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Report on Naval Exercises Dec 15-23 1933 Operation Orange Thresher
To: CoS Marina Argentina, Min of Defence, CinC Infantería de Marina, CinC Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina, Admiral Inspector Training, Admiral Inspector Gunnery, Adm. of Fleet and Commanders of all combat formations
Ref: M132/Re79/33

TOP SECRET

FORCES TAKING PART (BLUE FORCES FRIENDLY RED FORCES EMEMY)
BLUE Forces
2nd Battleship Squadron PATAGONIA and PAMPAS (Almirante Peablo), 1st Cruiser Squadron VEINTICINCO DE MAYO and ALMIRANTE BROWN (Vice Almirante Dominguez), 1st Destroyer Squadron five Mendoza Class (Contra Almirante Gomez), 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron (Capitan de Navio Bahia) and submarine Salta

RED Forces
1st Battleship Squadron LIBERTAD and CAPITAN GASCÓN (Almirante Bendicto), 2nd Destroyer Squadron six 1916 Class Destroyers (Capitan de Navio Roho), 2nd Cruiser Squadron HIPOLITO BOUCHARD, ESPORA (Contra Almirante Bouchard) and 3rd Destroyer Squadron HEROINA, SARANDI and CORDOBA (Vice Almirante Higgins)

JUDGES
A team of three judges were attached to each fighting ship or one for smaller vessels. All gunfire is of course not live and damage is simulated in accordance with the judge's rules. Smoke shells, practice bombs and blanks were used.

EXERCISE AIMS
I. Red Force to simulate an attacking fleet from Eastern Atlantic. Red Force's main aim is to destroy the heavy units of Blue Force and use destroyers to dominate the coastline and stop merchant traffic.
II. Blue Force is to destroy the Red Force and conserve heavy units for further fighting, that is losses must be minimised.
III. Blue Force has shore-based seaplanes to act as reconnaissance forces in consort with light forces.
IV. To test suitability and tactical aims of submarines.

BATTLE REPORTS

I. Dec 15 Summary

Setting up of Red Force some 500 miles west of Argentina mid ocean. Blue heavy units in place cruising off Bahia Blanca by nightfall and full escorts in place by the morning of the 16th, submarine Salta began cruise at 10:20am

II. Dec 17 Reconnaissance Operations

Squadrons No 4 and No 5based at Naval Air Base Bahia Blanca equipped with eight Westland Wapiti V floatplanes and twelve Fokker T.IVa seaplanes respectively were making frequent aerial patrols. Four Wapiti floatplanes were based aboard the cruisers Veinticento de Mayo and Almirante Brown. The Fokker's flew in pairs and several times tested the flying boat homing receivers aboard the Mendoza Class ships. This allowed them to head directly to where the seaplanes had spotted a potential target and were circling until surface forces arrived.

Salta was some eighty miles west of the main Blue Force and was searching on the surface most of the day.

III. Dec 19 First Day of Battle

The Red Force under the command of Almirante Bendicto was now in formation, Libertad and Capitan Gascon in line astern steaming at 19kts roughly SSW heading towards southern Argentina. The cruisers Hipolito Bouchard and Espora under the command of Contra Almirante Bouchard were stationed either side of the battleships on the forward quarters and the 3rd Destroyer Squadron was acting as close escort. The 2nd Destroyer Squadron was some fifteen miles further west acting as the reconnaissance screen and Capitan de Navio Roho was in overall charge of the destroyer screen. He spread his ships out line abreast some six miles. It was these ships Captain de Navio Mendez saw late that afternoon.

