WesWorld

Near the close of 1940 (game time) I prepared a summary of the Kriegsmarine’s near term plans, A Look Forward – From the Sea. Some four game years having passed, it seems appropriate to take a new look at the subject, consider what has transpired since, and lay out the likely course of action for the next quadrennial period.



Summary

The Kriegsmarine has undergone a significant transformation in its doctrine and structure over the last four years. At the present time it is well equipped to engage in operations on an oceanic scale in cooperation with its alliance partners or in defence of national interests. It has settled upon the aircraft carrier as the chief arbiter of battle in preference to the battleship, which it sees as but a part of a balanced task force. It has significantly expanded its force of dedicated antisubmarine warfare vessels, conveying the ability to protect trade on the high seas or to support the fleet in offensive operations. It has created an amphibious warfare arm capable of projecting power in areas considered to be of national interests. It has continued the expansion of its fleet train in all categories, creating a service force capable of sustaining fleet elements abroad without the need to resort to fixed bases. It has also begun to address certain limitations of the naval industrial infrastructure which have conditioned its expansion.

Capital Ships

The four battleships of the Sachsen class were finally completed in the autumn of 1942 and passed into service in the spring of 1943. They are likely to be the last capital ships to be constructed by the Kriegsmarine in the foreseeable future – the core of the fleet being now seen as the aircraft carrier, with capital ships serving in the role of escorts. Fleet exercises carried out in 1943 confirmed that capital ships cannot operate effectively without air cover, while a properly-handled group of aircraft carriers has nothing to fear from a surface battle group. The twelve capital ships available to the Kriegsmarine – the four vessels of the Sachsen class, the four vessels of the Bismarck class and the four battlecruisers of the Blucher/Derfflinger classes, are considered adequate escorts. The last named have undergone recent refits to improve their electronic systems; it is expected that the four vessels of the Bismarck class will also undergo similar refit in the near future.


Aircraft Carriers

The two large aircraft carriers referred to in the prior A Look Forward – From the Sea study passed into service as the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the summer of 1944. They were preceded by two smaller aircraft carriers, the Wallenstein and Pappenheim, whose primary missions are to provide air cover and antisubmarine protection for a carrier task force, allowing the larger vessels to concentrate on offensive operations. The number of aircraft carriers in the Kriegsmarine’s service has thus trebled in the last three years, and is destined to continue to grow. At the present time four vessels of the intermediate-sized Großer Kurfürst class are under construction, with two due to complete next year and a further pair the following year. Moreover, the Admiralstab has requested including of a further two large aircraft carriers in the 1945 construction programme. If acted upon, this would raise the size of the Kriegsmarine’s operational aircraft carrier force to twelve units by 1948.

Several designs for a very small aircraft carrier on the hull of a fast cargo vessel or tanker have been examined; all have been rejected thus far on the basis of excessive cost.

Cruisers

Since completion of the last of the eight Karlsruhe class large light cruisers and the two smaller Novara class trade protection cruisers in late 1941 there has been a hiatus in German cruiser construction. This was broken in early 1944 with the construction of the first of the Dresden class large light cruisers. These are designed first and foremost for screening carrier task forces rather than trade protection or commerce raiding as independent units. Four units of the Dresden class are projected for construction over 1944-45; however, there is considerable discussion as to whether the type will be perpetuated beyond that point. Suggestions have been brought forward for development of a mid-sized vessel to replace both the smaller existing cruisers and the current force of large destroyers employed as scouting units.

The existing force of heavy and light cruisers has seen progressive refits, chiefly the updating of shipboard electronic systems and upgrades to antiaircraft armament where this can be accomplished economically.

