From: -Report of Rear Admiral Christian Albrecht Bluhme,
Officer Commanding,
Far East Stations
Kingdom Of Siam.
To: - Admiral Carl Christofer Georg Andrae, C in C,
Admiralty House,
Kastellet,
Copenhagen.
Report of the surface action, Andaman Sea, 23 August 1924.
(All times are local Siamese times, 7 hours ahead of Danish Time)
As had been previously decided, the convoy break-out was planned for 1900hrs on the 23rd of August, to take advantage of the failing light and the worsening weather, and to allow the Berberan Squadron sufficient time to reach a position where it could give support to the breakout. Due to the worsening weather, and some accurate anti aircraft fire from the Indian blockade vessels, the Naval Air Arm’s 3 Gotha WD14’s based at Phuket were grounded by 1600hrs, and could play no part in the break-out, but they had managed to force the Indians to keep their distance and provided crucial details about the disposition of the Indian blockade vessels earlier in the day.
At 1700hrs, all convoy vessels were ordered to make steam, and prepare to leave port on a flag signal from the convoy escort. The convoy was originally made up of 14 vessels, but this was increased to 15 with the late arrival at 1800hrs of the
S.S.Wang Fu, which had made her way from the port of Kantang on the mainland.
At 1745hrs, the Coastal gun emplacements on the heights of Cape Phrom Thep opened fire on an Indian destroyer, provisionally identified as G-122, which was scouting due south of Koh Kaew Yai Island, trying to observe the convoy preparations. The destroyer hastily departed the area amid multiple water plumes, but no hits were observed.
At 1830 hrs, the diversionary squadrons left port to take up positions, ready to aid the convoy’s break-out. The 12 STC’s were broken into 4 X 3 boat squadrons, 1 to accompany the convoy, sailing close to the civilian vessels and waiting until ordered into action by the convoy commander, while the 3 remaining squadrons would operate independently to harass and confuse the Indian blockade squadron, 1 to the North-West, 1 to the West, and 1 due South.
The 3 Cruisers, K.D.M. Bornholm, K.D.M. Jutland, and K.D.M. Gejser, accompanied by the destroyers K.D.M. D10, K.D.M. D11, and K.D.M. D14, made up the main diversionary force, which steamed out of the port area in a South-Westerly direction to draw away the bulk of the Indian blockade.
The destroyer K.D.M. D15, under Captain Poul Hartling, the convoy commander, the torpedo boat K.D.M. Nordkaperen, and the submarine K.D.M. Flora were to accompany the convoy. All the vessels were formed into 3 lines of 5 vessels, and at 1845hrs, set sail due South, trying for the gap that should open up in the Indian line as it moved to intercept the diversionary force. The K.D.M. Flora would stay on the surface among the convoy vessels, submerging only if a threat is encountered.
At 1920hrs, the operators of the Huginn system aboard K.D.M. Bornholm spotted an Indian light cruiser, identified as the Chennai, on a course that would lead her onto an intercept course once she spotted the diversionary force. The Huginn system was shut down in preparation for a surface action, all ships were brought to action stations and the smaller vessels brought into closer formation to disguise their presence.
At 1945hrs, K.D.M. Bornholm and K.D.M. Jutland opened fire at long range on the Chennai, reporting each others fall of shot on the first salvo to help with ranging due to the worsening weather and light conditions. After several minutes, at 1949hrs, from a position to the south of the rest of the diversionary force, the cruiser K.D.M. Gejser spotted and opened fire on the Indian destroyer G-108. By 2015hrs, both Indian vessels had taken several damaging hits, and were attempting to take evading action.
At 2019hrs, the diversionary force were engaged by an Indian light cruiser, identified as the Trincomalee, and a destroyer, possibly G123, steaming due South from a position West of Cape Phrom Thep. At this time the 3 destroyers were directed to steer north and to intercept the new arrivals.
At 2024hrs a call for assistance was received from Capt. Hartling, in command of the convoy, as he believed that his position had been discovered by a destroyer of the Indian blockade to the south. All the vessels of the diversionary force were ordered to turn South-East and make best possible speed to the convoy’s position. The destroyers; which had taken some hits during the engagement, fired a spread of torpedoes to dissuade pursuit by the Indian cruiser and destroyer which had turned away and made smoke when initially confronted by the 3 vessels.
At 2032hrs, a large vessel was spotted by the K.D.M. Gejser off her Port beam.
She turned to investigate as the poor weather made identification difficult, and by 2033hrs was taking fire from what was later identified as the Indian heavy cruiser Hyderabad. As she had been closer to the Hyderabad because of her flanking position in relation to the rest of the diversionary force, she sustained several hits before K.D.M. Jutland and K.D.M. Bornholm were able to bring their forward guns to bear, while holding the Indian cruisers Chennai and Trincomalee at bay with their after guns; and smoke, torpedoes and gun fire from the escorting destroyers and torpedo boat.
At 2040hrs, Capt Hartling signalled that the convoy was taking fire from an Indian cruiser and 2 destroyers, and that he had freed the STC’s to “go hunting!” The K.D.M. Flora submerged and moved to the Port side of the convoy, allowing the STC’s free range on the Starboard side against the cruiser and destroyers. Some of the convoy vessels were hit and 2 had to drop out due to hits to their engine rooms.