At 15:36 lookouts on the conning tower spotted one of the destroyers some eight miles distant heading directly for them. Mendez ordered a crash dive and he stopped his engines. Now silent he waited until the destroyer passed nearby. As it thundered overhead he put his recent German practise into play. He rose to periscope depth and continued along her wake so the destroyer could not pick him up. Carefully raising his periscope he identified the destroyer as a 1916 type, they all lacked ASDIC. His First Officer asked why they did not attack, "because those are just the little fry, behind them are the battleships, steer green 106 and let's see what follows them." He surfaced and made a quick sighting report to Almirante Peablo before submerging. At 16:43 the Libertad came within 8,000 yards of the Salta and Mendez made two perfect torpedo attacks. Such attacks were filmed through the periscope but not included in the final battle tally because no weapon was fired and verifying the claim would force the sub to surface but such action was evaluated after the exercise in accordance with the objectives set out. At 17:04 the Cordoba making a regular sonar (all three 3rd DS ships have Italian sets) search picked up the Salta as Mendez was manoeuvring for an attack on the Gascon. At first the Captain was inclined to see it as a false alarm with the crew still being rather green. Then three minutes later Heroina also picked up the sub on her sonar. Vice Almirante Higgins then left the convoy at 26kts and Cordoba followed, the Italian ASW supervisors astern watched their men ready the depth charges.

By now Captain de Navio Mendez knew he had been found and his hydrophones picked up the two speeding destroyers and the sonar pings. He crash dived to 100 metres before making evasive action. It was the start of a two hour game of cat and mouse. Heroina expended twenty-four depth charges and Cordoba eighteen before Salta was declared sunk by the judges. The clicks of the firing pins were heard (the dummy DCs had no HE only ballast but the firing pins were intact) close enough and the judge aboard Salta declared the battle over and she surfaced. Although this action was unknown to the Blue Force until the end of the exercise it had some consequences. Only Sarandi was left with the battleships and it was some five hours before the other two could rejoin the main force thus leaving the force without adequate protection. Salta had proved enough intelligence for the Blue Force to close into his position.

Almirante Peablo aboard Patagonia now had a choice to make. His Staff Navigation Officer Capitan de Corbeta Calvera had plotted a rough interception course; the two fleets would meet at 02:20am. This was at full speed, Peablo could slow down and intercept after dawn but he felt that if the enemy fleet changed course he might miss them so he wasted no further time and ordered the fleet to change course and speed was set at 30kts. Patagonia and Pampas were line astern with the 1st Destroyer Squadron's five Mendoza Class destroyers in a V formation some six miles ahead. Contra Almirante Gomez was ordered to make a torpedo attack only when ordered by Peablo personally. The 1st Cruiser Squadron under Vice Almirante Dominguez detached and joined forces with the 1st Torpedo Destroyer Squadron commanded Capitan de Navio Bahia to make an attack from the north. These two formations met just after midnight and took a more northerly course as Vice Almirante Dominguez felt the Red Force might have changed direction. He failed to tell Peablo of his decision.

IV. Dec 20 The Battle

At 01:40 Vice Almirante Dominguez ordered his force to change direction further south and within six minutes they clashed with the destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron. Capitan de Navio Roho ordered his ships to attack at once the enemy force while he radioed the situation back to the main force. Almirante Bendicto had his three destroyers move ahead of the convoy with the two light cruisers to act as a light screen to defeat what he believed to be an enemy destroyer force.

The 2nd Destroyer Squadron were so spread out that no concentrated attack was made but rather a series of individual clashes. Both sides used a large amount of starshell to illuminate each others ships. Not being designed for oceanic service the Corrientes Class torpedo boats were well awash at high speed and their light armament was no match for the five 100mm guns on the 1916 Class destroyers. Three of the five boats were soon declared sunk or disabled and only the firepower of the two cruisers forced Roho to retreat and regroup to the south, one destroyer being claimed as heavily damaged. By now Veinticento de Mayo and Almirante Brown were within the range of Libertad and Gascon's 14in guns. They turned south and unleashed three full broadsides, not having any flashless cordite the rangefinders on the battleships were temporarily blinded. Roho's destroyers used their searchlights and fired nine rounds of starshell to highlight the cruisers and Vice Almirante Dominguez was soon outgunned and four hits were claimed on Almirante Brown. He radioed Peablo for help at 01:57 but Peablo did not understand the message, he thought Dominguez was some ten miles north of him, and he could see no nearby battle. He realised something was wrong and the force went to 31kts and steered towards a pink glow on the horizon. Not the sunrise but the battle now in progress.