Destroyers and Frigates

During the period 1940-44 no fewer than sixteen units of the Paderborn class of destroyers, and sixteen units of the improved Detmold class, have passed into service. They have been followed by sixteen frigates of the Klagenfurt class, all of which were laid down during 1944, and are expected to enter service during 1945. The current frigate design is almost as large as a fleet destroyer, but its armament is designed to provide antiaircraft defence of carrier task forces, with a secondary role of providing antisubmarine defence. The Kriegsmarine sees the principal difference between the destroyer (zerstörer) and the frigate (fregatte) primarily in the latter’s lack of torpedo tubes with which to take the offensive.

The Admiralstab has requested that construction of destroyers be resumed under the 1945 programme, with eight units of an enlarged design being recommended. If past practice is followed, a second such flotilla will follow in succeeding years. Frigate construction is also likely to be continued, with a successor to the Klagenfurt design emerging in 1946.

The existing force of heavy destroyers and destroyers has been completely refit within the last four years, with updated armament and electronic systems (Typ Zerstörer 214) or electronic systems alone. The 12.8cm dual purpose gun is now the standard weapon of the Kriegsmarine’s destroyer force; the Kriegsmarine favours the 10.5cm gun for its frigates and surface escorts (see below) due to its higher rate of fire in an antiaircraft defence role.

The Kriegsmarine has divested itself of its older torpedo boats and the light destroyer type is not expected to be revived, its role being undertaken by frigates or by smaller surface escorts (see below).

Surface Escorts

The Kriegsmarine has introduced the specialised antisubmarine escort vessel or corvette to its order of battle, signalling its recognition of the need for convoy escort against hostile submarine threats. The existing older fleet escorts were reconstructed as the Jagd class, retaining their unique ability to operate a light observation helicopter; the newer vessels of the Leopard class now coming into service are intended to operate in the antisubmarine and anti-air role. Sixteen vessels of this class have been authorised, and the Admiralstab has requested approval for a further eight similar vessels for construction in 1945. It is likely that further vessels would authorised in subsequent years.

The two vessels of the Roter Löwe class, rated as offshore patrol vessels, demonstrates the commitment being made by the Kriegsmarine to trade protection in the widest sense. Intended to operate in the waters of the North Atlantic and Arctic on detached service, these vessels will be equipped to render assistance to merchant vessels in distress, conduct weather observations, monitor and report the movements of icebergs that might threaten shipping lanes and support scientific and climatological investigations near the Arctic ice pack. Present plans do not call for perpetuation of the type, but the design offers great promise.

U-Boats

The Kriegsmarine’s view of the role of the submarine has undergone several changes of emphasis in the preceding four years; the planned replacement of the older Type I and Type IV U-boats with the newer Type IX and Type VII was halted in 1942 after completion of only six of each type. Since then, many of the small Type 1 boats have been disposed of. This change is reflective of the evolving role of the Kriegsmarine within the structure of the Grand Alliance, where defensive submarine warfare – characterised by the small coastal U-boat – is of diminishing importance. The premature retirement of Admiral Karl Dönitz signalled that the commerce-raiding role of the U-boat arm had lost its importance to the sea-control role of the aircraft carrier task forces.

However, joint exercises with the French Marine Nationale in 1943 showed the effectiveness of submarines operating in conjunction with carrier and surface forces. This has led the Admiralstab to re-evaluate its view of the U-boat arm and it has been reported that a new design – deriving from French models – may be brought forward. If so, it is expected that any new design will be larger, have greater radius of action and higher speed than existing boats.

In the interim the existing Type IV boats have been refitted with new electronic detection equipment, and it is expected that the Type VII boats will follow. Disposal of additional units of the Type I has been announced, and it is expected that in the next several years the remaining units will be sold, scrapped or expended. The Type IX boats are expected to be retained for training and coastal defence.

Minecraft

Sixteen minesweepers of the Arendsee class have been constructed and followed by the diesel-engine Avensee class; all are presently in service, replacing old Typ R11 (o) minesweepers of 1930s vintage. The small Arendsee/Avensee class vessels have been succeeded by the larger Attersee class, intended for oceanic service as minesweeper/escorts. The number of motor minesweepers has been reduced by disposal, with only twelve of the Type 1941 Raumboote being built. It is not clear whether the Attersee class will be perpetuated beyond the eight vessels presently authorized, or whether a new design will be drawn up. There is a strong faction in the Admiralstab that sees the minesweeping force as sufficiently well equipped to allow a hiatus in construction at this time.

