WesWorld

Another naval story, this time a much larger and more important naval clash than the last cruiser Vs cruiser action.



By mid January the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Almirante Peablo, was under great pressure by the government to do something about the powerful RSAN seemingly sailing along the coastline at will. On January 3rd 1936 a meeting took place at Bahia Blanca which would have historical significance for naval historians. Almirante Peablo pressed for the two new carriers to come home early from Japan to give an advantage to the Argentine fleet to begin some effective offensive actions. To many of the Naval Staff, unconvinced as to the power of the carrier, this seemed a risky move. Peablo’s arguments in favour of curtailing the shake-down period was that most of the complement (made up of 1/3 cadets and the rest experienced sailors) and all of the aircrew and deck handling crews had been conducting training aboard Japanese carriers a full three months before the Argentine carriers were completed and so had around six months of training under their belts. Also RSAN Naval Intelligence knew the ships were ready, a seemingly innocent fishing boat kept appearing near the carriers whenever they returned to harbour. Almirante Peablo felt a surprise move might unsettle the Africans.
After a heated discussion the idea was approved and plans then turned to how the ships could reach Argentina intact. One obvious route was via the Panama Canal, this would have the advantage of safety from African warships until the force reached the Brazilian coast and at the same time they could rendezvous with the new Belgrano Class cruiser Almirante Storni coming from Germany [Note 1]. The southern route via the South Horn was quicker and had the advantage of strong Chilean covering forces keeping a neural watch for enemy units and the fact that heavy Argentine ships could escort the carriers safely past the Falklands into port. A meeting on the 5th endorsed the latter plan and by the 7th Capitan de Navio Torrez-Bucholz [Note 2] and Capitan de Navio Sarimento [Note 3], in Japan overseeing the training of the crews of the Independencia and Guardabosques respectively, received a copy of the orders to sail for home.

In order to deceive the South African spies the ships seemingly set sail for a routine training mission practising circuits and bumps on the 9th but once over the horizon the two ships set course for a rendezvous with an Argentine tanker to top up fuel tanks near Saipan and again near Majuro. The voyage went well and both ships suffered no problems and they managed to avoid the attentions of other surface traffic until the 21st when a Colombian-registered steamer sighted the two ships and radioed a signal to Colombian Naval HQ, “sighted two Japanese carriers 200 miles SW Galapagos Islands heading SE speed 15kts.” A copy of this report was sent to the Iberian naval station at Panama and was then transmitted back to the Naval High Command in Iberia. A copy of the report was picked up by the secret agent Jackal in the Iberian embassy in Pretoria within two days and this seemed to indicate that the RSAN Naval Intelligence likely as not knew the carriers were sailing for Argentina and that they were not making for the Panama Canal as they might have supposed.

The Naval Staff had already dispatched the light cruiser Fortleza and the new heavy cruiser La Argentina under the command of Vice Almirante Murphy to escort the ships and on receipt of the Iberian report quickly readied a supporting cover force which was to patrol the Falkland Gap. The battlecruiser Patagonia was suffering from machinery troubles so the battleship Libertad under the command of Almirante Benedicto was dispatched (her un-modernised sister Gascon was unfit for sea duty at short notice) and the light scout cruisers Comodore Py and Hipolito Bouchard and the new destroyers Contra Almirante Barbera and Simon Bolivar attached for support.

The RSAN received the warning from the Naval Attaché to Japan on the 10th and later the Iberian sighting report. The South African naval high command soon realised the two ‘Japanese’ carriers heading south in the Pacific were the Independencia and the Guardabosques. Both had vanished from Japan and the information from Iberia fitted the jigsaw perfectly. The High Command had several options once the decision was made to destroy both carriers and deny the Argentine Navy any chance of rebuilding its strength and making offensive sweeps against the convoy routes. The carrier RSAN Anvil of the 6th Scout Squadron was deployed in the region in August to replace the RSAN Hammer. She was being escorted by the heavy cruiser Fafnir and two light cruisers and was currently 230 miles due north east of the Falkland Islands preparing a series of strike on shore targets. The only other carrier in theatre was the RSAN Gripper (8th scouting) operating from Douala but fully occupied with operates against the Brazilians. The carrier RSAN Forge and the 7th Scout Squadron from Cape Town was engaged on convoy protection the southern trading routes and was in mid Atlantic when the Argentine fleet neared the Cape. News of the arriving 4th Scout Squadron with two Triumph-class battlecruisers had not reached the Argentinean Naval Intelligence. Both ships and two older light cruisers were ready to sail. Other forces in the region included part of the blockade force, the 7th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons comprising the heavy cruiser Cape Delgado and light cruisers Aurora and Blantyre II.
The RSAN also had the option to launch an intercepting mission from Mar del Plata with the 9th Scouting including large seaplane carrier Thjazi, heavy cruiser Abderos and the light cruisers Ajax and Achilles. Due to the reconnaissance radius of the Thjazi and the fast and powerful cruisers this unit probably is best suited for finding the Argentine force. Reinforcements from home bases could include the 2000ts DLs of the 6th DD Flotilla which is based in Cape Town.

