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1

Saturday, August 27th 2005, 10:39pm

Assorted pieces of information

1. Deals with foreign powers

2. Anti-Submarine Warfare

3. Italian Destroyers

4. Underwater protection

5. Sapir Report

6. Patents

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Saturday, August 27th 2005, 10:49pm

1. Deals with Foreign Powers

i. Lease of Dante Alighieri and San Marco to Turkey. Completed

ii. Rebuilding of Ulic Ali Reis 20% profit, Complete and paid for.

iii. Sale of plans for Spica Class TB, 130mm and 37mm guns. 0.5pts total. Complete and paid for.

iv. Sale of plans for abortive CLV to Philipines. 0.1pts paid. Complete

v. Building of 2xVeinticinco di Mayo Class Cruisers for Argentina at 20% profit. Complete and paid for.

vi. Building of 2xPatagonia Battlecruiser for Argentina at 20% profit. Completed

vii. Sale of Ariete Class to Yugoslavia, Persia and Philipines

viii. Two Ruggiero Class destroyers laid down for Argentina.

ix. Regina Elana and 4 destroyers sold to Siam

x. Two mobile Floating Docks built for Iberia 1933

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Wednesday, May 31st 2006, 1:29pm

[size=5]Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Regia Marina Italiana[/size]



The Italian anti-submarine effort in the world war did not produce great deeds with no submarines being accredited to Italian surface forces. However, there were only a handful of enemy submarines operating in the Mediterranean during this period. The most useful weapon against them were nets and mines. The weapons fitted to RMI warships were depth charges type 50/1917 with an explosive charge of 50kg and a weight of 66kg. These were fitted to destroyers, some escorts and the new MAS (Motoscafi Anti Sommergibili). The MAS proved to be totally unsuited to anti-submarine work, being too small, having insufficient seakeeping and having very temperamental aircraft engines. They have since been used for other duties. The method for detecting submarines relied on c-tubes, mechanical hydrophones which listened for the sounds made by a submarine, then gave a bearing that the noise was coming from. However, the range was limited and the accuracy of the bearing ± 5°. As such, this method was not particularly successful. The depth charges were launched in patterns of 5 when a contact was acquired: two charges either side from a Y-gun and 3 charges from the stern racks. The first vessel fitted was the destroyer Ardito. 23 vessels had been fitted with this method by the end of the war.



1. RN Ardito



2. Y - gun

Post-war, the first destroyers to be newly built were the Navigatori class. As these were scouts, the anti-submarine function was not considered to be as important. A single rack containing 20 depth charges was placed on the stern, along with the hydrophones.



3. RN Giovanni da Verrazzano

The next major development was the Type 115 asdic acquired from the Royal Navy. This used an active system which transmitted a sound and then listened for the echo. The Type 115 was a modified version of Type 114 produced in 1923 to sweep a 180° arc before switching to a localising mode of 5° arc. It had an electrical training mechanism but the system failed to reach acceptable standards in the RN, and was abandoned during the 1920s. One reason for this was its fixed but streamlined steel dome, which limited the ship’s speed to 20 knots, as it crushed above that speed. This set was fitted to the Turbine Class destroyer Aquilone and extensive tests were conducted. The anti-submarine armament remained a single depth charge rack on the stern. As stated above, the system was not successful as it limited the ship's speed to 20knts. The dome was strengthened and streamlining increased until it was possible for maximum speed to be attained.

The next 3 classes of destroyer continued with the world war period anti-submarine equipment. Two new depth charges were introduced in 1927, the 50/1927 and 100/1927 respectively with differences being in weight of explosive. Depth charge projectors of 430mm diameter were included on the destroyer Baleno which increased the pattern size.



4. RN Baleno



5. 430mm projector

There was then a pause in the construction of destroyers which allowed the anti-submarine technology to mature. The next class of destroyers, the Soldati were to be the first to mount all the new systems together.

Mention at this point must be made of the 4 Vespa class corvettes. Their slow speed of 20knts meant that the unmodified Type 115 (named D1 in Italian service) could be fitted. This was alongside 8 x 430mm projectors aft and a single towed torpedo at the stern. 200Hp electric creeping motors were also put in place for silent running at 5knts. The 430mm projectors aft faced towards the either beam of the ship and were loaded with 2 x 50/1927 each. Upon acquiring the target with the D1 sonar, at about 200m range the ship would turn right and fire 8 depth charges in 2 square patterns, one at 100m depth and one at 50m depth. The same attack could then be made with the projectors on the other beam and the torpedo towed through the target area afterwards.



