroyer Squadron under Contra Almirante Moreno was still patrolling the northern area about five miles from the north convoy now sailing in Tabor 3 to reinforce Regimenta de Infantería No.3. Trinidad and Pueyrredon was escorting this force and by 11:30 beginning a bombardment.

The weather was now clearer, cloud cover was minimal, and aircraft were continually over the fleet, only two or three at any one time but enough to inform Contra Almirante Murphy of where the BLUE forces were. Vice Almirante Dominguez was very worried by this constant presence and found only Pueyrredon had an effective AA armament, this ship shooting down two aircraft. At 11:57 Julio spotted Py steaming south about eight miles away. Py spotted Julio at about the same time. Immediately Moreno informed Dominguez and steamed straight at the enemy to close the distance. The six destroyers split into two groups to port and starboard. Murphy simply turned port and crossed the T. Soon all three cruisers let off a salvo of 120mm shells. None hit. Moreno then turned starboard to enable his full broadside, the port group of destroyers began a smokescreen and while the starboard group cut behind Julio and followed under cover of the smoke. The range was now three miles and closing. Having a speed advantage Murphy outran the Julio and turned starboard to again cross the T. No hits had been obtained by either side. Meanwhile the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron and the 2nd Destroyer Squadron clashed at full speed. In a close range melee two Corrientes were sunk by gunfire while Bathurst was sunk by 100mm gunfire and two torpedo hits. The 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron broke off towards the open sea but the faster destroyers chased them down and sunk another before coming to the aid of Julio. By this time Julio had been the focus of three ships and enough hits had been obtained to knock her out. She steamed on but was unable to bear many guns. Murphy steamed south to intercept the convoy.

At 12:48 Contra Almirante Murphy began lining up to attack the convoy now disembarking troops. Trinidad and Pueyrredon put up a hail of fire which deterred him. By now the 2nd Destroyer Squadron had cut off his retreat. They closed and made a torpedo attack but scored no hits. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron fled to open sea joined by her remaining torpedo boats.

At 13:04 the 1st River Fire Support Squadron appeared and began firing their light cannon at the transports. One fishing vessel was declared sunk and the others began to move off. They briefly strafed the troops before turning round and heading off north. Another bombing attack failed to hit any ships. The MTB A-4 made an independent attack without prior orders and sank the America while at anchor.

Phase II results: RED had successfully made a counter attack with superior numbers. While losses on both sides were relatively light both sides had suffered damage that weakened the forces. RED now only had two Corrientes Class torpedo boats left. Without adequate screening forces the judges felt it unwise for RED forces to attempt another day attack. A small night attack was possible but not likely effective. The disembarkation although delayed was not halted. BLUE forces had suffered serous damage to Julio and lost a destroyer. Only seven transports had been lost. The core element was undamaged and continued to offer fire support. BLUE still had the power to defend itself against the RED force.

PHASE III OCEANIC BATTLE
For this phase all land based planes now became BLUE forces. The aim was to find and destroy a RED reinforcing fleet coming from mid ocean. This operation is deemed to be separate from the landing operation and therefore ships “sunk” in the previous battle were now fully combat read. This phase allowing for redeployment etc began on Dec 18.

BLUE forces under Almirante Bendicto consists of; 1st Battleship Squadron (Libertad and Gascon), Trinidad, 2nd Destroyer Squadron (only five destroyers) and Nueve de Julio.
RED force under Almirante Peablo consists of 2nd Battleship Squadron (Patagonia and Pampas), 1st Cruiser Squadron Veinticento de Mayo and Almirante Brown and 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron (a full six ships). RED has an advantage in having the latest Italian rangefinders and fire-control equipment. This is balanced by the crew’s unfamiliarity with this equipment despite a week of intensive gunnery training prior to these exercises. Libertad and Gascon have modern rangefinders and have been high scorers on gunnery exercises. The 14” is a superior weapon in hitting power and range than the 12” of the P Class.

Almirante Peablo had deployed his force as follows; 1st Cruiser Squadron line astern three miles ahead of both battlecruisers in line astern with three torpedo boats on each beam. He was steaming SW towards Tierra de Fuego north of the Falklands. He was about 40 degrees latitude, 600 miles east of Bahia Blanca when discovered. Almirante Bendicto had created a scout force of Julio and two destroyers about thirty miles ahead. The main line was Libertad, Gascon and Trinidad. Three destroyers formed the van in a V formation.

The Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina had begun flights with the sole serviceable Curtiss WW1 vintage flying boat and three Heinkel seaplane fighters backed up by ten Avro 504 seaplanes and landplanes. Serviceability was poor and many sorties were abandoned. Two 504s were lost without trace at sea. Radios were too few and unreliable. The Pampas had two brand new Westland Wapiti seaplanes abroad and these scouted ahead of the RED force. It was these planes that spotted the Julio on day three of the Phase. Julio did not spot the aircraft. Almirante Peablo simply altered course to avoid them.

On the bridge of Libertad Almirante Bendicto was pacing clearly in a mood. “Where are they! I have no spotters [seaplanes] and I have heard nothing from the air force. Nothing! Moreno has seen nothing, is he asleep! Where are they? We do I hear nothing”. Suddenly an ensign entered the bridge and handed Capitan D’Silva a message, “Sir Nueve de Julio reports, one large vessel six miles northeast of my position, am moving closer to investigate and identify.” Bendicto turned and simply said “good increase speed to flank.” Thirty minutes later another radio message confirmed what the vessel was, the Admiral was not happy. “A cargo ship! Damn can’t he distinguish a battlecruiser from a tramp steamer, the fool. Reduce speed to 19 kts, steady as she goes.” It would be a long morning. By the afternoon a cold front had swept over the RED force shrouding it in thick cloud. Winds were force five to six and conditions bad. The RED force slowed to 15kts and began taking advantage of the natural cover.

07:22 Dec 22
Julio in the dying storm made contact with the RED fleet. Undetected Contra Almirante Moreno moved his force astern of the RED force and radioed a brief message. Meanwhile Almirante Peablo was having problems. His small torpedo boats were being swamped by the waves and were unable to keep up; now the fleet had slowed to 12kts. His seaplanes could not operate and he was blind. Almirante Bendicto immediately put his powerful fleet onto a collision course for the RED force hoping to make contact during the late morning. By now the front had passed and the weather was beginning to improve slightly.

08:12 Curtiss flying boat radios position of RED fleet to Almirante Bendicto. The navigation officer plots the enemy at only nine miles west of them only to realise the pilot has mistaken them for the RED fleet.

At 11:46 the battle began. By 11:00 Peablo had moved his cruisers closer and the force was now steaming at 23kts. At 11:26 Pampas launched a Wapiti and it soon found Moreno’s small force following about eight miles astern. At 11:42 it spotted the Libertad and another two big ships ahead on a bearing to cross their path. Peablo knew he was trapped unless he acted fast. He ordered a battle turn to port and a fast retreat at 31kts towards Moreno’s force. The 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron was to fire a screen of torpedoes towards Bendicto’s force and lay a smokescreen. Peablo was copying Admiral Scheer and hoped this ‘Jutland’ would work in his favour. Almirante Bendicto ordered his 14” gunned ships to open fire at long-range and soon Pampas was straddled before she completed her turn and raced off. A sailor on Gascon spotted the torpedo tracks first and this ship moved forcing Trinidad to veer off course, then Libertad followed by turning into the torpedo tracks while the destroyers began engaging the little torpedo boats. It took several minutes to get the line back in order and Trinidad sped off at 24kts adding her firepower to harass the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron.

Moreno soon closed for the attack and his two destroyers went after the Patagonia. King was considered sunk but not before she put two torpedoes into Patagonia’s hull. Julio was sunk by a hail of 12” and 7.5” gunfire and Yucuman was also sunk. The 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron had lost three ships but was still able to cover the retreat and they surrounded the Patagonia now making only 18kts. Almirante Bendicto saw the stricken vessel and ordered his three ships to fire everything they had at Patagonia; he smiled every time a salvo went in “another hit, and another! Yes, yes pound her, another hit!” His crew cheered their success as Patagonia was ruled as sunk. Patagonia had put up a stiff fight and added by her advanced rangefinder equipment had hit Gascon six times disabling some of the 4” casemates and slowing her by three knots. Two Correintes were also lost.