On January 25th the RSAN put Admiral von Grunveldt in command of the RSAN forces and aboard the RSAN Anvil he began the preparations for his sweep. By the dawn of the next day he expected the RSAN Forge from the mid Atlantic, she would be refuelled at sea during the 26th and then both carriers with the cruisers RSAN Fanfir, RSAN Cape Agulhas, RSAN Santana and RSAN Paraná and from St. Helena the 9th Destroyer Flotilla 2nd Division RSAN Lachesis and RSAN Monatheris would sail to the south of the Falklands to cut the shipping routes to the west of the island.
From the north the 4th Scout Squadron with the two Triumph class battlecruisers and the cruisers RSAN Yaoundé and RSAN Brazzaville were supporting the 9th Scouting (RSAN Thjazi, RSAN Abderos, RSAN Ajax and RSAN Achilles. A weather front stopped the aircraft from Thjazi from spotting the rest of Vice Almirante Murphy’s force as it moved into position. On the 26th they moved to cover the north of the Falklands to the Argentine shore.

To be continued...

[Note 1] The cruiser actually remained in Germany until the war ended due to poor crew training and some technical problems and late delivery of some items from Argentina.

[Note 2] Capitan de Navio Torrez-Bucholz; age 35; born 1901, son of an émigré German naval officer, he joined the Navy at 16 and enrolled to become an officer cadet in 1921. He rose through the ranks quickly and became the aide to the Naval Attaché to the United States in 1929 and became interested in carrier warfare. He learnt to fly and served in the Aviacion Naval 1931-33, he returned to sea aboard the Libertad in late 1933 and was promoted to command the destroyer Mendoza on the outbreak of war. In July 1934 he joined the Naval Staff and was selected to command the first Argentine carrier by Almirante Peablo (a good friend of his father) and underwent a Staff course before setting off to Japan to form his crew and he organised a training regime with the Japanese for 2,300 sailors within two weeks.

[Note 3] Capitan de Navio Sarimento; age 40; born 1896, joined the Navy in 1914 he served aboard the Moreno and was severely wounded during the 1921 War while serving as a junior officer. He transferred to heavy cruisers and served aboard the Garibaldi until 1927. He completed the Naval Academy course during 1929 and was posted to the Naval Staff at Bahia Blanca. Here he met Almirante Peablo while he was still at the War Plans Division. Both shared ideas on naval aviation and the practical uses of the carrier. Although Peablo was to move on Sarimento remained in the Naval Staff until 1933 when he was promoted and went back to sea aboard the Espora which he commanded until its major refit during the war. When Peablo became CoS he sent for Sarimento to join the Staff once more and was given the task of overseeing the construction and equipping of the carrier fleet and selecting suitable crew and pilots. He trained Capitan de Navio Torrez-Bucholz and together they left for Japan to take up command of the new carrier Guardabosques.

[Note that now full specs and a picture of the Argentine carriers are posted in the Argentina section]

Part II: First Exchanges

On January 27th the two carriers entered the Drake Passage and met their escort. The Independencia, Guardabosques, Fortleza and La Argentina (under the overall command of Vice Almirante Murphy) sailed on and just before dusk Vice Almirante Murphy’s powerful force moved into station some forty miles ahead of the carriers as a screen. Around twenty miles NW of the carriers was convoy PC-123 heading towards Comodoro Rivadavia consisting of fourteen merchant ships and an escort of the old cruiser Commandante General Irigoyen and the destroyers San Juan and Bathurst under the overall command of Capitan de Navio Honchez. The carriers’ transit was timed to cover this large and important convoy containing as it did three large tankers and munitions from Europe.

