WesWorld

Repository for items pertaining to the forthcoming joint exercise between Indochinese and Philippine airborne forces

The arrival of the Philippine First Parachute Regiment has brought into sharp focus the challenge of the forthcoming exercise; not only will the battalion need to prove itself to the High Command but it will have to represent the Forces de sécurité territoriaux in the eyes of foreigners. Each man knows his duty, and I have no doubts that they will give their best.

I find our guests of great interest; not only in terms of their organization, but in their outlook. The former is more readily apparent to the outside observer, but I have already seen the Philippine troops adapt to their surroundings in unexpected ways. Language differences will be, as one might expect, a handicap in the forthcoming exercise – there is a lack of liaison officers with knowledge of the Philippine dialect of Iberian – but Major Pajota and his men have taken positive action in this respect. Each man of the Philippine detachment has been given a small illustrated phrase book with common French expressions which he is to study – this is not so uncommon – but the sous-officers drill their men on it day and night. According to Major Pajota, they were issued these books on their voyage from Cavite; if so, his men have become quite proficient in a short time.

The Philippine paratroops have a novel organization, the basic unit of maneuver being a small peleton of two-dozen officers and men – apparently sized according to the transport aircraft used by their air service. This unit in turn is subdivided into three combat teams, each comprising a leader equipped with a machine pistol, four riflemen and a machine-gunner with his assistant; the peleton leader, his assistant and a radio operator round out the peleton. Each of the combat companies comprising the Philippine detachment is divided into nine such peletons, with some support weapons rounding out the company. Compared with my own troops, they seem very lightly equipped. Most of the heavier weapons are controlled at the regimental level; they were not included in the detachment sent here.

We will begin tactical exercises in a day or two, depending upon the availability of training areas; and the major phase of the exercise is still dependent upon the availability of airlift. Colonel de Castries has assured me that he is using all his influence with the Air Command in Saigon to make the requisite number of aircraft available, but I fear it will take some days to assemble them.

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-China, 21-22 September 1944

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-China, 23 September 1944

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-china, 23 September 1944

The departure of the advance guard of the 9ème Escadron de Reconnaissance Indochinoise was the signal for the sentinels of the First Para to begin preparations for the reception of the supply convoy, whose appearance was anticipated in mere minutes. A "borrowed" bullock cart, suitably distressed, was wheeled into position at the point where the road left the causeway above the paddy fields and rejoined higher ground, blocking the road to traffic. A small knot of Philippine paratroops in mufti milled about it, giving the impression of peasants arguing of how best to remove it. Several other "peasants" relocated their "work" to that part of the paddy field at the opposite end of the road, in a position to move smartly to block its escape.

The preparations were made none too soon. As the lead armored car of the convoy close escort came down the road and debouched onto the causeway. Its commander, presuming that the local villagers would instantly give way to his vehicle, made no attempt to stop, but rolled forward only to find its way blocked by the bullock cart at the other end. The trucks of the convoy, not knowing of the problem, followed like sheep after the shepherd, only to stop short one after another. The officer in the lead armored car stood in the open hatch, expostulating with the ignorant peasants before him, demanding that they clear the way.

In the lead truck one of the members of the team of umpires thought, "I have a bad feeling about this."

Suddenly the air was cut by a shrill whistle, and from the waters of the paddy fields on either side of the elevated road rose the Philippine paratroops, appearing right beside the trucks seemingly out of nowhere. A deftly lofted smoke grenade fell through the hatch of the lead armored car, while others were thrown into supply trucks along with small sacks of white stone dust, simulating fragmentation and white phosphorus grenades. Drivers were pulled from their seats and found sticky labels bearing the legend "Dead" thrust upon them, while the raiders counted coup on others with similar labels bearing "Wounded". On the far bank the trailing armored car attempted to intervene, only to find itself swarmed by a squad of Philippine paras who pried open the hatch and dropped a smoke grenade inside.

In less than five minutes the convoy was "wrecked", its trucks "burning", its escort "finished". The raiders had suffered loss however - four Philippine paratroops had been designated by the umpires as "dead", and three more "badly wounded".

Major Pajota sounded his whistle again, and the men of the First Para promptly broke off their attack and began to melt back into the rice paddies, to rendezvous at their base camp. They bore with them several "lightly wounded" comrades as well as a few trophies - the guidon of the 9ème Escadron having been detached from the lead armored car among them.