By 12:50 Vice Almirante Bouchad on board Veinticento de Mayo reformed in a line Mayo, Pampas and Brown. His plan was to steam at full speed and cross the T across Bendicto’s rear and hit his weakest vessel Trinidad. Under cover of a squall he managed to get to 12” gun range and Pampas and Trinidad duelled. Bendicto tried to turn sharply to starboard to get his 14” guns into action but Bouchad’s cruisers stuck to Trinidad and began pounding the three BLUE destroyers who made a brave torpedo attack that was unsuccessful. Trinidad was judged to have her rear 10” and starboard 8” aft turret disabled and her stern flooded. Bouchard then turned south to outrun the 14” battleships under a smokescreen laid by Brown. It was this vessel that was hit by no less than four 14” salvos. She was sunk. Bouchard now fled the scene but the three destroyers kept following them for thirty miles and making torpedo attacks.

Dec 23
During the morning Almirante Bendicto was looking for the Pampas. His force now consisted of just the Libertad and Gascon, trailing behind, with two destroyers. Trinidad was en-route home. They had entered the storm front again and visibility was poor. The elderly Curtis at 12:40 spotted the Pampas just east of Peninsula Valdes. Almirante Bendicto was some fifty miles behind and well out of range with his ships just making 13kts. A small aerial force of six Avro 504, two Heinkel HD 58 seaplane fighters and a Hawker Audax was sent to bomb them. They scored only one hit on Mayo and three aircraft were lost and a 504 was written off on landing. That afternoon Vice Almirante Bouchad bombarded Rawson. The exercise was called off at 16:00.

THE LAND FIGHTING
Tierra del Fuego. Banderas No. 1 and No. 2, Regiment de Artillería de Campaña No. 7 and Banderas No.2 and No.3, Tercio de Infantería de Marina No. 25 were placed in defensive positions around the town. Also the normal garrison Regimenta Infantería No.22 took up defensive positions along the coastline. Two batteries of 75mm M1931 guns and a battery of 155mm M1931 were deployed in the area.
At 05:54 the South Force began unloading troops largely unhindered. Tabors 1 and 2 soon moved inland with support from Parana. By 06:30 they had reached the first defence line. Bandera No.3 Tercio No.25 mounted a small counterattack but without artillery support his failed as light 75mm howitzers were unloaded on the beach from a shallow draught barge beached on the coast. The commander of Bandera No.3 TIM/25 moved forward some new 75mm M1931 guns that had been moved out of the area following the bombardment. At 07:23 they fired on Parana knocking her out and then switching to the invading BLUE forces now approaching the hills behind Rio Grande. Heavy fighting all day left the invaders exhausted but supplies were coming ashore despite sporadic bombing and shelling. The 75mm battery held out until it was overrun at 15:45. By nightfall Tabor 2 was pinned in the hills facing another set of defending trenches. The hillsides were barren and coverless and by dawn they had retreated back to the beachhead. Tabor 1 now occupied about a third of Rio Grande and formed a defensive stronghold centred on the school and some of the coastal defences. Firepower was aided by four captured 105mm guns.

The North Force consisting of Regimenta Infantería No.22 was decimated by the convoy attack and only a third of the troops arrived in the port area. Support from gunboats helped and soon they occupied the church and dockyard. By 13:00 Tabor 3 had arrived to strengthen the weak bridgehead. At 15:10 a massive barrage began a RED counterattack that broke through to the port and captured a small barge unloading there. Tabor 3 was forced into the hills only to meet fire from hastily dug foxholes and trenches. Tabor 3 tried to capture them but was wiped out by 17:00. Cut off around the church the infantry troops fought on until 10:20 the following day. During the night a platoon managed to get as far as the hardware store before running into a Vickers MG emplacement. Naval gunfire support helped Tabors 1 and 2 to move on and capture another battery and move into the town. They captured the command post after a half-hour fight and after this RED defences soon became less effective. Tabor 1 sent small groups to make feint attacks. They just failed to reach the church in time. Gen. Pallegos and his staff escaped to a secondary command post outside the town but this lacked any radios and only had three telephone lines. This telephone system could not be used because BLUE forces had disabled the exchange network. By evening TIM/25 had begun attacking the beachhead and all ships pulled out. Naval gunfire was helpful but 155mm guns were moved forward on the hills to bombard the gunboats. By 13:00 the next day Tabor 1 was encircled in the town while Tabor 2 was now south of the town trying to regain the beach. Maj Gen. Allvere surrendered his troops at 14:20 and the exercise ended. The fleet tanker arrived at 17:40 and refuelled the smaller ships that set off for the starting points for Phase III that night.

LESSONS

1) The Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina put up a very poor performance. Reequipping must proceed with speed. Radio equipped aircraft are needed as are more seaplanes for scouting. A new flying boat type is badly needed. The direction finding equipment fitted to the Corrientes Class will become standard. A flying boat when it finds an enemy force will emit a homing signal which surrounding ships can track. Bombing was very poor and more training is needed.

2) More modern ships are needed. The cruisers are too slow and antiquated. Lack of destroyers was a key issue. More are needed and by next years exercise we should have many more units to work with.

3) The Infantería de Marina needs much more modernisation. Leaders have to be trained in both attack and defence. More support weapons are needed as are radios, especially lightweight short-range radios. The artillery batteries are now more modern but more work needs to be done.

4) Gunnery was very good and our standards cannot be allowed to drop.

5) The torpedo is the main weapon to sink ships or cripple them severely. More must be fitted to the fleet. Perhaps a Torpedo Cruiser will be studied. Submarines will also address his problem.

6) The need for scouting forces. Partly to be met by the new Atlantis-designed cruisers but the Naval Staff is now looking at a seaplane carrier to augment this force.

7) Some commanders are inept and will be replaced. Capitan de Navio Rodriguez was dismissed by Vice Almirante Dominguez and Capitan de Navio Roho will take over his command. Rodriguez will be assigned a desk job. Capitan de Navio Honero after his daring attacks during the exercises may receive a promotion.

The construction of new pillbox defences armed with new 75mm and 155mm guns is necessary to protect against large calibre shells.

9) Amphibious operations are very hazardous and unloading troops very difficult without the kind of support craft the Indians are now developing. Any future operations of this kind would be very hazardous.

10) Intercepting a force at sea without good intelligence is almost impossible unless luck and chance are positive factors. More scout forces are needed as are aircraft.

11) The battleship fleet is in excellent shape and Argentina now has among the most powerful ships in South American waters. The Libertad Class are very powerful while the Patagonia Class is fast enough to outrun older and slower vessels. Libertad’s refit must include modern AA weapons and turreted secondaries. Underwater protection must be improved too.

12) Cruisers, as the fleet is today the cruiser fleet is obsolete and practically useless against modern warships. By 1934 much of these weaknesses will be addressed by new construction. More heavy cruisers are also needed.

13) Destroyers, they put up a good fight but more are needed. Torpedo boats when handled with élan can be very effective. These boats must be considered expendable in order to fully use them to their best advantages.

14) AA defences across all ships must be improved; the new 115mm DP gun will address some of these issues as will the new HA M31N AA fire rangefinder.

15) The river gunboats are best employed on rivers and not at sea. The armament is too light for anti-ship work and the next batch may be more heavily armed.

16) More use of radio intelligence must be used. Transmissions must be intercepted and evaluated and if possible bearings taken of the origin of transmission. Such information could aid search and interception as well as revealing enemy strengths. It is recommended that the naval cipher now used is changed twice a year. More training in this area is needed.

Appendix I 1932 Naval Training Plan
Battleships: Gunnery, damage control, tactical manoeuvres at high speed.
Cruisers: Scouting, gunnery, avoiding torpedo attacks, AA gunnery
Destroyers: Gunnery, co-operation with heavy units, operating with élan and improvisation
Transports: Efficient troop loading and unloading, convoy operations
Aircraft: spotting, radio communications, bombing

Appendix II Biographies of key personnel

Gen. Pallegos; age 56; born 1875, joined army 1891 and became an officer cadet, in 1911 attached to Military Staff and promoted brigadier, in 1921 after the war with Nordmark he was promoted to Lieu. Gen. and then in 1925 became Inspector General of Training and promoted Maj. Gen. and in 1930 was finally made full General and posted as Fuego District Commander. An infantry officer he has an appreciation of what machine guns and artillery can do in defence, spent four years 1916-19 in Europe during Great War studying British trenches and operations.