During the day both RSAN Thjazi and RSAN Anvil launched reconnaissance aircraft but failed to find any worthwhile targets except for two Royal Navy cruisers heading for Port Stanley.
Already that afternoon from an air strip at Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego a flight of six Tucan NB-1 dive bombers and the first four production Spartan TBN-7 (TB-1) torpedo bombers had landed on the two carriers (it was each pilot’s first carrier landing and it is remarkable none of the planes were damaged). Independencia carried the NB-1s and Guardabosques the TB-1s, both carriers also had 25 Mitsubishi A5M4 Navy Type 93 (NF-1) fighters (around 20 of this total were dissembled in crates) each and four were airborne from dawn on the 28th as fleet air cover. It was to be a remarkable day.

At 08:27 a Westland Wapiti floatplane from the cruiser La Argentina spotted the African carrier force and radioed its position and heading (around 120 miles due east just outside the Falklands territorial waters). Dodging in and out of the clouds it avoided detection until 08:52 when a Foller Fo. 137 Vulture II spotted the biplane and managed to hit the port wings and fuselage fuel tank. Already the six Spartan TBN-7 (TB-1) torpedo bombers aboard Guardabosques were being armed and the Independencia’s four Tucan NB-1 dive bombers were being ranged on deck alongside six Mitsubishi A5M4 fighters.
At this time however a Foller Fo. 122 Kingklip III torpedo bomber fitted with extra fuel tanks was making a reconnaissance of the straits and spotted the Libertad and her consorts. Around half an hour later she over flew the convoy and drew anti-aircraft fire but was out of effective range and it withdrew to the east. The RSAN Anvil launched ten Foller Fo. 122 Kingklip III torpedo bombers and nine Snider Type 24 Shark dive bombers escorted by twelve Foller Fo. 137 Vulture II fighters.

At 09:23 a Mitsubishi A5M4 flown by Sergeant de Aero Sainz positioned himself with height and dived out of the sun to deliver a surprise attack on the shadowing Kingklip which exploded and fluttered to the surface. Thus by the time the first waves of both sides were airborne the Argentines knew where the enemy carriers were and the Africans knew the Argentine battle fleet was protecting the carriers but did not know where the carriers were. Around 40 minutes after the first wave took off the RSAN launched another wave of ten Foller Fo. 122 Kingklip III torpedo bombers with eight escorting fighters from RSAN Forge.

Capitan de Navio Sarimento launched six extra fighters as and as they reached their operational height and began a sweep to the east the first RSAN wave of aircraft arrived. Vice Almirante Murphy had slowed his carriers and had turned slightly northward to bring his forces behind the convoy and thus further from the main screening forces. It was Almirante Benedicto’s force that took the brunt of the attack.
The Vulture II fighters were bounced by the six-strong CAP. The Mitsubishi A5M4 fighters came out of the sun and had the superior speed and manoeuvrability to down three of the fighters and get in among the Snider Sharks. Two A5M4 fighters were lost to the bombers defensive fire but the formation was scattered and it took time to get to bombing height and into a line astern formation while three more Mitsubishi A5M4 fighters arrived over the warships of Vice Almirante Murphy but at a much lower height than the incoming enemy formations.

Flight Captain Prien in his Snider Shark got ready for the bomb run, once the enemy fleet had scattered the torpedo bombers, coming in at wave-top height and as yet undetected, would strike. At 5000 metres the three three-aircraft groups began to make converging attacks on the Comodore Py, Hipolito Bouchard and Libertad in line astern. The 130mm and 115mm dual-purpose guns began firing as the planes formed up and were soon joined by the 37mm and 20mm mounts. Libertad’s modern fire-control system and her powerful quadruple 37mm mounts (with their own rangefinder) and sextuple 20mm mounts began clawing the Sharks from the sky. Three of the planes fell but at heights between 1500 and 800 metres the remaining pilots released their bombs.
Flight Captain Prien aimed for Libertad’s foreward turrets and as he pulled out (at 400 km/h) several 20mm shells ripped into his aircraft killing his rear gunner and smashing the radio. His 350kg SAP bomb hit just abreast of A turret where it buried into the hull exploding on the main armoured deck blasting the mess decks and flinging a chunk of hull plating into the sea. The magazine was flooded by a zealous junior officer but the turret was jammed and electric power to this part of the ship was cut off. The other four bombs were misses but one was a near-miss on Hipolito and water entered the forward boiler room slowing her speed to 21kts.