The minelayer force of the Kriegsmarine has seen significant expansion; the four converted destroyers of the Widder class have been followed by eight converted minesweepers of the Spica class. No purpose-built minelayers have been constructed, and the Admiralstab does not foresee the need for such dedicated vessels at this time.

Coastal Forces

The adoption by the Kriegsmarine of an oceanic stance, together with Germany’s entry into the Grand Alliance, has seen a large scale diminution of the service’s inventory of coastal patrol craft. Only eight of the 1930s vintage Voorpostenboote remain in service, and the Admiralstab has commissioned paper studies for a more capable replacement design. Production of the interesting Type 1940 Mehrzweckboote was halted after only four units, and that of the Type 1941 Schnellboote after only twelve units.

The Admiralstab has taken the position that in peacetime available funding should be allocated to design of suitable craft for series production in time of war. Its stated intent is to commission in small numbers the most promising designs but minimise investment during peacetime.

Amphibious Forces

The last four years have seen the Kriegsmarine establish a strong amphibious warfare component, capable of lifting two brigades of landing troops simultaneously. The anticipated arrival into service of the Wittelsbach class amphibious transports will complete this process. The converted landing ships of the Frundsberg class have confirmed their usefulness in exercises in the Baltic as well as in the recently concluded joint Grand Alliance exercises in North Africa. The tank landing ships of the Delphin class have likewise proved their worth. Production of smaller landing craft is continuing.

Other than small craft, current plans to not call for further expansion of amphibious shipping. In some respects the recent spurt in construction was achieved at the expense of cruiser construction; now that such construction has resumed, large-scale construction of purpose-built amphibious ships has been slowed. Certain elements in the Admiralstab have brought forward arguments for additional tank landing ships but no definitive plans have been put in motion.

Fleet Train and Service Types

The expansion of the Kriegsmarine’s fleet train over the course of the last four years has been the most striking element of its transformation. While construction of the purpose-built Donau class replenishment ships and Lahn class support tankers has been halted, the ongoing conversion of ships taken up from trade has filled its need for tankers and support ships of all kinds.

The conversion of ex-mercantile hulls to fleet oilers (Siegerland class) and fleet tenders (Gustav Nachtigal class) is expected to continue at a reduced pace. In other specialised categories the existing quantities of vessels in service are considered adequate for peacetime operations, but would be augmented by further conversions in time of war.

The lack of smaller service craft- tugs, netlayers, icebreakers and such, has been addressed over the course of the last four years. It has been proposed to construct two multi-purpose tenders under the 1945 programme, but it is unclear at this time whether additional units will be sought.

Naval Infrastructure

The expansion and refurbishment of the Kriegsmarine has been tempered by the availability of adequate dockyard space. These limitations have begun to be addressed. A major programme of expansion is underway at Flensburg, on the Baltic, with construction of two building slips for moderate sized vessels and provision for a floating repair dock of similar size under the 1944 authorisations. Funding for a second floating repair dock has been requested in the 1945 fleet law, and it is expected that a slipway for cruiser-sized vessels will be requested in 1946. It is probable that additional infrastructure projects will be pursued if the international situation allows.

Any consideration of future versions of the Blucher/Derfflinger class ships? At least in my way of thinking, these ships are what I'd prefer to use for long-range sorts of showing-the-flag missions. I'd probably see them as more useful than ships like the Sachsens or the 15cm-armed light cruisers by a significant margin.

Not a question, but rather a comment for public consumption: the 'new German U-boat' design mentioned here is one jointly developed by France and Germany. The French goal is to develop a fleet boat with greater surfaced and submerged capabilities than the last set of fleet boats. The two Roland Morillot class fleet submarines I laid down in 1943 were transitional types between the previous French Protee class and the Emeraude-class.