Maj Gen. Allvere; age 47; born 1884, joined army in 1899 as 15 year-old runner, worked up through the ranks reaching Major by 1922, he fought during the 1921 war and sustained an injury, in 1924 he became the aide to the new European Military Commission then based in Switzerland and he swiftly rose to the rank of Colonel, recognising the need for young officers to lead the Infantería de Marina he swapped services and was attached to the training department until 1928, he was made a Maj. Gen in 1931 partly as recognition of his work and he is the youngest in the Argentine Military.

Almirante Bendicto; age 55; born 1876, joined Navy as an officer cadet after leaving Cordoba university in 1897, he specialised in gunnery and became in due course gunnery officer of the Rivadavia in 1918 after serving on most of the heavy cruisers and ironclads, he missed the 1921 war owing to TB but he recovered and was promoted Capitan de Navio in 1923 and commanded the Independencia, in 1927 he commanded the Libertad as Rear Admiral, promoted to Vice Adm. he was head of the gunnery school from 1929-31 and recently he was promoted to full Admiral and is the de-facto Admiral of the Fleet. He prides himself on knowing all the sailors names on the Libertad and although quick tempered and impatient he has a clear decisive mind and he believes heavy accurate gunfire will sink any ship, he has little faith in the attacking capabilities of aircraft.

Almirante Peablo; age 49; born 1889 the youngest Admiral for many years this fine sailor graduated from the Naval Academy Class of 1910 as the best of the year, taken under the wing of Admiral Gomez-Chiladeo as his aide he learnt his trade not just from books but also at sea, shipwrecked twice and given an award of bravery in 1917 he rose to become a Capitan de Navio by 1919 and commanded the destroyer division from 1920-22 seeing action in the 1921 war, post-war he was on the Naval Committee which looked into the defeat and later chaired a series of lectures on naval tactics, by 1925 he was promoted Rear Admiral and was in charge of the War Plans division, a position he held until 1929 when he rejoined the active fleet as the 1st Cruiser Division commander, in 1930 he became Vice Admiral and in early 1931 was made responsible for fleet reconnaissance and drafted the recent Light Scout Cruiser specification and judged the final entries, now a full Admiral he will command the new fast wing of the Navy. Perhaps the most gifted tactician the Navy has he has studied all the great naval battles and leaders and has absorbed the latest in naval technology.

Vice Almirante Dominguez; age 52; born 1879, joined Navy as officer cadet and specialised in engineering, he became the chief engineer of many warships including Trinidad during his active duty until he entered the Naval Academy in 1922, passed out in 1925 as a full Captain and commanded a series of destroyers and light cruisers until made Rear Adm. in 1929 and placed in command of 1st Cruiser Division, he studied naval tactics under Peablo and in late 1930 was placed in command of Trinidad and promoted to present rank. A sound officer who is capable of planning and tactics he lacks any real fighting qualifications and has always been referred to by his crews, with affection, as the ‘grease monkey’, he is good at getting results and efficiency, key qualities which promoted him after the effects of 1921.

Contra Almirante Murphy; age 50; born 1890, joined Navy in 1910 and became an officer cadet at his Captain’s insistence in 1914, graduated 1917 and joined the Destroyer force and from 1921 commanding several destroyers and working up the ranks, in 1928 he joined the training division until he requested active service again and resumed his active service as a Rear Adm. commanding a cruiser squadron. A destroyer man he favours the torpedo over the gun and always acts with the élan of a destroyer skipper, he likes combat to be fast and close quarters, only his abrupt forthright views have prevented his further promotions. He is a close friend of Moreno having been his commanding officer several times.

Contra Almirante Moreno; age 36, born 1895, an exceptional officer who has spent almost all his career at sea, wounded during the 1931 war he lost his right eye, determined to carry on sailing he worked up through the ranks and got his first command at 29 in 1924 of a patrol boat, destroyers and torpedo boats followed and by 1928 he was commanding a destroyer squadron, in 1930 he was made Rear Adm. and in 1931 moved to Peablo’s staff concerning scouting and was given the chance to exercise his ideas during the exercise, he is slated to become the head of the new Tactical Formation and Combat School at the Academy.

Report on Joint Naval Exercises May 6-8 1932 Operation Blue Tuna
To: CoS Marina Argentina, Min of Defence, CinC Infantería de Marina, CinC Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina, Admiral Inspector Training, Admiral Inspector Gunnery, Adm. of Fleet and Commanders of all combat formations
Copy to: SAE Naval Forces Commander South Atlantic
Ref: M146/Re19/32

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FORCES TAKING PART

Argentina:
Escort Destroyer JORGE (Capitan de Naivo Catamarca), MGB-4 (Capitan de Corbeta Hoho), MTB A1 (Capitan de Corbeta Sarimento) and transport PAMPA. Commander of Group Capitan de Navio Roho.
South Africa:
RSAN LOOK-OUT (Captain M. Breuk), UJ33 (Lieu. J. de Vries) and R-6 (Lieu. P. Glogge)

PHASES
1) Patrol and search. Marina and RSAN forces will patrol a designated area. Pampa will be the target ship. Note no notification of her sailing or taking part in the exercise was given to the force forcing them to check all ships in the area and she flew the merchant ensign and false company titles on her hull.
2) Chase. Formation of group to and interception to make Pampa heave-to.
3) Boarding and inspection. Marines and crew to board and search Pampa for hidden weapons.

REPORT

At 05:10 RSAN forces arrived off Viedma about 200km south of Bahia Blanca. Capitan Roho deployed the force into two groups. MGB-4 and R-6 to searching in the east, UJ33 to the west alone and MTB A-1 inshore within sight of the port. Jorge and Look-Out patrolled the southern sector together. Look-Out deployed her floatplane at 06:28 to aid the search.

At 07:02 floatplane returns with engine trouble, Captain Breuk does not notify Roho until 11:16. Jorge searching a small fishing vessel does not spot the aircraft being recovered and Roho continues to believe the aircraft is still searching.

At 09:30 MTB A-1 stops a tramp steamer and three crewmen search the holds.

At 10:00 Lieu. P. Glogge in UJ33 begins a standard SAE A/S patrol pattern to cover his assigned area.

At 10:16 MGB-4 and R-6 lose contact with each other in rain squall.

At 11:10 UJ33 inspects two small fishing vessels until 11:46. Look-Out inspects a cargo vessel and Jorge goes on alone until they finally rendezvous at 12:39. On Jorge several drills are carried out as are two mock depth-charge attacks.

MTB A-1 at 12:04 returns to Viedma with engine problems. R-6 searches a small tanker.

By 14:06 the eastern sweep is complete and due to worsening weather MGB-4 and R-6 turn west to join main force. MTB A-1 also resumes her station after minor repairs and refuelling.

At 14:55 Pampa spotted by Look-Out, range nine miles. Jorge increases speed to 21kts and goes to make a close inspection. At range of five miles a look-out identifies her as Pamapa despite civil colours.

At 15:24 Jorge turns hard-a-port and comes alongside at 12kts to make a close visual check of Pampa’s decks and hails her to stop. Capitan refuses to heave-to and Look-Out swiftly changes course to starboard to cut across her bows to force Pampa to stop.

The Captain of Pampa realising she has been spotted increases speed to 14kts and makes a hard turn to starboard on full rudder. Meanwhile an Army single 20mm cannon hidden under tarpaulin on the poop deck is uncovered and opens fire on Jorge (with blanks). A 37mm on the bows fires on Look-Out. The accuracy is poor and Look-Out is missed although Cap. Breuk takes evasive action and turns to starboard to come alongside Pampa after a half-circle. Jorge’s bridge was swept by 20mm fire and all are declared dead by RSAN judge on board. Forward gun suffers half of the gun crew killed as well.

On board Look-Out Bruek, who does not know Pampa is armed, is shocked, “Captain Roho has left himself open to attack by getting too close. I’ll stop that floating junk! Bring us on her course number one, stand-by gun number one. No shot across the bows make every shot count. Fire!” Three 5” training rounds were fired at Pampa. Two actually hit the ship causing some damage. At full-speed Look-Out soon overhauled her and opened a broadside that hit Pampa again, one round going through the funnel. At 11:58 Pampa heaved-to and put up a red pennant (exercise marking to determine if ship badly damaged/sunk).

