Wehrgedanken des Auslands, September 1942
In the second of a series of articles focused on the aftermath of the South China Sea War, the staff of Wehrgedanken des Auslands examines the state of the Chinese Navy eighteen months after the conclusion of hostilities.
Assessments of the state of the Chinese Navy are difficult at best, due to the paucity of published information and the rapidity in which its order of battle shifts; the latter due in no small part to the policy of the Chinese Government of purchasing on the second-hand market whatever tonnage becomes available. As misguided as the policy could seem, it has allowed China to amass a force that in numbers alone appears formidable – but the efficacy of this great mass of warships must be questioned in the light of its relatively poor showing in the recent conflict.
The Chinese Navy utilised its small force of aircraft carriers to raid a surprised Philippine fleet at Subic Bay, striking what proved – in retrospect – to be a decisive blow in ending the war between the two nations. It was less the material damage done but the psychological effect of the attack on the Philippine Government that brought about peace, but the usefulness of carrier-based air power has obviously made its case for the Chinese leadership. In the last eighteen months it has take the opportunity to purchase two units from Bharat and a third from Persia, doubling its aircraft carrier force to six vessels. Admittedly, some of these units are small and cramped, but handled boldly they could present a threat to an opponent unprepared to deal with them. The strength of China’s carrier-based air fleet has nearly doubled to more than 190 aircraft; however, its current equipment is verging on obsolescence and it not capable of meeting the latest European or American designs on equal terms.
China has availed itself of Peru’s decision to divest itself of capital units to acquire the two Atahualpa class battleships being disposed of by the South American nation. When delivered these two vessels – as obsolescent as they are – will change the balance of forces in the China Sea. Coupled with the existing Tai-pei class battlecruiser, the Chinese Navy appears to be bent on developing a battle force to complement its already expanded carrier force. This signals that China has not abandoned its expansionist tendencies that the threat it poses to European interests in the Far East will continue.
The Chinese fleet includes two vessels classed as coast defense ships – one, an ancient armoured cruiser obtained from Thailand, and a small armoured ship of South African design that is still under construction. The former is of doubtful utility and limited combat power; the second is better suited for service on China’s great rivers. This vessel, the Jiangkai, mounts only four 15cm guns, and with its slow speed would find difficulty in fending off a flotilla of modern destroyers.
The twenty-four vessels that comprise the Chinese cruiser force are impressive on paper – and individually some of the ships seem capable of matching the best of their foreign contemporaries. The Prince class large cruiser mounts six 28cm guns and with her high speed is an excellent design for commerce raiding; however the war record of the one extant vessel was unimpressive and the construction of a second ship of this class is not expected to remedy this. The majority of the cruisers operated by China are small, and the most numerous is the Whenshan class mounting but six 119mm guns in twin turrets. Despite outnumbering the opposing Philippine cruiser force few of China’s cruisers were committed to battle which suggests a lack of faith in the Chinese Admiralty in its materiel and personnel.
The Chinese navy operates some forty-one destroyers of various classes, including ships purchased in the United States, Bharat, Chile and Mexico. Those vessels constructed in China itself are workmanlike but not outstanding – the ten ships of the Maoke class constructed between 1940 and 1941 being the largest and most homogeneous class. Of South African design they are seen as rather lively vessels for typhoon-plagued Far Eastern waters. Intelligence reports hint at further Chinese acquisitions – China is seen as the likely buyer for sixteen destroyers recently declared surplus by Mexico and sold abroad, but this purchase has yet to be confirmed by either party.
The twenty-seven torpedo boats operated by the Chinese represent a far more homogeneous force than would at first appear. The ships of native design, of the Huangfen type, are seaworthy and well-armed for their size and role. The eight ships of the Slivnitsa class purchased from Bulgaria are smaller but handy in coastal waters, and would have been particularly useful had the Chinese retained control over the Spratly Islands. The eight ships of the T13 type recently disposed of by the Kriegsmarine require no further comment here. The only ‘odd-duck’ as it were is the former Persian torpedo boat Vendidad – a huge if swift vessel with a wholly inadequate armament. Compared with the other such vessels in the Chinese inventory, its acquisition can been seen only as a prestige vessel.
