WesWorld

"8 - 2.99" / 76.0 mm guns (4x2 guns), 13.39lbs / 6.08kg shells, 1944 Model
Automatic rapid fire guns in deck mounts with hoists
on centreline ends, evenly spread, all raised mounts - superfiring
"

Side distribued or side ends, I think

Jef

Will fix when Im not on a work comp. Should make no difference.

Fixed the main gun issue. No other changes.

Giuseppe Cei, Italia Aircraft Carrier laid down 1944

Displacement:
16,000 t light; 16,446 t standard; 18,898 t normal; 20,860 t full load

Dimensions: Length overall / water x beam x draught
656.17 ft / 639.76 ft x 85.30 ft x 23.95 ft (normal load)
200.00 m / 195.00 m x 26.00 m x 7.30 m

Armament:
8 - 2.99" / 76.0 mm guns (4x2 guns), 13.39lbs / 6.07kg shells, 1944 Model
Automatic rapid fire guns in deck mounts with hoists
on side ends, evenly spread, all raised mounts - superfiring
16 - 1.46" / 37.0 mm guns (4x4 guns), 1.55lbs / 0.70kg shells, 1944 Model
Anti-aircraft guns in deck mounts
on side, all amidships, all raised mounts - superfiring
48 - 0.79" / 20.0 mm guns (24x2 guns), 0.24lbs / 0.11kg shells, 1944 Model
Machine guns in deck mounts
on side, evenly spread, all raised mounts
Weight of broadside 143 lbs / 65 kg
Shells per gun, main battery: 700

Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 1.18" / 30 mm 415.85 ft / 126.75 m 11.09 ft / 3.38 m
Ends: 1.18" / 30 mm 223.88 ft / 68.24 m 11.09 ft / 3.38 m
Main Belt covers 100 % of normal length

- Torpedo Bulkhead:
1.57" / 40 mm 415.85 ft / 126.75 m 21.19 ft / 6.46 m

- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 0.98" / 25 mm 0.39" / 10 mm 0.98" / 25 mm
2nd: 0.39" / 10 mm 0.39" / 10 mm -
3rd: 0.39" / 10 mm - -

- Armour deck: 2.95" / 75 mm, Conning tower: 2.76" / 70 mm

Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, steam turbines,
Geared drive, 4 shafts, 84,002 shp / 62,665 Kw = 30.05 kts
Range 8,238nm at 20.00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 4,414 tons

Complement:
805 - 1,047

Cost:
£5.904 million / $23.616 million

Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 21 tons, 0.1 %
Armour: 2,989 tons, 15.8 %
- Belts: 341 tons, 1.8 %
- Torpedo bulkhead: 514 tons, 2.7 %
- Armament: 15 tons, 0.1 %
- Armour Deck: 2,077 tons, 11.0 %
- Conning Tower: 42 tons, 0.2 %
Machinery: 2,145 tons, 11.4 %
Hull, fittings & equipment: 5,645 tons, 29.9 %
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 2,898 tons, 15.3 %
Miscellaneous weights: 5,200 tons, 27.5 %

Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
31,438 lbs / 14,260 Kg = 2,347.2 x 3.0 " / 76 mm shells or 5.3 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.15
Metacentric height 5.1 ft / 1.6 m
Roll period: 15.8 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 60 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.01
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.28

Hull form characteristics:
Hull has raised forecastle
and transom stern
Block coefficient: 0.506
Length to Beam Ratio: 7.50 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 29.54 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 55 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 47
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 20.00 degrees
Stern overhang: 3.87 ft / 1.18 m
Freeboard (% = measuring location as a percentage of overall length):
- Stem: 34.45 ft / 10.50 m
- Forecastle (20 %): 34.45 ft / 10.50 m (19.69 ft / 6.00 m aft of break)
- Mid (50 %): 19.69 ft / 6.00 m
- Quarterdeck (15 %): 19.69 ft / 6.00 m
- Stern: 19.69 ft / 6.00 m
- Average freeboard: 22.64 ft / 6.90 m

Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 89.8 %
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 177.1 %
Waterplane Area: 38,027 Square feet or 3,533 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 149 %
Structure weight / hull surface area: 105 lbs/sq ft or 512 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0.97
- Longitudinal: 1.32
- Overall: 1.00
Hull space for machinery, storage, compartmentation is adequate
Room for accommodation and workspaces is excellent
Good seaboat, rides out heavy weather easily