Regarding coastal forces, that generally mimics my own thoughts - maintain sufficient interest to design suitable craft for series production during wartime. (Indochina represents a bit of a special case on my count - they get a lot more coastal forces because they have fewer senior officers available for oceanic commands, and a greater perceived need for those sorts of roles.)

Unlike France, or some of the other powers, Germany does not have colonial possessions requiring constant patrolling, and "showing the flag" is less of an issue. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Kriegsmarine would perpetuate construction of battlecruisers for that purpose. That said, where necessary, the battlecruisers have been detached from the fleet for overseas missions, if appropriate. If surface units are required to maintain a presence in a region overseas, the four heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class are seen as adequate. If a larger presence is required, it is probable that a balanced carrier task force would be sent. However, the call for such is not foreseen at this point, unless the conflict in northeast Asia escalates.

As to submarines, you are quite correct; to what could be a surprise for some, Germany has actually learned a few things about operating submarines from the Marine Nationale. The new Type XXI boats are a significant improvement over older vessels, and are designed to work with the fleet.

The number of major warships in service permits the draw-down of coastal forces; small battle units are seen as a poor investment at this point. They would, of course, be required in the event of conflict with neighboring powers, as remote as that might seem. Hence the continued interest in designs, and the development of prototypes for war construction.

Quoted

unless the conflict in northeast Asia escalates.

Conflict in northeast Asia? What conflict in northeast Asia? I did not know that anyone was stupid enough to attack the Russians?

... well maybe Mexico would do that but I have not seen that in the news...

Quoted from "Rooijen10"

Quoted

unless the conflict in northeast Asia escalates.

Conflict in northeast Asia? What conflict in northeast Asia? I did not know that anyone was stupid enough to attack the Russians?

... well maybe Mexico would do that but I have not seen that in the news...

I speak of the little squabble between your allies, China and Chosen. Since the conflict appears to be interminable, I have no idea when and how it will end; if it even does.

I call that East Asia. Russia covers the whole Northeast of Asia.

IIRC, there is only a ceasefire between North and South Korea and how long ago was that war? Who knows where the Sino-Chosen war will end up?

Quoted from "Rooijen10"

I call that East Asia. Russia covers the whole Northeast of Asia.

IIRC, there is only a ceasefire between North and South Korea and how long ago was that war? Who knows where the Sino-Chosen war will end up?

It is all a matter of perspective.

Not really. It is considered East Asia "as defined by the UN" (quoted from wiki).


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Locati…Nsubregions.png

... so I guess your perspective does not match reality.


As for the conflict escalating... as long as it remains within the borders of Chosen and China and does not spill over the Line Of Death (= Japan-Taiwan-San Hainando) when it comes to Naval Warfare, it will be a well-contained conflict...

... but that is Japan's perspective I guess.

Interesting post and lots to think about. I’m sure part 2 will have more doctrine and strategy so I might be jumping the gun a bit but I’ve a few questions from a British perspective.

What is the rationale for this powerful fleet? Whom is it defending against and what out of area operations does it seek to get involved in? I see a lot about the North Atlantic and the Arctic but little that would suggest a fleet ready to sail beyond into the Pacific in strength even with the recent build-up of auxiliary support services. Given the sheer size of the GA such interventions would occur thousands of miles away in other continents, continents other GA powers already have forces stationed and ready. I would have expected the GA nations to have begun to rationalise their navies, but instead it seems all the GA navies are continuing to build up naval power regardless of existing forces and likely benefits each could bring to a combined taskforce. I wonder what Germany’s role is within such a GA taskforce?

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Fleet exercises carried out in 1943 confirmed that capital ships cannot operate effectively without air cover, while a properly-handled group of aircraft carriers has nothing to fear from a surface battle group.