The fifty boats forming the Chinese submarine fleet appear formidable on paper, but are far less a threat than at first glance. The sixteen coastal submarines of the Type II, constructed between 1935 and 1937, and the four units of the Jin type are the only truly combat-worthy units in service. The range of the former limits them to coast defence now that that China has lost its advanced bases in the Spratlys, and the small number of seagoing units poses no serious threat to a force properly equipped with antisubmarine equipment. The twenty coastal submarines acquired from Italy in 1938 are barely adequate for harbour defence or training, and the usefulness of the ten boats acquired from South Africa is questionable to say the least – constructed in 1916-17 their equipment is well worn and hopelessly out of date.
China has assembled a force of escort craft that is at once interesting and confusing. The four ships of the Huangshi 400 class are combination escort/minelayers, featuring a reasonable armament. They are a type that seems well adapted to Far Eastern conditions. In contrast, the three ships of the Yamlai type lack speed and armament yet are fitted to operate seaplanes, which, it seems, the Chinese see as their principal antisubmarine weapon. The ten small frigates of the Mengqín class, which China acquired from Italy, have actually been refitted despite their age. Their new armament and antisubmarine detection equipment does make them more useful but it remains to be seen if they will be employed in the role for which they are now outfitted. China also operates six former Kriegsmarine Vorpostenboot which have not yet been refitted.
The ability of the Chinese Navy to engage in mine warfare is extremely limited. The four vessels of the Gongshu class – small destroyer-minelayers, together with the aforesaid Huangshi 400 class, are the only minelaying vessels in service, and their capacity is quite limited. Apart from the fourteen surviving Fushun class motor minesweepers, the only specialist minesweeping vessels in service are the five small sloop-minesweepers of the Shuihong class. This force is totally inadequate to patrol China’s many harbours and coastal approaches.
The Chinese Navy and its auxiliary Coast Guard together dispose a force of fifty-four coastal patrol craft of limited usefulness; while capable of controlling smuggling and perhaps preventing the landing of small raiding parties these vessels lack sufficient firepower to fight off any significant opposition. Its force of motor torpedo boats – of which at least thirty-nine units have been identified – is more combat-worthy and could effectively interdict any force foolhardy enough to attempt a small-scale landing on the portion of China’s coast they can defend.
The growth of China’s amphibious forces in the last several years is perhaps the most worrying element of its drive for naval power. From small beginnings China has designed and built two classes of amphibious transports – one, the APD type, is capable of carrying and landing a company-sized raiding force; the Chu class, of which two are under construction at the present time, is capable of landing a battalion-sized force. Coupled with the large number of smaller barges that China has constructed, this force might be capable of carrying out a landing on undefended beaches in the Philippines as a harbinger of stronger forces conveyed by conventional transports.
China has built up a significant force of aviation support ships – three very large and five smaller seaplane and flying boat tenders. The newly constructed Shanton and refitted Palk Bay have extensive facilities to support squadrons of aircraft in forward locations, while the smaller ships are quite useful in allowing the Chinese Navy base its naval air forces at convenient locations along its coast. While the loss of the Spratly Islands may have reduced the immediate usefulness of this force, its continued expansions suggests that China has not turned its back on the potential reconnaissance and strike capabilities its seaplane force confers.
The Chinese Navy has a surprisingly large logistics force, counting no fewer than sixteen vessels classified as ‘supply ships’. This transport force suggests the desire of China to maintain the capability of transporting a large force of troops and materiel on short notice, though it would rely upon the use of port facilities at its destination. Many of these vessels have been employed in the past in the build up of its forces in the Spratlys, and subsequently in the withdrawal of Chinese forces thence. The tanker force is also larger than what might be expected for a fleet which habitually operates close to home. Coupled with the development of service forces it suggests that China desires to possess the capability of projecting fleet forces over considerable distances, though it showed no inclination to use such in the recent conflict.
Despite the apparent lack of purpose in the Chinese Navy’s procurement – three main things stand out: its enlargement of its aircraft carrier force; the creation of a battle force; and the continued expansion of its amphibious capability. By forsaking orderly construction China has been able to greatly expand the size of its striking forces in a very short period of time; while inadequate to face a major European opponent in open battle, it is clear that China’s leaders see these vessels as viable in the context of its likely Asian opponent – the Philippines. Backed by a cruiser and destroyer force of considerable size if of mixed qualities, the Chinese Navy could pose a formidable threat if treated in a cavalier manner. It remains to be seen whether the Chinese Navy will seek a second confrontation with the Philippines, where it might obtain success, or will find itself thrown into combat with a superior opponent due to a misstep by the Chinese leadership.
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Quoted
Originally posted by BruceDuncan
Saturday, June 1st 2024, 12:29pm
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