60 Combat-ready Aircraft (3600t) (Actual practical compliment ~48 aircraft as warship, ~24 as a training ship)
10 Crated spares, spare parts and workshop equipment (1000t)
Electronics Fit (200t)
Inert Gas sheilding for AVGAS storrage and transfer lines (50t)
Small Aircraft Operations Center (100t)
One Catapult (25t)

Warship Variant
Enhanced crew comfort (50t)
Enhanced Tropicalization (50t)
Underway Refueling equipment (50t)
Flag Facilities (25t)

Training ship variant
Classrooms, simulators, other educational equipment and Cadet accomidation (175t)

I am somewhat mystified by the assumption that a specialized vessel needs to be constructed to train carrier pilots. Carrier qualifications are just about the last phase of pilot training at the advanced level, and can be done on any reasonable hull. This seems a very expensive approach. Why not use one of the older existing vessels instead?

It is also a very large training carrier. Mexico spent a grand total of 1,100t on its training carrier.

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

I am somewhat mystified by the assumption that a specialized vessel needs to be constructed to train carrier pilots. Carrier qualifications are just about the last phase of pilot training at the advanced level, and can be done on any reasonable hull. This seems a very expensive approach. Why not use one of the older existing vessels instead?

All of the other existing hulls are combat warships, and the Francesco Morosini is being pulled out of service. As also stated prior, the Giuseppe Cei is also designed to be of use as a aircraft ferry, "large" carrier for the Indian Ocean during war,and other rolls that require a larger hull. It also gives a better approximation of the Fleet Carrier's size then a smaller ship would.

It still seems a high-cost solution to the problem. Will not the Morosini do?

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

It still seems a high-cost solution to the problem. Will not the Morosini do?

The Morosini has not been touched since 1927. Any refit to bring her up to modern standards will be almost as expensive as it has to redo the flightdeck which is a 50% job.

Quoted from "snip"

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

It still seems a high-cost solution to the problem. Will not the Morosini do?

The Morosini has not been touched since 1927. Any refit to bring her up to modern standards will be almost as expensive as it has to redo the flightdeck which is a 50% job.

Very well then - what are you using as a training aircraft carrier at this point? Your new vessel will not be available for at least two years.

I'm not sure there would be a dedicated ship. I'm going to say a rotation of the Pisa's since the old one was sold to Peru in 1941.

Why would Morosini require a 50% refit? Life extension is only 25%...

For what it's worth, I've always assumed my oldest active carrier will be the next training carrier - that'd be Urumi for Bharat and Navarra for Iberia.

Quoted from "The Rock Doctor"

Why would Morosini require a 50% refit? Life extension is only 25%...

For what it's worth, I've always assumed my oldest active carrier will be the next training carrier - that'd be Urumi for Bharat and Navarra for Iberia.

That is a very logical approach. I inherited the Otto Lilienthal, but the compromises in her present condition made a refit to take advantage of her potential not cost effective. I was able to purchase the Nordish Gassen but have no intention of refitting her for active service. She can handle carrier qualification training; most proficiency training is going to be carried out on the operational carriers in any case. Building a training aircraft carrier from the keel up just seems wasteful.

I agree its an expensive way to acquire a training carrier and an aircraft ferry. Realistically there has never been a purpose-built training carrier ever built from the keel up. Only the American paddle steamer conversions of WW2 would count as purpose-training decks and they lacked any hangar. In reality most deck training is done flying from land bases so you only really need a deck at sea, rather than the full deck, elevator, hangar etc. As an aircraft ferry these seem over-armed and perhaps a merchant conversion would be better? Both are low-end roles best performed by older ships.

Ok, slight change of plans on this. I'm still going to build the Giuseppe Cei, but as a dedicated CV for the Indian Ocean squadron. Right now it only has two Pisa class conversions and that is not enough. I will convert some merchant into something Bogue-like for a dedicated training ship starting in early 1945.

Considering the strategic situation of your Indian Ocean Squadron, is that necessarily the wisest investment?

