Wien, Wednesday, 1 April 1942
The Verlag Freytag und Berndt debut the first issue of a new publishing venture – an illustrated novella or comic-magazin featuring the character of Erich von der Heydt – an adventurer and amateur explorer based in the city of Vienna. While taking coffee in the rare bookshop of his friend Georg Backhaus von der Heydt receives a postcard from an old friend that prompts him to travel to India; en route he encounters a Eurasian beauty with a clue to the whereabouts of his long-lost companion.
Bremer Nachrichten, Thursday, 2 April 1942
Yesterday saw the keel laying of four new destroyers for the Kriegsmarine, two in Bremerhaven and two in Cuxhaven. They represent yet another chapter in the continuing renovation of the nation’s sea-shield. The vessels of the Detmold class are highly regarded in naval circles and it is rumored that the Kriegsmarine will seek to continue their construction beyond the eight units currently funded.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Friday, 3 April 1942
Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Bruning, together with other officials, departed today from Berlin on a visit to the Russian Federation for discussions with their counterparts. Details of the agenda have not been released at this time.
Wehrgedanken des Auslandes, April 1942
This month the Wehrgedanken des Auslandes staff looks at the United States Navy as it undergoes a period of transition.
One of the more interesting developments on the naval scene has been the public pronouncements of the Wilkie Administration on the role it sees for the United States in international affairs. President Wilkie sees the United States as having a duty to defend democracy and has expressed the desire to expand American economic and security interests into Asia and South America; this is a far cry from the introspective stance of the Long Administration. Nevertheless the policies adopted in recent years has left the United States Navy with dilemmas that cannot be solved overnight; the General Board of the American navy has begun to address these dilemmas within its means, and progress has been made; but at the moment the United States Navy would be hard-pressed to fulfill all the roles that President Wilkie’s policies might call it to carry out.
Historically the United States has seen the potential threat posed by Iberian seapower on its doorstep as its top priority, and while such a threat cannot be dismissed summarily, it is unlikely that the Iberian Federation would deliberately court conflict with America – given the presumption that American’s NATO allies would respond as well. Nevertheless, this has conditioned American strategic thinking for many years, leaving it with a battle force composed of relatively slow, heavily armed and well protected warships well suited for operating in the Gulf of Mexico and the western Atlantic – the likely theatres of operation for any Ibero-American conflict. The American aircraft carrier force too is of considerable size and its materiel is on par with the vessels of other nations – if not superior on a ship-for-ship basis. The cruiser force of the American navy is more than sufficient to screen the battle line and provide escort to its aircraft carriers – the newer vessels being commissioned are far better equipped to conduct these missions compared with the older vessels of Great War vintage that have been sold off. In this regard there are still rumors of dissatisfaction within the upper echelons of the American navy of the sale abroad of two heavy cruisers in the latter days of the Long Administration. The destroyer force of the American navy is similarly composed – vessels adequate to current requirements and in sufficient number to escort major units.
The greatest strategic dilemma facing the United States Navy is its need to defend its coasts on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards. Until completion of the Mexican Canal the United States is dependent on Iberian goodwill for use of the Panama Canal, or must send its ships around South America to transit from one coast to the other. When the Mexican Canal is complete the United States will be able to redeploy its forces in a far more responsive manner.
The Wilkie Administration appears to see a greater role for the American navy in the Far East; this forces upon the General Board the issue of the state of its Service Force. At the current time the United States Navy has only five fleet tankers in service – though the acquisition of many more units is a priority. This limits the American fleet to operations near its own bases or those of friendly forces; while adequate for the perceived threat of Iberia, it is not for any operations in the Western Pacific Ocean. The Cimarron class tankers are excellent vessels – fast, capacious, and planned in significant numbers. However, due to competing priorities, only three units of the class have been procured to date. The United States Navy is devoid of tenders for its light forces, and the essential components of a fleet train – store carriers, ammunition ships, and repair vessels – are lacking. In wartime these deficiencies might be made up by conversion of mercantile hulls, but their absence from the current force structure shackles the American navy in attempting to carry out the policies articulated by the President.
The current American naval force structure lacks provision for conducting mine warfare – having neither dedicated minelayers or minesweepers. While the American army’s Mine Planting Service can lay defensive minefields in coastal waters to complement coastal batteries, the United States Navy cannot picket the harbors of an enemy without resorting to fitting its destroyers or submarines for the purpose. No doubt this situation would be remedied in wartime, but the peacetime lack of minelaying assets precludes realistic training. Of greater moment is the lack of modern minesweeping vessels; if called upon to confront hostile forces the American fleet would quite vulnerable to mines laid by an enemy, whether by surface craft, submarine or aircraft. On the other hand, if the United States was able to conduct a naval campaign in concert with its NATO allies, the lack of mine warfare vessels could be offset by those of the Royal Navy, which is well versed in such matters.
The United States Navy also lacks dedicated antisubmarine assets. While the current destroyer force is adequate to screen major task forces, the only escort vessels available to the Americans at this time are the ships of the United States Coast Guard. While some of these vessels are of adequate design to protect merchant vessels in time of war they are not at present equipped with the latest advances in antisubmarine warfare. This lack of escorts is of particular concern should hostile powers in the Pacific seek to engage in attacks on American communications with Hawaii or Samoa.
Offsetting this lack of surface escorts to some degree is the considerable investment the United States Navy has made in its airship force. With more than twenty airships in active service – including such massive behemoths as the four units of the George Washington class – the Americans can field one of the largest, if not the largest, airship forces in the world. As a long range scouting unit the airship has many advantages – it has unparalled range and almost unlimited loiter time; it can carry its own combat aircraft to extend its range or defend itself; and if equipped with modern electronic detection equipment, can greatly extend a commander’s scouting horizon. However, airships have the disadvantage of vulnerability to weather – in past exercises airships have been driven off their appointed stations at the approach of bad weather; they are too slow to evade attacking aircraft should they be discovered by hostile forces, and lack adequate defenses against determined attack; and their air groups, while adequate for scouting purposes, cannot be compared with those carried by an aircraft carrier. Deployed in the Atlantic theatre airships can form a useful adjunct to American seapower, and much the same can be said for defensive patrols in the eastern Pacific.
On the whole it may be said that the United States Navy is carefully choosing its course in the shoals of conflicting priorities. It is clear that the General Board is attempting to address many issues of long-standing nature, and it has taken the risk of concentrating its available resources on refurbishing the battle and aircraft carrier forces with a new generation of warships before embarking on the revitalisation of its Service Force. What remains to be seen is whether this decision will fully support the policies of the current administration, or whether President Wilkie can likewise chart a course for the American ship of state that does not ask too much of the United States Navy in the near future.
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but at the moment the United States Navy would be hard-pressed to fulfill all the roles that President Wilkie’s policies might call it to carry out.
Friday, May 24th 2024, 6:18am
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