At this point a look-out on the destroyer Simon Bolivar spotted the incoming Kingklip torpedo bombers and they were soon were in a cross fire from the 115mm fire from the destroyers Contra Almirante Barbera and Simon Bolivar and the Libertad. The main body of six torpedo planes were engaged but some of the guns could not depress low enough to hit the slow biplanes and four torpedoes were launched. All of them missed but Hipolito, slowed by flooding, had to make a series of severe turns to avoid two torpedoes. The final flight of four Kingklips also attacked Hipolito from the port side and managed to drop three torpedoes. The slowed Hipolito managed to avoid two of the torpedoes but one hit the stern wrecking the steering gear and the port propeller. In revenge only one of the enemy planes was shot down. Thus as the second wave hit a forming cloud bank only a damaged force of planes were heading back to the African carriers but still harried by the remaining Argentine fighters.

The cloud bank forced the Argentine air group to change course, they climbed to fly over it and no enemy fleet was sighted. The formations were strung out and after fruitless searching for the enemy they set course to return to the carriers at 12:56. The second African wave from RSAN Forge missed the main Argentine battle fleet to the north and instead came across the convoy. Without Argentine fighters overhead the Kingklips had an easier run-in and the Vulture II fighters strafed the escorts. The recently refitted elderly cruiser Commandante General Irigoyen had a powerful anti-aircraft armament of twelve 100mm DP guns, four 37mm guns and six 20mm cannon. She put up a good defence and three Kingklip’s and two fighters ended up in the water. San Juan’s bridge was sprayed with machine gun fire and the Captain and senior officers killed or wounded. One torpedo struck the 5,000GRT steamer Capo Deseado which stopped and began to list, another ripped out the vitals of the 2,300GRT tanker AOC Maria which soon sank. The destroyer Bathurst avoided two torpedoes. As the African planes regrouped to head back west two A5M4 fighters swooped down and shot down a Vulture II which exploded, the two brave Argentine pilots easily outran the remaining African fighters.


To be continued...

I'm watching with intense interest. Finally, the moment I've waited for since... well, since I joined the game and started reading the war.

Chile very much hopes their Argentine allies don't lose either of their valuable new ships: we'd like to see them sometime in mutual port visits or fleet exercises, and compliment the Argentines' good taste in acquiring good-looking ships.

Part III: The RSAN Strike Again

The first exchanges over both sides took stock and reflected on what had happened and planned their next moves. Vice Almirante Murphy’s force was unscathed and for the loss of two fighters had scored successes on the enemy. However, the first strike had returned empty handed and one Tucan dive bomber was lost when the pilot misjudged his landing.
Almirante Benedicto was not so optimistic, his flagship was damaged and one quarter of his firepower was knocked out and one cruiser was crippled. If the enemy closed in and he had to face a surface action he felt he would lose. The destroyer Simon Bolivar took the Hipolito Bouchard in tow and the destroyer Contra Almirante Barbera remained close-by to cover them in a smokescreen. Capitan de Navio Honchez had lost one merchant ship and another was in tow but his escort forces were intact. The second officer of the Bathurst was transferred to the San Juan to take command. Two more Wapitis were launched and the aircraft on the decks of the Independencia and Guardabosques were armed and ready to launch another strike.

Admiral von Grunveldt had not found the enemy carriers, his primary task, but he knew they could not be far away from the battleship. The few returning crews claimed two merchants sunk and one cruiser crippled and the Libertad had suffered severe damage. However, he had lost seven Kingklip III torpedo bombers, three Sharks and three Vulture II fighters. He was puzzled why no enemy planes had attacked his force and a suspicion that perhaps the Argentine carriers were further west than he first thought led him to direct Thjazi to waste the afternoon sending aircraft much further west. Of the six Wilson-Brown WB IX "Sea Dart" seaplanes sent out one crashed from lack of fuel on the return flight and one fell to an I-99 fighter based in Tierra del Fuego.

As both sides sent out new scouts and rearmed the strike planes a lone Fokker T.IVa from Squadron No 3 at Naval Air Base Rio Gallegos spotted the Thjazi and her escorts at 13:06. Out of range of land-based bombers the information was radioed to the Argentine fleet. Almirante Benedicto seemed cheered by this news; his force could easily sweep this small force out of the way [Note 4].

