Berlin, The Admiralstab, Monday, 3 May 1948
The gathering of officers convened at the direction of, and under the gaze of Generaladmiral von Fischel, the Chief of Naval Operations, to consider the results and lessons learned from the recently-concluded exercise Donnerschlag. Having called the meeting to order von Fischel turned matters over to Kapitän zur See Heinrich Bramesfeld, Director of Plans.
“Gentlemen,” Bramesfeld began. “As you know, Donnerschlag had two primary objectives. First, to gain experience in the handling of large-scale carrier task forces at sea. Second, to test the reaction of the Royal Navy to the appearance of such a significant force in the North Sea.” In the next several minutes he outlined the subsidiary objectives and goals of the exercise, which included a map exercise which postulated a war scenario in which strikes by carrier-based air power would open the Atlantic to German naval forces. Bramesfeld then concluded, “The question before us is to what degree were the primary objectives achieved? And what lessons can we draw from the exercise?”
There followed presentations by the senior commanders engaged in the exercise – Lindemann, who addressed the overall actions of Einzatzverband 58; Langsdorff, who spoke to the challenges of screening dispersed carrier groups; Ruge, who outlined the problems encountered and overcome in maintaining air searches to guard against the unexpected appearance of British warships. Other officers reported on the activities of the anti-submarine forces that opened the exercise. Admiral Lindenau addressed himself to the shore-based command-and-control aspects of Donnerschlag.
Following a mid-morning break Generaladmiral von Fischel turned to Kapitän zur See Heinrich Gerlach, Director of Naval Intelligence, to address a question that was on the mind of all present, the apparent sluggishness of the British response to Donnerschlag.
“Our intelligence assessments are not yet complete in this regard,” Gerlach began, “but we have formed several working hypotheses, which may explain what was observed.”
He went on to speak to the magnitude of the exercise, involving more than one hundred fifty vessels, and how this might have surprised the British Admiralty given the dispersal of its naval strength in home waters. “Heretofore the British maintained a relatively small force in northern waters, basing the greater portion of its strength in the southwest or on the Clyde. Thus when confronted with Einzatzverband 58 in its front yard, rather than attempting to break out into the Atlantic, the British were faced by a situation for which they were not prepared. In this sense, Donnerschlag achieved an operational surprise.”
“A second possible explanation for the apparent unwillingness of the British to respond more forcefully lies in the sphere of politics.” Gerlach went on to reveal aspects of the Foreign Ministry’s assessments of the British political scene. Despite the rhetoric of Bevan, the British Foreign Secretary – his demarche regarding the presence of German U-boats off the British coast had triggered their premature re-deployment as part of Fischadler – it seemed that the whole of the British cabinet was more pacifically inclined. “It would not be wise to put too much stock in this,” Gerlach cautioned. “But if the British Admiralty has been shackled by its political masters it may grant us greater than anticipated freedom of action in the future.”
Gerlach then touched on the Royal Navy’s own plans and how these might have impinged on its response to Donnerschlag. On 13 April the British announced that they would hold their own fleet exercises commencing soon after the planned conclusion of the German exercise. “It is possible,” Gerlach opined, “that the British chose to not upset their own plans and timetables with what could be considered a hasty response. That the British chose not to follow Einzatzverband 58 as it retired at the close of the exercise supports such an interpretation.”
“For whatever reason,” he concluded, “the cautious British response denied us the ability to fully deduce what might have happened in a true war situation. We hope to gain further knowledge of this subject but the prognosis is unclear.”
Admiral Lindenau took the opportunity to ask, “Do we know anything regarding the British exercises at this point?”
Kapitän zur See Karl-Friedrich Merten, Director of Naval Operations, rose to answer. “Herr Admiral, we know little beyond the areas announced by notices to mariners. Several vessels have been sent to observe if possible, but with the British exercises being carried out in the mid-Atlantic our ability to monitor them will be limited.”
“We are hopeful,” Gerlach added, “that our allies might also have means in the area to expand our knowledge.” He nodded in the direction of Capitaine de vaisseau Cabanier and Capitaine de fregate des Moutis, “but they too are handicapped by the British decision to carry out their exercises out of sight and away from the normal shipping lanes.”
With the conclusion of Gerlach’s presentation, Generaladmiral von Fischel announced that lunch would be served in the Officers’ Mess, and that the review would resume in the afternoon.
(The conclusions and assessments presented herein should be considered out-of-game knowledge to non-participants)