At 16:12 R-6 and MGB-4 arrived on the scene and both began disembarking marines onto Pampa. Look-Out slowly circled the Pampa while Jorge halted on Pampa’s port side. A small boat transferred a party of RSAN Marines.

At 16:30 UJ33 gave up the search and docked in Viedma.

On board the Pampa some thirty Marines and sailors began disarming the crew of Pampa and searching her holds. At 16:38 the false bulkhead was found and some sixty rifles and ten HMGs were recovered and transferred to Jorge.

All ships then set sail for Viedma docking from 17:08.

Officers Staff Meeting Viedma Customs Station 09:00 07/05/1932

Capitan Breuk has come under severe criticism after yesterdays exercise. He failed to report he un-serviceability of the only aircraft assigned to the operation to his commander. The actions taken during the stopping of Pampa were called “outrageous, foolish and bloody mad” by Capitan de Navio Roho. There followed this unpleasant exchange which the board wished to be included in the minutes in full.

(B= Breuk, R Roho, C Catamarca and V de Vries)
B “I believe getting as close to Pampa as you did was foolish. Getting you and your officers killed even more so. You may take chances in your navy but we do not in ours. I’ve never seen such amateurs in action.”
V “I disagree with you Capt. Roho, Capt. Breuk acted with good judgement in the conditions he faced. Had we been warned we would not have thought the vessel was a real pirate ship.”
R “You have damaged one of our ships, not be accident but by forethought. You recklessly endangered the crew of the Pampa. The judge on board clearly felt you acted not in self-defence but recklessly. Officers like you would rot in obscurity in our navy.”
B “An officer like you is a danger not only to his crew but his whole force. Caution is paramount in these waters with pirate ships heavily armed. If Pampa had 150mm guns then Jorge would have been sunk.”
R “Perhaps your kind of caution is what has retarded your career.”
B “NO! My career has nothing to do with my record; it is only officers like you who retard experience and replace it by text-book madness. I have had time at sea learning the practicalities while you have been behind a desk somewhere.”
C “I would like to add something here aside from all the personal sniping. I believe Capt. Breuk is essentially correct, we did engage too closely and either we must adopt distance visual inspection or we must reduce our caution and immediately force ships to halt with force. We are not talking about small time crooks but powerful pirate-run organisations armed to the teeth. This does not, however excuse his behaviour.”
V “From the RSAN point of view we have done nothing wrong, we followed our guidelines to the letter. If your navy has lax procedures then that is a matter for your superiors and we would welcome any chance to help them revise the current plans.”
C “I think such action is needed in view of yesterday’s events”
B “I can only hope you have learned something from us in how to deal with these threats.”

The judges deemed that Capt. Roho had committed an error of judgement in expecting Pampa to be unarmed but also believed Capt. Breuk had acted unprofessionally, although in real combat his quick actions would have been correct. His long-service and varied career hold greater weight in the judges opinion than Capt Roho’s. Capt. Catamarca made it clear that he disagreed with Capt. Roho and wished to remain further away from Pampa but was overruled by Roho as force commander. In view of this Capt. Roho has apologised to Capt Breuk and has offered to resign his post, the C-in-C refused his offer.

LESSONS/ RECOMENDATIONS

1) Search patterns must be improved to maximise sweep area. More ships are needed, light Chaco Class vessels and modified Corrientes Class ships should be built for Customs. The Navy must build more light craft to aid the civil authorities. Sloops could be brought cheaply from abroad.

2) That further joint exercises be carried out to increase co-operation with the RSAN. Relations are still strained amongst officers and crews on both sides. We have much still to learn in this area of operations.

3) That longer-range telescopes and sights be used to make a visual search of any suspicious vessels. No ship should get close to any suspicious vessel under any circumstances. Ship’s crew should be ready at action stations with guns loaded for instant action.

4) More armour needs to be fitted to conning and bridge areas of small vessels.

5) A new training programme for tracking and boarding ships will be developed by Training Command over the next three months.

6) Aircraft are badly needed to keep a constant patrol in our waters. These must be obtained as soon as possible. All aircraft connected with maritime search and attack are to be operated by the Navy. Customs will not have an air arm.

7) The Marines did a very through job of searching all the ships during the day. They are to be congratulated and more specific training will be given. A new unit will be created and permanently attached to Customs.

Development of new close-range weapons to incapacitate the crew but leave the ship floating for inspection.

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF RSAN OFFICERS INVOLVED

Captain Martin Breuk is an older officer who has fought his way through the ranks from the lowest crew quarters. He knows the waters better than anybody else and there is little he hasn’t seen in his career. However, knowing there is no mentor in the higher ranks for him he has little chance to take another step on the ladder upwards. Hence he became somewhat filled with bitterness. Sometimes one can notice this when he makes comments.
Lieutnant Jan de Vries is a professional sailor and currently commander of the 3rd squadron of the 3rd ASW flotilla. For this exercise he is an observer for RSAN high command.
Lieutnant Piet Glogge left the academy just six months ago. He has served on another motor launch before became captain of R6 quite suddenly when the ships commanding officer died due to flu.

To: CinC Navy Adm. Antonio Moreno Smith
Defence Minister Vice Adm (ret). Juan Perez Benedicto Hood

MA/R085/32

TOP SECRET

Mendoza Class Acceptance and Trials Report

Construction quality: Overall all first three ships are built to a very high standard and all are within the correct weight limits. All three have withstood rough weather trials very well.

Armament Notes: The licence built 130mm guns have been very satisfactory and accurate. The heavy-hitting shell, low dispersion and long barrel life are very good attributes and the horizontal sliding breech block combined with shell hoists help to maintain a 12rpgpm rate of fire. These destroyers are among the most powerful in the world. The shields are well armoured and offer good protection from spray. The 37mm guns have proved very good in service and standard Army-pattern 20mm guns have been fitted.

Fire Control: One 5m rangefinder and one HACS. Will ship the new HA fire-control system when it is ready in late 1933. Gunnery is proving to be accurate and very rapid. AA fire-control is adequate but owing to costs the searchlights have been omitted on the first three ships.

Torpedo Armament: Thankfully the mounts are unaffected b the problems still affecting the Corrientes Class vessels. Training is quick and aiming is improved by a new sight mounted on the bridge.

Anti-submarine weapons: The two depth-charge racks and six depth-charge throwers are fitted. ASDIC also fitted and the next three will be further improved by the Italian Langhiri-Florisson set.

Radio and other navigational equipment: Radios have worked well and flying boat homing receivers have been fitted and extensively tested. Long range sets suffer from some interference. Compasses etc all tuned and working well. Covered bridge is well equipped and working well. Window wipers have been fitted for use in poor weather. Open bridge has identical equipment (expect steering apparatus). Internal telephone system fitted but still has some problems. Protection is 70mm over the forward arc.

Engines and other machinery: Given the hard work to perfect the Standard Propulsion Unit there has been no major problems. The turbines are running very well. Boilers are fine and working well and oil consumption is falling as they break-in. Bilge pumps and diesel generators working well. The electric system is fully functional and the hydraulic system for the hoists has suffered a few leaks but these are now sorted. Steam powered capstan for anchors have been fitted and tested.

Performance: On trials all three ships made good speeds and achieved the contract speed. Mendoza 34.12kts, Rioja 34.56kts and La Plata 35.07kts. In service cruising speed is easily attained and held for more than four hours.

Crew Habitation: The crew have very good accommodation that is both airy and spacious for oceanic voyages. The galley is well equipped with stoves, ovens, bakery, refrigerators, freezers and tray lifts. Asbestos panels for insulation while being effective have poor brackets and some have come lose in storms. An American air-conditioning system has been fitted. The officers’ quarters have been fitted with good quality furniture. The Captain’s cabin is of very high standard and décor. The crew’s wash areas and heads are of a good standard but still are poor compared to foreign ships.

Crew Capabilities: The three crews are composed of a mix of experienced sailors from the older destroyers with untrained conscripts. The ratio of untrained to trained sailors is 1:1. This has improved training and as a result the crews are highly experienced. As more ships commission some of the crews will be transferred. Overall morale is high and they are willing to learn.
To: CinC Navy Adm. Antonio Moreno Smith
Defence Minister Vice Adm (ret). Juan Perez Benedicto Hood



MA/R089/33

TOP SECRET

General San Martin Acceptance and Trials Report

Construction quality: This is the first cruiser built in Argentina and overall the constructors have done a good job. The hull can withstand rough weather very well and the hull is sturdy and well built. Some welding has been used to reduce weight and this is of fair quality.