6. RN Vespa

The pause in destroyer construction was taken as an opportunity to improve on the D1 system with the result being the D2bis. This was a thoroughly modern and mature system, with a loudspeaker on the bridge, mechanical range indicator, electric training from either sonar hut or bridge and capable of automatic transmissions. It could also have training returns fed in to the system to allow own ship training at sea. The dome was strong and did not slow the ships, and was not retractable. The range was improved over the D1 with 2000m maximum on trials with an error of ± 1°. The sweep range was increased to 360° but the local mode remained 5°.

The next class of destroyers laid down in 1931, the Soldati class, featured the D2bis system and improved weapons systems as well. Two Gatteschi dischargers were installed aft, which were equipped with six 4-charge trolleys each, which upon command could be dropped into the water. This armament allowed for the contemporaneous dropping of patterns of 8 bombs for a total of 400 kg of explosive which made a “pocket” around the submarine under attack. Inside each group the bombs were set to explode at a different depths (30, 60, 90 and 120 meters) to create a vertical pattern. It was possible to launch all 48 weapons at once creating a 3D pattern around the submarine. Two 430mm dischargers were included on each beam with 8 bombs stored in racks close by. There was a single Ginnochio towed torpedo on the stern. To take advantage of the range of the new D2bis system various ideas were explored in order to fire a weapon whilst the submarine was still detectable. Two units of the Soldati class were altered with each receiving a different experimental weapon. Ascari received two launchers either side of the bridge. The launcher holds 12 rockets with each with a 15kg contact charge. The two launchers create two concentric circles about 500m in front of the ship. Aviere received the new 325mm torpedo. The launching mechanism, which has created some problems in experiments, consists of stub wings with 2 small rockets which give a range of 1000m. Tests with both these experimental weapons are still ongoing and have yet to be proven viable for use on a destroyer-sized vessel.



7. RN Aviere



8. Gatteschi discharger

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Wednesday, May 31st 2006, 1:33pm

[size=3]
Cacciatorpediniere Italiani fra 1925 e 1930
[/size]


-The destroyer is “a small, fast, highly maneuverable warship armed gun, torpedoes and depth charges”

The roles of the destroyer are;
- Protect against torpedo attack from torpedo boats and other destroyers
- Protect against submarines
- Ablility to act offensively with torpedoes
- Protection against aircraft

These offensive and defensive roles have to be balanced on a small hull, which has proven increasingly problematic over the last few years.

1925 Navigatori Classe
The “Navigatori” class of destroyers should be more correctly termed as Esploratori Leggeri, that is to say, Light Scout Cruisers. They follow the pattern set by Quarto, Nibbio, Brindisi and Aquila. They were to be the eyes of the fleet. With the advent of the “Capitani Romani” esploratori, this role has passed, and now the Navigatori have reverted back to more traditional destroyer roles. They are rated as such under Cleito.

Their hull is quite short at 100m, but their beam and draught are greater than other destroyers giving them more stability for the heavy armament. There are 3 duple 130mm/50 mounts on the centreline which are hand-loaded and fire the 32kg HE shell.They are single purpose mounts. Anti-aircraft defense is comprised of a duple 37mm mount aft, and 13.2mm machine guns. There are 6 533mm torpedo tubes mounted in triples and a single rack for depth charges on the stern.

Their machinery produces 44.000shp which gives a speed of 34.5knts at normal load in a light seaway. The machinery is arranged in the unit principle, with 2B-T-2B-T. In practice, their sea speed has been found to be too slow, with a speed of about 29knts in state 4. In addition, they suffer from stability problems because of their heavy armament. Overall, they are considered to be very successful, but too slow.

1926 Turbine Classe
The Turbine class of 8 ships are in effect reduced versions of Navigatori. Their waterline dimensions have been slightly increased, but with far less draught making for a lighter ship. They are rated as 2nd class destoryers under Cleito.

Armament is very similar to Navigatori, but with the midships 130mm/50 being deleted and replaced with a quadruple 37mm/54 mount. Anti-aircraft gun power is increased and the stability problems have been rectified with the deletion of the extraneous 130mm mount. 6X533mm torpedoes and depth charges are still carried.

