From: Admiral William V. Pratt, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
To: Admiral Charles F. Hughes, Chief of Naval Operations
Re: Summary Report on 1929 Fleet Problem IX
January 14th, 1930
Sir:
Fleet Problem IX was held from December 5th, 1929 to December 10th, 1929 and despite the inevitable complications from such a diverse, multinational force, it proved to be quite informative. The influence of naval aviation, both fixed wing and lighter than air, had a decisive impact on the outcome of the exercise.
At the start of the exercise on the fifth, the Brown Fleet was located approximately 300 nautical miles west of Havana, Cuba. The exercise scenario assumed that Brown forces had neutralized Key West and any installations in South Florida through air strikes launched from Island X. The airships Los Angeles and Shenandoah were operating with the Brown force in the scouting role, simulating Brown zeppelins based on Island X. They moved ahead of the main force in an attempt to locate enemy units attempting to intercept the fleet. Because Brown zeppelins are not known to carry aircraft, neither airship was equipped with a scout plane for this exercise and would operate as direct scouts.
At the start of the exercise, Ranger and Constellation and their attending escorts made a high speed run to the northwest while the main fleet headed west. The carriers then arced to the west towards the Mexican coast and before sunrise on the seventh launched a strike towards Veracruz after reports from PD-1’s operating from simulated Brown bases in Florida indicated that several large fleet units were still in port. The strike arrived just at sunrise and was ruled to have caused serious damage to battleships Oklahoma, Arizona, and Theseus and moderate to minor damage to four others. Admiral Robinson had deployed his scout units, including his three light carriers, but was holding back his heavy units until the enemy was located. Keeping the bulk of his fleet in port until the enemy was sighted was a poor decision in the light of the Brown fleet’s carrier force and the losses he suffered would hamper his defense later in the exercise. However, the Brown strike targeted primarily surface units in Veracruz Harbor, and the Allied airfields in the area were not seriously damaged. It should be noted that the Texas did spot the incoming strike on her Device, but the range readings were not interpreted correctly and when a warning was issued it was too late. Still the Device shows considerable promise despite the difficulties encountered so far in its use and maintenance.
Allied reconnaissance was able to locate the Brown carriers late on the seventh and a limited strike from the carriers Hermes and Alioth was launched but was ruled to have been repulsed by defending aircraft and defensive fire. Afternoon thunderstorms on the Mexican coast prevented launching Army bombers. Personally I doubt that the Army would have fared much better since realistic tests with the Arkansas have shown level bombing to be all but useless against maneuvering surface units. General Mitchell’s much publicized “tests” off the Virginia Capes only proved that it was possible to sink stationary, defenseless targets, not operational warships. Torpedo strikes or possibly dive bombing seem the most effective anti-ship tactic but the Army has yet to embrace those ideas fully.
Regardless of the failure of the Allied counterattack, the Brown carrier force was not able to escape pursuit. The airship Atlantes was able to maintain contact with the force though the use of her scout planes throughout the night of the seventh into the eighth. Captain Maxfield is preparing a full report on his observations while on board the Atlantian airship which should prove quite useful once the Akron enters service in 1931. During the night, the Lake Champlain moved to join with Hermes and Alioth and launched a second strike on the morning of the eighth which was ruled to be somewhat more successful. The judges ruled that moderate damage was done to Ranger and the Canadian Repulse as well. Atlantes was then discovered by scout planes from the Lexington and ruled shot down. After a few hours she was allowed to rejoin the exercise simulating another airship.
Later on the eighth, the airship Los Angeles, simulating a Brown zeppelin, was able to locate the light carrier Lake Champlain, but was spotted and quickly ruled destroyed by anti-aircraft fire since Brown airships use hydrogen and would prove far easier to destroy than a helium airship. She retired for several hours until she was allowed to resurrect as another Brown airship. The Brown carriers immediately launched a strike which was ruled to have sunk Lake Champlain and damaged several escorts. Hermes and Alioth launched another strike on the Brown carrier force, which arrived just as the strike on the Lake Champlain returned. The judges ruled that damage to the Repulse, previously damaged on the eighth, forced her withdrawal. The Brown carriers escaped damage and the attacking force was ruled to have suffered heavy losses from the returning escort fighters. Both Allied carriers then withdrew south towards the Allied fleet and its bases. Atlantes continued to shadow the Brown carriers using her scout planes while keeping herself well clear of the enemy.
