WesWorld

Quoted

Originally posted by BruceDuncan

The growing amphibious assault potential of China is seen as a major threat. If China were ever to establishment a beachhead on Luzon it would be extremely difficult to throw them back. This same threat applies to San Hainando, Indochina and Borneo, a point Philippine diplomats are quick to remind their counterparts about.

Heh the part of Borneo the Chinese can reach easily is British, the rest Dutch. I doubt the Chinese could supply their landing force for long in the face of opposition.

Indochina- I put that in because current day there are some spats, I think over things that have mostly been put to bed in Wesworld, and it's the future not the present - though I forgot about the factory disparity.

Quoted

Originally posted by Kaiser Kirk
Heh the part of Borneo the Chinese can reach easily is British, the rest Dutch. I doubt the Chinese could supply their landing force for long in the face of opposition.

That may be true, but invasions are so messy.

Quoted

Originally posted by Kaiser Kirk
Indochina- I put that in because current day there are some spats, I think over things that have mostly been put to bed in Wesworld, and it's the future not the present - though I forgot about the factory disparity.

Right. If Indochina went independent, they'd have:

Quoted

2 factories

At Saigon
1x D4
1x D1
1x D0
2x S0

At Chrouy Svay
1x D0

Quoted

Originally posted by BruceDuncan

Quoted

Originally posted by Kaiser Kirk
Heh the part of Borneo the Chinese can reach easily is British, the rest Dutch. I doubt the Chinese could supply their landing force for long in the face of opposition.

That may be true, but invasions are so messy.

The Dutch just spent 15 years worrying about a full SATSUMA invasion they couldn't stop, so the best they could do is make it messy, the "tar baby defense". The Dutch may be a middling power at best, but I'd hope the preparations I've made would hold against a Chinese force at the end of a 1500nm long SLOC. I'm sure the Marine Brigade running the Dongalla Jungle Training School could make it over to Borneo for the party as well

One aspect of Philippine naval planning that may benefit by exposition is that of the role of the navy in policing the Southern Sea Frontier – or, as it is called by the more romantic, the Southern Seas. The recently concluded operations against Muslim revolutionaries (officially Moro ‘bandits’ and ‘pirates’) have highlighted the need for strong naval support of the civil power, yet the Philippine Navy has, over the last several years, purged itself of many of the small craft that might have played such a role. I choose to speak to that and other issues at this point.

From my point of view the vessels that were disposed of had very little value remaining in them. The gunboats of the Cavite and La Union classes were old, slow, and too large and over-armed for local patrol duties; The Sierra class subchasers were likewise devoid of useful antisubmarine weaponry yet inappropriate for other employment. While numerous and not altogether useless, the force of older MAS-boats and tiny coastal vedettes was aged in the extreme.

The first class of vessels to be constructed to replace these were the eight minesweeper-escorts of the Colorado class, a handy sort of vessel that proved its usefulness in the fight against the Abu Sabaya rebels. Eight similar vessels of the Batanes class were subsequently built; however, these craft now represent the bulk of the Philippine Navy’s mine warfare forces, and as soon as they can be relieved from local patrol duties they will revert to mine warfare as their primary duty.

The Southern Seas have proven to be a useful place to deploy some of the older warships on the fleet; this will be changing, as many of these older vessels, such as the American Wickes-class or ex-Chilean Balintawak-class destroyers have gone to the breakers. While a token force will remain in the area, the bulk of the Philippine Navy’s major warships will be deployed in the Northern Fleet or with the special Western Patrol Force at Palawan.

Yet the Southern Seas figure largely in Philippine thinking. For the government in Manila the elimination of the Muslim minority in the region is an objective – by peaceful conversion if possible, or by marginalization if necessary. The surplus population in the northern and central Philippines looks to the southern provinces as an outlet, and the economic resources of the region demand exploitation. The oft-mentioned Strategic Hamlets Program, which sees settlers established on vacant (or recently vacated) lands and the missionary efforts of the Church (personified by the successful Brother Francis on Tapiantana Island) are but two areas in which this drive manifests. All these require a strong naval presence in support of the civil power. The Philippine Navy is responding with construction of several types of vessels far better suited to its present needs than the older vessels it once possessed.