At 14:36 Admiral von Grunveldt launched a wave of 24 Foller Fo.122 Kingklip III torpedo bombers, 12 Snider Type 24 Shark dive bombers escorted by 24 Foller Fo.137 Vulture II fighters from Anvil and Forge. It was to be a knock out blow to destroy the enemy battle fleet and therefore force the carriers to reveal their location.
At 14:42 one of the Wapitis from the cruiser La Argentina spotted the African carriers and the launching of the strike wave and radioed a warning to Vice Almirante Murphy. Contact with the Wapiti was lost at 14:56 but five A5M4 fighters clawed their way into the air to cover the carriers. The earlier cloud bank had moved north-east and now was less of an effective screen but the carriers moved 10 degrees to port and were now some three miles ahead of convoy PC-123 and Almirante Benedicto had now entered Argentine territorial waters and was heading due north straight towards the northern RSAN group’s position.
At 15:10 the six Spartan TBN-7 (TB-1) torpedo bombers aboard Guardabosques and the Independencia’s four Tucan NB-1 dive bombers took off with an escort of six fighters. Capitan de Navio Torrez-Bucholz now made the turn to the north and it seemed likely the carriers would get through the African attempts to stop them.

At 16:07 the RSAN planes arrived where the fleet should have been, since Thjazi’s seaplanes were searching further west none were available to spot the Argentine carriers and the two Kingklips from Forge were searching further to the west. Flight Captain Prien guessed the enemy had turned north so began a search pattern and eventually at 16:45 convoy PC-123 was spotted. To screen the carrier’s right flank the cruiser Fortleza was detached and she manoeuvred to bring herself just ahead of the convoy.
The African pilots had been briefed to attack and sink the carriers or the Libertad and cruisers but the convoy was a secondary objective so they flew over it and drew AA fire from the escorting destroyers. The cruiser Commandante General Irigoyen put up a formidable barrage of 100mm fire and this was joined by Fortleza. This barrage failed to hit any of the Kingklips but it unnerved the aircrews (some ditched their torpedoes early to turn away quicker) as they turned to attack the cruisers. Flight Captain Prien and his dive bombers continued further north.

The Kingklips split into two groups; one eventually followed Flight Captain Prien but the other set up a two-pronged attack on Fortleza. The cruiser at top speed managed to avoid the first two torpedoes off her port bow but no less than five torpedoes ripped into her engine spaces and she quickly capsized to starboard and sank. In revenge her guns downed one of her attackers [Note 5]. The other ten Kingklips ran into trouble almost immediately; four Mitsubishi A5M4 fighters had avoided the African fighters and dived onto the biplane torpedo bombers. Two fell in flames before they could react and by the time a flight of six Vulture II fighters arrived to drive the nimble Japanese-built fighters away another had fallen. Ahead of them the fighters escorting the Shark dive bombers swept away the two A5M4 fighters that were still climbing to operational height. It was now Flight Captain Prien began to have doubts. He felt sure the two downed fighters were all that stood between his force and the carriers and that he was able to destroy both vessels or at least cripple them. But he realised they were nowhere in sight and facing more cloud from the north he began to feel that Admiral von Grunveldt was right and that the carriers were still further behind the convoy. Gritting his teeth he gave to order to turn 180 degrees and begin a sweep to the south before the fuel situation got any worse [Note 6]. The remaining Kingklips under strong fighter escort continued in a loose line astern formation but returned to the convoy where they attacked the Bathurst without success and the 2,500GRT tanker SS Aristotle was hit by a torpedo which slowed her to 7kts. The crippled 5,000GRT steamer Capo Deseado, earlier hit and crippled was also finished with a torpedo on the port side.

Note 4] However the seaplane failed to spot the two Triumph Class battlecruisers in the area only twelve miles astern.

[Note 5] Two torpedoes hit the starboard side in the forward boiler room followed by one to port just aft of the after turbine space and the fifth struck abreast X gun on the starboard side. Only 186 sailors were rescued.

[Note 6] Historians will always debate what could have happened next. As it turned out the Argentine carriers were less than six miles away just behind the cloud bank that obscured Prien’s view without any further CAP cover to hinder his twenty four dive bombers. Had he continued he may have sunk or damaged both ships and would have been able to vector in the remaining torpedo bombers. It is still one of greatest naval What-Ifs of the twentieth century.


To be continued... the Argies strike back!

Good stuff, showing the difficulties in just plain FINDING the enemy.

Superb!

By the way, what is this battle called? The Battle of the Falkland Islands?

Quoted

Originally posted by Hrolf Hakonson
Good stuff, showing the difficulties in just plain FINDING the enemy.

Yeah, finding the enemy is a real problem. And it probably was the last large sea encounter in the pre-radar era....

Also note the emphasis (again) put on difficulties to sucessful operate planes against targets at sea. The whole operate cost many pilots and planes but actually achieved nothing. Hardly promoting CVs, that is....

