The following Executive Summary is presented for OOC use only...
Your Highness,
As per your instructions, we have analyzed the current naval arms limitation situation and have presented our conclusions in the attached paper. In brief, we foresee three viable options, all of which have advantages and disadvantages associated with them.
1. Immediate withdrawal from the Treaty
An immediate withdrawal is at once the easiest thing to do and the most unpredictable. It provides the largest window in which to adjust the building program to suit operational needs - yet it is generally agreed that the construction of the Talwar class carriers, the Ahmadabad class cruisers, and the Miraj class destroyers will be proceeding with little modification during 1932-34 regardless of whether we adhere to the Treaty or not. There is, then, little actual scope for an immediate withdrawal to have tangible benefits until 1934.
Although there would be some political turbulence expected as a result of a withdrawal, the main issue that may balance out our own freedom is the possible implosion of the Cleito Treaty. It is not unreasonable to assume that other Contracting Powers will withdraw - for the same cited reason as India, or because they view India’s withdrawal as a threat in itself, or simply for their own benefit, though one of the preceding rationales may be the official basis for the move.
Assuming the Treaty were to collapse entirely, we would expect an escalation in warship production worldwide. There would be a greater range in warships constructed, with the upper end of each type of vessel increasing in size and armament. India would be hard-pressed to keep up with this pace, particularly given our limited infrastructure.
However, the situation is not necessarily dire. The alliance we are most commonly in conflict with, AANM, benefits the most from the Treaty’s existence. Despite near parity in industrial capacity with SATSUMA, AANM enjoys 45% more capital ship hulls. Similarly, while FAR’s industrial capacity exceeds AANM by 30%, its capital ship hull allocation only exceeds AANM by 17%. A collapse of the Treaty, in the long term, would likely see FAR address its inferior position in the Mediterranean, thus putting pressure on AANM to commit additional resources of its own to retain its control. Overall, we would not expect a significant increase in AANM, FAR, or even necessarily UK capability in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. SATSUMA should be in a position to field a larger naval component that remains concentrated in South Asia.
2. Increase to “French” limits
The next tier of allocations in the Treaty, the so-called French limits, would address most of our projected operational requirements through the remainder of the current treaty, and likely into a potential succeeding regime. The increase in carrier tonnage and Class A cruiser tonnage is modest, but the other categories are significantly greater, in some cases far in excess of what is actually required.
There is no reason not to make a request for French limits. The UK has indicated its willingness to accept such a request, though this can not be considered a guarantee of future behaviour. The difficulty lies in convincing all of the other Contracting Powers to agree, as unanimous consent is required. AANM is most likely to oppose the request for obvious reasons; the question will be whether they consider French limits to be a lesser evil than an Indian withdrawal and its possible consequences.
A side issue that may arise is a possible “jumping onto the bandwagon” from other powers who will seek additional allocations of their own as a result of India’s request. It will be difficult for us to oppose such a bid without jeopardizing their support for ours; it will also be that much more difficult for the other Contracting Powers to stomach such a scenario if it leads to increases in warship levels around the world. All we can do is present a logical argument and see if it carries the day.
3. Retain Status Quo
The status quo is not necessarily a bad thing. The existing limits do promote a balanced fleet, with reasonable growth rates. Our ability to increase the overall number of men at sea is, after all, constrained by our ability to train new recruits and graduate new officers and to construct and maintain the warships.
Therefore, we must consider the related issue of infrastructure. Consensus is that our existing drydock capacity remains inadequate for sustained military operations. Particularly lacking are docks to deal with larger warship types - including our allies’ ships in the Class 4 category. The case can also be made that additional Class 3 construction capability is required - Class 4 may be desirable if consensus is that the Cleito Treaty will not be renewed. If India finds itself in a position to acquire additional warships via French limits, and does so, it will come at the expense of the infrastructure program we require to support them.
In this scenario, we expect that India would round out its remaining allocations (minus the coastal defence armorclad category) by ~1934, leaving approximately two to three years for intense infrastructure development. Provided we maintain some headway in design and construction work, the end of the Treaty would see India with sufficient infrastructure that the full weight of the naval program from mid-1936 on. This will remove one possible objection - lack of capacity - that may be voiced when we seek larger allocations under the Cleito Treaty’s successor; more likely, it will leave us better positioned to build up to the desire force levels when accumulated ill-will leaves the Contracting Powers unable to renew or replace Cleito.
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Originally posted by Swamphen
Monday, April 29th 2024, 9:53am
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