The lifeline between Italy and the EAS goes straight through the Suez Canal, so it is vulnerable closure; the competing naval forces in the Red Sea make maintenance of SLOCs between Italy and the EAS even more difficult. Does a build-up of strength in East Africa make sense, now that Italy has no eastward commitments?

Or does this imply that Italy is seeking a greater role in the Far East?

We do not need Wops in the Far East. Keep Pizzas and Pastas on the right side of the Suez Canal.

RA was always seeking to extend his power into the Indian Ocean and projects like the Spaghetti Bomber were attempts to create big sticks in case India caused trouble. So in this sense IC, the move would be fully justified and in keeping with previous planning. Also, since in WW Italy has a share of the Suez Canal, her position is not quite to bad as OTL because Britain and France can't easily simply block the canal (although accidents can happen!) or unilaterally take measures the shareholders won't agree with. If snip is moving away a Western Atlantic reinforcement role then I think the Indian Ocean role makes the most sense for Italy if she wants to project power beyond the Med and support her EAS vassal state.

Bharat's dance card is full and the line-up goes out around the saloon.

Quoted from "BruceDuncan"

Considering the strategic situation of your Indian Ocean Squadron, is that necessarily the wisest investment?

The lifeline between Italy and the EAS goes straight through the Suez Canal, so it is vulnerable closure; the competing naval forces in the Red Sea make maintenance of SLOCs between Italy and the EAS even more difficult. Does a build-up of strength in East Africa make sense, now that Italy has no eastward commitments?

Or does this imply that Italy is seeking a greater role in the Far East?

Good questions Bruce, and I will attempt to explain my thinking on them. The idea is two-fold in nature, one half relating to the Suez Canal in conjunction with the withdrawal from AEGIS and the other to influence in the Indian Ocean and Far East. First off, Italy sees conflict with France and the UK at the same time unlikely (I consed there are scenarios where a war with France could transpire but they are also remote IMO), therefor the ability to outright close the Suez is equally unlikely. However, the canal does serve as a choke point that adds time to the ability for assets to deploy rapidly from the Med to the EAS or beyond. Now, this was less of an issue during the days of AEGIS, because as I understand it the roll of the Italian Navy in AEGIS Far-East deployments was to secure the Indian Ocean while the other AEGIS navies moved to the Far East proper. Seeing as the other navies in question had to transit the Suez as well, this delay was not as important to migate. Now, it is viewed as more important to keep assets in the EAS that are sufficient to secure that side of the canal for longer seeing as there is no longer the specter of the combined AEGIS navies behind it. This can buy time for the rest of the fleet to safely transit the canal. The inverse is also true; in the event of a war confined to the Med (say Italy vs. WP), assets do not have to make the transition though the canal to cover the EAS and therefor are invulnerable to interdiction. This ensures that the EAS is covered by a capable squadron, which is not what its own is. Italy also wishes to exert more influence thought the Indian Ocean on its own in the post-AEGIS period, and the EAS is a critical part of that strategy. While the EAS possesses its own Army and Air Force (Which I will detail at some point), it is not yet prepared and likely will not be for some time to project power over the seas. Therefor, this duty must fall to the Italian Navy if Italy wants be be a player in the Indian Ocean which it does.

Quoted from "Hood"

RA was always seeking to extend his power into the Indian Ocean and projects like the Spaghetti Bomber were attempts to create big sticks in case India caused trouble. So in this sense IC, the move would be fully justified and in keeping with previous planning. Also, since in WW Italy has a share of the Suez Canal, her position is not quite to bad as OTL because Britain and France can't easily simply block the canal (although accidents can happen!) or unilaterally take measures the shareholders won't agree with. If snip is moving away a Western Atlantic reinforcement role then I think the Indian Ocean role makes the most sense for Italy if she wants to project power beyond the Med and support her EAS vassal state.

Hood brings up another good point in that the ability of Italy to project power across the Atlantic is majorly reduced in the post-AEGIS period due to no longer having the AEGIS obligations and therefor rights.The Americas have been Iberia's domain for quite some time. Italy sees no reason to challenge that roll, much less the Monroe Doctrine and its Atlantian equivalent (which I seem to recall hearing about with regards to Brazil).

Quoted from "The Rock Doctor"

Bharat's dance card is full and the line-up goes out around the saloon.

Not quite following.

I'm referring to Hood's observation about Italy building up against India.