Armament Notes: The licence built 130mm guns have been very satisfactory and accurate. The heavy-hitting shell, low dispersion and long barrel life are very good attributes and the horizontal sliding breech block combined with shell hoists help to maintain a 12rpgpm rate of fire. The quadruple 37mm guns have proved problematic in service but hopefully the Mk.II for the 1933 Destroyers will be better. The rangefinder on the mount is reasonable accurate.

Fire Control: Two 8m rangefinders and one HACS. Gunnery is proving to be accurate and very rapid and good night-time control owing to four searchlights. AA fire-control is very good with one HACS and one rangefinder on al four quad 37mm mounts.
Torpedo Armament: Notes as Mendoza Class.
Mine Armament: Rails for 100 mines. New mines are a priority to arm these ships. Rails working very well but more training needed to minimise risks to the ship.
Anti-submarine weapons: The two depth-charge racks and two depth-charge throwers are fitted. ASDIC is fitted along with an anti-submarine control room. Can act as an anti-submarine operations flagship.

Radio and other navigational equipment: Radios have worked well and flying boat homing receivers have been fitted and extensively tested. Long range sets suffer from some interference. Compasses etc all tuned and working well. Covered bridge is well equipped and working well. Open bridge has identical equipment (expect steering apparatus). Internal telephone system fitted but still has some problems. Protection is 70mm over the forward arc. Flagship communications and navigation equipment is fitted to this ship.

Engines and other machinery: Given the hard work to perfect the Standard Propulsion Unit there has been no major problems. Two of these are used on this ship. The turbines are running very well. Boilers are fine and working well and oil consumption is falling as they break-in. Bilge pumps and diesel generators working well. The electric system is fully functional and the hydraulic system for the hoists has not suffered any leaks, unlike the Mendoza Class but these are now sorted. Steam powered capstan for anchors have been fitted and tested.

Performance: On trials San Martin made a maximum speed of 33.68kts. In service cruising speed is easily attained and held for more than eight hours.

Crew Habitation: The crew have very good accommodation that is both airy and spacious for oceanic voyages and equals any foreign standard. The galley is well equipped with stoves, ovens, bakery, refrigerators, freezers and tray lifts. Asbestos panels for insulation and an American air-conditioning system has been fitted. The officers’ quarters have been fitted with good quality furniture. The Captain’s cabin is of very high standard and décor and Admiral Cabins have also been furnished. The crew’s wash areas and heads are of a high standard and can be used in the roughest weather. Training rooms and extra cadet berths have been installed.

Crew Capabilities: The crew is mostly new recruits with a largely experienced armament crew and senior officers in accordance with her peacetime training role. Once the cadre is trained most unspecialised crew will be rotated through the fleet.

To: CinC Navy Adm. Antonio Moreno Smith
Defence Minister Vice Adm (ret). Juan Perez Benedicto Hood

MA/R097/33

TOP SECRET

Mendoza Modified (Cordoba) Class Acceptance and Trials Report

Construction quality: Built to the same very high standard and within the correct weight limits. Some welding defects noted on the superstructure which must be rectified.

Armament Notes: The Cordoba has the new 115mm MR L/50 Dual-Purpose guns mounted in three weather-proof powered turrets with hydraulic ramming and electric motors. This ship is the trails ship for this mount and range finding equipment. So far the guns work well but supply problems have been encountered and the hoists sometimes jam. Water flooded A turret and burnt out her electrics twice and modifications have been made to the front plates. The 37mm guns have proved very good in service and standard Army-pattern 20mm guns have been fitted.

Fire Control: One 5m rangefinder and one Mk10 HACS. The 5m rangefinder is a good system and works well. The new Mk10 HACS has suffered with some problems in fire-prediction and traverse is slow but improved motors will be fitted later in the year. Training with this complex mount has been slow and technical staff need retraining to enable quick repairs to be made in combat.

Torpedo Armament: Everything checked and works well.

Anti-submarine weapons: The two depth-charge racks and six depth-charge throwers are fitted. An Italian Langhiri-Florisson set is fitted for anti-submarine work.

Radio and other navigational equipment: Radios work well and flying boat homing receivers have been fitted and extensively tested. Long range sets still suffer from some interference. Compasses etc all tuned and working well. Covered bridge is well equipped and working well. Window wipers have been fitted for use in poor weather. Open bridge has identical equipment (expect steering apparatus). Internal telephone system still has some problems. Protection is 70mm over the forward arc.

Engines and other machinery: Given the hard work to perfect the Standard Propulsion Unit there has been no major problems. The turbines are running very well. Boilers are fine and working well and oil consumption is falling as they break-in. Bilge pumps working well and one diesel generator had to be replaced. The electric system is fully functional and has been upgraded to deal with the increased power demands of the gun system. Steam powered capstan for anchors have been fitted and tested.

Performance: On trials all Cordoba made very good speeds and achieved the contract speed. Her maximum trial speed was recorded as 35.11 kts, the fastest of the class so far. In service cruising speed is easily attained and held for more than four hours.

Crew Habitation: The crew have very good accommodation that is both airy and spacious for oceanic voyages. The galley is well equipped with stoves, ovens, bakery, refrigerators, freezers and tray lifts. Asbestos panels for insulation while being effective have poor brackets and some have come lose in storms. An American air-conditioning system has been fitted. The officers quarters have been fitted with good quality furniture. The Captain's cabin is of very high standard and décor. The crew's wash areas and heads are of a good standard but still are poor compared to foreign ships.

Crew Capabilities: The entire crew is composed of trained officers and sailors from other destroyers and the Mendoza to get the ship into shape as quickly as possible and to complete the technical work needed on the mounts.


MA/R098/33

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Indomita Class Acceptance and Trials Report

Construction quality: These small ships are sturdy and well built but there have been some construction defects. Welding has been used to reduce weight and this is of fair quality.

Armament Notes: The licence built 100mm guns have been very satisfactory in service and two twin mounts are carried with shields. Spray guards are also fitted for heavier seas. Although better than the original Italian mount it is still maintenance intensive. The twin 37mm guns have proved problem free in service. Manual 20mm cannon are also fitted.

Fire Control: One standard 5m rangefinder is carried and two powerful searchlights for nigh-time action and two smaller searchlights on the bridge wings. AA fire-control is poor with no specific range finding equipment.

Torpedo Armament: The mount is as new quadruple type developed from the triple mount used on the Mendoza Class. It trains well but reloading is time-consuming.

Anti-submarine weapons: The two depth-charge racks and four depth-charge throwers are fitted. ASDIC is fitted but no control room has been added.

Radio and other navigational equipment: Radios are working well and flying boat homing receivers have been fitted and tested. Compasses etc all tuned and working well. The well-equipped bridge is open and somewhat exposed to the elements but it is high enough to escape most spray interference. A smaller conning position is below with steering and engine controls. An internal telephone system fitted but it has major problems.

Engines and other machinery: Given the hard work to perfect the Standard Propulsion Unit there has been no major problems. One of these are used on this ship. The turbines are running very well. Boilers are fine and working well and oil consumption is falling as they break-in. Bilge pumps and diesel generators working well.

Performance: All ships met the contract speeds on trials, the maximum trials speed over the measured mile are; Indomita 32.08 kts, Intrepida 32.11 kts and Alerta 32.36 kts.

Crew Habitation: Designed for coastal and short-term voyages the crew spaces are somewhat cramped and ill-equipped compared to the bigger destroyers. The spacious galley is well equipped with stoves, ovens and refrigerators. A small freezer compartment is fitted to Alerta and will be fitted to the fourth ship. Asbestos panels for insulation are fitted to the quarters and mess decks. The officers quarters have been fitted with good quality furniture. The crew's wash areas and heads suffer some problems when used in heavy weather.

Crew Capabilities: The crew is mostly new recruits with a largely experienced armament crew but it is an uphill task to train them within six months to a high standard.

MA/R099/33

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Chaco Class Acceptance and Trials Report

Construction quality: Designed by a private consultancy firm as the best multi-role ship the hull is very strong and adaptable with a large broad margin for carrying extra equipment in the future. No defects have been found so far.