Quoted

Originally posted by Brockpaine
Superb!

By the way, what is this battle called? The Battle of the Falkland Islands?

That´s probably an option. But as this is Hood´s little piece it is up to him I´d say. However, what would the ausdience call it? Are there other proposals?

Heh, as long as it's not called something like "Operation Tinkerbell".

Depending on where it is taking place, the Battle of the Scotia Sea/Battle of the Argentine Sea might also be used; or in Argentina, Battle of the Malvinas Islands?

Quoted

Originally posted by Brockpaine
the Battle of the Scotia Sea

If we can't have Operation Tinkerbell...

I'm kinda favoring "Battle of the Scotia Sea" myself; but would it actually be called the Scotia Sea? It received that name in 1932, and was named after a steamship which carried the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition. The "Argentine Sea" might actually be used in WW.

*Shrug* Just a consideration.

I'm sure James likes the idea of "Argentine sea"!

Part III: The Navy Strikes Back

At 16:07 the six Spartan TBN-7 (TB-1) torpedo bombers aboard Guardabosques and the Independencia’s four Tucan NB-1 dive bombers spotted the two light cruisers RSAN Santana and RSAN Paraná. Both ships began evasive manoeuvres and began laying smoke. Major de Aero Rival in his TB-1 guessed both ships were part of the aircraft carriers screen and they continued on a south-easterly course and eventually on the horizon spotted two large ships and at least one cruiser. Rival radioed his good news only to find as he reduced height to close in that enemy fighters were above them. The Vulture II fighters dived out of the sun and Rival ordered his pilots to attack the two cruisers. The TB-1 could give a Vulture a good run for its money but with horror he discovered the fighters were the new DeBroek FC-5A Mercury armed with two heavy and four light machine guns and with a top speed of 570 km/h. Even the A5M4 had met its match although the Mercury was not as agile and in a dogfight the Mitsubishi had the edge. Its only shortcoming was the weak armament of two 7.7mm machine guns which failed to harm the sturdy Mercury fighters. The four Tucan NB-1 dive bombers lacked the speed to escape and two quickly went down. One of the FC-5As went down to several well aimed bursts from a TB-1’s dorsal 13mm machine gun but another TB-1 met a watery grave.
The two remaining NB-1 dive bombers attacked the RSAN Santana; one was shot down during his dive but dropped its bomb before exploding from an 88mm AA hit. The bomb was a near-miss which ruptured the hull forward of the main belt causing minor flooding which was controlled by the pumps. The other NB-1 scored a direct hit with a 500lb SAP bomb which hit just to the right of the forward funnel blasting a twin 88mm mount overboard and sending splinters through the armoured deck into the boiler room below. There was no serious fire but some ready-use ammunition did explode. Only Rival’s TB-1 got into a firing position and he let his “fish” loose at RSAN Paraná. It missed. By 16:34 the battle was over and three TB-1s, one NB-1 and four A5M4 fighters made their way back at wave-top height avoiding the few remaining African fighters.

Unknown to the Argentine pilots Admiral von Grunveldt had quickly launched a group of six DeBroek TB-9A "Petrel" torpedo bombers from RSAN Forge. This new modern monoplane torpedo bomber had a top speed of 427 km/h and a range of 1720km carrying a full torpedo load. These six bombers followed the Argentine aircraft hoping they would lead them to the carriers. One of the "Petrels" carried radio direction finding equipment and was monitoring the Argentine pilots radio traffic.

At 18:48 the aircraft began circling for the landing routine as the carriers moved into the wind. At 18:56 as the first TB-1 caught the arrestor wire aboard the Guardabosques the six DeBroek TB-9A "Petrel" torpedo bombers roared into the attack a wave-top height. There was no Argentine fighter cover as the planes roared in. The powerful AA batteries aboard Independencia and Guardabosques backed up by modern fire-control and the AA guns aboard the cruiser La Argentina opened up. The few fighters on patrol above kept away from the furious fire from the ships hoping to pick off any stragglers on the way home. Each carrier had 22 115mm DP guns and soon the water around the ships was whipped into spray by the lines of 37mm shells and the 115mm shells. The air filled with black puffs of smoke and one by one the "Petrels" either fell into the sea or ditched their torpedoes to pull away to safety. Only three torpedoes were dropped and all missed (Independencia swerved to avoid one on her starboard quarter). Four of the Petrel’s made it back, one of which crashed on landing. Another TB-1 was lost as it ran out of fuel while circling to land. As night fell both sides once again took stock of the day’s events.