I agree that capital ships need air cover but I wonder how well that rationale would last in confined waters like the Baltic and North Seas or the Med where much more powerful shore-based aircraft forces can be deployed relatively easily and exhaust the carrier escort. Also in the North Atlantic and Arctic seas weather can be rough, you can’t assume that carriers can maintain or provide effective air support against surface forces all the time in those harsh conditions.

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Admiralstab has requested including of a further two large aircraft carriers in the 1945 construction programme. If acted upon, this would raise the size of the Kriegsmarine’s operational aircraft carrier force to twelve units by 1948

That’s a big carrier fleet. Matches the RN’s fleet which is stretched across the entire globe (I’ll admit the RN should have around 14 carriers by 1948 but around a third will be for trade protection). How can Germany justify such a large fleet of offensive power sitting at anchor when it has no peacetime global role and no overseas bases and no reasonably-likely enemies to defend against?

Quoted

The Kriegsmarine’s view of the role of the submarine has undergone several changes of emphasis in the preceding four years… defensive submarine warfare – characterised by the small coastal U-boat – is of diminishing importance… the commerce-raiding role of the U-boat arm had lost its importance to the sea-control role of the aircraft carrier task forces.

Well Britain can breathe easy, reduces the spectre of Great War style unrestricted submarine warfare. I agree that submarine defence of Germany is no longer a priority since the GA as formed. The capital ships entry refers to carriers being the best form of protection for capital ships (which I agree with) and that carrier groups need not fear surface groups. Yet they require submarine escort for long-range spotting and anti-surface roles to operate effectively. Suggesting that carriers are not the all-seeing and all-conquering forces the Admiralstab seek to justify hinging the Navy’s doctrine and building programmes on. I see commerce-raiding as a stronger and more war winning potential than sea control alone. The latter is hard to achieve under optimum conditions let alone during a major war and over vast distances. A carrier force cannot be everywhere at once and cannot be hidden as effectively. With HF/DF etc. seeking submarine scouts is easier and any carrier-force in mid-Atlantic is vulnerable to damage and crippling hits and must return to harbour at some point. This is a doctrine only suited to operating with other GA fleets which suggests an increasing acceptance of avoiding independent operations. If on the other hand, if Germany does seek to operate in much warmer seas further south and east, then of course the home-based submarine fleet has a less useful commerce-raiding role unless you have sufficient long-range subs to transfer to friendly ports overseas and then operating with the fleet and its support units does make greater sense.

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The Admiralstab has taken the position that in peacetime available funding should be allocated to design of suitable craft for series production in time of war. Its stated intent is to commission in small numbers the most promising designs but minimise investment during peacetime.

Most sensible, you only really need prototypes to test the design of the ship, systems and machinery works as advertised. Though as technology changes during peacetime the need to keep refreshing the wartime designs is key.

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The last four years have seen the Kriegsmarine establish a strong amphibious warfare component, capable of lifting two brigades of landing troops simultaneously.

A capability that Germany has never had historically but one that will be an asset to the GA.

Quoted from "Rooijen10"

Not really. It is considered East Asia "as defined by the UN" (quoted from wiki).


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Locati…Nsubregions.png

... so I guess your perspective does not match reality.


As for the conflict escalating... as long as it remains within the borders of Chosen and China and does not spill over the Line Of Death (= Japan-Taiwan-San Hainando) when it comes to Naval Warfare, it will be a well-contained conflict...

... but that is Japan's perspective I guess.

What is this "United Nations" you speak of? Is this some new supra-national player in the game?

Hood has asked a number of questions, and I shall try my best to answer them. Since the POV of the questioner is unclear to me, I may not answer the question from the same POV, but merely from my own.

Quoted

What is the rationale for this powerful fleet? Whom is it defending against and what out of area operations does it seek to get involved in?

Quoted

How can Germany justify such a large fleet of offensive power sitting at anchor when it has no peacetime global role and no overseas bases and no reasonably-likely enemies to defend against?

Some time ago I settled upon three long-term goals for Germany within the context of Wesworld.