Machinery output is 40.000shp which gives a speed of 34.4knts in a light seaway, and again a speed of 29knts in state 4. The machinery has been grouped, with 2B-1B-1T-1T which lessens possible resistance to damage. Considering their size, they are relatively successful, but again need more speed. It is well to note that stability problems were solved whilst maintaining a useful range.

1927 Dardo Classe
Essentially, the Dardo Class were repeated versions of Turbine, the only differences being external. The funnels being grouped into one, and a more enclosed bridge being adopted. For the first time, there is also a fire-control director. It is of limited use, being only 3m long.

1928 Baleno
The next destroyer, Baleno was considerably different than previous ships. The hull was longer at 115m, and the draught reduced further. The displacement remained at around 1600tons.

Baleno's armament differs from previous classes. The 130mm/50 gun is the M1928 and fires a heavier 36kg shell. The mountings have high-angle capability, but do not have hoists, instead taking ammunition from deck lockers. This is unsatisfactory for sustained rate of fire, but it was not possible to include hoists on the design. The 36kg shell has been found to be too heavy for sustained firing at high angles, so a 28kg AA-fused shell is included for the first time also. The anti-aircraft armament is improved over Dardo with the inclusion of a triple 47mm/50 mount amidships and 6 Oerlikon FFL 20mm cannons. Offensive capability is also improved, with the use of 8 600mm torpedo tubes in quadruple mounts. There is extra capabilty against submarines, with depth charge projectors and towed torpedoes being used for the first time on a destroyer. A proper fire control director is included, a single Typo 2 being mounted above the bridge.

The machinery output is much lower than previous classes at 36.000shp for 33.9knts. However, Baleno is able to maintain this speed in state 4, giving a speed advantage of 5knts over the preceeding ships. Bunkerage is also increased to nearly 400tons as a result of possible oceanic operations. The machinery layout returns to Navigatori, with 2B-T-1B-T and two funnels. Stabilty is increased over the previous classes because of more attention being paid to layout.

1929 Ruggiero Classe
This next class of destroyers remedies all the problems of the preceeding classes at the expense of size. Unfortunately, it has proven that 2.600tons is necessary for a fully-able destroyer. Sadly, these ships must count as 2nd Class Cruisers under Cleito. That is not a particular problem, as Cleito has granted us plenty of tonnage in that category.

The armament of the Ruggiero's, named after frigates, is the tried and tested 130mm/50 gun. There is provision for 300 36kg shells, but usually 200x36kg and 100x28kg are carried. The mountings are different from Baleno's with completely enclosed turrets with hoists. They are again capable of high-angle gunfire, but sustained fire is possible due to the inclusion of hoists to below decks. Anti-aircraft armament has been able to be increased further. The larger hull is able to mount 4 triple 47mm/50 mounts. More Typo 2 fire control directors are provided. Again there are 2 quadruple 600mm torpedo tubes, but with reloads also availiable. The anti-submarine weaponary has been deleted. This may prove to be a mistake in future.

Machinery output is higher at 56.000shp for 35knts in state 4. It was felt as necessary to include 35knts speed in light of recent foreign developments. The Ruggiero are proper oceanic escorts, and have the range and ammunition storage for this role. The only problem is their size. Is it really worth it to have these escorts, especially when they cost twice as much as Baleno? Limited numbers of the type for special roles will be necessary, as there are certain roles that Baleno cannot fulfill. However, it would be more economical to adopt the Baleno-type as a future model for destroyers.

5

Wednesday, May 31st 2006, 1:35pm

[size=5]Underwater Protection Systems[/size]


Since its invention in the 1700s, the torpedo has become a useful and extremely powerful weapon. It can greatly increase the offensive firepower of a vessel.

Capital Ships sunk by torpedo/mine in the Great War;

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HMS Audacious – Mine
HMS Britannia – Torpedo
HMS Cornwallis – Torpedo
HMS Formidable – Torpedo
HMS Goliath – Torpedo
HMS Irresistable – Torpedo
HMS King Edward VII – Mine
HMS Majestic – Torpedo
HMS Ocean – Torpedo
HMS Russell – Mine
HMS Triumph – Torpedo

RM Regia Margherita – Mine

MN Bouvet – Mine
MN Gaulois – Torpedo
MN Suffren – Torpedo
MN Danton – Torpedo

SMS Pommern – Torpedo

Petropavlovsk – Torpedo

Wien – Torpedo
Viribus Unitis – Mine
Szent Istvan - Torpedo


Most of the capital ships sunk were of pre-dreadnought design and did not feature underwater defense systems. However, the loss of 21 capital ships proves that defense against underwater attack is paramount. By comparison, the number of capital ships lost to gunfire is 4. The RMI must work to improve the underwater defense systems(UDS) for future capital ships.