To be continued... the next day's action

[OOC: On the name, I'm useless at naming battles, we could call it Battle of the Malvinas Islands but if the Argies win it could be Battle of the Argentine Sea! ]

[Edit: torpedo error fixed! Proof you can never proof read enough!]

"three torpedoes were dropped and both missed"...

Some one seems to have teleported your torpedo out from under your nose!

Quoted

Originally posted by thesmilingassassin
"three torpedoes were dropped and both missed"...

Some one seems to have teleported your torpedo out from under your nose!

New Argentinian secret weapon??

Some new SAE weapon!
*incert evil laughter here*

Interphasic torpedoes!

Cloaked perhaps?

Part IV: The Final Day

Vice Almirante Murphy had escaped the day’s action with the loss of only one cruiser, lost because she was not mutually protected by another ship. The carriers were still undamaged but the air group was decimated and incapable of further offensive action. His goal now was to get into harbour as soon as possible. Almirante Benedicto was mystified why he had not been attacked by the enemy either by sea or air all day. Acting as the screen his ships failed to find any enemy units although he knew they could not be far away. He kept strict radio silence except for short messages and this seemed to have avoided detection by enemy intelligence so far. Capitan de Navio Honchez had protected the convoy well but had to detach Bathurst to escort the crippled SS Aristotle. Tomorrow if all went well he would receive some escort ships to help in the final section.

Admiral von Grunveldt had no reasons to be happy, his hunch that the carriers were further west had been wrong had only been proved just as darkness prevented another wave taking-off. Six aircraft had been lost including two of the new DeBroek TB-9A "Petrel" torpedo bombers on their operational trials. He had lost 20 aircraft; tomorrow would be the last day he could operate before he came within range of shore-based bombers. Also he was worried the Northern Group had not met the enemy and at 01:16 radioed them to turn northwest to find the enemy.

Events took another turn however when at 02:46 some 30 miles astern of the convoy (itself now 20 miles astern of Vice Almirante Murphy’s group) the destroyer Bathurst was escorting the SS Aristotle at 7kts. The fires on the tanker were out but her engines were badly damaged. At 02:47 a lookout on the starboard bridge wing aboard Bathurst spotted a large dark shape heading the opposite direction. The officer of the watch felt it was no friendly ship and the Captain came onto the bridge and ordered them to open fire. Six 4in salvos boomed into the night with red flashes and Bathurst roared away at flank speed to port leaving a visible wake. The enemy fired back but hits were observed on the target. The director crew and the gun crews shouted and waved and bragged about the dozen hits and huge explosions [Note 7]. Two unidentified cruisers (the RSAN Ajax and RSAN Achilles) went after the Bathurst but she avoided the searchlights and the star shells to escape into a fog bank some two hours later. The SS Aristotle was not so lucky.
The news spread, Almirante Benedicto felt sure the enemy was far behind and that they had a large lead on them and Admiral von Grunveldt now felt RSAN Thjazi had found the enemy convoy and that the carriers were within range of the two Triumph class battlecruisers but by dawn with only one tanker sunk it was clear the enemy was much further north.

At dawn Admiral von Grunveldt ordered RSAN Anvil and RSAN Thjazi to launch reconnaissance aircraft to scour the whole area. Vice Almirante Murphy instead kept an eight-aircraft patrol over his carriers and the convoy. On land the Aviacion Naval leapt into action as the Argentine ships got closer to Comodoro Rivadavia. Squadron No 3 from its bases at Rio Gallegos and Puerto Deseado sent out four Fokker T.IVa seaplanes and six new IMPA SI-21S seaplanes armed with bombs to attack any RSAN ships they found. Squadron No 7 at Naval Air Base Madryn under the command of Capitan de Navio Albarrcin began arming and warming-up its 45 TBN-6A Seadart torpedo bombers to launch an attack if the African fleet got close enough. A few local defence flights of FAA I-100 Baron fighters took off to make patrols and by 10:05 a flight of FMA I.Ae 4S twin-engined torpedo bombers was on station above the carriers of Vice Almirante Murphy. Overnight six more Mitsubishi fighters had been assembled and these were test flown after breakfast.

