2. Light Surface Force Operations
-Two revolutionary MAS against SR M-13, M-24, off Calapan, Mindoro, 26 February 1929
-Two revolutionary MAS against SR M-21, M-22, M-30, off Nasugbu, Luzon, 15 March 1929
-SR M-21, M-30, M-32, M-33 in support of a commando raid at Boac, Marinduque, 9 April 1929
-One revolutionary MAS vs SR M-13, M-32, M-38, off Roxas, Mindoro, 10 April 1929
-Interdiction operations, Sibuyan Sea, 8 March 1929 to present.
The Filipino Revolution was the first occasion in which Indian motor torpedo craft were used in combat. Eight motor torpedo craft were initially deployed, using a requisitioned Formosan ferry as a tender. Two additional torpedo craft were moved to the area of operations after the mid-March action.
The flotilla was charged with three missions. First, it was to search for and destroy revolutionary MAS craft rather than expose fleet destroyers to this risky task. Second, the flotilla was to investigate coastal traffic in the northwestern Sibuyan Sea and detain any vessels involved in transporting revolutionary troops or supplies. Finally, the boats were used to deliver army commandos on raids against land targets.
Events demonstrated that the motor torpedo boat, while the best available option for these missions, was not the best option overall. Configured for attacking larger vessels with torpedos, they were underarmed for combatting MAS craft with light cannons and machine guns - hence the loss of two MTB to one MAS in the three actions, despite having numerical superiority on both occasions where a boat was lost. The MAS, with a medium caliber gun and two twenty-five millimeter cannons, significantly outgunned the smaller MTB with their two fifteen millimeter cannons and two machine guns.
The raid at Boac was a dismal failure. Four MTB carrying two platoons of commandos were supposed to execute a high speed run into a wharf and then provide fire support to the commandos as they struck a rebel command post. Once detected - one assumes from the engine noise - and taken under fire by shore batteries, the boats lacked the firepower necessary to suppress protected gun positions, and lacked the protection and durability necessary to withstand much fire from those positions. The loss of one boat and a quarter of the commandos must be considered relatively light under the circumstances, and I approve of the quick decision to abort the attack by the strike leader.
In both situations, an exclusively gun-armed boat with some combination of eighty-eight, seventy-five, and thirty-five millimeter guns would probably have fared better against their opposition. On the other hand, in the interdiction role, the presence of torpedos was necessary as a real incentive for suspect vessels to submit to MTB command. This operation utilized two-boat patrols, sometimes guided by aircraft, to detect ships that might be trafficking men and material to Luzon to oppose the loyalist ground campaign. If a suspicious vessel was detected, one boat would circle at a distance while the other closed to make a visual inspection and provide verbal orders. If a vessel did prove to be under revolutionary control, it was either escorted to a friendly port or a destroyer was called in to take aboard prisoners and scuttle the vessel. In this fashion, seven successful intercepts resulted in the capture of approximately nine hundred soldiers, thirty artillery pieces, and a considerable amount of ammunition.
From the logistical perspective, the use of a tender was essential for operations. The flotilla commander has reported that the arrival of the Jagan Rane in early June has made for a huge improvement over the improvised ferry, despite Rane’s new condition and inexperienced crew. The accommodations are better and the fuel and munition transfer systems more efficient. Rane’s workshops sufficient to deal with light-caliber arms damage, and obviate the need for damaged MTB to journey to wherever the repair ship Otta happened to be - generally up near Iba, well away from the MTB’s usual operating area.
Recommendations
-The captured revolutionary MAS (the one supposedly destroyed on 19 March) should be extensively tested at sea and examined in drydock to gauge its capabilities. There should be an effort to maintain operational security as the capture of this boat is not public knowledge.
-The navy should develop a “motor gunboat”, geared specifically at the destruction of enemy light craft. These craft should train for aggressive hunter-killer operations.
-Operational experiences from the flotilla complement should be collected and incorporated in the training regime, and should also be used to guide future MTB design developments.
-The navy should continue acquisition of the Jagan Rane class tenders and practice the deployment of such vessels and their “flock”.
-Future exercises undertaken by the Navy should seek to integrate MTB operations where possible.