Capitaine Marcel Bigeard, chief of the team of umpires, surveyed the results. "A classic example of how to conduct an ambush, and this is the last place I would have expected it," he thought. A moment later Commandant Quang's support force arrived, and began to assess the situation. Quang strode up to the convoy commander and demanded an answer as to what has happened. "Ah, mon Commandant," said Bigeard with a smile, "Lieutenant Tran is mort de combat; you will have to find someone among the wounded who can answer your question."

That took time, but Commandant Quang did not dally for details. It was obvious that somehow "Red Force" had managed to ambush the convoy in an exposed position, and had melted away out of sight. He sent out scouts to find the trail of the "Red Force" elements, and while the convoy made ready to clear the exercise area, he dismounted his own troops, preparing to follow "Red Force" into the countryside.

"This is not over yet," Quang said to himself. "I still have two more companies in the field, and once I find and pin Pajota, I will teach "Red Force" a lesson better than they have taught me."

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-china, 23 September 1944

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

Capitaine Marcel Bigeard, chief of the team of umpires

Uh oh! ;)

Quoted from "Brockpaine"

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

Capitaine Marcel Bigeard, chief of the team of umpires

Uh oh!

Oui! If he were in command of the pursuing force and not an umpire, Major Pajota would be well advised to be worried. Quang is no poltroon however, merely learning on the job. First Para is not out of the woods yet.

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-china, 24 September 1944

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-china, 24/25 September 1944

As dusk descended on the countryside, Major Juan Pajota knew that his men needed to rest; their march had lasted the entire day, with small respite. His scouts kept him informed of the progress of the force now trailing them – their lead cut to little more than two hours. If the Indochinese paratroops continued their pace they would overtake “Red Force”, handicapped by imperfect knowledge of the countryside. While Pajota had successfully navigated his force this far, trying to do so at night was risking too much.

Thus he decided to find a defensible position and give his men an opportunity to rest; if his pursuers were reasonable and bivouacked for the night, “Red Force” could still slip away at dawn. A night attack by his pursuers was also a distinct probability. So the Philippine paratroops took up firing positions and hastily set trip flares to give warning of the approach of the “Blue Force”. They then sat in their rifle pits, eating cold rations, hoping that “Blue Force” was doing likewise.

Lieutenant Delafond had his own opinions, which he kept to himself, as befitted an umpire. He rated the chances of a night attack by “Blue Force” as a fifty-percent probability – it was what doctrine called for – unremitting pursuit and extermination of the enemy. Whether the Indochinese commanders would call for such exertions from their men was one of the questions this series of exercises was intended to test.

The answer was not long in coming. Contrary to proper doctrine Capitaine Tran Van Bay kept his company moving forward into the night, concentrating on the trail left by the fleeing “Red Force”. His scouts were discovered and “eliminated” by the sentries posted by Major Pajota – having been introduced to the art of escrima. Bay’s column blundered forward and tripped several warning flares – and invited a fusillade of rifle and machinegun fire from the waiting Philippine troops.

Both sides were firing blanks, as befitted an exercise, but to Capitaine Pierre Langlais and his fellow observers, the fire from the “Red Force” position was far more accurate, and much of the return fire by “Blue Force” was misdirected. Capitaine Bay stood up and called for his men to advance; nearby a “Red Force” machine gun answered.

“Capitaine Bay!” Langlais shouted. “Please turn over command to your senior lieutenant. I admire your courage but you have just been wounded!”

Tsk! Captain Bay forgot to use his rifle-grenade launchers and 60mm mortars to fire illumination rounds. (Although the follow-up Whiskey Papa probably wouldn't have been used in an exercise.)

Quoted from "Brockpaine"

Tsk! Captain Bay forgot to use his rifle-grenade launchers and 60mm mortars to fire illumination rounds. (Although the follow-up Whiskey Papa probably wouldn't have been used in an exercise.)

Captain Bay is overly ambitious, or perhaps in need of a good lesson; or, perhaps, he was about to order that when he was cut down. No doubt his second in command will be more cautious, and more wise.

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-china, 25 September 1944

Lieutenant Dau gets booted higher on the list for promotion. Capitaine Bay gets placed on the short list for promotion to the battalion's staff and supply company: eagerness to engage the enemy, good. Sloppiness when engaging the enemy, bad.

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-china, 25 September 1944

Vicinity of Nha Trang, Cochin-China, 25 September 1944

Nha Trang, Cochin-China, 25-26 September 1944

Nha Trang, Cochin-China, 27-29 September 1944