Following a brief report from one of the seaplanes before it was shot down Admiral von Grunveldt launched a wave of 8 Foller Fo.122 Kingklip III torpedo bombers, 12 Snider Type 24 Shark dive bombers escorted by 16 Foller Fo.137 Vulture II fighters from Anvil and Forge at 10:24. Flight Captain Prien did not want to disappoint his Admiral again and was determined to get some success today. At 11:59 the fighters of both sides began to mix over the convoy while the escort fired at friend and foe alike. By 12:30 Prien could see the two carriers, dark and squat in the smooth seas, above them he could see fighters getting airborne. None of the A5M4 fighters were near his bombers as he climbed to bombing altitude, then his gunner shouted a warning, “Long-range fighters astern 5 o’clock.” Prien did not believe him, “they have no such fighters, they must be bombers!” They were the flight of FMA I.Ae 4S twin-engined torpedo bombers; they had decided to join the fight. With a maximum speed of 404 km/h they matched the Sharks and had three machine guns in the nose with which to cause damage. The Snider Sharks were able to out-manoeuvre the I.Ae 4s but one Shark went down and the bombing formation was split up.
The Kingklip torpedo bombers facing harassment from the A5M4 fighters and some heavy AA fire from La Argentina dropped their torpedoes at long range and turned for home at wave-top height. None had been shot down but it was clear the crew’s morale had weakened. None of the torpedoes hit.
The Snider Sharks with some closer fighter cover (two I.Ae 4S went down to the Vulture II fighters) made individual attacks from around 5000 metres altitude dropping their bombs from 800 to 600 metres. Such tactics were suicide and the unsupported bombers bore the brunt of the AA fire as they dived without any friendly planes to distract the gunners. Two of the planes were shot down by 37mm fire, Prien desperate to score a hit made a terminal dive. His port wingtip clipped the flight deck of Guardabosques as he crashed, his bomb failed to release. Five bombs straddled Guardabosques, Independencia was near-missed by one bomb on the port side and La Argentina was near-missed by two bombs which caused splinter damage and some minor fuel leaks. The Vulture II fighters after shooting down two A5M4 fighters after a long chase then attempted some strafing runs before turning for home.

Relief swept over the Argentine ships, Vice Almirante Murphy had rebuffed the attack without serious damage, Almirante Benedicto was preparing to enter Comodoro Rivadavia and Capitan de Navio Honchez was not far behind with four 611 Class patrol boats augmenting his tiny force to counter any African submarines brought into the area. Likewise the carriers were joined by two Guardia class sloops.
Admiral von Grunveldt moodily paced the bridge, he knew he had no more effort to spare, his final attack had failed and now the enemy was safely within ground-based fighters and bombers and his battlecruisers would be vulnerable. Thus he ordered the Northern Group to head back to Mar del Plata on a north-easterly course while his own force scoured the Cape for any merchants before heading back into the Atlantic.

[Note 7] In fact the ship was the seaplane carrier RSAN Thjazi. Bathurst fired 22 4in shells and four hit the ship. One hit below the waterline causing some minor flooding in the fuel tanks, another ripped through the forward superstructure, another hit the hangar in the hull destroying two seaplanes and starting a fire and the fourth smashed the starboard boats. RSAN Thjazi was not seriously damaged and only ten sailors were wounded and by dawn she was fully operational but only four seaplanes were serviceable. Ship now rated 97%.

[Note 8] Ship ratings after the battle
Argentina;
Independencia rated 99%
Guardabosques rated 98%
Libertad rated 97%
Fortleza rated 0% (sunk)
La Argentina rated 98%
Comodore Py rated 99%
Hipolito Bouchard rated 92%
Commandante General Irigoyen rated 99%
Contra Almirante Barbera rated 98%
Simon Bolivar rated 99%
San Juan rated 97%
Bathurst rated 97%

RSAN;
RSAN Anvil rated 99%
RSAN Forge rated 99%
RSAN Fanfir rated 99%
RSAN Cape Agulhas rated 99%
RSAN Santana rated 94%
RSAN Paraná rated 98%
RSAN Lachesis rated 99%
RSAN Monatheris rated 99%
RSAN Yaoundé rated 99%
RSAN Brazzaville rated 99%
RSAN Thjazi rated 97%
RSAN Abderos rated 99%
RSAN Ajax rated 99%
RSAN Achilles rated 98%

So then gentlemen what have we learned from WW first carrier Vs carrier action and the first battle fought at sea between two fleets that never came within sight of each other?

What are the strategical and tactical implications of the battle and the outcome?

What deductions can be made from the battle to put into future plans and carrier design?

How did the aircraft perform? How could they improve?

Was the AA armament as effective as supposed?

What do the other navies of WW think about the answers to these questions?