At 2044hrs, after scoring several hits on the heavy cruiser Hyderabad, the K.D.M Jutland took hits in return, causing damage to the aft conning position, the upper forward fire control mount, and the bow. The K.D.M. Bornholm was hit aft, destroying the Huginn system, and starting a small fire. Both vessels and their escorts turned away making smoke and firing torpedoes in an effort to open the range, but though no hits were reported on the Indian heavy cruiser, K.D.M. Bornholm was struck twice but mercifully, both torpedoes failed to detonate. K.D.M. D14 was struck astern by 2 shells which reduced her speed and she dropped behind as the range opened. As the only Danish vessel in range she became the centre of Indian interest, and after taking several more hits, Captain Nils Svenningsen was forced to abandon ship and scuttle his ship to prevent capture of sensitive documents and equipment.
The last sighting of the K.D.M. Gejser saw her in a severely damaged state, stationary in the water with fires along her Port side, and the flag signal “ For King and Dannebrog” flying from her main mast.
At 2045hrs, Capt Viggo Jorgensen, commanding the submarine K.D.M. Flora, spotted the Indian torpedo boat T-14 breaking through a squall line on an intercept course for the convoy. He had moments to compute a firing solution, and fired a spread of 4 torpedoes with a 2 degree spacing as the T-14 crossed his bow. After a run time of 50 seconds the first of 2 explosions was witnessed, followed 5 seconds later by a larger secondary explosion. When the smoke cleared, nothing could be seen of the T-14 except for surface debris, and no survivors were sighted by the either the K.D.M. Flora or the convoy lookouts.
At 2055hrs, the STC’s started their runs against the cruiser Delhi. Using smoke they ran towards the Indian cruiser, circling Port and Starboard, disappearing from sight but getting ever closer to their target.
At 2056hrs, the vessels of the Berberan Squadron, under the command of Commodore Anker Jorgensen, entered the battle catching an Indian minesweeper, later identified as Manas, unawares and reducing her to an ineffective hulk with accurate fire from the cruisers K.D.M. Falster and K.D.M. Vaerge within 3 minutes.
At 2105hrs, 2 large explosions were observed on the Indian cruiser Delhi, as the STC’s scored 2 hits on her. They had launched at the Indian destroyer G-127, but the more manoeuvrable vessel was able to evade the torpedoes. The STC’s broke off contact under cover of smoke to open the range and to allow another run on the destroyers.
At 2116hrs, STC section 3 spotted the Indian destroyer G-133 closing at high speed on their position, and turned away making smoke to help with their escape
At 2116hrs, STC section 2 spotted the Indian heavy cruiser Hyderabad and started to make an attack run, however they were spotted before they could close the range. The cruiser turned away at full power and broke contact under cover of smoke and twilight, firing astern to dissuade pursuit by the STC’s.
At 2122hrs, the Indian vessels broke contact wherever they were involved in combat, and steamed away to the North-West, obviously intent on avoiding a night action.
Over the next 30 minutes, the various squadrons came together around the convoy’s position. At this time the cost of the break-out became obvious, the most serious loss being that of the light cruiser K.D.M. Gejser, which was reduced to a sinking state by enemy action. Capt.Hartling requested of those vessels that were able to, that they assist the damaged convoy vessels. The K.D.M. Vaerge, along with the torpedo boat K.D.M. Nordkaperen were dispatched to the location where the Indian cruiser was sinking to search for survivors
Of the 15 convoy vessels, 4 had been damaged; the most seriously damaged being the S.S. Wang Fu. The 3 more lightly damaged vessels were glad of the assistance, but the master of the S.S. Wang Fu was insistent that his crew had the damage under control, despite the fires aft of the bridge. At 2204hrs an explosion was observed aboard the S.S. Wang Fu, and Commodore Deiter Schmidt, O.C. the Phuket Squadron aboard the K.D.M. Bornholm, ordered the S.S. Wang Fu to heave to and accept assistance from the K.D.M. Bornholm’s damage control crews. At 2210hrs, the officer that headed the damage control crew sent to help aboard the S.S. Wang Fu,
Lt.2c Jan Petersen, signalled back to the K.D.M. Bornholm, requesting a squad of marines as he had discovered something of interest, and was meeting resistance from some of the crew.
The Marine party was swiftly made ready and transferred to the S.S. Wang Fu, and the merchant vessel was taken under military control and the crew were detained to allow a full investigation of what Lt. Petersen had discovered, and allow the damage control crew to make the vessel safe.
After approximately 15 minutes, Lt1c. Adolph Erikssen of the Bornholm’s Marine detachment, returned to the K.D.M. Bornholm with some of the goods from the merchant vessel’s holds, to confer with Commodore Schmidt.
At 2230hrs, I received an urgent signal from Commodore Schmidt concerning the discovery of Danish armaments and munitions aboard the S.S. Wang Fu. At this time I informed our Ambassador to Siam, The Rt.Hon. Christian Magnussen, of our discovery and asked him to contact the Indian Ambassador to arrange a ceasefire, pending a more detailed and complete investigation of the Indian allegations following our discovery.
I ordered the whole convoy with escorts back to Phuket, to prevent any contact with the Indians before a ceasefire has been officially arranged. All ships reached Phuket safely and I will prepare a full list of ships that have sustained damage shortly after consultation with the port engineers.
Respectfully yours,
Rear Admiral Christian Albrecht Bluhme