The two surviving torpedo boats under the command of Capitan de Corbeta Jachinto made use of the dark to head towards Gascon but within 6,000 yards and ready for a torpedo attack they came under rapid fire from Cordoba's 115mm guns and soon Heroina arrived to sink the other torpedo boat. Not one torpedo was fired. Dominguez had Veinticento de Mayo sunk under him by Roho's destroyers that made a successful torpedo attack after the judges declared her immobile. Almirante Brown was also declared abandoned after six more 14in hits that would have penetrated the hull over the engine spaces. At the cost of one of Roho's destroyers the Blue Force had been annihilated by bad luck and overwhelming firepower.

Contra Almirante Bouchard now implored Almirante Bendicto to regroup and leave the area but he decided against this. He felt the enemy force was just a reconnaissance group and he continued SSW straight into the advancing Blue Force. The five 1916 Class ships formed a V ahead of Libertad and Gascon while Hipolito Bouchard and Espora sailed just aft of the destroyers to add gunfire support. The 3rd DS was detached to the starboard flank to search for any further Blue reconnaissance forces.

At 02:27, nearly on time, the two forces met. The Red Force was still reforming and changing positions and soon panic set in ahead of the battleships. Peablo turned his ships to rake the after port quarter of the Red Fleet while his destroyers detached into line abreast to await the order to attack. Patagonia fired starshell from the S1 100mm mount and this illuminated Gascon, the range was about 18,000 yards and Patagonia opened with a full broadside as she straightened on a parallel course steaming at 30kts, Pampas astern took another two minutes before she fired her guns. Gascon's turrets were trained fore and aft and it took time before she replied, already the 12in dummy rounds had straddled her and she judged to have received at least nine non critical hits. As Patagonia overtook Gascon her forward turrets trained onto Libertad. She was more ready however and her aft turrets lit up the night sky and Patagonia suffered at east two hits on the bow area before she steamed further south to widen range and cut ahead of Libertad's bows forcing her to turn to starboard as well. Soon she was the focus of the guns of both battlecruisers as Gascon's forward turrets still fired at Pampas which was judged to have lost Y turret. Overall however, the battleships had difficulty tracking the faster battlecruisers in the dark. Some thirty starshells were fired by Libertad alone.

Contra Almirante Bouchard ordered his ships to formate for a torpedo attack and at 02:41 the five destroyers headed straight into the Mendoza Class ships of Contra Almirante Gomez's force. Starshell exploded above the lead 1916 Class destroyer and Bouchard ordered his ships to come broadside on for a mass torpedo attack, already though the 130mm guns of the Mendoza's had found the mark and the sea around the two leading destroyers erupted into foam and spray. The two old light cruisers put up stiff resistance but being too slow were left behind as the battle raged further north and they attempted to torpedo Pampas but were beaten back by her secondary guns. It soon became a close-quarters battle and the Red Force launched some ten torpedoes of which three struck home on Rioja which was declared sunk. The two lead destroyers were declared heavily damaged to the point of abandoning ship and Contra Almirante Bouchard was out of the exercise. The two remaining destroyers decided to turn north and escape and three Mendoza Class ships followed leaving Contra Almirante Gomez aboard Mendoza to protect the flank of Patagonia. The two 1916 Class ships led the Mendoza's straight into the three powerful destroyers of the 3rd DS and another battle was joined which lasted another 45 minutes and resulted in no further losses for either side but the Mendoza's were now nearly out of ammunition and withdrew to the south as the Red destroyers regrouped to the north and headed back to the main force.

These sideshows had an impact on the main battle now raging. Peablo had lost his torpedo strike option now his destroyers were tied up and Bendicto had lost his counter-attack option and it was now a slugging match to the end. The two battlecruisers and the two battleships began to fight in a circle, the slower battleships making 21kts at best on the smaller inner arc and the battlecruisers at 29kts on the outer arc keeping the distance at 13,000 yards. The 14in guns were making several big hits and Pampas had both after turrets knocked out and her speed reduced by eight knots with one boiler room knocked out. Gascon had several secondary casemates knocked out but her main guns were intact. Peablo in the conning tower of Patagonia knew his ships were outgunned and he decided to withdraw to preserve his force. At 03:18 he broke off and Patagonia and Pampas withdrew to regroup with the destroyers and head further west as Bendicto followed some nine miles behind.