Armament Notes: The licence built 100mm guns have been very satisfactory in service and two single deck mounts are carried with modified shields. All ammunition is carried in ready-use lockers and hull mounted magazines. Manual 20mm cannon are also fitted.

Fire Control: One small 3.5m manual rangefinder is carried and consequently fire-control is poor with no fire-control equipment. The AA Escort variant will carry the Mk10 HACS.

Mine Warfare Equipment: Two rails for 150-200 mines or contact sweeping gear.

Anti-submarine weapons: One depth-charge rack can be fitted for 30 DC. No ASDIC is fitted at present.

Radio and other navigational equipment: Radios are working well and flying boat homing receivers are being added during the year. Compasses etc all tuned and working well. Both the open and closed bridges are well equipped but some equipment featured in destroyers is missing.

Engines and other machinery: Two 500hp diesels are fitted and also one main diesel generator is fitted. All electric systems working well and the engines are breaking in well but oil consumption is still higher than manufacturer's brochure figures.

Performance: All ships met the contract speeds on trials and handle well in rough seas. Turning circle is very small and these ships are very handy.

Crew Habitation: Designed for coastal and short-term voyages the crew spaces are somewhat cramped but the crew describes them as snug and homely and certainly conditions are good. The galley is well equipped with stoves and refrigerators. Asbestos panels for insulation are fitted to the quarters and mess decks and later ships will have air-conditioning.

Crew Capabilities: The crews are being trained in mine warfare aboard Fulton and all crews have had previous sea experience. Morale is very high.

MA/R101/33

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Guardia Class Acceptance and Trials Report

Construction quality: These small ships are sturdy and well built and there have been no construction defects.

Armament Notes: One licence built 100mm single deck mounts is fitted. All ammunition is carried in ready-use lockers and hull mounted magazines. Manual 20mm cannon are also fitted along with a standard twin 37mm mount.

Fire Control: Only hand-held AA type rangefinders are carried like the Corrientes Class. Suitable only for self defence. Four searchlights for nocturnal operations also fitted.

Mine Warfare Equipment: Contact sweeping gear is fitted with powered steam and electric winches.

Anti-submarine weapons: Two depth-charge racks and four depth-charge throwers are fitted. ASDIC and anti-submarine plotting room fitted for a very good performance.

Radio and other navigational equipment: Radios suffer from some interference and flying boat homing receivers have been fitted. Compasses etc all tuned and working well. An internal telephone system not been fitted because of major problems in other ships.

Engines and other machinery: The turbines are a commercial type and have proved rough-running in service and some blades have been lost causing serious damage to the turbines. Boilers are working well and are proving efficient. Steam lines in the lead ship were replaced after they failed during high-speed trials killing six sailors. Bilge pumps and diesel generator working well.

Performance: All ships met the contract speeds on trials over the measured mile. Turning radius is not as small as hoped for, but they handle well in rough waters and steep swells.

Crew Habitation: Crew spaces are quite spacious and well equipped and lined with asbestos panels for insulation The spacious galley is fully equipped. with stoves, ovens and refrigerators. The officer's quarters are somewhat Spartan compared to other ships, officers have made complaints. The crew's wash areas and heads suffer some problems when used in heavy weather.

Crew Capabilities: New recruits mixed with experienced men off the older torpedo boats and they are getting along well and all training is on schedule.

Report on Naval Exercises Dec 15-23 1933 Operation Orange Thresher

To: CoS Marina Argentina, Min of Defence, CinC Infantería de Marina, CinC Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina, Admiral Inspector Training, Admiral Inspector Gunnery, Adm. of Fleet and Commanders of all combat formations

Ref: M132/Re79/33

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FORCES TAKING PART (BLUE FORCES FRIENDLY RED FORCES EMEMY)
BLUE Forces
2nd Battleship Squadron PATAGONIA and PAMPAS (Almirante Peablo), 1st Cruiser Squadron VEINTICINCO DE MAYO and ALMIRANTE BROWN (Vice Almirante Dominguez), 1st Destroyer Squadron five Mendoza Class (Contra Almirante Gomez), 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron (Capitan de Navio Bahia) and submarine Salta

RED Forces
1st Battleship Squadron LIBERTAD and CAPITAN GASCÓN (Almirante Bendicto), 2nd Destroyer Squadron six 1916 Class Destroyers (Capitan de Navio Roho), 2nd Cruiser Squadron HIPOLITO BOUCHARD, ESPORA (Contra Almirante Bouchard) and 3rd Destroyer Squadron HEROINA, SARANDI and CORDOBA (Vice Almirante Higgins)

JUDGES
A team of three judges were attached to each fighting ship or one for smaller vessels. All gunfire is of course not live and damage is simulated in accordance with the judge's rules. Smoke shells, practice bombs and blanks were used.

EXERCISE AIMS
I. Red Force to simulate an attacking fleet from Eastern Atlantic. Red Force's main aim is to destroy the heavy units of Blue Force and use destroyers to dominate the coastline and stop merchant traffic.
II. Blue Force is to destroy the Red Force and conserve heavy units for further fighting, that is losses must be minimised.
III. Blue Force has shore-based seaplanes to act as reconnaissance forces in consort with light forces.
IV. To test suitability and tactical aims of submarines.

BATTLE REPORTS

I. Dec 15 Summary

Setting up of Red Force some 500 miles west of Argentina mid ocean. Blue heavy units in place cruising off Bahia Blanca by nightfall and full escorts in place by the morning of the 16th, submarine Salta began cruise at 10:20am

II. Dec 17 Reconnaissance Operations

Squadrons No 4 and No 5based at Naval Air Base Bahia Blanca equipped with eight Westland Wapiti V floatplanes and twelve Fokker T.IVa seaplanes respectively were making frequent aerial patrols. Four Wapiti floatplanes were based aboard the cruisers Veinticento de Mayo and Almirante Brown. The Fokker's flew in pairs and several times tested the flying boat homing receivers aboard the Mendoza Class ships. This allowed them to head directly to where the seaplanes had spotted a potential target and were circling until surface forces arrived.

Salta was some eighty miles west of the main Blue Force and was searching on the surface most of the day.

III. Dec 19 First Day of Battle

The Red Force under the command of Almirante Bendicto was now in formation, Libertad and Capitan Gascon in line astern steaming at 19kts roughly SSW heading towards southern Argentina. The cruisers Hipolito Bouchard and Espora under the command of Contra Almirante Bouchard were stationed either side of the battleships on the forward quarters and the 3rd Destroyer Squadron was acting as close escort. The 2nd Destroyer Squadron was some fifteen miles further west acting as the reconnaissance screen and Capitan de Navio Roho was in overall charge of the destroyer screen. He spread his ships out line abreast some six miles. It was these ships Captain de Navio Mendez saw late that afternoon.

At 15:36 lookouts on the conning tower spotted one of the destroyers some eight miles distant heading directly for them. Mendez ordered a crash dive and he stopped his engines. Now silent he waited until the destroyer passed nearby. As it thundered overhead he put his recent German practise into play. He rose to periscope depth and continued along her wake so the destroyer could not pick him up. Carefully raising his periscope he identified the destroyer as a 1916 type, they all lacked ASDIC. His First Officer asked why they did not attack, "because those are just the little fry, behind them are the battleships, steer green 106 and let's see what follows them." He surfaced and made a quick sighting report to Almirante Peablo before submerging. At 16:43 the Libertad came within 8,000 yards of the Salta and Mendez made two perfect torpedo attacks. Such attacks were filmed through the periscope but not included in the final battle tally because no weapon was fired and verifying the claim would force the sub to surface but such action was evaluated after the exercise in accordance with the objectives set out. At 17:04 the Cordoba making a regular sonar (all three 3rd DS ships have Italian sets) search picked up the Salta as Mendez was manoeuvring for an attack on the Gascon. At first the Captain was inclined to see it as a false alarm with the crew still being rather green. Then three minutes later Heroina also picked up the sub on her sonar. Vice Almirante Higgins then left the convoy at 26kts and Cordoba followed, the Italian ASW supervisors astern watched their men ready the depth charges.