The most important factor in determining the effectiveness of the UDS is the breadth of the system. This, by necessity, indicates that a beamy hull must be used. Keeping with current models, the B2 hullform looks to be used for future vessels. PedS used the B1 hullform, but since then it has been found that the B2 is a better compromise. Whilst Italy is limited to 40,000tons displacement, a beam of c. 32-33m is the maximum possible using the B2 hullform. A system breath of up to 7m is possible.

Currently two systems are being investigated, the Pugliese system, and the Fíume system. The Pugliese system uses a large cylinder to expend the energy of the torpedo warhead. The cylinder crumples under the impact. The system will be hard to repair and still lets water into the hull. The Fíume system works on a number of cuboid boxes, 1 void, 1 liquid carrying fuel oil and 1 void then the splinter bulkhead. In testing, both systems have been able to withstand up to a 500kg charge. Currently, our largest torpedo has a 750kg warhead. It is impossible to further protect against torpedoes on a displacement of 40,000tons. Even in the event of a successfully contained hit, a large quantity of water will still flood the ship. Eventually, with many torpedo hits, the ship will succumb to flooding.

Neither of these two systems do anything to protect the ends of the ship against torpedo hits. The breadth of the system means that it is only possible to mount it in the middle 60% of the vessel. Which means that a torpedo is nearly as likely to hit the underprotected ends and cause massive flooding. The tunnel-system installed on the Aquila-class Portaaerei gives more than adequate protection to the otherwise extremely vulnerable propellors and rudders. The disadvantages of the system are some vibration at high speeds and the ability to only use a 2-shaft propulsion unit. Experiments are ongoing to try and give a similar level of protection to a 4-shaft unit. For battleships, this system is sadly unworkable, as the barbette for the aft turret interferes with the centrally located shafts. Any capital ship will remain extremely vulnerable to torpedo hits in unprotected areas.

I propose that Italy forgo the construction of additional battleships either until we are in a position as to build ships larger than 40,000tons, or to forgo the construction of battleships entirely.

Where will new battleships be used? The Eastern Med. Indian Ocean, Red Sea and the Atlantic. Of these, the possibilty of torpedo attack in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean is small and would probably come from submarines. It is reasonable to expect 1-2 hits as a maximum, which a new battleship should be able to withstand. However, in the main areas of operations, the EM and Red Sea, torpedo attack from both submarine and surface vessels is much more likely. It is likely that, in a prolonged action, multiple strikes will be observed, with each strike bringing the next easier. In addition, the inability to protect propellors and rudders against torpedo strikes would give battleships an extreme vulnerability faced with small torpedo craft. The RMI had great success with MAS in the Great War. It is known that other navies have a similar capability. The situation is that in the most likely theatre of operations, the battleship is at a great disadvantage. For this reason, more than anything else, I propose to forgo capital ship construction. The June conference into fleet rebuilding declared that battleship construction should be given up on economic grounds, further strengthening the argument against battleships.

The RMI still needs to be able to project power. The other conclusions reached in the June Conference were for the construction of new aircraft carriers and ACRs. The aircraft carrier is able to be protected better against torpedoes than the battleship due to the lack of barbettes which interfere with the depth of the system. It is also possible to protect the vulnerable ends, as seen with Aquila.

The ACR is to be the exponent of torpedo warfare for the RMI. A heavy torpedo battery of 600mm torpedoes is being included on all designs. Our current weapon, the M1923 is a wet-heater powered torpedo with a range of 3500m@35knts. This will become insufficient in the future and a weapon with a range of up to 20.000m is to be desired. The positive side is that the M1923 carries an exceptionally large 750kg warhead. Experiments at Fíume indicate that it might be possible to increase the speed of our torpedoes by 2knts with a more hydrodynamic shape. For extra range, the wet-heater system may prove impossible. Links with the RN tell of their new 24.5” torpedo with a range of 20.000yds@30knts. This is made possible from the use of oxygen-enriched air. I suggest that experiments with various oxidizing agents be carried out to obtain similar or better performance.