V. Final Actions

As the sun rose the Red Force was highlighted and in the darker west Peablo moved his ships so there courses diverged slightly. At first light he radioed to shore to send every available aircraft to attack the enemy force. His intention was not to sink the ships but break up their formation so his destroyers could get in a telling torpedo attack supported by his guns. At 10:12 the first of nine Fokker T.IVa seaplanes made their level bombing runs which scored no hits, two accidentally attacked the Blue Force. Bendicto made no course change and the ships steamed on in formation, Cordoba the best equipped AA capable ship in the fleet claimed one aircraft shot down by her 115mm guns. The gunfire was heavy but largely inaccurate from the other ships. At 10:20 Peablo steamed to intercept at 31kts. At some 35,000 yards he opened fire and covered his destroyers which made a classic torpedo attack under a smokescreen. They fired twenty-one torpedoes before breaking off and heading back toward the battlecruisers. Two hit on the Libertad forwards and she was deemed to be slowed by eight knots and A turret's magazine flooded. Bendicto ordered his destroyers to attack and his two cruisers stayed with him but the Blue Force kept out of reach and no further action was joined that day. At 16:02 Bendicto unable to shake Peablo turned east, the exercise was over.


LESSONS

I. The Commando de Aviacion Naval Argentina put up better performance but improvements are still needed. The direction finding equipment fitted to the various smaller ships works and the reconnaissance capability is very good but the ability to strike is very poor. Bombing accuracy was still poor and more training is needed. The purchase of medium bombers and torpedo bombers is advised as the main striking force leaving the less manoeuvrable seaplanes for scouting.

II. Gunnery is of a high standard aboard all vessels and all types and the fire control equipment is working well.

III. More Anti-Aircraft Escorts are needed and more ships must be fitted with the HACS Mk.10. Ships gunnery outfits must be upgraded before 1937.

IV. The Naval Staff still believes the torpedo is the main weapon to sink or severely cripple ships. The 600mm torpedo must be standardised across the fleet, more tubes must be fitted and reload capability is essential aboard destroyers. The current method of restricting a broadside to save torpedoes weakens an attack and the non-ability to reload restricts the destroyer to just a single attack. More torpedoes are needed to ensure a hit at greater distances. The Naval Staff recommends the designing of a new type of Torpedo Destroyer to overcome these difficulties.

V. As in previous exercises intercepting a force at sea without good intelligence is almost impossible unless luck and chance are positive factors. Aircraft have proved a great help and the successful use of destroyers can provide a successful screen but this does reduces the long-range capability which only aircraft can provide.

VI. The submarine has proved itself of some worth but the full potential is yet to be explored. The Salta provided excellent intelligence and proved itself as a successful reconnaissance tool. The unit was sunk by Italian equipped destroyers and while this reflects greatly on the good training provided by Italian advisers the sinking of a capital ship easily balances this out. The Salta was the only unit to sink any heavy unit during the exercises, even though not counted in the tally in a real action such a loss would have forced the RED force to turn back or change their objectives. The Naval Staff recommends increasing production from the current six boats planned to eight.

VII. The Corrientes Class torpedo boats have confirmed themselves as useless except in coastal waters. The Naval Staff recommends the procurement of a new cheap torpedo boat design.

VIII. More use of radio intelligence must be used. Transmissions must be intercepted and evaluated and if possible bearings taken of the origin of transmission. Such information could aid search and interception as well as revealing enemy strengths. More training in this area is needed.

IX. The destruction of the detached Blue Force was entirely down to poor communications and the failure of Vice Almirante Dominguez. Such conditions cannot be allowed in real warfare. All Commanding Officers must inform their superiors if undertaking improvised actions and they must seek advice before hand. The Naval Staff recommends that Vice Almirante Dominguez should not be relived of command but rather disciplinary action taken and intensive tactical training undertaken.

