This post has been edited 2 times, last edit by "BruceDuncan" (Jun 28th 2013, 3:07am)
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Chile:
The Chilean Navy comprises; a Battle Force (three battleships (Almirante Blanco Encalada, Almirante Cochrane, Capitan Prat), four heavy cruisers, six destroyers); a Scouting Force (two seaplane carrier-cruisers, six destroyers, 16 aircraft); a Fast Carrier Force (two carriers (Libertad, Mapuche), six destroyers, 117-147 aircraft); other forces comprise twelve destroyers, a coastal defense force with submarine hunters and sixteen destroyers covering geographical districts of the coastline, eight submarines and an Amphibious Command of six vessels. There is a training carrier, Chiloe, with 24 aircraft.
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Chile:
The Chilean Navy comprises; a Battle Force (three battleships (Almirante Blanco Encalada, Almirante Cochrane, Capitan Prat), four light cruisers, eight destroyers); a Scouting Force (one armoured cruiser, one seaplane carrier-cruiser, six destroyers, 8 aircraft); a Fast Carrier Force (two carriers (Libertad, Mapuche), one heavy cruiser, four light cruisers, eight destroyers, 117-147 aircraft); other forces comprise fourteen destroyers, one minelayer, a coastal defense force with submarine hunters and sixteen destroyers covering geographical districts of the coastline, eight submarines and an Amphibious Command of five vessels. There is a training carrier, Chiloe, with 24 aircraft.
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Despite the long history of settlement, the historical and political point of view taught in those nations places the South African Empire as an interloper, controlling the valuable lands surrounding the Rio de la Plata to the economic determent of the peoples around, who are primarily of Iberian or native descent.
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Grand Alliance:
The possibility of war is remote. Only France has local bases, Djibouti being the nearest. This base could conceivable be knocked-out by carrier raids and operations in the Red Sea would hamper reinforcements to Indochina. West African forces are unclear but like Britain any offensive action will rely on naval forces closer to their homelands. The Gulf of Guinea is most at risk but RSAN forces there are sufficient for adequate defense. A direct attack from Chad is unlikely but possible. Germany is building up a fleet capable of global operations but the lack of friendly bases in the African region suggest limited persistence and only token forces. For the threat from Atlantis see the NATO assessment above. SAE merchant traffic using the Red Sea/ Med would be halted.
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Grand Alliance:
A direct attack from Chad is unlikely but possible.
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"A basing rights treaty with the United Kingdom ensures that the SAE would be able to field commerce raiders worldwide...".
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Originally posted by Hood
3) "A basing rights treaty with the United Kingdom ensures that the SAE would be able to field commerce raiders worldwide..." I did not write this and can only assume Kirk or Hoo added it. I don't know where this came from but its the first I've ever heard of it. I can say the UK would not allow this. It's possible Kirk meant United Kingdom of the Netherlands I suppose...
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Originally posted by HoOmAn
The SAE has a treaty with the UK about basing rights for naval assets, warships first place. Kirk read from this, that the SAE can field commerce raiders worldwide, but he (and James) missed the point why the SAE really aimed for that treaty. The SAE has no intention of sending commerce raiders all over the world and the SAE also has no interest in using the Falklands or Walvis Bay. But British bases on the Arabian peninsula (Aden etc.) come in handy when the RSAN is operating around the Red Sea. As pointed out elsewhere in the assessment the RSAN would be forced to operate a fleet about 2,500 miles from major bases. With the British bases nearby this is no longer necessary.
Now, to what extend those bases are available in times of crisis depends on the situation, I assume. But that's what that treaty is for. In peace times ships can usually be refueled and repaired in any port anyway. So the SAE relies on the British to hold their word and allow RSAN units to use British bases. How this collides with international law (which law btw) is a matter of debate.
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Originally posted by HoOmAn
@Brock - Thanks for your corrections. I rate those differences as a matter of intel data quality. :o) In fact, the date of the assessment is late '42 because that is where I halted posting reports etc. while waiting on assessment results. All data on the SAE is from 1940/41. But other data may be of different date as WesWorld went on during the time while content was written. Not all news pieces about cruisers, OOB modifications etc. have been considered, I guess. Would you rate those difference critical with high impact on the assessment? IMHO it is correct to address the Grand Alliance instead of FAR by late 1942. Am I wrong?
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Originally posted by HoOmAn
The "interloper" part is, as I read it, still valid. Although we agreed the Urus are more Afrikaans in origin than Iberian or Indian and the society in Grand Uruguay is thus not seeking independance from SAE mother land or falling apart, Gran Uruguay is still a good focus for people/politicians that want to distract from other things, like social issues or bad economy news. That is my personal take on the issue, however, and Kirk - who wrote it - may have had different thoughts.
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Originally posted by HoOmAn
With the UKN SAE has a full fledged alliance. With the British United Kingdom there is a treaty about basing rights.
I guess I have to clarify with Hood. There is no purpose in having such treaty if the RSAN cannot use British bases when they need them - which is what I read from Hoods general comment above too. He either changed his mind or there is a misunderstanding...
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Originally posted by Brockpaine
*Shrugs.* Well, when the topic came up earlier in the thread, I did a search through all of the known treaties in Wesworld, and I didn't see any statements about the British extending basing rights to the South Africans; perhaps there is one somewhere that I missed,
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Originally posted by HoOmAn
Please see my EDIT note above.
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Article 5. Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with the belligerent forces on land or sea.
Article 8. A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which had been adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction for use in war.
Article 12. In the absence of special provisions to the contrary in the legislation of a neutral Power, belligerent war-ships are not permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power for more than twenty-four hours, except in the cases covered by the present Convention.
Article 13. If a Power which has been informed of the outbreak of hostilities learns that a belligerent war-ship is in one of its ports or roadsteads, or in its territorial waters, it must notify the said ship to depart within twenty-four hours or within the time prescribed by local regulations.
Article 14. A belligerent war-ship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port beyond the permissible time except on account of damage or stress of weather. It must depart as soon as the cause of the delay is at an end.
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