Marine Kriegsakademie Stralsund, Tuesday, 13 May 1947
The murmur of quiet conversation in the auditorium came to a stop when the doors opened to admit Generaladmiral Hermann von Fischel, Chief of Naval Operations. The officers present stood to attention and remained so as von Fischel strode to the podium. The admiral’s staff filed in behind him and stood at their seats on the right side of the hall.
“Be seated Gentlemen,” the Admiral said, and the sea of blue uniforms moved as one. Von Fischel paused a few moments before speaking.
“As you know the Minister of Defence had called for this conference some months ago to consider the options available to the Kriegsmarine in the forthcoming quadriennium as to force levels, equipment, organisation, and doctrine. In the past six months we have maintained a high operations tempo, and the number of new vessels coming forward continues. We have learned much, and we have much to discuss. However, before examining in detail our own requirements, I have asked Kapitän Gerlach and Kapitän Merten to brief us on the recently concluded British training exercises in the North Sea. I believe that you will find their conclusions most illuminating.”
Merten, Director of Naval Operations had spent the last fortnight attempting to unravel what had happened during the British exercise and what it meant; Gerlach, Director of Naval Intelligence, had provided additional information, obtained from a variety of sources, that unlocked some of the anomalies that had confused Merten during the actual days of the British operation. Merten began the presentation while an assistant drew back the curtain on a large map of the North Sea that hung at the rear of the stage.
“The exercise proper appears to have begun at midnight, 15 April, with movement of many warships from Scapa Flow and other bases in Scotland,” Merten began. “Prior to this point a force – comprising three light carriers, five cruisers, eleven destroyers, two sloops, and four auxiliary vessels had been concentrated at Harwich. As best as we can determine this force was meant to be the opposition force for the exercise – in our tracking it was designated as the ‘Albrecht’ group.” He paused while the wall map was updated to show the initial movement of the ‘Albrecht’ group.
“In reaction to the movement of the ‘Albrecht’ group a large force of British vessels moved across the North Sea to take up patrol positions near the Shetland Islands, the Viking Bank, and the Fisher Banks. This force – we estimate it included at least two aircraft carriers, three battleships, and ten cruisers, with numerous destroyers – was designated ‘Julius’, and was clearly intended to intercept the ‘Albrecht’ group within the eastern portion of the North Sea.”
The markers on the map behind Merten took on a configuration familiar to many of the officers present – that of the Skagerrakschlacht of the Great War; indeed, some of the senior officers had been present at that battle. Merten could see heads nodding, and some shaking.
“Despite the presence of three aircraft carriers in the ‘Albrecht’ group air operations appeared to be tentative at best,” continued Merten, drawing on the observations of the Marineflieger crews that had overflown the British vessels. “Aircraft operations were hesitant, relatively few aircraft were employed on air search, and the combat air patrol was thin.”
Gerlach spoke up at this point. “From traffic analysis we believe that two of the aircraft carriers in the ‘Albrecht’ force were ships of the Albion class – we have identified HMS Centaur as one of them. These are recently commissioned vessels, and their actions may reflect the state of their training.”
Merten nodded. “Yes – the composition of the ‘Albrecht’ group offers insight into British operational thinking; it also offers insight into the current limitations of the Royal Navy. Based upon all information we have gathered thus far we are forced to conclude that the ‘Albrecht’ group was intended to reflect a Kriegsmarine task force attempting to break out into the North Atlantic.”
Several guffaws echoed from the back of the auditorium, which were stifled quickly by a scowl from Admiral von Fischel.
“On 16 April the ‘Albrecht’ and ‘Julius’ forces exchanged air strikes – they were approximately one hundred kilometres distant at the time, and several sub-units were involved,” Merten explained. “The commander of the ‘Albrecht’ group made the tactical error of dividing his forces, detaching the bulk of his screening vessels in a vain attempt to initiate surface combat with a sub-unit of the ‘Julius’ force. The ‘Albrecht’ group was attacked while attempting to recover its aircraft and its subsequent movements indicate that the exercise umpires must have ruled that it took heavy damage.”
Vizeadmiral Ernst Lindemann, Commander, Battle Force, who had been in the plotting room of the Admiralstab at the time asked, “Do we have any information regarding the outcome of the surface engagement between the two groups?”
Gerlach answered, “We are still attempting to analyse the information obtained by observation from Wiesbaden and Kolberg, and to decrypt the wireless transmission intercepted during the whole of the exercise. The retirement of the ‘Albrecht’ group indicates that whatever the details, its presumed losses did not allow it to continue its attempt to break out.”
Vizeadmiral Werner Lindenau, Commander, Aircraft Carrier Force, the driving force behind the Kriegsmarine’s air-centric structure inquired, “Your analysis supposes the presence of three aircraft carriers yet you describe their activity as ‘tentative’. What explanation can you offer for this apparent disparity between means and results?”
Gerlach seemed prepared for the question. “The Albion class vessels have only recently entered service; it is possible, even likely, that their air groups are inexperienced. Further, our intelligence data suggests that the Royal Navy sees these vessels as primarily air defence and scouting platforms for surface units rather than striking forces in their own right. In size and employment they are not unlike our own Wallenstein and Pappenheim.”
At this point Admiral von Fischel intervened. “Gentlemen, I know that you have many questions, but I ask that you hold them until the presentation is complete, as I know that some will be answered by it.”