X. Night fighting is very difficult and training must begin to enable the fleet to fight in such actions. For an attacking force night brings excellent tactical surprise and to the defender this is deadly. Illuminating the enemy is problematic. Starshell offers a better lighting solution and behind the target can show a good silhouette or it can illuminate the attacker if not fired accurately. During the battles masses of starshell was used and this lit the whole area quite well which aided both sides. Searchlights are good for surprise pin-point illumination but they reveal the attackers position and rangefinder crews found the searchlights did not dazzle them and so this aspect is less important than previously thought. The lack of flashless cordite for the main guns on most ships is also a drawback both giving an aiming point for the enemy and disrupting the gunner's sight.

Almirante Peablo; age 44; born 1889 the youngest Admiral for many years this fine sailor graduated from the Naval Academy Class of 1910 as the best of the year, taken under the wing of Admiral Gomez-Chiladeo as his aide he learnt his trade not just from books but also at sea, shipwrecked twice and given an award of bravery in 1917 he rose to become a Capitan de Navio by 1919 and commanded the destroyer division from 1920-22 seeing action in the 1921 war, post-war he was on the Naval Committee which looked into the defeat and later chaired a series of lectures on naval tactics, by 1925 he was promoted Rear Admiral and was in charge of the War Plans division, a position he held until 1929 when he rejoined the active fleet as the 1st Cruiser Division commander, in 1930 he became Vice Admiral and in early 1931 was made responsible for fleet reconnaissance and drafted the recent Light Scout Cruiser specification and judged the final entries, now a full Admiral he will command the new fast wing of the Navy. Perhaps the most gifted tactician the Navy has he has studied all the great naval battles and leaders and has absorbed the latest in naval technology.

Vice Almirante Dominguez; age 54; born 1879, joined Navy as officer cadet and specialised in engineering, he became the chief engineer of many warships including Trinidad during his active duty until he entered the Naval Academy in 1922, passed out in 1925 as a full Captain and commanded a series of destroyers and light cruisers until made Rear Adm. in 1929 and placed in command of 1st Cruiser Division, he studied naval tactics under Peablo and in late 1930 was placed in command of Trinidad and promoted to present rank. A sound officer who is capable of planning and tactics he lacks any real fighting qualifications and has always been referred to by his crews, with affection, as the "grease monkey", he is good at getting results and efficiency, key qualities which promoted him after the effects of 1921.

Contra Almirante Gomez; age 43; born 1890, joined Navy in 1910 and became an officer cadet in 1914, graduated 1917 and joined the Cruiser force and from 1925 commanding the cruiser Nueve de Julio. He saw action in the 1921 war serving aboard La Argentina when the ship was sunk he rescued three trapped sailors below decks earning him a bravery award. In 1931 he served as a commander 3rd Destroyer Squadron as a Contra Almirante. A cruiser officer by heart he favours the gun over the torpedo but always acts with the élan of a destroyer skipper and believes in innovative action. He is a close friend of Murphy having been at College together.

Contra Almirante Bouchard; age 39, born 1896, largely a desk bound officer for most of his career he only went to sea in the aftermath of the 1921 war and served aboard the cruiser fleet , in 1928 he rose to Captain de Navio and commanded the Almirante Brown in 1930. He was promoted Contra Almirante last year after completing the tactical course at the Naval College. He has specialised in screening and reconnaissance operations and he largely masterminded the hunt for the pirate ship Intrepida.

Captain de Navio Mendez; age 31, born 1902, served on destroyers since joining the Navy in 1922, rose to command a destroyer in 1927 and in 1930 promoted to his current rank he was chosen to head the Submarine Section of the Naval College and he went aboard to Germany for specialist training. He returned in late 1932 to head the course and in April 1933 was selected to lead the Submarine Squadron. He believed strongly in the purchase and operation of submarines since his the start of his career and few in the Navy know who to use them better.

After the exercise Almirante Peablo wrote a letter to the Naval Tactics Magazine containing his tactical thoughts and recommendations about the exercise. In it he expressly asked for the Navy to build carriers rather than battleships.