1. Protect the national territory from attack

2. Secure access to markets and raw materials

3. Support allies and friendly states

The Kriegsmarine, as presently constituted and its planned expansion, supports these goals. By its presence it has contributed to the first two, by its development it makes the third possible. Beyond that Germany does not need to justify its naval developments to any nation.

Quoted

I would have expected the GA nations to have begun to rationalise their navies, but instead it seems all the GA navies are continuing to build up naval power regardless of existing forces and likely benefits each could bring to a combined taskforce. I wonder what Germany’s role is within such a GA taskforce?

I do not feel at liberty to discuss such matters from a solely German perspective.

Quoted

The capital ships entry refers to carriers being the best form of protection for capital ships (which I agree with) and that carrier groups need not fear surface groups. Yet they require submarine escort for long-range spotting and anti-surface roles to operate effectively. Suggesting that carriers are not the all-seeing and all-conquering forces the Admiralstab seek to justify hinging the Navy’s doctrine and building programmes on.

All elements of the fleet - air, surface, and sub-surface - contribute to the overall success of operations. None can operate as effectively in isolation as they can as a whole. This is one of the lessons learned in the 1943 Fleet Exercises referred to.

Quoted from "Hood"

I would have expected the GA nations to have begun to rationalise their navies, but instead it seems all the GA navies are continuing to build up naval power regardless of existing forces and likely benefits each could bring to a combined taskforce.

I'll make a comment here, at least from my perspective playing two members of the GA.

The longstanding grand strategy derived from FAR pretty much gave the different countries their own preferential zones of operation. For instance, France tends to concentrate in the region of the Mediterranean, the South China Sea, and the western Pacific. Russia concentrated in the North Atlantic / Arctic and the northern Pacific (and Black and Baltic Seas). Atlantis got the majority of the Atlantic, as appropriate for their positioning. On the few occasions joint task forces formed, they were temporary things. So France generally left their Atlantic coast pretty much open, aside from light forces, trusting in their partnerships with Atlantis, Russia, and Britain to keep things well-sorted. With the addition of Germany, the available forces in the Atlantic region became significantly stronger. The addition of Chile and Colombia covers the southeastern Pacific, and backed up by Atlantean forces, I'd estimate those forces can defeat any incursion in that area short of a major operation.

There is one place where GA members have formed a joint task force: it's the Force opérationnelle Indochine out of Cam Ranh Bay, which is run between the Russians and the French. Overall command goes to the French, as they have the majority forces there. That is, I'd note, one of the areas they're responsible to defend for purposes of SAER. While old FAR could, in theory, offer Germany bases in our overseas territories, any such agreements would presumably be made only for minor forces to avoid... unfortunate diplomatic repercussions? Probably both international and national. The French government would face a lot of pointed questions if German battleships started parking regularly in Cam Ranh Bay, after all, particularly in peacetime.

As to rationalization of forces, I'd point out that France is doing just that. For the last three years France has been destroyer-binging in order to replace sixty destroyers that I sent to the scrapyard. Ten more went just recently, and I still have twenty-six destroyers in desperate need of replacement. I've generally scrapped an existing capital ship every time a new vessel enters service. I'm preparing to replace the carriers Clemenceau, Vauban, Suffren, and Gambetta, which have largely stayed on as long as they have in order to serve as training ships and aircraft ferries. Almost every submarine I've brought into service has been matched by one that's retired. The coast defense ships are probably going to be retired without replacement.