By now Captain de Navio Mendez knew he had been found and his hydrophones picked up the two speeding destroyers and the sonar pings. He crash dived to 100 metres before making evasive action. It was the start of a two hour game of cat and mouse. Heroina expended twenty-four depth charges and Cordoba eighteen before Salta was declared sunk by the judges. The clicks of the firing pins were heard (the dummy DCs had no HE only ballast but the firing pins were intact) close enough and the judge aboard Salta declared the battle over and she surfaced. Although this action was unknown to the Blue Force until the end of the exercise it had some consequences. Only Sarandi was left with the battleships and it was some five hours before the other two could rejoin the main force thus leaving the force without adequate protection. Salta had proved enough intelligence for the Blue Force to close into his position.

Almirante Peablo aboard Patagonia now had a choice to make. His Staff Navigation Officer Capitan de Corbeta Calvera had plotted a rough interception course; the two fleets would meet at 02:20am. This was at full speed, Peablo could slow down and intercept after dawn but he felt that if the enemy fleet changed course he might miss them so he wasted no further time and ordered the fleet to change course and speed was set at 30kts. Patagonia and Pampas were line astern with the 1st Destroyer Squadron's five Mendoza Class destroyers in a V formation some six miles ahead. Contra Almirante Gomez was ordered to make a torpedo attack only when ordered by Peablo personally. The 1st Cruiser Squadron under Vice Almirante Dominguez detached and joined forces with the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron commanded Capitan de Navio Bahia to make an attack from the north. These two formations met just after midnight and took a more northerly course as Vice Almirante Dominguez felt the Red Force might have changed direction. He failed to tell Peablo of his decision.

IV. Dec 20 The Battle

At 01:40 Vice Almirante Dominguez ordered his force to change direction further south and within six minutes they clashed with the destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron. Capitan de Navio Roho ordered his ships to attack at once the enemy force while he radioed the situation back to the main force. Almirante Bendicto had his three destroyers move ahead of the convoy with the two light cruisers to act as a light screen to defeat what he believed to be an enemy destroyer force.

The 2nd Destroyer Squadron were so spread out that no concentrated attack was made but rather a series of individual clashes. Both sides used a large amount of starshell to illuminate each others ships. Not being designed for oceanic service the Corrientes Class torpedo boats were well awash at high speed and their light armament was no match for the five 100mm guns on the 1916 Class destroyers. Three of the five boats were soon declared sunk or disabled and only the firepower of the two cruisers forced Roho to retreat and regroup to the south, one destroyer being claimed as heavily damaged. By now Veinticento de Mayo and Almirante Brown were within the range of Libertad and Gascon's 14in guns. They turned south and unleashed three full broadsides, not having any flashless cordite the rangefinders on the battleships were temporarily blinded. Roho's destroyers used their searchlights and fired nine rounds of starshell to highlight the cruisers and Vice Almirante Dominguez was soon outgunned and four hits were claimed on Almirante Brown. He radioed Peablo for help at 01:57 but Peablo did not understand the message, he thought Dominguez was some ten miles north of him, and he could see no nearby battle. He realised something was wrong and the force went to 31kts and steered towards a pink glow on the horizon. Not the sunrise but the battle now in progress.

The two surviving torpedo boats under the command of Capitan de Corbeta Jachinto made use of the dark to head towards Gascon but within 6,000 yards and ready for a torpedo attack they came under rapid fire from Cordoba's 115mm guns and soon Heroina arrived to sink the other torpedo boat. Not one torpedo was fired. Dominguez had Veinticento de Mayo sunk under him by Roho's destroyers that made a successful torpedo attack after the judges declared her immobile. Almirante Brown was also declared abandoned after six more 14in hits that would have penetrated the hull over the engine spaces. At the cost of one of Roho's destroyers the Blue Force had been annihilated by bad luck and overwhelming firepower.

Contra Almirante Bouchard now implored Almirante Bendicto to regroup and leave the area but he decided against this. He felt the enemy force was just a reconnaissance group and he continued SSW straight into the advancing Blue Force. The five 1916 Class ships formed a V ahead of Libertad and Gascon while Hipolito Bouchard and Espora sailed just aft of the destroyers to add gunfire support. The 3rd DS was detached to the starboard flank to search for any further Blue reconnaissance forces.

At 02:27, nearly on time, the two forces met. The Red Force was still reforming and changing positions and soon panic set in ahead of the battleships. Peablo turned his ships to rake the after port quarter of the Red Fleet while his destroyers detached into line abreast to await the order to attack. Patagonia fired starshell from the S1 100mm mount and this illuminated Gascon, the range was about 18,000 yards and Patagonia opened with a full broadside as she straightened on a parallel course steaming at 30kts, Pampas astern took another two minutes before she fired her guns. Gascon's turrets were trained fore and aft and it took time before she replied, already the 12in dummy rounds had straddled her and she judged to have received at least nine non critical hits. As Patagonia overtook Gascon her forward turrets trained onto Libertad. She was more ready however and her aft turrets lit up the night sky and Patagonia suffered at east two hits on the bow area before she steamed further south to widen range and cut ahead of Libertad's bows forcing her to turn to starboard as well. Soon she was the focus of the guns of both battlecruisers as Gascon's forward turrets still fired at Pampas which was judged to have lost Y turret. Overall however, the battleships had difficulty tracking the faster battlecruisers in the dark. Some thirty starshells were fired by Libertad alone.

Contra Almirante Bouchard ordered his ships to formate for a torpedo attack and at 02:41 the five destroyers headed straight into the Mendoza Class ships of Contra Almirante Gomez's force. Starshell exploded above the lead 1916 Class destroyer and Bouchard ordered his ships to come broadside on for a mass torpedo attack, already though the 130mm guns of the Mendoza's had found the mark and the sea around the two leading destroyers erupted into foam and spray. The two old light cruisers put up stiff resistance but being too slow were left behind as the battle raged further north and they attempted to torpedo Pampas but were beaten back by her secondary guns. It soon became a close-quarters battle and the Red Force launched some ten torpedoes of which three struck home on Rioja which was declared sunk. The two lead destroyers were declared heavily damaged to the point of abandoning ship and Contra Almirante Bouchard was out of the exercise. The two remaining destroyers decided to turn north and escape and three Mendoza Class ships followed leaving Contra Almirante Gomez aboard Mendoza to protect the flank of Patagonia. The two 1916 Class ships led the Mendoza's straight into the three powerful destroyers of the 3rd DS and another battle was joined which lasted another 45 minutes and resulted in no further losses for either side but the Mendoza's were now nearly out of ammunition and withdrew to the south as the Red destroyers regrouped to the north and headed back to the main force.

These sideshows had an impact on the main battle now raging. Peablo had lost his torpedo strike option now his destroyers were tied up and Bendicto had lost his counter-attack option and it was now a slugging match to the end. The two battlecruisers and the two battleships began to fight in a circle, the slower battleships making 21kts at best on the smaller inner arc and the battlecruisers at 29kts on the outer arc keeping the distance at 13,000 yards. The 14in guns were making several big hits and Pampas had both after turrets knocked out and her speed reduced by eight knots with one boiler room knocked out. Gascon had several secondary casemates knocked out but her main guns were intact. Peablo in the conning tower of Patagonia knew his ships were outgunned and he decided to withdraw to preserve his force. At 03:18 he broke off and Patagonia and Pampas withdrew to regroup with the destroyers and head further west as Bendicto followed some nine miles behind.

V. Final Actions

As the sun rose the Red Force was highlighted and in the darker west Peablo moved his ships so there courses diverged slightly. At first light he radioed to shore to send every available aircraft to attack the enemy force. His intention was not to sink the ships but break up their formation so his destroyers could get in a telling torpedo attack supported by his guns. At 10:12 the first of nine Fokker T.IVa seaplanes made their level bombing runs which scored no hits, two accidentally attacked the Blue Force. Bendicto made no course change and the ships steamed on in formation, Cordoba the best equipped AA capable ship in the fleet claimed one aircraft shot down by her 115mm guns. The gunfire was heavy but largely inaccurate from the other ships. At 10:20 Peablo steamed to intercept at 31kts. At some 35,000 yards he opened fire and covered his destroyers which made a classic torpedo attack under a smokescreen. They fired twenty-one torpedoes before breaking off and heading back toward the battlecruisers. Two hit on the Libertad forwards and she was deemed to be slowed by eight knots and A turret's magazine was flooded. Bendicto ordered his destroyers to attack and his two cruisers stayed with him but the Blue Force kept out of reach and no further action was joined that day. At 16:02 Bendicto unable to shake Peablo turned east, the exercise was over.