Meanwhile, the bulk of the Brown Fleet continued west towards Veracruz and the northern terminus of the canal. Late on the eighth they were spotted by an Allied submarine and Admiral Robinson, who by now had sent his remaining forces to sea, moved to engage them. Army Keystone bombers launched an attack on the Brown fleet but this was ruled to again have little effect. The Allied fleet was at a numerical disadvantage as far as capital ships, with four operational front line battleships and a pair of coast defense battleships versus the Brown fleet’s nine. Arizona, Oklahoma, and Theseus were ruled to be too heavily damaged to go to sea and remained in Veracruz. The Allied submarine force was primarily deployed in scouting positions across the Gulf while the lighter, coastal units remained near the Mexican coast
On the morning of the ninth, an Allied submarine was able to maneuver into a firing position and was ruled to have torpedoed Ranger, knocking her out of the battle. Constellation and her escorts continued to move to attempt to catch the Allied fleet in a pincer between the battleships of the main Brown fleet and the battlecruisers and aircraft of the carrier force. Admiral Robinson ordered all Allied submarines to move into a position to engage the Brown fleet in the probable event that he was unable to stop the force from advancing towards the coast. Late on the ninth, Shenandoah and scout planes from the main Brown fleet located the Allied force, but it was too late in the day to launch an air strike before sunset. Shenandoah was able to shadow the Allied fleet through the night, but was engaged by catapult launched scouts and ruled shot down just after sunrise on the tenth. At this point she was determined to have a leak in one of her gas bags and retired to the expeditionary mast at Key West for temporary repairs. It was determined that a broken wire had torn the bag. Shenandoah is due for a major inspection in the spring and Captain Lansdowne and Commander Rosendahl have both expressed some concern as to her material condition. The design she was based on had an expected lifespan of only a year or two and she's now eight years old and has seen some hard use.
By sun-up on the tenth, the two fleets were about fifty nautical miles apart and closing rapidly. Scout planes from Atlantes were able to locate the Brown carrier force and Hermes and Alioth launched what aircraft they had that had not been ruled already lost in the exercise. While the force was meager, their timing was impeccable. They arrived over the Constellation just as she was about to launch a strike on the Allied fleet. The judges ruled that she was badly damaged due to secondary explosions from ammo and fuel. Captain Yarnell apparently came close to striking the judge when he was informed. Despite Yarnell’s complaints, I believe it was a fair judgment based on the accidental fires witnessed in other navies and our own studies.
Despite the loss of the last Brown carrier, Robinson still faced the rest of the Brown battle line, nine battleships and three battlecruisers and their escorts. Just after 09:30 visual and Device contact was made between the two forces. Both fleets formed lines of battle with the Allied fleet located roughly between the Brown battleship and battlecruiser groups. The Brown fleet “opened fire” first, at just over 28,000 yards. All gunfire was simulated by the judges after it was decided to forgo using “blanks” for safety reasons. The live fire exercises after the main exercise would be practice enough under real conditions. Gunnery crews did practice loading using dummy shells and powder bags. The effects of gunnery smoke, wear and tear, and fatigue were calculated into the system used by the judges and developed at Newport as was crew quality based on prior training reports. It was a rather boring way of doing things, but it was certainly cheaper then expending real powder charges and the attending risk.
The battlecruiser force, running at top speed, was able to cross the Allied “T” at roughly 21,000 yards and was ruled to have struck the flagship Pennsylvania severely, forcing her to disengage. Nevada and Melampus were also ruled to have taken several hits as well. The Allied side generally had older fire control equipment and this was taken into account by the judges, though they did score some good “hits”. The Texas and the Chilean Almirante Gideon were judged to have the most modern FCS in the engagement, but their crew quality was hampered by the limited time they have had to train with the equipment. New Mexico and Tennessee were ruled to be moderately damaged by 14” fire from the two Allied ships, and Colorado was “struck” by the Melampus. Clearly outgunned, Robinson ordered the destroyers to move in and launch torpedoes to cover the Allied withdrawal. The Allied destroyer force was roughly double the size of the Brown force and made an almost textbook daylight attack which forced the main Brown force to break off, though the destroyers were ruled to have suffered heavy losses and some communication difficulties made the attack a tad haphazard at points. West Virginia, Idaho and Saratoga all were ruled to have been struck by at least one torpedo in the attack. The Allied force then withdrew back towards the Mexican coast behind its submarine screen.
By the end of the tenth, both sides had lost most, if not all of their sea-based aviation assets. The Allied fleet had been badly mauled both by air and surface attack, while the Brown fleet still retained most of its surface strength. The Brown landing force was still well to the rear and had not seen action. However, Allied land-based air assets were still considerable and while not effective against maneuvering units at sea, they would be devastating to any landing force. The failure to target the airfields early in the exercise was a major complicating factor in completion of the assigned mission. The additional light units defending the canal’s Gulf terminus would also prove a serious threat to any assault with the forces available. After consultation with Admiral Robinson, it was decided to end the scenario at this point. An attempt to continue with the attack under the tactical conditions present would most likely result in further losses to the main Brown fleet, not to mention the assault force. Also, it has been my opinion that a sea-borne attack on the canal would not occur in isolation. Brown forces in Central America would almost certainly invade Mexico and attempt to set up forward bases for their own land based forces in southern Mexico, as well as on the Yucatan after crossing over from Island X. Any seaborne attack would require overwhelming superiority to succeed and the current Brown fleet certainly does not possess such superiority, even if its allies were to become involved.