Thanks Brock, I think I'm beginning to understand the GA rationale - I've been attempting to get my head around the GA for some time as to precisely what purpose it serves its members.
I had, perhaps misguidedly, assumed it was a unified defensive bloc along the lines of a proto-NATO (historical not WW) whereby its members not only had geographical zones (as SAER has) but also joint forces and some element of standard logistics being arranged over time. I guess having so much French-Russian-Atlantean co-operation and common equipment I felt that over time a set of standard calibres and equipment might appear but this appears not so. While we have all talked much of demilitarisation in Europe there seems to be still over-large forces in Europe defending each other when in fact, like Germany, all potential enemies do not exist as such. It just seemed to me the KM is creating an Atlantic force without an Atlantic enemy. Germany's geographical location surrounded by allies and non-aligned but non-aggressive pact members seems to be among the safest nations in Northern Europe. To that end I would say Bruce has met his three objectives very well and without recourse to strong militarism. I was therefore wondering what out-of-area operations Germany intended or was hoping to prepare for but it seems from Brock's French perspective that an overseas role that Germany would be welcomed to attend is limited beyond a major war. Bereft of a colonial basis it has a less politically-justifiable position to its taxpayers than France, Atlantis (and to some extent Russia) who have large colonial responsibilities across the world next to potential enemies in Africa and Asia (potentially Iberia too).

Rationalisation is evidently replacing older ships, but I was meaning more broadly as to whether there GA-wide fleet plans for nations to build and operate certain classes of vessel and undertake certain types of operations or to measure the sizes of fleets required by looking at what assets allies have. But that seems not to be so.

In view of the above and the safety of Europe being over-insured and war seemingly highly remote and that AEGIS has effectively ceased to exist, whether now there is the European willpower from all the major powers to come together and create a new European Cleito-style naval treaty (perhaps without building tonnage restrictions) to limit fleet sizes and reshape European naval power to ensure adequate defences for all and allow for more overseas basing?

Having discussed matters with the more active members of the Grand Alliance, I think I can now offer a better answer as to the role the Kriegsmarine plays within the overall strategic framework of the Alliance.

As Brock has pointed out, short of major war a commitment of Kriegsmarine forces abroad is an unlikely event within the context of the Alliance. However, the presence of the Kriegsmarine in home waters represents a strategic reserve that can be called upon should a major war break out. Further, it allows other Alliance partners to thin out their home forces in favor of their own overseas commitments. For a nation such as France, with its widespread commitments and lower factory count, this is a strategic consideration of some importance.

Germany has also made it clear, or I hope that it has made clear, that it looks with disfavor on any outside power interfering with the present political situation in the Middle East. The Kriegsmarine's expansion was originally directed towards countering the then evident Bharati ambitions in the Persian Gulf; thankfully, that danger has receded. Germany also has made clear that it would support friendly nations when its interests are threatened - where ever in the world that might occur. The intended reach of the Kriegsmarine is global if required, and is not limited to the North Atlantic alone. Whether it can make that reach effective is a question that - given the political state of Wesworld - may never be adequately answered.

As a player, I do not see value in disarmament talks. I was not here for all the recriminations regarding the downfall of the Cleito Treaty, however, I have read some of the threads on the subject and it is clear to me that there will not be consensus on the subject.

As to a political justification for the fleet to the German taxpayer, I choose not to venture into that rabbit hole unless all of us are going to be asked to provide that political justification; while some may answer, others may not, and I am not going to do something that others are not asked to do.

Certainly a strong Kriegsmarine is at variance with the historical perception of Germany in the post Great War era. However, this is a game of alternate history, specifically naval history. If you start the line of questioning with "Why does Germany need such a large navy?", you then move on to "Why does Germany need a navy at all?" If Germany is to be a player nation in this game, with the industrial capacity it has (none of which was created by the current player), it will follow that German naval developments will not be the same as historical, and it is the perception of others that needs reconsideration, not the size or composition of the Kriegmarine.

Thanks Bruce. That answers the questions I had and I think that's a reasonable policy. Your probably right about the taxpayer issue, its one of the fuzzy parts of the game but you must admit, historically, the High Seas Fleet was largely a waste of resources unless you cite tying down the Grand Fleet for several years and the Kriegsmarine's value for money was only realised in U-boots and even those were decidedly checked within three years of hard fighting. Germany is a young nation still and a young naval power with a strong land emphasis. Germany's might in WW is still army and air force orientated. I see what your trying to achieve though and its less threatening to Britain IC. I hope we'll see what seapower can do for Germany to put her onto the world stage. As you say, Germany supports status quo in the Middle East and I'm sure nations like Bharat and Persia, or even nations further east, would respect that policy intent when its backed up by an intervention fleet of strength. Like all powers at the diplomatic table they need hard bargaining chips and a carrier and 2-brigade amphibious force is a big chip.