The sloops of the Marakina class – of which four have been authorized to date – are well adapted to work in the region. Long-legged, reasonably fast but not excessively so, weatherly to deal with high seas – they will form the backbone of the Philippine Navy’s patrol force. They are entering service at the close of 1944, and the last will be commissioned in 1945. Following them eight smaller patrol combatants of the Marawi class, the first of which will be laid down in 1945. Smaller and faster than the sloops, these patrol combatants are intended for rapid construction. Their armament, while not overly impressive, is more than sufficient to overawe any pirate of smuggler craft likely to be encountered on their standing patrols. It remains to be seen if this particular design will be perpetuated; it is likelier that an improved vessel will follow in the late 1940s.

The recently projected civil support ships of the Cabo Bojeador class represent the Philippine Navy’s answer to the need for timely response in the event of storm damage to coastal villages as well as the lack of medical facilities in many of the villages across the region. While they would normally be employed on a regular “beat”, visiting a set number of places in turn, they would be available to respond rapidly should disaster strike. Funding for an initial group of four such vessels will be sought, with construction commencing some time in 1945.

Thus the present projected strength of the forces assigned to the Southern Sea Frontier are expected to shift during the course of the next eighteen months. The goal is to release the minesweepers of Minesweeper Escort Squadron One upon the commissioning of the final two Marakina class sloops in mid-1945; as the Marawi-class patrol vessels are commissioned, it is expected that Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Three will return north from its temporary assignment. The Philippine Navy expects that this smaller patrol force, augmented by naval aircraft, will suffice to deal with any likely internal threat.

Are there amphibious assets deployed to the southern force?

Quoted from "The Rock Doctor"

Are there amphibious assets deployed to the southern force?

Not under normal circumstances. Amphibious Ready Group One, with four Danao class utility landing ships is assigned to the Central Fleet operating out of Cebu; they provide amphibious lift as required.

In the best of all possible worlds there would be more amphibious shipping available, including some designated assets for the Southern Sea Frontier. I've toyed with the idea of building a few small landing ships along the lines of German MFP for inter-island transport but haven't the budget to build them right now.

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

Quoted from "The Rock Doctor"

Are there amphibious assets deployed to the southern force?

Not under normal circumstances. Amphibious Ready Group One, with four Danao class utility landing ships is assigned to the Central Fleet operating out of Cebu; they provide amphibious lift as required.

In the best of all possible worlds there would be more amphibious shipping available, including some designated assets for the Southern Sea Frontier. I've toyed with the idea of building a few small landing ships along the lines of German MFP for inter-island transport but haven't the budget to build them right now.

I have been giving more thought to Rocky's question, and while I stand by my initial response, I may need to amplify it.

For better or worse the Philippines is basing its naval requirements on what it sees as the threat from China; prior to the outbreak of the conflict with Chosen the Chinese Navy was aggressively expanding - obtaining capital warships and aircraft carriers from several nations, embarking on a large program of submarine construction, increasing its amphibious force capabilities, and beginning to rectify shortcoming in its destroyer force. Since the outbreak of the conflict the Chinese Navy has not had that much press - though it can be inferred that it was able to overcome the threat of Chosenian submarines and to use its amphibious assault capabilities to good effect. Therefore, unless evidence appears to the contrary, the Philippines would still see the Chinese Navy as the force against which it must measure itself.

Rebuilding and expanding the Philippine cruiser and destroyer force has been expensive, absorbing most of the available budget. It is only in 1945 that the needs for new patrol craft - as cited previously - can be addressed, and the percentage of budget available for such remains small.

The Philippine Navy has looked enviously at the French frigate Polynesie as an excellent example of a vessel well adapted to patrol activities in the Southern Seas. It is also more massive than any of its destroyers; the budget would barely stretch to build one, and certainly not two. They have also looked enviously at the smaller avisos of the French Sans Reproche class - at 1,400 tons they are a far likelier candidate to fill any need for a larger patrol vessel. Something like them might be laid down in 1946, for service entry by 1947. The less expensive alternative is to perpetuate the Marakina class frigate.

I had mentioned that it would be be desirable to have a few small landing vessels such as the German MFP; but I ask myself whether such small craft would be capable of handling the many storms that arise. For carrying supplies up and down the island chains they would certainly work; but crossing the Sulu Sea alone would seem like a risk. As for building additional large amphibious ships, again, it becomes a budget issue.

What I'm confused about is that the Philippines did have two ships similar to Polynesie in the Agbayanis, and sold them off when they where still in excellent condition.

Quoted from "Desertfox"

What I'm confused about is that the Philippines did have two ships similar to Polynesie in the Agbayanis, and sold them off when they where still in excellent condition.