A recent study calculated that a modern capital ship will take c. 6-7 500mm torpedo hits to sink. If we take the lower figure as at which a capital ship will be rendered combat ineffective we can extrapolate the following: 500mm torpedo has a warhead of about 200kg. M1923 has a warhead of 750kg, so a ship can only take 1/3 of the hits by a M1923. (This is only a approximation, as the amount of water let into a ship does not only depend on warhead size) This means that a capital ship can take 2-3 M1923 hits before being rendered combat ineffective. The accuracy of torpedo hits in the Great War was about 6%. Now with superior ranging, it might be possible to obtain 10% hits. As such, it would be necessary to expend 20-30 torpedoes to sink 1 capital ship. Current destroyers carry 6 each, and cruisers 6 a side. A SAG of 2xCruisers and 3xDestroyers could expend the 30 torpedoes necessary to sink a capital ship. I propose that the RMI should train to become expert with torpedo warfare to maximise this offensive cabability.

[size=3]Conte de Rosso[/size]

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Wednesday, May 31st 2006, 1:36pm

[size=5]The Direction of Cruiser Construction and its integration into the “New Navy”[/size]


[size=1]By Jacques Sapir and Conte di Rosso[/size]


Cruiser construction is pro-eminent in thinking leading to Fleet rebuilding post-war. Initially cruisers were supposed to play four distinct war roles entailing different specifications:

Strategic scouting (long range, good communication)
Tactical scouting (good armament and protection to fight for information)
Fleet screening (high speed to be combined with DD, good torpedo armament)
SLOC off/def (long range, good armament to dispose off any AMC or trade cruiser).


Peace employment includes training and enforcing political presence.

These different missions traditionally are split into three different cruiser types, the Fast ACR (Pisa, San Marco), armed with 10" guns and with good protection for tactical scouting, the large trade cruiser for SLOC off/def and strategic scouting (which plays little part in Italian thinking), and the small fleet cruiser (Quarto Esploratori types) for fleet screening. Such thinking was explicit during first talks held in winter 1924/25 and have lead to the June 1928 conference about fleet rebuilding. Even if no new major ship construction is seen possible before 1933 for economic reasons, a long-range plan has to be drafted. Capitalizing on the brief clash between Denmark and India, both the fast ACR and the fleet cruisers are seen as vindicated. The trade cruiser is something of a novelty, but plays more on Italian minds as we become closer to Iberia and her overseas territories. However, other naval powers are building large cruisers armed with 8" or 210mm guns (the so-called Cleito-type) and it made sense to assume that any new large cruiser had to be able to fight "treaty" cruisers.

In 1928 thinking has evolved fast. First studies done at the Naval War College demonstrated that iterations of the "treaty" type are weak on armour. The fast ACR could be then a very potent cruiser-killer. At this point carrier-based aviation was becoming a relevant factor both for tactical scouting (hence relieving the need for an ACR or scout cruiser) and for strike, with the development of torpedo-carrying planes. It has to be noted that the Italian Air Attaché in Germany had sent by spring 1927 a complete report about dive-bombing trials done in Germany and Soviet Union. The potential of Dive-Bombers has begun to be appreciated in the Navy by 1928 when a study demonstrated that a 250kg bomb launched at 1500m would be equivalent to a 10" shell. The newly tested two-seat scout aircraft designed by the Fiat company could be turned into a provisional dive-bomber. Quick progresses in aircraft engine design are promising powers between 800hp to 1000hp for mid-30's. Already, there exist existed 2 1000hp engines of Fiat and Isotta-Fraschini design, but development is proving troublesome. Planes able to carry a 500kg AP bomb (equivalent to a 12" shell) or even a 750kg one (equivalent to a 14" shell) could well be at hand by the mid -30s. Combined to torpedo-delivering planes, which are the our much favoured type, it appears that Carrier-based air groups could deliver a considerable punch, or at least a useful hinderance, when ships of the "New Navy" would be completed.

Now it is important to recall what is the main strategic assumption of Italian military authorities. We assume that the country would not face the full strength of a possible enemy (seen by 1928/27 as either the USA, Atlantis, SAE or SATSUMA) because such enemy would have to husband a large part of his naval forces against another major naval powers. Hence a limited fleet could be quite enough to have a deterrence effect, the more so because countries supposed to be possible enemies did not have major naval bases close to Italy apart from France. Hits on capital ships, even if not lethal would imply retreat to well equipped base and would let the enemy at a diminished strength to face his possible other competitors.
Actually, the Minister for Defence and Military Affairs Paulo Yue stated at a Defense Council meeting in March 1927:
"If you can cut your enemy's arm and let him face his other adversaries with just one hand you will make him think twice before attacking a country he can't see as a major military threat for him. Building up our forces to achieve a complete kill against any major world power would then be a waste of resources badly needed in other places. What our country needs is a combination of forces making the prospect of any intervention against us as a protracted and risky business implying such losses, both military and political at home, that the interventionist would be considerably weakened when confronting his opponents in the struggle for world supremacy. In the context of the current world's correlation of forces between major powers this would give a weaker military power like us an effective lever against stronger powers."