With the end of the fleet problem, other secondary exercises were conducted. The Atlantian landing fleet went ahead with a landing exercise just south of Veracruz. Their specially designed landing craft proved most useful and the Marine Corps expressed considerable interest in procuring several examples for experimentation. Gunnery and bombing exercises were also held. Their light attack craft also looked quite interesting. Considering the successes the type had during the Great War, especially in the confined waters of the Adriatic, it might pay to further investigate them as defensive units or for use as offensive units in any future Gulf/Caribbean conflict. Groups of those boats operating out of out-of-the-way bays could wreak havoc with any attacking force or even strike Brown bases. Likewise, we cannot ignore the threat that such units could prove to our forces in future operations and having some to work with would allow us to generate effective counter tactics to them. If Congress does not want to purchase complete units from the Atlantians, we could always buy the plans and produce them domestically. There are numerous small-craft manufacturers who would be up to the task.
The battleships of the Scouting Fleet and the older units of the Battle Fleet clearly have inferior fire control systems and the planned refits to the older ships will come none too soon. Texas’ new FCS proved quite accurate and the Device also seems to be somewhat useful in a limited fire control role, though difficulties with range calculation and reliability issues were quite frustrating. Perhaps now that we have less “eccentric” scientists working on it we can make some quick improvements.
There were also a series of seminars and social gatherings in Veracruz that lead to some interesting discussions. Admiral Togo talked at length about the war with Russia and I must admit that the room would have mirrored any lecture hall at Annapolis save for all the gold braid on their uniforms. I know some in the War Department are none too fond of having such a large foreign audience watching our forces in action, but I think the advantages outweigh any risks. Seeing the United States in action could prove a deterrent to any potential aggressor, and being exposed to different doctrines will help us as well.
Carrier forces proved rather decisive in the exercise, especially the larger Ranger and Constellation. It has been my opinion that the Sackets Harbor design was ill advised in light of the superior striking power of the larger air groups. I know Congress was loath to fund a third fleet carrier after then war and looked more at numbers of hulls over capability, but the light carrier has shown itself to be of limited offensive use beyond scouting and it seems likely that the new ZRS airships will prove equally useful in that role as will fixed wing, land or sea-based aircraft. Frankly I think we should convert two of the light carriers into training ships under the new provisions of the Cleito Treaty and use the tonnage we would then have remaining for a trio of fleet carriers instead of the two we are now planning. I would gladly trade two small decks for a big one. We would be stuck with the third light carrier, but considering the current estimates about the future continuation of the treaty regime that may not be a very serious problem. We should also continue efforts to modernize and rationalize our air groups as Admiral Moffett has suggested. We have too many different types of planes doing basically the same mission right now and the ones we have are starting to show their age compared to some of the new models being produced overseas.
Lighter than air forces proved useful as well in the scouting role, though not as direct scouting platforms as was the practice during the Great War. The Atlantian ZRS-type ship proved a useful platform for scout planes and was crucial in finding and maintaining contact with the Brown carrier force. Our ZR’s, operating using the wartime methods still used by Brown were less useful. They were able to find targets on occasion, but were quickly dispatched. I know some of those at Lakehurst don’t like the idea of their airships being “relegated” to flying aircraft carriers instead of offensive units, but I think experience is showing that continuing to use tactics from the last war is suicidal. Also, the geography of the Gulf and Caribbean are not the most conducive to rigid LTA operations due to relatively confined waters and the generally short distances that favor fixed-wing aircraft. The long-range capabilities of the airship are best demonstrated in the more open waters of the Pacific or Atlantic. The ability to witness the operational use of a ZRS will provide us with a major “leg-up” when Akron enters service in 1931 and as I stated earlier, Captain Maxfield is preparing a report on his observations over the last several weeks he has been on board Atlantes. As for the Atlantian blimps, they certainly proved most interesting in coastal defense. While both they and our subs were on the same side in the scenario, they were quite adept at visually locating submerged subs and their endurance allowed them to prosecute any target for extended periods. Their ability to see beneath the surface would also prove useful in mine warfare situations. We haven’t been able to really investigate what the non-rigid is capable of since the agreement with the Army that they worked with blimps while we worked with rigids. I know the Army has been agitating to be allowed to build rigids, and we could stand to have some more blimps to experiment with. Perhaps its time to rethink the limitations imposed on both sides.
As for future Fleet Problems, the Hawaiian scenario seems the most logical to run next year. Its smaller scale will also prove less controversial to Congress who has already expressed severe reservations about the cost of our recent “games”. As for future scenarios involving the canal, I believe that Newport should coordinate with the Army War College at Washington Barracks to design an integrated scenario for the defense of the canal region from both land and sea attack. Such scenarios may be too large to be realistically played out in the field, but they will give us ideas for smaller scenarios that address specific aspects of the defense issues faced. Further multi-national cooperation should be pursued by all means. While there were major language and doctrinal differences between the disparate parties involved in IX, further exercises will reduce those difficulties as well as generate good will that will certainly prove useful in the future. Such cooperation is the surest method to prevent further foreign expansion in the hemisphere and protect American interests. .
Respectfully yours,
Admiral William V. Pratt
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