LESSONS

I. The Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina put up better performance but improvements are still needed. The direction finding equipment fitted to the various smaller ships works and the reconnaissance capability is very good but the ability to strike is very poor. Bombing accuracy was still poor and more training is needed. The purchase of medium bombers and torpedo bombers is advised as the main striking force leaving the less manoeuvrable seaplanes for scouting.

II. Gunnery is of a high standard aboard all vessels and all types and the fire control equipment is working well.

III. More Anti-Aircraft Escorts are needed and more ships must be fitted with the HACS Mk.10. Ships gunnery outfits must be upgraded before 1937.

IV. The Naval Staff still believes the torpedo is the main weapon to sink or severely cripple ships. The 600mm torpedo must be standardised across the fleet, more tubes must be fitted and reload capability is essential aboard destroyers. The current method of restricting a broadside to save torpedoes weakens an attack and the non-ability to reload restricts the destroyer to just a single attack. More torpedoes are needed to ensure a hit at greater distances. The Naval Staff recommends the designing of a new type of Torpedo Destroyer to overcome these difficulties.

V. As in previous exercises intercepting a force at sea without good intelligence is almost impossible unless luck and chance are positive factors. Aircraft have proved a great help and the successful use of destroyers can provide a successful screen but this does reduces the long-range capability which only aircraft can provide.

VI. The submarine has proved itself of some worth but the full potential is yet to be explored. The Salta provided excellent intelligence and proved itself as a successful reconnaissance tool. The unit was sunk by Italian equipped destroyers and while this reflects greatly on the good training provided by Italian advisers the sinking of a capital ship easily balances this out. The Salta was the only unit to sink any heavy unit during the exercises, even though not counted in the tally in a real action such a loss would have forced the RED force to turn back or change their objectives. The Naval Staff recommends increasing production from the current six boats planned to eight.

VII. The Corrientes Class torpedo boats have confirmed themselves as useless except in coastal waters. The Naval Staff recommends the procurement of a new cheap torpedo boat design.

VIII. More use of radio intelligence must be used. Transmissions must be intercepted and evaluated and if possible bearings taken of the origin of transmission. Such information could aid search and interception as well as revealing enemy strengths. More training in this area is needed.

IX. The destruction of the detached Blue Force was entirely down to poor communications and the failure of Vice Almirante Dominguez. Such conditions cannot be allowed in real warfare. All Commanding Officers must inform their superiors if undertaking improvised actions and they must seek advice before hand. The Naval Staff recommends that Vice Almirante Dominguez should not be relived of command but rather disciplinary action taken and intensive tactical training undertaken.

X. Night fighting is very difficult and training must begin to enable the fleet to fight in such actions. For an attacking force night brings excellent tactical surprise and to the defender this is deadly. Illuminating the enemy is problematic. Starshell offers a better lighting solution and behind the target can show a good silhouette or it can illuminate the attacker if not fired accurately. During the battles masses of starshell was used and this lit the whole area quite well which aided both sides. Searchlights are good for surprise pin-point illumination but they reveal the attackers position and rangefinder crews found the searchlights did not dazzle them and so this aspect is less important than previously thought. The lack of flashless cordite for the main guns on most ships is also a drawback both giving an aiming point for the enemy and disrupting the gunner's sight.

Appendix I Biographies of key personnel

Contra Almirante Gomez; age 43; born 1890, joined Navy in 1910 and became an officer cadet in 1914, graduated 1917 and joined the Cruiser force and from 1925 commanding the cruiser Nueve de Julio. He saw action in the 1921 war serving aboard La Argentina when the ship was sunk he rescued three trapped sailors below decks earning him a bravery award. In 1931 he served as a commander 3rd Destroyer Squadron as a Contra Almirante. A cruiser officer by heart he favours the gun over the torpedo but always acts with the élan of a destroyer skipper and believes in innovative action. He is a close friend of Murphy having been at College together.

Contra Almirante Bouchard; age 39, born 1896, largely a desk bound officer for most of his career he only went to sea in the aftermath of the 1921 war and served aboard the cruiser fleet , in 1928 he rose to Captain de Navio and commanded the Almirante Brown in 1930. He was promoted Contra Almirante last year after completing the tactical course at the Naval College. He has specialised in screening and reconnaissance operations and he largely masterminded the hunt for the pirate ship Intrepida.

Captain de Navio Mendez; age 31, born 1902, served on destroyers since joining the Navy in 1922, rose to command a destroyer in 1927 and in 1930 promoted to his current rank he was chosen to head the Submarine Section of the Naval College and he went aboard to Germany for specialist training. He returned in late 1932 to head the course and in April 1933 was selected to lead the Submarine Squadron. He believed strongly in the purchase and operation of submarines since his the start of his career and few in the Navy know who to use them better.

To: Chief of Staff of the Navy Adm. Jacinto Pablo Peablo
Defence Minister Vice Adm (ret). Juan Perez Benedicto Hood

MR/T172/34

TOP SECRET

Lessons of Riverine Operations and Future Requirements

Armament: The 155mm and 75mm guns fitted (standard army guns on naval mounts) have proved satisfactory in service. Powerful artillery able to silence most fortifications and suitable for counter-battery work. 75mm can also fire useful AP shot.
The use of standard Italian pattern 37mm AA guns will increase to provide rapid fire able to break up most infantry attacks and disable other river vessels built of wood or light metals. AP shot will also be provided. 20mm cannon will supersede 13mm Browning HMGs for anti-air and anti-infantry roles. More 81mm mortars for support missions are needed when they become available. Boats armed with heavy and light weapons are required to support each other as both have different tasks and both cannot be done satisfactorily in one hull.

Propulsion: Diesels are preferable but wood burning boilers may prove useful for smaller patrol craft. Petrol engines will not be used because of the fire risk.

CLASSES
Motor Gunboats
Type 1A River Gunboat (wood) 19 tons, 17.5/3.2/0.6m, two 150bhp diesels 12kts, 2x20mm 4x7.92mm MG, 12 crew. A useful patrol design but limited attack ability but capable of destroying light river craft.
Type 3A River Gunboat (wood + steel) 27 tons, 19/4.8/0.6m, two 150bhp diesels 11kts, 1x37mm 1x20mm 3x7.92mm MG, 19 crew. An enlarged Type 1A with 37mm cannon, still under armed but still a useful armament for patrol duties.
Project 612 Type 6A (Italian MZ1) transport with bow ramp (3x20mm), B supply/tender for MTB (1x37mm 3x20mm) and C fire support (1x75mm M1931 1x 37mm 2x20mm 4x7.92mm MG 4x81mm mortars). Transport for Marines for assault and general transport duties, one supply tender variant will be issued to each MTB/MGB squadron by 1940. The fire support variant may be replaced by Project 611 boats but it offers great firepower in the attacking role, not so useful for defence.
Type 7A River Gunboat (wood + steel) 27 tons, 19.2/4.8/0.65m, two 150bhp diesels 11kts, 2x37mm 2x13mm HMG 2x7.92mm MG, 21 crew. Planned improved Type 3A with two 37mm cannon.

Gunboats
Parana Class: Badly in need of updating or replacement. Parana now in drydock will be rebuilt with modern diesel engines and standard Army 155mm and 75mm guns to bring her up to a modern standard. Rosario unlikely to be refitted but replaced (see below)

Patria: Awaiting surveyors report to establish if economic repairs can be carried out. If not plans for two replacement gunboats (Project 614) have been made equal in firepower to the Los Andes Class but with deck and belt armour sufficient to defeat light AP and HE projectiles.

Los Andes Class: Modern and immensely powerful with four 155mm guns and three 75mm guns but no armour makes these vessels vulnerable to mortar and artillery attack.

Chaco Class: Planned gunboat variant cancelled.

Project 611: Two new Squadrons to be formed with a mix of types. Each will have three 611L2 and three 611L3 boats. The 611L2 is armed with two 75mm guns with armour around the bridge; these will support the 611L3 with three 37mm mounts of undecided type with similar armour.

We are short of capable craft for patrol missions with the necessary firepower and the Committee recommends replacement boats are acquired as soon as possible to augment the gunboat fleet while new construction takes place. Funds are requested from the 1933 Destroyer Class to enable these plans to reach fruition sooner because of the immediate tactical need of this branch of the Navy to support the Army's operations.