Another growing influence on our thinking has been the need to operate in 3 distinct areas; the Meditterenean first and foremost; the Red Sea and Indian Ocean; and the Atlantic and Carribean in support of our erstwhile ally. Even so, the firming up of relations between Italy and the Netherlands has raised yet another possibility, that of operations in the East Indies.
Operations in the Meditterenean are seen to be berefit of BBs. They are seen as too valuable to risk in an environment rich in small craft. However the aircraft carrier-cruiser group gives visibility yet limited expendability, which is seen as essential. The situation in the Indian Ocean is different. With vast ocean to search, encounters are expected to be rare, again lending support to the Carrier-cruiser group to bring an enemy to battle. Warfare in the Carribean and Atlantic is seen to be an extension of the Meditterenean, with sporadic clashes and confused battles. The shorter ranges and larger draughts of our battleships ensure that they will be impossible to use in the Carribean and most probably restricted to operations in the Bay of Biscay and around the Azores. The fast ACR has a perfect environment here in which it can sucessfully both interdict traffic and hunt on the high seas.

A new mission is appearing for the cruiser force, which is Carrier-escort at night and in bad weather against cruisers and destroyers during the opening phases of operations. In bad weather or at night, CVs could encounter enemy cruisers; hence a potent cruiser was needed. Experience in naval exercises with KDM Jutland have shown this vulnerability. But carriers are also to expect air attack and be able to destroy enemy scouting aircraft, hence a good AA platform is a requirement for any CV-escort. The demise of tactical scouting does not translate into the demise of the large cruiser, which can become a specialised CV escort coupled with a trade protector/raider whilst the CV takes on the role of scouting.
With the newly-elected government in 1928, finances have become a important factor too. Some doubts were raised on the cost estimates of a full program with 5 BBs, backed by Zara-type cruisers and 2 aircraft carriers. The cost of this program is roughly £120m. When coupled with the need to improve infrastructure in the EAS, this is unaffordable.
The BB project is already clearly in trouble, despite 1 ship being laid down, as aviators are proclaiming their ability to deliver heavy bombs and torpedoes quite accurately. Politically too the BB project is becoming highly sensitive as there is much muttering in foreign countries over our interests. Internally, there are some factions who would like to make far-reaching liberal reforms than construct vessels of limited purpose. The lack of activity of the Italian battleships in the war has questioned the rational behind their existance. Their only real affect was in shore bombardment; the projection of sea power onto land. This is something naval aircraft are able to do for less cost.
A heavy cruiser force is seen as politically less damaging as a true cruiser race has already developed between Cleito-treaty powers. But, if political angles were to be accepted, then the fast and well armoured battlecruiser was problematical too. Now, in 1928 this project has evolved into a large ship which could grow still. A conference held in June 1928 at the Naval War College reached the following conclusions:

:-BB construction has to be abandoned altogether, as BBs are too expensive and too limited a design.

:-A large CV force (4 new, purpose-built carriers) is desirable and has to be escorted by large cruisers, and fleet cruiser began to mean now a CV-escort type.

:-The Zara type cruiser should be a excellent vessel but is too limited with regard to the 5 roles imposed on it. A reduced version of the A2 design which at the moment is a small battlecruiser with VIII x 10" (4xII), VIII x 130mm, and XII x 100/47 AA, could be scaled down and used for an 8in cruiser.

I propose the curtailing of future battleship construction until such a time when economic conditions allow for a large naval construction program to be instigated. The current fleet of battleships should be sold by 1933 with the exception of the Caracciolo-Class and Lepanto. The older ships are too limited, too small and too slow. The 2 aircraft carriers currently under construction will be completed along with 2 of new construction. A detailed study into the A2 design should be produced for the production of at least 12 vessels by 1933. Initial estimates for this program are of around £50-60m, a significant saving over the battleship program.