"The exercise has shown the need for our patrolling forces to have their own air cover when they need it. The fleet has shore-based aircraft which can sweep an area but cannot defend the fleet from enemy bombers or fighters and such units take time to get into position, time a fleet cannot afford to lose. A force of three or four carriers would prove more worth than the expensive battlewagons proposed by the high command that will soon be obsolete. The hunt for the pirate Intrepida by surface forces without much success and Japanese carrier based aircraft which made some telling attacks allied with experience elsewhere seems to back my claims that aircraft alone are the best eyes of the fleet. Ever since the 1921 War the Navy has accepted the torpedo is the future killer of warships by directly attacking any ship's weakest point, under her waterline. Aircraft apart from destroyers are the only effective means to deliver such weapons. What can a 15in gunned battleship offer? Striking power against other battleships and cruisers but it cannot defeat enemy bombers and fighters nor can it strike over long-ranges. Neither can it be unsinkable from enemy bombs and torpedoes. It has only one task, to destroy the enemy battle fleet while the carrier can scout, defend the fleet, attack sea and land targets and be with the fleet all the time. Therefore I propose a 13,000 ton carrier armed with several 115mm DP guns and an air group of 36 aircraft (12 fighters, 12 bombers and 12 torpedo bombers). Armour would be light to cover magazines and a speed of 32kts with a 10,000nm range at 15kts. This I feel would best meet the future needs of the fleet and modernise the navy away from the obsolete battleship theory."

The battleship's most vocal defended was Almirante Bendicto who wrote a strong reply to the Naval Tactics Magazine refuting Peablo's theories.

"The fact the battleship in the recent exercise dominated the battle and inflicted heavy losses on the Blue fleet seems to prove the battleship is not dead but vital to destroy the enemy on the sea. To date no major warship has been lost to carrier based aircraft and I believe such will be the case for the next ten years. The carrier Peablo favours would be largely defenceless from enemy cruisers and would need extra escorts and such a vessel would have to be placed on the edge of the fleet to allow her to move into the wind etc. This would weaken the fleet and prove a drain on our escort resources. Even if our bombers got through and damaged enemy ships it would still fall to the battleships to sink their opponents. The Libertad could have been easily sunk by submarine as the exercise proved and therefore this class of ship seems to offer much more promise for torpedo attack than flimsy aircraft. If anything kills the battleship it will be the submarine used to such effect in Europe not more than twenty years ago. Could twenty-four strike aircraft have caused the same amount of damages as the battleships did to the Blue Fleet? I'm inclined to think not, aircraft will not be that capable for another twenty years at least. The fleet needs a modern battle fleet and I suggest a new 12in battlecruiser should be built as soon as possible before a new 15in fast battleship is built along the lines of recent design projects. The carrier programme would halt all battleship building for a decade. Such a move is unthinkable. A small 10,000 ton carrier could be built to carry a few reconnaissance aircraft and defending fighters and such a ship need not be expensive nor too big to take vital slip space for the battleship programme. Submarines too must be built in great numbers to provide a screen which will bottle the enemy fleet in harbour, this would give the strategic control to us, something the carrier cannot do."

These letters began a series of thirty-six responses from officers and cadets alike and the rift between big gun and aircraft went right the way to the Naval Staff and the Ministry of Defence. There was a debate in the Senate and the whole future of the Chief of Staff was in jeopardy while the Navy split into three camps, the Big Gun Club, the destroyer captains and the airpower club. Also the air force entered the argument claiming land-based bombers the best solution and they discouraged the navy to seek its own independent air force. Finally after much argument the Defence Minister forced the Staff make a decision&

Great stuff. The only issue I had was that I saw mention of the ocean erupting into spray, which suggests actual shells were being fired. Were rounds actually being fired???

Heh, I guess the judge got a little excited and mistook the bow spray at high speed for shells.

Of course it could have been a case of nervous battle exhaustion which has been known in entirely safe actions. An event off Alaska in 1942 springs to mind where US cruisers expeneded hundreds of rounds on a false radar echo and crews below deck thought they had been hit by shells and torpeodes. The target was an island some miles away!