I hear you on the arms limitation issue. I just feel the sim lost a lot of its character and ship designing purpose since those talks broke down. Also, reading a bit lately about interwar ship design its obvious how strong collective security by disarmament was for many moral and economic reasons. Yet in WW we've got collective security quite easily and yet gone on building up piles of weapons or at least maintaining those levels. It's true global WW player agreement was impossible to reach, maybe European player agreement would be too and active players are less of late won't help. The offer's worth exploring perhaps OOC (in a separate thread)?

Quoted from "Hood"

Thanks Brock, I think I'm beginning to understand the GA rationale - I've been attempting to get my head around the GA for some time as to precisely what purpose it serves its members.
I had, perhaps misguidedly, assumed it was a unified defensive bloc along the lines of a proto-NATO (historical not WW) whereby its members not only had geographical zones (as SAER has) but also joint forces and some element of standard logistics being arranged over time. I guess having so much French-Russian-Atlantean co-operation and common equipment I felt that over time a set of standard calibres and equipment might appear but this appears not so.

That collaboration still exists in many cases, although with the lack of updates from Atlantis-ward I'm not sure it's very visible at present. One recent example is that the French dropped their homegrown 138mm and 120mm naval guns and started using the Russian 130mm gun. Another example is that France has started acquiring the German-designed acoustic torpedoes... they just got re-designed for the French 550mm tubes rather than the German 533mm. In an example of Germany adopting a foreign design, I'd point toward the joint submarine design which Germany adopted: though he posted it publicly, its specs are basically "everything France wants in their next submarine", and evolved from the DCNS design lineage (Protee then Roland Morillot then Emeraude). While bringing in the German collaboration probably changed a lot of technical details to the design, the specs were still written to French tastes, and those haven't changed.

Quoted from "Hood"

While we have all talked much of demilitarisation in Europe there seems to be still over-large forces in Europe defending each other when in fact, like Germany, all potential enemies do not exist as such. It just seemed to me the KM is creating an Atlantic force without an Atlantic enemy. Germany's geographical location surrounded by allies and non-aligned but non-aggressive pact members seems to be among the safest nations in Northern Europe. To that end I would say Bruce has met his three objectives very well and without recourse to strong militarism. I was therefore wondering what out-of-area operations Germany intended or was hoping to prepare for but it seems from Brock's French perspective that an overseas role that Germany would be welcomed to attend is limited beyond a major war.

Clarification: the French would not terribly mind it, but they'd insist on maintaining the overall command in areas where they believe they'd have the most to lose or gain. A force in the South China Sea being the pre-eminent example in my mind, as that's the one existing example of an international task force.

Quoted from "Hood"

Rationalisation is evidently replacing older ships, but I was meaning more broadly as to whether there GA-wide fleet plans for nations to build and operate certain classes of vessel and undertake certain types of operations or to measure the sizes of fleets required by looking at what assets allies have. But that seems not to be so.

Hum... I don't think we'd ever even considered that. It might make an interesting thought-exercise to plot out, if nothing else.

Quoted from "Hood"

In view of the above and the safety of Europe being over-insured and war seemingly highly remote and that AEGIS has effectively ceased to exist, whether now there is the European willpower from all the major powers to come together and create a new European Cleito-style naval treaty (perhaps without building tonnage restrictions) to limit fleet sizes and reshape European naval power to ensure adequate defences for all and allow for more overseas basing?

I'll express my interest in pursuing this topic further, provided there's sufficient buy-in from the other major powers. Would you care to make an initial proposal?