I note you have made that comparison before, and as far as I am concerned the Polynesie and the Agbayani designs have very little in common beyond their general size; the Polynesie design is first and foremost a patrol vessel - the Agbayani at best a minelayer - and the Philippine Navy had - and still has no need for a large minelayer. The Philippine Navy has no need to haul large number of troops around on a regular basis, and if it does, it has the Danao class amphibious ships to do it far more readily. From its new strategic viewpoint, the two Agbayanis were white elephants that it was happy to sell to Mexico.

Spent some time analyzing the probable Philippine Navy orbat for 1945, the budget and other factors and decided that there was need for, and ability to pay for, a pair of patrol frigates to back up the already projected small ships that will be taking their places in the Southern Seas. The design is very much based on the French Sans Reproche, with some minor adjustments.

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Jolo, Philippine Patrol Frigate laid down 1945

Displacement: 1,405 t light; 1,467 t standard; 1,725 t normal; 1,931 t full load

Dimensions: Length overall / water x beam x draught

355.29 ft / 344.49 ft x 39.37 ft x 10.50 ft (normal load) [108.29 m / 105.00 m x 12.00 m x 3.20 m]

Armament:

2 - 4.53" / 115 mm guns (1x2 guns), 46.40lbs / 21.05kg shells, 1945 Model Dual purpose guns in a deck mount with hoist on centreline forward
2 - 1.38" / 35.0 mm guns (1x2 guns), 1.31lbs / 0.59kg shells, 1945 Model Anti-aircraft guns in deck mount on centreline forward, all raised guns
4 - 0.59" / 15.0 mm guns (2x2 guns), 0.10lbs / 0.05kg shells, 1945 Model Machine guns in deck mounts on side, evenly spread, all raised mounts
Weight of broadside 96 lbs / 43 kg
Shells per gun, main battery: 500

Armour:

Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 0.98" / 25 mm 0.39" / 10 mm 0.39" / 10 mm
2nd: 0.39" / 10 mm 0.39" / 10 mm -

Conning tower: 0.98" / 25 mm

Machinery:

Diesel Internal combustion motors, Geared drive, 2 shafts, 4,807 shp / 3,586 Kw = 20.00 kts
Range 6,100nm at 16.00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 464 tons

Complement: 133 - 173

Cost: £0.527 million / $2.107 million

Distribution of weights at normal displacement:

Armament: 12 tons, 0.7 %
Armour: 7 tons, 0.4 %
- Belts: 0 tons, 0.0 %
- Torpedo bulkhead: 0 tons, 0.0 %
- Armament: 4 tons, 0.2 %
- Armour Deck: 0 tons, 0.0 %
- Conning Tower: 3 tons, 0.2 %
Machinery: 121 tons, 7.0 %
Hull, fittings & equipment: 815 tons, 47.2 %
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 320 tons, 18.5 %
Miscellaneous weights: 450 tons, 26.1 %

Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:

Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship): 5,159 lbs / 2,340 Kg = 111.2 x 4.5 " / 115 mm shells or 1.6 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.10
Metacentric height 1.5 ft / 0.5 m
Roll period: 13.6 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 68 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.13
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 2.00

Hull form characteristics:

Hull has a flush deck and transom stern
Block coefficient: 0.424
Length to Beam Ratio: 8.75 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 21.64 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 43 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 34
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 20.00 degrees
Stern overhang: 3.28 ft / 1.00 m
Freeboard (% = measuring location as a percentage of overall length):
- Stem: 20.67 ft / 6.30 m
- Forecastle (20 %): 19.36 ft / 5.90 m
- Mid (50 %): 18.04 ft / 5.50 m
- Quarterdeck (15 %): 9.84 ft / 3.00 m
- Stern: 9.84 ft / 3.00 m
- Average freeboard: 15.94 ft / 4.86 m

Ship space, strength and comments:

Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 58.8 %
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 203.5 %
Waterplane Area: 8,804 Square feet or 818 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 217 %
Structure weight / hull surface area: 54 lbs/sq ft or 262 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0.89
- Longitudinal: 2.99
- Overall: 1.00
Hull space for machinery, storage, compartmentation is excellent
Room for accommodation and workspaces is excellent
Excellent seaboat, comfortable, can fire her guns in the heaviest weather

Breakdown of Miscellaneous Weight

Provision for radar - 40 tons - Surface search, air search, navigational
Provision for sonar - 20 tons
Provision for A/S outfit - 10 tons (DC racks and 36 depth charges)
Provision for tropicalization - 20 tons
Provision for crane aft - 10 tons
Provision for up to four aircraft - 100 tons
Provision for Additional Accommodation of Embarked Marines - 250 tons